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Abstract 
This thesis challenges the widely accepted discourse of post-truth politics, which finds 
support in what is in this thesis referred to as ‘antinomy hypothesis’ – the belief that 
politics and truth are opposites and external to one another, where one exists the other 
disappear; truth is abstract and absolute, while politics is a theatre of appearances with 
no room for truth. In contrast, this thesis explores the conditions of possibility for think-
ing that we inhabit a world of post-truth politics, by proposing the concept of the 
‘politics of truth’ – the struggle at the most general level of society where the true is 
separated from the false and where what gets to count as truth and reality is decided. If 
truth only has value in so far as it serves life then the central problem in the politics of 
truth, the thesis argues, is to establishes the socio-political limits of thought: how and by 
what practices is it possible for thought to test its own truth in politics? It is by erecting 
the epistemological space that sets out possible answers to this question that thought 
became the tyrant of truth, which today has taken form of hyper-real politics of truth. 
This thesis thus asks the genealogical question: what will or wills have shaped the 
politics of truth, so that it today has become hyper-real? To answer this question the 
thesis develops a theory of ‘traditions of thought’ based on the French school of Histor-
ical Epistemology. The rest of the thesis explores, in a series of chronological chapters 
spanning from Archaic Greece until today, how the politics of truth has been problema-
tized in thought through the concepts of parrhēsia, exhortation, public critique, and 
hyper-real politics. In hyper-real politics of truth where the real is in the process of 
being replaced by its copy, there is no space for the difference of thought, only the 
positive mode of thought that affirms and produces more truth. 
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Introduction: The Antinomy Hypothesis 
and the Politics of Truth 
*   *   * 
[1] This is a thesis about the politics of truth – that struggle, at the most general level of 
any society, where the true is separated from the false, where what gets to count as truth 
and reality is decided; or rather in the light of the present, it is about the emerging hy-
per-real politics of truth and what this means for the practice of truth-telling (relative to 
the relationship between truth and politics). What follows is (I) a clarification of how 
this study is situated in the present in opposition to what I term the ‘antinomy hypothe-
sis’. Then follows (II) an outline of the concept of the politics of truth, drawing 
extensively on Nietzsche, determining it as the problem of placing a socio-political limit 
on thought. Lastly (III), after uncovering how the antinomy hypothesis is implicated in 
what it purports to critique, a sketch of the argument made in the thesis is presented – 
specifically how the thesis traces the formation of historical social forces that, through 
their determination of epistemological spaces, have constituted the different socio-
political limitations of thought. 
I 
[2] In certain parts of the world, contemporary political discourse is plagued by a com-
plete disregard for truth and truth-telling. We are told the post-factual society is upon 
us: post-truth politics that emphasise emotions over evidence have hijacked the institu-
tion of democracy; the public sphere is said to be swamped with alternative facts 
instigated by ‘bullshit artists’ who display a complete cynicism towards truth and reali-
ty; and we are also told that thanks to the relentless critiques of rigorous scientific facts 
by post-modernists in our universities, conspiracy theories have become mainstream in 
the realm of politics. 
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[3] An imagined Golden Age legitimizes the current discourse of a time before and after 
the crisis of post-truth politics. It is a discourse that is easily defended, because it is 
anchored in series of value commitments that find support in three related instances of 
western civilization, which crucially provide strategies for confronting post-factual 
society. Principally, this genuine sense of something being lost, or at least denied its 
rightful place, emanates from a sense of the hard fought struggle of the scientific 
worldview against ignorance and superstition. All adherences to a post-factual society 
are regarded as dangerous because they eclipse the scientific worldview, which we are 
told emancipated us from millennia of mysticism and barbarism. We are only offered 
simple choices; the truths discerned by science are good because they rest on impartiali-
ty, on the collection of and respect for evidence and the value of critical scholarship and 
clear thinking. The scientific worldview firmly links the progress of man to the progress 
of science – it civilizes, enlightens, and after having accumulated knowledge in a stead-
fast stream, it provides us with the tools for addressing our common challenges. Truth is 
discovered by science, common sense and scientific realism hold it in place and guaran-
tee it. And by now, science has rightfully established itself as the only way to truly 
know reality, legitimated by scientific method and standards of evidence, it has been the 
function of the scientific expert to delineate a worldview that overrules all others. Post-
factual politics is a catastrophe for the scientific community; in our darkest imagination, 
it is only a question of time before scientists will be rounded up and disposed of in the 
most gruesome fashion. 
 Likewise, after the fall of the Berlin Wall it became clear for all to see that 
liberal democracy had triumphed. History had shown us that it was the only form of 
politics where truth and truthfulness had at least a chance to flourish, which is why we 
commonly hold that democracy is the least worst form of government; all other forms 
of government, having no concern for truth and truthfulness, rule through the use of 
force and lies which it effectively deploys before its citizens. That at least has been the 
historical rule. Truthfulness and truth-telling are the central democratic values. Democ-
racy implies respect for truth; one must adopt a stance of accuracy and sincerity – to do 
the best you can to acquire true beliefs and to always reveal what you believe.  It is 
these virtues of truthfulness that are in jeopardy with the advent of post-factual society 
and the increasing belief in conspiracy theories. The association of liberal democracy 
and truthfulness is an easy one to make, as the arrival of post-truth politics coincides 
with a new rise of populism – a political movement that has only ever appealed to the 
Tyrants of Truth 
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emotions. Hence, with the reappearance of the ancient figure of the demagogue (who 
now thrives in the technological infrastructure that connects our political reality), truth-
fulness becomes the highest duty: the spread of mis-information and untruthfulness 
should be answered with empowerment and emancipation of the individual who needs 
to be provided with correct information, as true democracy consists in everyone having 
an informed vote. 
 This story would, however, not be complete unless we touch on its last compo-
nent: the existence of factual reality. There is an inherent order to the world, we are told, 
which is perceivable as states of facts. Even so, the discourse of post-truth politics owes 
in large part its legitimacy to centuries of struggle against the oppressive forces of 
politics. The relationship between truth and politics has always been in favour of the 
latter – the tyrant would execute the one who dares speak against him; public opinion 
would always silence discourse, which was not in its favour. The space for true-
discourse in politics has always been minimal, yet it has never been possible for the 
powers that be to annihilate it completely. This is because of the fabric of truth itself. In 
the last instance we could always count on the certainty that everything answers to the 
stubbornness of factual reality. As the last refuge for the lovers of truth, factual reality 
has always been resilient to the exercise of power; even the most recent political move-
ment of post-modernism and cultural relativism, fortunately exposed as the sophistry 
that it was, failed to dismantle it completely. It is therefore of little surprise that, once 
again, it is from here that the great offensive against the post-factual society is launched, 
with the last weapon left in our arsenal: facts. With them, ‘alternatives’ can be rejected 
as the fabrications that they are, incorrect and deceitful statements exposed. All we 
need, a miracle cure if there ever was one, is more facts, more fact-checking of political 
pundits, and more dissemination of factual information to the larger public. Education 
about, in, and for factual reality is what is needed to overcome the post-factual society. 
 
[4] This post-factual depiction of the present state of politics is not complete without 
historical support. In fact, it has been such a common theme that the history of political 
thought contains an ancient story about the relationship between truth and power that 
supports this description. This story, which is no doubt associable with Platonism and 
has found a manifestation in every age of the Western tradition of thought ever since, I 
shall here refer to as the antinomy hypothesis: thesis (a), truth is abstract and absolute; 
antithesis (b), there is no such thing as truth in politics, the proper realm of men. Writ-
ten in parallel they look like this: 
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a. Truth has an abstract and abso-
lute value. Since Plato we have known 
that truth shines bright; detached from 
the fluctuating affairs of politics, it per-
sists in another world (of ideas) – where 
only in rare moments in time, men of 
great intellect that are gazing from their 
ivory towers are able to reach out and 
grasp it; bring it back down and confront 
the rest with what they have found (that 
is, if they do not keep it for themselves in 
silence; what compels them?). This is 
what could be called an ontologic con-
ception or ascetic idea of truth: first, 
when we deal with truth we are dealing 
with identity and form, truth is what is (it 
is being, it is natural); second, the philo-
sophical tradition holds that thought has 
an unbreakable bond with truth - a 
thought or belief is true if it corresponds 
to an external reality (only through logic 
is thought in agreement with the world, 
and truth then becomes a question of 
applying the correct method); and third, 
because truth is a common good, it could 
never hurt anyone (more than they de-
serve) and can therefore be pursued 
without interest.1 From Plato, over Kant, 
to Heidegger, there has been a settled 
relationship between truth and freedom: 
granting truth freedom will make it 
b. There is no truth in politics, the 
proper realm of men. The political is that 
unavoidable domain of existence, which 
all others must submit to as a law of 
nature. It is a theatre of appearances. If 
the history of humankind has taught us 
one thing, it is that in politics there is no 
room for truth and truthfulness; at best 
the man who dares speak the truth can 
hope for laughter, at worst for slaughter. 
As a martyr of truth, his sacrifice will 
testify to his truthfulness. All the more 
likely in the relativism that governs the 
relations between men; he will be met 
with apathy. This is because politics is 
about power, and power has no use for 
truth. From the point of view of politics, 
our hopes for truth in the political realm 
are hopeless, as convention has it that 
“truth is the first casualty of war.” And 
by the implication of the inversion of 
Clausewitz’s famous dictum – war is the 
continuation of politics by other means – 
we could just as well say that truth is the 
first casualty of politics. Rather than 
truth, the realm of politics is one of 
dishonesty and flattery. In the struggle of 
politics, truth is powerless; it has no sting 
and can be written of as just another 
opinion. Indeed, truthfulness is not 
counted among the political virtues by 
                                                
1 Barry, Allan. Truth in Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 1995) 
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appear. From this point of view, the 
prime directive in politics is to speak 
truth to power: “who ever knew truth put 
to the worse, in a free and open encoun-
ter?”2 The dictum corresponds with the 
Baconian motto, also expressed in the 
Enlightenment, that ‘knowledge is pow-
er’ – with truth and knowledge in our 
hands, we can confront power and hope 
to prevail. The pen is mightier than the 
sword, we insist; and by the means of the 
pen, truth will triumph over power. But 
we also know that in that act, truth has a 
despotic character in the realm of politics 
– in a realm where everything could be 
different, it will always remain the same. 
Carrying an element of coercion, all men 
of power are afraid of it – there is no 
way, no matter how powerful, they 
would be able to change its stubborn 
nature, which is why it takes courage to 
speak the truth. ‘The truth will out’ we 
persistently uphold, believing that one 
day justice and freedom will prevail over 
injustice and tyranny. The truth is out 
there, not up for interpretation or trick-
ery, it robs men of their freedom, staring 
them blatantly in the face – there is no 
way they can resist. No one has insisted 
more on this than the Marxists; yet in 
their historical teleology, there comes a 
day where the need to ‘speak truth to 
anyone. Power politics and realpolitik 
have never been concerned with truth, 
but rather with deception, ploys, and lies 
that all have proven more effective in 
making things happen. Power is about 
making things happen, “Ultima ratio” as 
it was written across the cannons of the 
French kings; balls of fire and brute force 
is the currency of politics, not fragile 
notions of truth. Thus, a great many 
theories of politics, either explicitly or 
implicitly, justify and regard lying as a 
necessary tool. Politics in its very nature 
has only disregard for truth. In the realm 
of international politics, the highest 
ethics law is the survival of the commu-
nity; the statesman cannot say, “Let truth 
be done, even if the world would perish.” 
Survival of the state and the security of 
its people always come before any con-
cern for truth. 
 
                                                
2 Milton, John. Areopagitica and Other Writings (Penguin Books, 2014), p. 35 
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power’ suspiciously ends. 
No doubt the picture that has just been drawn is a caricature, but being a common place, 
we could say a doxa, this does not necessarily constitute a problem. It is no contradic-
tion in our everyday lives that power at one moment can squander truth and at the next, 
truth can triumph over power. It is nevertheless at this juncture that our inquiry of truth-
telling starts with this antinomy hypothesis as the epistemological obstacle because, 
taken together, these two common sensual propositions amount to a paradox: how can 
truth both be completely powerless and at the same time all-powerful? How is there no 
truth to the exercise of power – does not every act of power contribute to that which is? 
What is characteristic about both statements is that they appear to be adhering to the 
view that truth and power stand in opposition to one another: truth is a casualty of war, 
there is no room for it in politics; at the same time, truth is spoken to power from a 
place where it carries an authority that power will never be able to bend or destroy – it 
shatters the very hold over man that power had established. 
 
[5] Three instances of doubt follow from such a paradox: is the post-factual society 
really an established historical fact, is it really true that facts no longer play any role in 
our society? Is the relation between truth and politics really one of antinomy, or is the 
relation between them more complex? And finally, is there a historical rupture between 
on the one hand a ‘factual’ society and on the other a post-factual society, or is the 
critical discourse of post-truth politics not entirely engulfed in what it criticises? Yet for 
all this it has not been considered how the ascetic ideal of truth and the political rancour 
against untruthfulness, the increase in lying and popularity of conspiracy theories, the 
annunciation of a state of crisis and urgency, the mistrust of politicians and the deficien-
cies of liberal democracy, and the faith in and denunciation of the scientific worldview 
and the factual reality which it discovers, all refer back to a complex of problems that 
has remained out of sight for the greater part of the debate: namely that of the problem 
of the politics of truth as it is and has been constituted within the epistemological spaces 
of our thought. The question of the relationship between truth and politics is in the last 
instance a question of the politics of truth. Understood as such, the discourse on post-
truth politics is an engagement in the politics of truth: what are the social forces that call 
forth such thoughts about and judgements of the present? 
 Thus, in contrast to these predominant conceptualizations, I would like to con-
sider, through a social analysis, how such a proclamation of a ‘crisis’ of post-truth 
Tyrants of Truth 
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politics is rather a manifestation of a crisis in thought emerging from the realization of 
the paradoxical synthesis inherent in the antinomy hypothesis. Is there rather not some-
thing erroneous in our understating of our collective social practices concerning the 
relationship between truth and politics? We should therefore admit that the emergence 
of post-factual society is not just a question of the denial of scientific facts. Neither is it 
merely a general increase of lying in politics; nor should we think of it as the rejection 
of factual reality, but as a crisis in thought – there are forces, none the least social forc-
es, which have taken hold of thought and accordingly we should ask: How did it 
become possible to think that we live in a post-factual society? How did it become 
possible to think of the politics as a realm of human thought and action where the very 
possibility of truth has become unthinkable? The question is therefore not, why is there 
no longer room for truth in politics? But rather, why do we think, with the utmost surety 
and conviction, let alone condemnation against anyone who would dare state something 
otherwise, that there no longer is any truth in politics? 
II 
[6] Any thesis on truth quickly runs into the sterile choice between ascribing an absolute 
value to truth (believing that it guarantees its own value) on the one hand and rejecting 
the value of truth (it is all just an ‘illusion’) on the other, neither of which seems an 
adequate choice if we are to successfully pose the problem of the politics of truth.3 
Rather, according to Nietzsche it is a question of having an unpretentious attitude to-
wards the natural world and towards truth – a warning against the demand and 
arrogance of thinking that human beings have access to some truth that stands behind all 
things “[as] if there were a ‘truth’ which could be approached somehow–.”4 To pose the 
problem of the politics of truth is therefore not to propose a (metaphysical) theory of 
truth, but to admit that it is necessary to suspend the question of truth in order to get 
                                                
3 This is the common trope that we find for example in Bernard Williams’ unhelpful division between the 
adherents of “common sense” (analytical philosophers) and “deniers” (postmodern philosophers) that was 
established in order to rephrase the question of the value of truth as a shorthand for what he calls the 
“virtues of truth” (sincerity and accuracy). He can thus maintain that truth really does exist (be it so even 
if it only has a moral value), but it also means that the question of a politics of truth remains unasked. 
Williams, Bernard. Truth and Truthfulness: an essay in genealogy (Princeton University Press, 2002), 
especially pp. 206-232. 
4 Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Will to Power, translated by R. Kevin Hill and Michael A. Scarpitti (Penguin 
Books, 2017) §451, p. 268 
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behind it.5 To ask the question of the politics of truth is to start with the question of the 
value of truth: Who is seeking truth? Who wills truth? What is the value of the will to 
truth Nietzsche asks: “Granted we want truth, why not rather untruth? And uncertainty? 
Even ignorance? – The problem of the value of truth steeped before us – or was it we 
who stepped before this problem? Which of us is the Oedipus here? Which of us 
sphinx?”6 By posing these questions of the value of truth, according to Nietzsche, we 
move to conceive of truth in an extra-moral sense that is beyond good and evil.7 
 That is the point of Nietzsche’s famous deflationary remark about knowledge in 
On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense: “In some remote corner of the universe 
poured out into the countless flickering solar systems there was once a star on which 
some clear animals invented knowledge. It was the most arrogant and most untruthful 
minute of ‘world history’; but still only a minute. When nature had drawn a few breaths 
the star solidified and the clever animals died.”8 He is astonished by the arrogance of 
knowledge and its ability, through deceiving the eyes and senses, to convince men that 
it alone is the ultimate judge of life and its value. Knowledge is opposed to life; it at-
tempts to fix its more violent and unwanted tendencies. According to Nietzsche, 
knowledge is an illusion that the weak happily buy into because of their lack of “horns 
and sharp predator teeth” to fight back with. It has been by the powers of dissimulation, 
by “deception, flattery, lying and cheating, backbiting, posturing, living in borrowed 
splendour, wearing a mask, hiding behind convention, play-acting in front of other and 
oneself” that they have survived, which makes it a mystery how they ever acquired a 
                                                
5 It is for this reason that I should like to leave aside Hannah Arendt or Ellis Sandoz, who both in one way 
or the other subscribe to parts, if not all, of the antinomy hypothesis. Arendt, Hannah. ‘Truth and Politics’ 
in Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought (Penguin Books, 2006) pp. 223-259; 
and Sandoz, Ellis. The Politics of Truth and Other Untimely Essays: The Crisis of Civic Consciousness 
(Columbia: University of Missouri, 1999). See also: Detmer, David. Challenging Postmodern Philosophy 
and the Politics of Truth (Humanity Books, 2003); and Man Ling Lee, Theresa. Politics and Truth: 
Political Theory and the Postmodernist Challenge (Suny Press, 1997). A more promising possibility 
would be C. Wight Mills, whose advantage is that he provides the politics of truth with no explicit con-
tents other than it being about maintaining an adequate definition of reality – but “adequacy” in terms of 
what? Mills, C. Wright. The Politics of Truth: Selected Writings of C. Wright Mills, edited by John 
Summers (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 611 
6 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil, translated by R. J. Hollingdale (Penguin Books, 2003), I 
§1, p. 33; but see also: Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morals, translated by and edited by 
Keith ansell-Pearson (Cambridge University Press, 2007) III §24, p. 113 
7 In his book on Nietzsche, Deleuze notes how this is the main difference between him and Kant; he was 
willing to pose the problem of critique in terms of values, that is: “The problem of critique is that of the 
value of values, of the evaluation from which their value arises, thus the problem of their creation.” It is 
from this extra-moral stance that Nietzsche achieves a “total critique.” Deleuze, Gilles. Nietzsche and 
Philosophy, translated by Hugh Tomlinson (London: Bloomsbury, 2006), p. 1 
8 Nietzsche, Friedrich. ‘On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense’, in Writings from the Early Note-
books, edited by Raymond Geuss and Alexander Nehamas (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 253 
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desire for truth.9 If truth is to have any value, Nietzsche maintains, it is in relation to 
life; truth is therefore in the service of life, not the other way around.10 
 
[7] Where then, does the drive for truth come from? According to Nietzsche, it stems 
from the hostility and uncertainty of human life in the real world: “Since man, out of 
necessity as well as boredom,” he tells us, “wants to live in a society or herd, he needs a 
peace settlement and he tries to make at last the most brutal bellum omnium contra 
omnes vanish from his world. This peace settlement entails something that looks like 
the first step towards attaining that mysterious drive for truth. At this point what is 
henceforth to be called ‘truth’ is fixed, i.e. a universally valid and biding designation of 
things is invented and the legislation of language supplies the first laws of truth.”11 With 
truth, we stand on moral ground and the means of production are linguistic (it is sounds, 
words, metaphors, and concepts; in short, it is discourse that orders things). An idea that 
is echoed by Foucault when he states that “[each] society has its regime of truth, its 
‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes 
function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and 
false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures 
accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with 
saying what counts as true.”12 The politics of truth constitutes a meta-political problem: 
by being the problem of which discourses are legitimate, the practices necessary to 
obtain the truth, and identifying those individuals who are its judges, truth becomes the 
political master concept that determines the high and the low, the base and the noble. To 
engage in this general politics of truth is to do something with what one is made into 
within the order of discourse by questioning these prevailing truths; as such truth does 
not come from some innate freedom, but is closely related to on the one hand a set of 
rules (provided by the structures of power) and on the other the stylization of acts 
(which are an extension of this prior set of rules).13 
                                                
9 Ibid., p. 254 
10 By equating truth and life Nietzsche avoids relativism, Strong points out: “noting a formal and ultimate 
co-terminism of life and truth. A form of life is a truth. Thus change in form of life will be change in truth 
and vice versa. There is not in Nietzsche the facile relativism which assumes that one can change one’s 
notion of truth at will, ‘because’ it is all ‘illusion’.” Strong, Tracy B. Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics 
of Transfiguration (California University Press, 1988), p. 45 
11 Nietzsche, ‘Truth and Lie’, p. 254-5 
12 Foucault, Michel. ‘Truth and Power’ in in The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault’s 
Thought, edited by Paul Rabinow (Penguin Books, 1991), p. 73 
13 Foucault, Michel. The Politics of Truth, ed. Sylvère Lotringer, trans. Lisa Hochroth and Catherine 
Porter (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 1978/2007), p. 32 
The Antinomy Hypothesis and the Politics of Truth 
 15 
 Thus, the first step towards a clearer understanding of our present predicament 
would be to admit that truth always has been the political battle-concept par excellence; 
it has always been a politically loaded concept, always at the very centre of the prob-
lems of politics. This is not to say that politics is antithetical to truth, but rather that 
truth is what is ultimately at stake in politics. In other words, politics is saturated with 
convictions of truth. Without the concept of truth other concepts such as justice, liberty, 
equality, authority, or sovereignty would have little value: how is justice to be justice 
without access to truth, how would we define liberty or equality without truth, how fast 
would both authority and sovereignty vanish by a single utterance of truth. Only then 
can we see that questions of epistemology and the nature of truth are political question. 
It is this same moral conviction behind the will to truth, which is at play throughout 
politics: to state the truth is about putting the other in the wrong so as to claim the truth 
for oneself. Rightfully then, we should note with suspicion how the evocation of post-
truth politics is always done as an accusation against another party, never as a general 
state of affairs in which all are equally implicated: with what conviction does one side 
claim truth for itself, how do they access such a truth, and what are their motives for 
doing so? It is not at all surprising that both the extreme right and the extreme left have 
claimed the moral high ground in the discourse of post-truth politics. What are we to do 
in the face of such certainty on both sides, when partisanship seems a wholly un-
reflexive and prejudicial position? The only reasonable way forward is to approach the 
present in terms of a politics of truth that is shared by all. 
 
[8] Meanwhile, two inherent dangers present themselves in the question of the value of 
truth: relativism and conviction. There is on the one hand the danger of ‘excessive 
distrust’ in the notion of truth and on the other that of ‘excessive trust’ in our capacity 
for truth. Relativism is commonly invoked by the discourse of post-truth politics as the 
prime evil of our time, but at the same time this condemnation unwillingly displays a 
certain prejudice towards truth itself – a kind of blind and immature belief in the perma-
nence of reality entertained by a realist conviction that is very dominant in our present. 
14 Yet, it is neither lie nor error that brings truth in danger; both owe their existence to 
it. While a lie is an outward expression of falsehood one inwardly knows to be false, a 
                                                
14 The existence of an ‘academic war on truth’ and the spread of ‘fanciful nonsense’, we are told by 
critics, have now taken hold and possessed –like some ritualistically summoned spectre of postmodern-
ism that for decades plagued the academy– the whole of society, stirring up old enmities from the culture 
wars questioning once again hard fought for science facts. There is no appreciation of the irony with 
which the conditions of a society can be excavated; and the surety with which the ‘sceptic’ claims to 
know the truth is preposterous (as if there existed such a grand conspiracy of the post-moderns!).  
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conviction on the other hand is an inward certainty one has attained the truth. Accord-
ingly, it gives way to an arrogance that entangles one in a web of delusion and 
falsehood and in the illusion that one is already in the true. Nietzsche explicitly warns 
that the conviction that one possesses the “‘Truth’ is […] more disastrous than error and 
ignorance, because it stifles the energies with which we strive for enlightenment and 
knowledge. The tendency to idleness now sides with ‘truth’ (‘thinking is hardship and 
misery!’), likewise a sense of order and regularity, the joy of possession, the pride of 
wisdom – in a word, vanity; it is easier to obey than to examine…”15 The proclamation 
of truth is therefore more dangerous than lie and error – within this conviction exists a 
blatant refusal to think. What, then, about relativism? Relativism is a conviction that no 
epoch in human history ever had: ‘we do not have the truth,’ … even the sceptics 
thought themselves to be in the possession of the truth. The danger of relativism is 
therefore largely inflated. Only too often has a particular will-to-truth invoked the spec-
tre of relativism to scare people away from others ways of thinking. There is a certain 
provincialism against the positions of relativism in that it is always assumed that it 
represents the devil to ones saviour – its mirror image: there is truth, there is no truth.16 
Relativism seems all the more dangerous for the one who possesses the conviction of 
truth – it is presented as an ultimate choice between order and chaos. It is thus not worth 
talking about proclamations of a nihilistic and self-contradictory relativism (does any-
one really hold them?), but only about different kinds of conditional relativism (how do 
we deal with the necessary relativism of the world?). Whichever side one comes down 
on, conditional relativism is an unavoidable fact; conviction is not. The danger of con-
viction is that the concept of truth is frozen: truth ceases to be between things, and 
instead becomes a thing – an object, predetermined and immobile by a resilient will to 
truth. 
 
[9] In contrast to the philosophical tradition and the antinomy hypothesis, which holds 
that truth is the property of thought by right, qua its love for truth and application cor-
rect method, Nietzsche sees thought as allied with life and in opposition to knowledge 
and truth.17 On the basis of the will to power, thought should be understood as a particu-
                                                
15 Nietzsche, Will to Power, §452, p. 269 
16 Geertz, Clifford. ‘Distinguished Lecture: Anti Anti-Relativism’, American Anthropologist 86 (2) 
(1985) pp. 263-278 
17 Deleuze explains, “Life goes beyond the limits that knowledge fixes for it, but thought goes beyond the 
limits that life fixes for it. Thought ceases to be ratio, life ceases to be a reaction. The thinker thus ex-
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lar kind of force-field, one which we all participate in shaping. Given the social demand 
for truth, this field splits in two: thought, the affirmative forces of creation, discovery, 
and invention, and the un-thought, the more reactive forces of what we silently think 
(for Nietzsche, knowledge) setting truth apart from un-truth. It is here, in the tension 
between thought and truth that the politics of truth forms a matrix of: (1) truth, (2) un-
thought, (3) thought, and (4) un-truth.  
 1. Truth. “What then is truth?” asks Nietzsche, “A mobile army of meta-
phors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms, in short, a sum of human relations which have 
been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, decorated and which, after 
lengthy use, seem firm, canonical and binding to people: truths are illusions that are no 
longer remembered as being illusions, metaphors that have become worn and stripped 
of their sensuous force, coins that have lost their design and are now considered only as 
metal and no longer as coins.”18 Truth is a topological concept, which means at least 
two things: truth is not something discovered, but is created; and its topology is drawn 
up by thought within an epistemological space. Truth, says Nietzsche in the Will to 
Power, “is not something which exists and which has to be found and discovered – it is 
something which has to be created and which gives its name to a process or, better still, 
to the will to subdue, which in itself has no purpose; to introduce truth is a processus in 
infinitum, an active determining, not a process of becoming conscious of something 
[that] would be ‘in itself’ fixed and determined. It is merely a word for the ‘will to 
power’.”19 It is the constellation of social forces that determines what counts as true and 
what counts as false. Truth is a trick that thought plays on itself, similar to discovering 
again what it once hid behind a bush: truthfulness is to be in agreement with the un-
thought (the epistemological space as established by the social pact).  
 2. un-thought. Because knowledge comes prior to truth, the production of 
truth takes place within an epistemological space, which constitutes its own verisimili-
tude. I shall develop this argument further in the first chapter Traditions of Thought, but 
for now it is necessary to point out that such epistemological spaces are logically consti-
tuted – that is, they follow a set of rules that display an inherent logic. Additionally, 
such spaces are more or less stable in relation to social practices because it is social 
forces that delineate them. In a Nietzschean sense there is will behind them. As such, 
any particular logic can either be laid out clearly in conscious thought (i.e. by philoso-
                                                                                                                                          
presses the noble affinity of thought and life: life making thought active, thought making life affirma-
tive.” Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 95 
18 Nietzsche, ‘On Truth and Lie’, p. 257 
19 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §552, p. 320 
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phers, which Nietzsche talks about as lawgivers) or it can be discovered by social analy-
sis.20 Thus, an epistemological space has the status of a social fact and is wholly 
impartial to individual experience of it. Striking a more anthropological note, we can 
say that a society’s epistemological space constitutes what Mauss called a “total social 
phenomena” – that is, the focal point of all ordinary social phenomena (religious, juridi-
cal, or moral) without which the fabric of a society would not cohere.21 This would 
account for the relative stability of societies when it is functioning and the catastrophic 
outcomes when it does not. Understood as such, the politics of truth is about the renew-
al and maintenance of a society’s epistemological space. 
 3. Thought. Thought is both subject and (forgotten) master of knowledge. 
As noted above, the relationship between truth and thought is not a one-to-one relation-
ship; it is tied to life. It is therefore not static (with a monolithic truth that thought 
through hard work discovers), but dynamic: thought advances new truths that then later 
come into existence. Truth is the event where thought is realized, when that which once 
was denounced as untruth is accepted as truth – when fiction becomes reality. It is in 
thought’s relation to truth that truth is the genesis of something real; acquiring its reality 
in realisation, which, if applied in a technical sense is the realisation of (a different) 
thought that counts. Here genesis as opposed to origin is thus supposed to convene 
something of a creative force: “thought is creation, not will to truth.”22 With Nietzsche 
we can therefore no longer talk about truth being constituted along the binary of truth-
falsity. Rather, it is thought that opens up space, makes things appear, fixes the senses – 
and makes out of the chaos that is this world, an order that is just enough to make us 
think that there is a reason for it all (a truth). Because of this gap, thought has a history 
of adjustment: one in which it stands in opposition to problems. This is why, in its 
commitment to untruth, thought does not result in relativism: to interpret the world is to 
judge it and to attach values to it – in so far as we think of schemes of interpretations we 
can allow for interpretations to result in different experiences of being, but to prescribe 
to relativism as the master interpretation seems altogether impossible for the individual, 
and yet is a fundamental demand for thought. The individual nature of thought is ulti-
mately a living paradox to his present; thought is allied with untimeliness. 
                                                
20 “Actual philosophers, however, are commanders and law-givers: […] Their ‘knowing’ is creating, 
their creating is law-giving, their will to truth is – will to power.” Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 
§211, p. 142-3 
21 Mauss, Marcel. The Gift: The form and reason for exchange in archaic societies, translated by W. D. 
Halls (London: W. W. Norton, 2000), p. 3 
22 Will to truth being the insistence on an onto-logic conception of truth. Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, 
Félix. What is Philosophy? (London: Verso, 1994), p. 54 
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 4.  un-truth. In this sense, thought is that which is not yet true, the un-true. It 
comes as no surprise when Nietzsche states: “There would be nothing that could be 
called knowledge, if thought did not first reconstruct the world as self-identical ‘things’. 
Only through thought is untruth possible.”23 This last part is particularly important, 
because it firmly establishes that there is an opposition between on the one hand truth 
and the un-thought (knowledge) and thought and untruth on the other. Thought is for 
the “creative spirit” and the “liberated intellect” occupied with fictions and art. Thus, if 
truth only has value in relation to life and one of the highest activities of life is the 
expression of thought, then the duty to truth is really a struggle for the right to untruth, 
that which is not yet true. In the Anti-Christ he writes: 
 
Truth has had to be fought for every step of the way, almost everything else dear to our 
hearts, on which our love and our trust in life depends, has had to be sacrificed to it. 
Greatness of soul is needed for it: the service of truth is the hardest service. – For what 
does it mean to be honest in intellectual things? That one is stern towards one’s heart, that 
one despises ‘fine feelings’, that one makes every Yes and No a question of conscience! – 
Belief makes blessed: consequently it lies …24 
 
Nietzsche is here speaking of the “free spirits” – those who take it upon themselves, 
despite the fear and danger of a vengeful society, to reproach tradition and challenge the 
old and the settled.25 In the politics of truth, it is first of all the free spirit that is in the 
firing line. To engage in the politics of truth implies the courage of truth because it is 
always a direct opposition of the established order: “the philosopher, being necessarily a 
man of tomorrow … had to find himself in contradiction to his today.”26 Likewise, in 
On the Pathos of Truth it was the “disregard for the present and the momentary [which 
was] inherent in the nature of philosophical contemplation.”27 Equally, when truthful-
ness is uncoupled from the will to truth, it becomes a form of transformation and 
overcoming of that which, at the present, is true. 
 
                                                
23 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §574, p. 331 – and he continues, “The origin of thought, like that of 
sensation, cannot be derived; but that is far from proving that it is primordial or self-sufficient! It simply 
shows that we cannot get behind it, because thought and sensation are all we have.”  
24 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Twilight of the Idols and the Anti-Christ, translated by R. J. Hollingdale (Penguin 
Books, 2003) §50, p. 179 
25 Free-spirits have always been met by a challenge of bound spirits: “Free spirits, pleading their cause 
before the tribunal of bound spirits, have to prove that there have always been free spirits and that free-
thinking therefore has permanence; then, that they do not want to be a burden; and finally, that on the 
whole they are beneficial to bound spirits. But because they cannot convince the bound spirits of this last 
point, it does not help them to have proved the first and second.” Nietzsche, Friedrich. Human, All Too 
Human, translated by Marion Faber and Stephen Lehmann (Penguin Books, 2004) §229, p. 142 
26 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §212, p. 143 
27 ‘On the Pathos of Truth’ in Nietzsche, Writings from the Early Notebooks, p. 250 
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[10] “Perhaps no one has ever been sufficiently truthful about what ‘truthfulness’ is.”28 
Truthfulness demands understanding among equals (inter pares); it is a property of 
thought rather than in correspondence with a state of the world, which is why truthful-
ness emerges as both sameness and difference.29 Consequently the politics of truth 
involves two kinds of truth-telling: on the one hand, there is the kind of truth-telling that 
enunciates the same – as that which is produced within a given regime of power. It is 
the kind of truth-telling that does not contribute anything new, but rather conforms to 
social expectations. Through discourse, it aims to secure truth as being through a self-
referential loop of correspondence between propositions and the world.30 This is truth-
discourse as government: in the practice of confessing, one tells the truth about oneself 
so as to produce the effect of turning one-self into a subject. On the other hand, there is 
the truth-telling proper to the politics of truth. This is truth-telling as difference, a con-
frontation of that which already occupies the position of the true. Through its discourse, 
it aspires to establish truth as becoming. It has a sense of nobility and enunciates a vital 
truth, and it is this latter form of truth-telling which constitutes the possibility of testing 
the truth of thought in politics. 
 
[11] Taken together, the politics of truth concerns the tension field that exists between 
on the one hand thought and un-truth, and on the other the un-thought and truth. Under-
stood in this way, the politics of truth is the politics of transfiguration: from the 
possibility of un-truth that the will to truth introduces, (novel) thought can, in response 
to the constellation of social forces, aim to overturn the un-thought and by extension the 
concept of truth, creating a new and different truth. In doing so novel thought is con-
fronted with the limits instituted by the epistemological space of the un-thought, which 
are maintained by the social forces. As such, the politics of truth is a confrontation 
between the ones who have the courage to say what they actively think and the social 
forces that opposes them; it is the space within which Nietzsche’s free spirits display 
their joys life. The politics of truth is thus ultimately about the possibility of thought 
testing its own truth in politics. In other words, it is here with the problem of the politics 
of truth that we encounter the socio-political limits of thought.  
                                                
28 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, IV §177 p. 106 
29 Nietzsche, The Will To Power, §378, p. 221. As Paul F. Gleen, we could interpret Nietzsche to propose 
two opposing epistemologies, one for the weak and one for the strong, but then we would be omitting 
what they have in common, namely the force-field of thought. See; ‘The Politics of Truth: Power in 
Nietzsche’s Epistemology’, Political Research Quarterly Vol. 57, No. 4 (Dec., 2004) pp. 575-583 
30 “‘Thou shalt not lie’: we demand truthfulness. But praise for factual correctness (the refusal to counte-
nance lies) has always been greatest precisely among liars.” Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §378, p. 221 
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 While acknowledging the value ascribed to the free spirit and the inevitable need 
any society has for it, it is at the same time necessary to take it serious as a problem 
complex. On the one hand, it is true that the most characteristic feature of novel thought 
is that it destroys and breaks with what is already there. Thus if novel thought is not 
situated in relation to what is already silently thought it will always face the possibility 
of either being rejected as an obscurity or persecuted for sacrilege (the triumph of reac-
tive forces). On the other hand, it is equally true that, while there has always been a 
need for thought, there has also always been a need for the force of truth as thought to 
be delimited. If not, the epistemological space –and by extension social space– would be 
in constant disarray. In other words, there is a danger to thought of society and a danger 
of thought to society.31 In the chapters to come, we shall see this dilemma play out time 
and again. It is thus clear that the problem of the politics of truth refuses to be under-
stood simply as the problem of truth in politics, which would simply mean that thought 
is neglected in favour of social conformism, but rather as the problem of establishing 
the socio-political limits of thought. The ultimate aim, according to Foucault, is that of 
“ascertaining the possibility of constituting a new politics of truth.”32 Accordingly, to 
question the politics of truth itself, to challenge the hegemony of truth and displace 
these limits, is the greatest duty of thought; it is the only activity that would secure our 
relative freedom to deal with problems. 
 
[12] Our scientific theories of the mind and thought are heirs of the long-standing tradi-
tion of western philosophy: the problem of what it means to think goes at least back to 
the ancient Greeks. Since Heraclitus, thought has been regarded as a social phenome-
non, one that is shared between individuals, but when Descartes started to doubt the 
foundations of his own thought, he reached a limit (the cogito). Soon other limits started 
to emerge: the limits that thought must place on itself to think correctly (Kant), the ones 
that are placed on it externally by language (Wittgenstein), those which are placed on it 
by the relations of power (Foucault), and lastly the image of thought taking the form of 
spectres of tradition that thought seems unable to get rid of (Deleuze). But in formulat-
ing the problem of the politics of truth as one of thought a new limit starts to emerge. 
The wider proposition of the thesis can therefore be formulated as follows: the politics 
of truth constitutes the socio-political limits of thought.  
                                                
31 Consider the necessity and consequences of preserving the danger of exception at the expense of the 
rule as outlined in §55 and §76 in Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science: with a prelude in rhymes and 
an appendix of songs, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974) pp. 130-131 
32 Foucault, ‘Truth and Power’, p. 74 
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 And I would further add that in so far as these socio-political limits are situated 
within an epistemological space they become visible through three interrelated prob-
lems, which act as their pillars of support. Firstly (a), the problem of truth-telling in 
politics, understood in terms of the practices of truth-telling within the political game of 
truth (which is not exactly to say the politics of truth, but rather the relationship between 
politics and truth more generally): who can speak the truth, with what authority do they 
claim to do so, what is required of their true-discourse, what is its mode of production, 
what are its external limits. It thus has to do with the person or figure who, at least for a 
time, can embody truth as dissidence; no doubt with some affinity to a particular styli-
zation of philosophical life.33 Secondly (b), the problem of political order, understood 
in terms of constitutional frameworks, spanning from how they are rooted in cosmolog-
ical beliefs to more practical issues of authority – how, and by whom, can political order 
be attained, who are the bearers of rights, and how are decisions to be taken. But be-
cause order is also about knowledge it also provides the epistemic foundation of true-
discourse: what kind of political order is able to guarantee a beneficial truth-telling in 
politics. And finally (c), the problem of the political game, understood as the concrete 
exercise of power (or games through which power is actually exercised) and the moral 
character and ethics of the political man who speaks the truth. It has to do with the 
practices and technologies in which politics are linked to truth. Taken together, the three 
can be in equilibrium or a coherent whole, which forms a kind of a diagram that makes 
visible the socio-political limit to thought. It has been by the pressure of different forces 
that such diagrams have been pushed towards hegemony and anarchy, forming a long 
history, but nevertheless one that has some key ruptures and breaks that can be delineat-
ed. 
III 
[13] By developing the concept of political of truth, it becomes clear that the founda-
tions of the discourse of post-truth politics are shaky and problematic. Firstly, we could 
note how the story about the slow accumulation of facts, that science tells about itself, is 
too straight and good to be true to be taken at face value: “Look at the epochs in the life 
                                                
33 With such a figure also comes the various ritualized manifestation of truth always present in the rela-
tionship between truth and politics: models of behaviour, socially agreed upon practices (what are the 
conditions of the free spirit: do they fit into any established order, are they tolerated, how courageous do 
they need to be?). 
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of a people where scholars predominated; they are times of exhaustion, often of twi-
light, of decline, – gone are the overflowing energy, the certainty of life, the certainty as 
to the future.”34 Indeed, the much-priced scientific worldview is itself in danger of 
devolving into forms of scientism – the belief that science, qua its methodology, dis-
closes a final and absolute reality and therefore can do without thought.35 This danger 
does not consist of science legislating in all areas of life (as in religion or law), but of it 
being a danger to the freedom of thought, as Feyerabend argued in How to defend socie-
ty against science?36 This is not meant as a rebuttal of the science wars, but to treat 
these conflicts as a part of much broader social phenomena. The insistence of the dis-
covery of a final reality should always be met with suspicion exactly because it is 
inherently problematic – science itself rests on a dialectic between thought and experi-
ment, and by denying the possibility of thought the process of science is arrested. 
Which is not a denunciation of either science or the scientific expert; rather, their role 
has not only been to serve the workings of power in the relationship between truth and 
politics, but also been a means to challenge to prevailing structures of power, to main-
tain a sufficient politics of truth. Even if there is a tendency towards growing 
irrationalism today, it is still not clear how such irrationalism moves within science 
itself, which makes it all the more dangerous to grant science a space above critique.37 
We ought to contemplate the very real possibility that if continuing on its current 
course, the persistence of scientific realism will in time come to mirror the crisis of 
scholasticism in the fourteenth century, where the assertion that universals were real 
                                                
34 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, III §25, p. 114 
35 I provide this definition to separate it from meaning the unscientific imitation of scientific language 
and method (in relation to justify faulty political or religious arguments). See for example: Hayek, F. A. 
The Counter Revolution of Science: Studies in Abuse of Reason (London: The Free Press, 1955), p. 15-16. 
To be very specific, this definition purposefully aims at the tension between science and thought (science 
cannot possibly work without freedom of thought). Feyerabend, Paul. Against Method (London: Verso, 
1975). The problem of scientism has been widely discussed in the philosophy of science, but rarely 
surfaces in the wider public discourses on science despite the fact that it constitutes a widespread intellec-
tual movement dating back to the nuova scienzia of the sixteenth century. Voegelin, Eric. “The Origins of 
Scientism”, Social Research, vol. 15 (1) (1948), pp. 462-494.  
36 What Feyerabend meant by the “tyranny of Science” was exactly that it inhibits freedom of thought, a 
freedom that science itself is wholly dependent upon. Feyerabend, Paul. ‘How to Defend Society against 
Science’, Radical philosophy 11, vol. 1. (1975): pp. 3-9 
37 Latour, Bruno. ‘Has Critique run out of Steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern’, Critical 
Inquiry (Winter 2004), pp. 225-248 
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entities led to self-contradicting doxa.38 Is it not then our duty to break thought out of 
the prison of scientism? 39 
 Secondly, have all forms of politics, except liberal democracy, rejected the 
virtues of truthfulness? Is this merely an elaborate scam? How different is the present 
experience actually from the Christian experience of a loss of power that could be found 
at the advent of modernity: that modern life itself – through its liberalism, philosophical 
realism, vitalism, and destructive nihilism – is a denial of truth.40 Have we not, at this 
present moment, made a virtue out of forgetting that which Jean Luc-Nancy reminds us, 
that “democracy is first of all a metaphysics and only afterwards a politics,” making 
truthfulness in politics a matter between those of an equals disposition.41 The presumed 
lack of truthfulness in politics would then seem to be the opposite case; there has hardly 
ever been more truth and truthfulness in politics. Thanks to the success of journalism, 
when politicians are caught in a lie, they will have to answer to the public. When they 
attempt to spin their policies, we have armies of experts ready to dissects and explain 
what is really being done, what is happening behind the stages of power. In the past, 
politics was a trade in secrets. Today it is the opposite – it is a competition of who can 
shout the truth: ‘I speak the truth, listen to me’. The endless murmurs of discourse on 
TV and the Internet about politics savour every little truth that can be found about the 
workings of politics. We are not lacking in truth, we are rather witnessing the overpro-
duction of truth, a political reality saturated with truth-claims. 
 Lastly, facts speak for themselves, don’t they? It is not just that facts are power-
less or a weak form of power in the political arena – they are not – as if all inconvenient 
facts have been effectively ignored whenever they needed, closing out eyes and ears to 
the problems of the world. The problem is rather the opposite: the overvaluation and un-
questionability that facts are granted. When it comes to facts, there is a kind of “fetish-
ism inherent in the commodity”, to borrow a phrase from Marx. The absurdity in only 
seeing as truth what can be demonstrated as a fact, while at the same time completely 
forgetting about the facticity of facts, of which there are at least two: facts could always 
                                                
38 The new movement of speculative realism in Philosophy, that safeguards the scientific worldview from 
thought, might be a candidate for such a fate. See for example: Meillassoux, Quentin. After Finitude: an 
essay on the necessity of contingency, translated by Ray Brassier (London, continuum, 2008). 
39 We must therefore not forget how the rise of the scientific worldview in the 19th and 20th centuries was 
paralleled by its critique in France, England, and Germany: as critiques of the “analytic of truth” they 
took the other way out of Kant. 
40 Rose, Eugene (Fr. Seraphin). Nihilism: The Root of the Revolution of the Modern Age (Saint Herman 
Pr., 1994) 
41 Luc-Nancy, Jean. The Truth of Democracy, translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas 
(Fordham University Press, 2010), p. 34 
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have been otherwise (that is, the contingency that comes with history being the totality 
of events); and more importantly, facts are always located at an intersection between 
models of thought (the unavoidability of having to interpret these facts). 42  The latter 
has to do with the anthropomorphic characteristic of all truths. By denying the facticity 
of facts, the belief in a total factual reality looks more like a part of the very same his-
torical movement that it denounces. In its most extreme version, it is the belief that we 
have succeeded in stripping away interpretation and theory and now confront a brute 
factual reality as it really is. As if the Platonic gap between appearance and the reality of 
ideas has been closed and we are, each and all, capable of living in the light of the sun 
in a face-to-face confrontation with brute facts – which does not mean that the game of 
politics allows for this outright, but that it needs to bend to this will to truth.43 Conse-
quently, experience retains none of the former meaning. It is not an experiment, but a 
pure datum, and consequently truth comes to reside only in commonsensical and de-
politicized speech. How then would we be able, under this total hegemony of a one-
dimensional factual reality, to tell what is a fact and what is not? 
 The point of these objections against scientism, against politics saturated with 
truth-claims, and against a one-dimensional factual reality, is to say that the politics of 
truth is today dominated by hyper-real politics – that is, a kind of politics where the 
precession of simulacra makes it no longer possible to separate reality from the model 
of the real, the true from the false.44 All we are left with is the simulation of the real. 
The discourse of post-truth politics is unhelpful because it attempts to conceal the veri-
similitude of the hyper-real epistemological space, effectively hiding the reality, which 
it produces. Our disillusion and feeling of anguish that it incites with the thought of a 
politics without truth therefore, we might say, comes from the attempt of driving head-
on into the future through the rear-view mirror, with the antinomy hypothesis as our 
road map. By being a part of the social forces that have shaped our concepts of truth and 
truthfulness, the scientific worldview, liberal democracy, and our insistence on an abso-
lute factual reality are all equally complicit in creating this hyper-real politics of truth. It 
                                                
42 Factual reality is not a historical constant of thought, but has to be brought into existence. For well-
documented historical accounts, see: Poovey, Mary. A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of 
Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society (University of Chicago Press, 1999); Shapiro, Barabara 
J. A Culture of Fact: England 1550-1720 (Cornell University Press, 2000)  
43 This is the key difference between science and scientism. Science distinguishes between scientific facts 
and brute facts, of which there can be divergent interpretations. In contrast, scientism conflates brute facts 
with scientific facts, leaving no room for interpretation and thus halts progress in the sciences.  
44 Baudrillard, Jean. Simulations, translated by Paul Foss, Paul Patton and Philip Beitchman (Semio-
text(e), 1983), p. 4 
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is, we could say, their unintended consequences, which is why it is too late to talk about 
an interregnum between the modern and the post-modern. The emergence of the hyper-
real politics did not manifest itself as a brute fact upon the horizon – it snuck up on us in 
our production of reality as if both the dangers of relativism and conviction were real-
ized at the same time without us ever noticing. Our detriment is that hyper-real politics 
by robbing thought of all its ingenuity and resources –by making the exception the rule– 
places an impenetrable limit on thought. 
 
[14] In conclusion, I am not claiming that truth has no value, or that any truth is as good 
as any other, that it is not worth fighting for truth, or that pursuing truth in political 
matters is a futile endeavour, but I do think that such value commitments are only worth 
considering in relation to a given problem – and at this present time that problem, I 
believe, is the politics of truth as I have tried to outline it above. Are all the questions of 
the politics of truth really passé, solved by the scientific worldview and the factual 
reality it ideally lays bare in liberal democratic societies, as the discourse of post-truth 
politics would have us believe? Of course not. If as argued above, the politics of truth 
constitutes a meta-political paradox, it is a problem that we will always have to return 
to. It would therefore neither come as a surprise nor be a cause of embarrassment that 
the politics of truth has developed into crises of thought many times over, and starting 
our inquiry requires at last a degree of historical openness towards the politics of truth: 
how and why has the politics of truth been turned into a problem by thought? “What is 
strongest, what is constantly exercised in all stages of life, is thought. It is presented in 
every perception and even in what is apparently passive! [namely the un-thought] Obvi-
ously this makes it the most powerful and exacting of forces, and in time tyrannizes all 
the rest.”45 It is by passing judgement upon these crises that thought has become the 
tyrant of truth – a tyranny that works through epistemology rather than politics. In short, 
my aim is to place or reinsert the discourse of post-truth politics, along with the antino-
my hypothesis in which it is rooted, into a general politics of truth where today the 
fluidity and dynamism have dried up and a tyrant has emerged, partially produced and 
sustained, I will argue, by the ascetic will to truth of scientism that demands a world of 
factual knowledge and nothing else. This tyrant is best understood as hyper-real politics. 
This thesis thus asks the genealogical question: what will or wills have shaped the 
politics of truth, so that it today has become hyper-real? This is what this thesis sets out 
                                                
45 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §611, p. 351 
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to accomplish: a history of how the politics of truth has been turned into a problem, or 
we might say, a history of the tyrants of truth.  
 The rest of the thesis will develop this argument as follows: the first chapter is 
concerned with the problem of how it becomes possible to think differently in relation 
to the history of the politics of truth, and responds by outlining a theoretical position 
that centres on the concept of a tradition of thought. The second chapter, which draws 
heavily on Foucault, explores the transition in the politics of truth between the wise 
king and the democratic practice of parrhēsia. The third chapter establishes the politics 
of truth as the set of problems associated with exhortation or council given to the king, 
by mainly focusing on the discourse of government called Mirrors for Princes that 
stretches from Xenophanes to Machiavelli. The fourth chapter concerns the elaboration 
of the politics of truth as critique as is found from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centu-
ry. The fifth chapter examines the historical development, which finally produces the 
hyper-real politics of truth of the present. Finally, the conclusion contemplates the 
socio-political vectors of the politics of truth and the different limits that have been 
placed on thought and tentatively asks what our present predicament demands of 
thought. 
 
[15] Before I begin, a note on method is warranted. As a method of inquiry, genealogy 
usually deals with a singular concept by relating it to the will to power, making it a 
symptom of that will without which it could neither be thought, experienced, or acted 
upon. By focusing my inquiry around the politics of truth, this has not been so straight-
forward, as there is no single coherent discourse that presented itself for the study of 
this particular problem. ‘Truth-telling’ as a concept is simply rooted in too many differ-
ent problems to be the sole measure of the politics of truth. Methodologically I have 
therefore found it necessary to approach the question through the three interrelated 
problems of truth-telling in politics, political order, and the political game. This has 
made it possible to choose a broad range of texts from, but not limited to, what could be 
called the canon of western political thought. It is my belief that in so far as they are 
adequate for excavating and outlining the epistemological spaces in which I am inter-
ested, they should be sufficient for establishing an effective history of the politics of 
truth. Nevertheless, such a choice obviously challenges my language skills, which is 
why I have relied on translations. In most cases, however, I have consulted works in 
their original language and crosschecked with different available translations. 
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Chapter I: Traditions of Thought  
*   *   * 
[1] The aim of this chapter is to develop the tripartite ontology of traditions of thought: 
problems, problematisations, and practices. The main source of inspiration is found 
within Phenomenology, in particular the school of French Historical Epistemology. As 
such the plan is as follows: first (I), I will spell out the background upon which tradi-
tions of thought emerge – in other words I shall attempt to spell out an ontology of 
problems. Then, I will (II) elaborate on the ideas and concepts of such an ontology and 
how they can be used to study a tradition of thought – they are: (a) problem, (b) realisa-
tion, (c) problematisation, (d) sedimentation, and (e) practices. Accordingly, our general 
problematic of the politics of truth has been realised in different points of history at 
events where the process of thought (as problematisation) has been sparked by a prob-
lem, which then has sedimented into practices that at some later point become 
problematic. Thus, I will suggest (III) a general model for the study of traditions of 
thought, one that collects these different concepts and put them in historical motion. 
Finally, I will (IV) briefly note some of the implications of multiplicity of traditions of 
thought – there among, the relationship between different traditions of thought on the 
basis of their catalyst, the problem. 
I 
[2] The subject of this chapter is the concept of traditions of thought and within them 
the possibility of thinking differently within the general force-field of thought. To that 
end I will argue that the problem, as a fundamental encounter of a sensation that cannot 
be thought, is the catalyst of new or novel thought, yet such problems are only realisable 
within already given structures of thought (thus forming an inherent contradiction be-
tween old and new); and the natural consequence that follow from this is that different 
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people having experienced different problems will form different traditions, which 
inevitably conflict over the interpretation of the world. We can put the central paradox 
like so: there is no such thing as a thought that came from nowhere – everything we can 
think of comes from somewhere, it is borrowed from our social relations, our culture, 
our very humanity– our thought are but the repetition of prior thought (we always think 
within a system of thought). Yet when we look closely and examine our history it be-
comes clear that it was not always possible to think like we do today, neither is it 
possible to think exactly like they did in the past – something, some thoughts must have 
come from nowhere, or rather from nothingness. There must have been a difference. In 
other words, thought must have a cause or a genesis; there must be a reason why we 
think, why we can think differently, and what it then actually means to think? That is 
the problem I want to pose in a political register: what is the relationship between the 
repetitiveness of the exercise of power (as politics) and the difference of thought (as 
constitution of news truths)? Or more precisely: how has the relationship between poli-
tics and truth been constituted as a problem throughout the history of the Western 
tradition? Thus, what is needed is a theory that can account for the changing relation 
between politics and truth, but within the structures of the un-thought. 
 By ‘tradition of thought’ must be understood, not the passing on of elements 
(thought) from one generation to the next, with thought being an act of computation 
directed against representational structures, but the progression of thought in opposition 
to previous thought. The generations in a tradition are distinguished by the breaks that 
they expose the tradition to – a tradition of thought thus has a genealogy of breaks and 
transformations. A tradition of thought then roughly amounts to the historicity of our 
life-world: it is important to emphasize, however, that in the world today there are 
multiple traditions with loose as well as strong webs of relations spun between them. 
Such is the insight of multiplicity: the scandalous notion of a ‘conversation of mankind’ 
does not take place on a background common to all. Such a proclamation is however 
deeply dissatisfying; it reveals nothing of what is at stake rather the ethical implications 
of a multiplicity of traditions of thought need to be worked out. 
 
[3] All theorizing starts with a nominalist impulse – a philosophy of no! – rejecting all 
universals and existing categories of language and reason relevant to the problem. This 
leaves the world in disorder; no pure relations between no-determined objects (identi-
ties) remain. True nominalism however has no language, it is completely incapable of 
speech; it commits to a non-existence of sorts. Thus, the second impulse of theorizing is 
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to posit new concepts with which the world can be ordered. And thus, before we can 
start to define further what is meant by tradition of thought a ground or foundation 
needs to be cleared. To study thought as a result of a problem, the problem must be 
asserted – thought is the result of a problem. Only thereafter can we study thought as an 
engagement with a problem; that is, as a problematisation. Such a cosmology or meta-
physical foundation needs to be asserted; therefore we need to outline a genuine ontolo-
gy of problems. 
 
[4] The world is an incomprehensible place of flux and particularities that spawns cha-
otic rumblings and quakes that shake everything within it; at which moment only ability 
fails the capacity to describe. Being in this world of freedom, human beings are con-
fronted with a sense of vertigo originating from this groundless abyss, metaphysical 
anxieties, a depressing feeling from the lack of ontological security; threats, difficulties, 
and dangers are here not fabricated, rather they materialise in the form of things, crea-
tures, and most of all other human beings. Facing this melancholic haphazardness, 
human beings have answered back with attempts of creating religious, moral, and social 
worlds of their own in which to feel secure – and in doing so, all dangers that are known 
to them are crystalized into problems; problems that require solutions. The problem 
made human beings think and remarkably, they have invented endless ways of reason-
ing and forms of rationality that have allowed them to manage and survive the looming 
dangers from external and internal environments. Most notable perhaps, is scientific 
reason with which they, since at least the Pre-Socratics, have fashioned to find explicit 
principles and definitions (theories) from which they could demonstrate objective truths 
about the world and themselves. It is as if human beings have insisted on looking for 
Parmenidean invariances (nothing changes) within a world of Heraclitian flux (every-
thing changes): all throughout our existence we have demanded certainty (the will to 
truth). Thus, an enduring tension underlies our existence in the world: on one hand, the 
strong conviction that through the use of their intellect human beings are able to solve 
the problems that they face; while on the other, the hopelessness of having to reconcile 
their attitude with the complete impossibility of verifying a ideal theory, which under-
mines the prospects of discovering an ultimate explanation or justification for their 
existence. On top of this chasm between conjectural confidence and unending despair – 
on the surface of everyday existence – human cultures and societies have always coped 
with this tension and the problems that it creates through their practises. The failure to 
solve the tension is not enough to convince us not to try; if anything, we fanatically 
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stick to the claim that the root of failure is that we are not rational enough. Practices, the 
fact that human beings do something that they act and behave in certain ways with a 
degree of regularity, is the most fundamental characteristic of their existence. 
 Practices are problematised: That is, we cope with the material and social world 
in terms of problematisations that more or less strategically handle rather than negate or 
ameliorate problems. Things enter into a tension field between true and false and are 
constituted as objects of thought where they can be reflected upon in terms of problems 
that require solutions. In this way, practices embody a society’s thought (the problems 
and they way in which they are managed; e.g. theory). The way in which a given society 
deals with a particular problem also generates certain human experiences to those in-
volved. In a sense then, a problematisation is a triad of problems, solutions and the 
experiences of bring human to which they give birth. Taken together, all our problema-
tisations amount to a set of background practices, which organises reality as an open 
field upon which human beings understand both themselves and the world. Here, the 
truth about Man and the world discloses itself – human beings and things show up and 
are presented in light of the background onto which they appear. 
 While these practices have incited a degree of regularity and stability as to what 
we do and how we behave, certain tendencies as to how problems will be solved; it 
remains that, in our shared reality the dividing line between true and false will always 
be contested. Primarily because the dangers emerging from the world and from other 
men are not perceived the same way all times and because some practices clash, over-
lap, and make use of other practices. In this, human beings are always caught up in the 
middle where they find themselves engaging in different games of truth (all the different 
problematisation of their practices), staking their claim as to what is and appears to 
them to be the truth. The struggle between different interpretations of the cultural para-
digm (the non-articulated and a priori understandings of being hidden within the 
background practices) makes society historical, since the present constantly re-interprets 
the past to make way for the future. It is the process by which central practices in the 
paradigm are replaced by marginal practices that are taken as a form to which is given a 
new content and set up in a new game of truth. 
 Social reality is continuously changing because it is perpetually dangerous – and 
therefore the history of Humankind is the story of re-interpreting practices through 
shifting problematisations. It would be hard to argue that a particular danger – such as 
‘nihilism’, ‘rationalization’ or ‘liberal rationalism’ – is the culmination of history, the 
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kind of great stories of decline that are so common to our culture.1 Yet, they are but 
bolstering attempt of attention. Rather, there are many kinds of dangers that each can be 
diagnosed and confronted. We can never transcend the chasm that is the condition of 
human existence; where dangers are met with solutions that most likely will contain 
new dangers, which then will need to be diagnosed and confronted. 
II 
[5] The problem by itself as a metaphysical entity does not give or show itself to 
thought. It is beyond representation, the foundation of existences that resides in the 
vastness of the great nothingness upon which human beings exist. It can only be experi-
enced as the fundamental encounter that forces the process of thought to begin.2 If the 
human world is one of knowable and playable games of truth, the problem in its meta-
physical state is a divine game without pre-existing rules and completely given over to 
the whole of chance.3 It is as soon as we cross this border – when we enter the realm of 
human beings and their world that we can start to develop concepts, with which the 
world can be comprehended. To do so, we should start with the most fundamental: our 
practical existence. 
 
[6] A practical problem is a problem in relation to our practices: that is, we encounter 
something in the world – either with ourselves, or with others – that does not act as we 
had expected or wished in relation to our practices.4 The criterion for a practical prob-
lem is that the problem can be solved by mere coincidence or simply disappears; this is 
so even if the problem has been cognized or not. Practical problems are therefore inde-
pendent of our thought; it is not required for them to be solved. 
 Practical problems are problems, in that they are anomalies, but always for 
someone that has the problem. It is quite possible to have a problem but without being 
                                                
1 The three dangers of nihilism, rationalization, and liberal rationalism should be familiar to any reader 
of Martin Heidegger, Max Weber, and Hans J. Morgenthau. 
2 See Althusser’s use of Lucretius’ famous swerve and clinamen in Louis Althusser. The Philosophy of 
the Encounter: later writings 1978-1987 (London: Verso, 2006). For Deleuze’s criticism of the seventh 
book of the Republic see Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repetition, translated by Paul Patton (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2014), pp. 182-186 
3 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 369-372 
4 The subsequent distinction between “practical problems” and “problems of thought” (originally theoret-
ical problems) can be found in Jes Adolphsen (1992) Problem I Videnskab: En Erkendelsesteoretisk 
Begrundelse for Problemorientering (Aalborg: Aalborg Univsersitetforlag). 
Tyrants of Truth 
 33 
aware of it. Practical problems have the same ontological status as acts and doings: they 
are as such, contradictions – between what is intended and what is possible – for some-
body that has the problem. By themselves practical problems are extra-linguistic: a bird 
that is building a nest does not act, it moves because it does not posses the concept of 
‘building a nest’. We, on the other hand, have the concept ‘building a nest’ and it is 
therefore us that see the bird as building a nest. To act or do something is a categorisa-
tion; in the same way, a practical problem is a categorization with the purpose of 
showing that there is a conflict between intention and possibility. Thus, for something 
to be called a practical problem it is not a requirement that those that have them are 
aware that they have a problem; but rather that those who assert that someone has a 
practical problem ascribe to them will or desires and determine that there is an opposi-
tion between intention and the possibilities of realising them: problem do not pose 
themselves. 
 Practical problems are significant for all cultures and traditions of thought be-
cause they present in extreme cases dangers and unwanted hazards that are necessary to 
overcome. These range from natural phenomena such as famine to diseases, to self-
created human phenomena such as economic crisis or the introduction of a new culture. 
As such, they have a certain materiality to them. Practical problems are of a dangerous 
kind; they force us to act, to organise. Some practical problems constitute important 
events in the history of thought because they have forced thought to change. 5 It is im-
portant to remember that these events lie before the act of cognition itself – prior to 
thought however, they rarely remain long! If we want to say something about how a 
tradition of thought has developed, it is therefore imperative to look at how practical 
problems have been turned into problems of thought. 
 
[7] Why do we think? Because of a problem, the process of thought starts by this fun-
damental encounter; the problem is the genesis of thought. In the Gay Science, 
Nietzsche tells us that human beings are only consciousness because of an external need 
for it: “[C]onsciousness has developed only under the pressure of the need for commu-
                                                
5 In this sense the practical problem has to be a lasting one. In Althusser’s words, “In order for swerve to 
give rise to an encounter from which a world is born, that encounter must last; it must be, not a ‘brief 
encounter’, but a lasting encounter, which then becomes the basis for all reality, all necessity, all Meaning 
and all reason. But the encounter can also not last; then there is no world.” Louis Althusser, The Philoso-
phy of the Encounter, p. 169. I do not here mean to suggest some extra-linguistic reality (like Kant’s das-
ding-am-sigh) towards which there is a absolute standard of knowledge as presupposed by science: 
problems, whether practical or theoretical, are always someone’s problem, someone’s ‘fundamental and 
lasting encounter’, and as such it is their world – the world. 
Traditions of Thought 
 34 
nication; that from the start it was needed and useful only between human beings […]; 
and that it also developed only in proportion to the degree of this utility. That our ac-
tions, thoughts, feelings, and movements enter our own consciousness – at least a part 
of them – that is the result of a “must” that for a terrible long time lorded it over man.”6 
The world in which Nietzsche sees human beings is overflowing with practical prob-
lems. Human beings are, to Nietzsche, nothing but endangered animals that are in need 
of help and protection; they need to be able to communicate to call for aid to make 
themselves understood: “for all of this he needed “consciousness” first of all, he needed 
to “know” himself what distressed him, he needed to “know” how he felt, he needed to 
“know” what he thought.”7  
 Individual consciousness is over-valued, says Nietzsche: “consciousness does 
not really belong to man’s individual existences, but rather to his social and herd nature; 
that, as follows from this, is has developed subtlety only insofar as this is required by 
social or herd utility.”8 We can thus say that thought is a social phenomenon that does 
not belong to the individual, and that the reason why it develops is that there have been 
practical problems that needed to be overcome. To Nietzsche there is something more 
latent within this consciousness: adventavit asinus pulcher et fortissimus – the convic-
tion of philosophy “it always creates the world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise; 
philosophy is this tyrannical impulse itself, the most spiritual Will to Power, the will to 
‘creation of the world,’ the will to the causa prima.”9 Through the questioned and the 
unquestionable, seemingly arbitrary borders are established which we, in our everyday 
experience, find impossible to transcend, but which nonetheless determines the charac-
ter of our thought.10 To Nietzsche:  
 
Our thoughts themselves are continually governed by the character of consciousness – by the 
‘genius of the species’ that command it – and translated back into the perspective of the herd. 
Fundamentally, all our actions are altogether incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely indi-
vidual; this is no doubt of that. But as soon as we translate them into consciousness they no 
longer seem to be.11 
 
                                                
6 Nietzsche, Friedrich (1974) The Gay Science: with a prelude in rhymes and an appendix of songs, 
Translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books), §354, p. 298 [emphasis in original] 
7 Ibid, §354, p. 298 
8 Ibid, §354, p. 299 
9 Nietzsche, Friedrich (1997) Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, Translated 
by Helen Zimmeren (New York: Dover Publications Inc.), p. 6 
10 See Strong, Tracy B. Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration: Expanded Edition 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 24-25 
11 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §354, p. 299 [emphasis in original] 
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This is therefore not about a Freudian idea of the unconscious, which lies beneath all 
human experience as a monolithic and unchangeable structure. Rather such a Nietzschi-
an character of consciousness is what later to Edmund Husserl becomes the Lebenswelt 
–life-world– the horizon of all experience, which forms the background on which all 
things appears as themselves and meaningful.12 Beneath all consciousness there is a life-
world loaded with a heavy philosophical infrastructure. And later with Heidegger this 
idea of consciousness as nothing but social phenomena as a shared ‘clearing’ that is 
opened up by the discourse of ‘the they’ (the Nietzschean ‘herd’) who are capable of 
nothing but meagre chatter the purpose of which is to escape from nothingness.13 It is a 
similar distinction that made by historical epistemologists: that between knowledge 
(connaissance) and forms of knowledge (savoir); where the latter is the property of 
man’s individual existence, the former is a property of his social existence – thus, be-
yond our conscious thought, there is a realm of thought that constitutes ‘internal’ 
limitations that are socially imposed.14 
 
[8] To thought, nothing is given. The question then is, how did it become possible for 
‘the given’ to become presupposed? The answer is that by granting itself (thought) 
freedom from the eye (the senses), thought was able to imagine a world, which the eye 
then could see: with Bachelard, “Knowledge of reality is a light that always casts a 
shadow in some nook or cranny. It is never immediate, never complete. Revelations of 
reality are always recurrent. Reality is never ‘what we might believe it to be’: it is al-
ways what we ought to have thought.” 15  Thus, we only know against previous 
knowledge. That is, empirical thought is always only clear in retrospect when the previ-
ous knowledge can be show to be an error by a sharpening or refocus of the apparatus of 
reason. With Alexandre Koyré we could talk of “Die Gischichte der menchligen 
Dummheit” – the history of human stupidity.16 According to Bachelard, the problem is 
one with thought itself (not external factors such as the elusiveness of phenomena, our 
sensual apparatus, or the physiological human mind). The very act of cognition is de-
                                                
12 Husserl, Edmund. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduc-
tion to Phenomenological Philosophy (Evanston: North Western University Press, 1970) 
13 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 1962) 
14 Foucault, Michel. Archaeology of Knowledge, translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith (London: Routledge 
Classics 2002), pp. 16-17 
15 Bachelard, Gaston. The Formation of the Scientific Mind: A Contribution to a Psychoanalysis of 
Objective Knowledge, translated and annotated by Mary McAllester Jones (Cinamen Press 2002), p. 24 
16 Koyré, Alexandre. Études d’histoire de la pensée philosophique (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), p. 254 
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spite our best intentions at its very heart marked by a kind of necessary sluggishness, 
disturbance, or lack of clarity – human beings are capable of reason, but in them it is not 
complete. The act of cognition by its nature constitutes a set of ‘internal’ obstacles, a 
positive web of beliefs or un-thought/unconscious structures on which explicit thought 
appears; Bachelard calls these ‘epistemological obstacles’ and argues that it is these that 
the scientific spirit must break with.17 It is Nietzsche’s ‘character of consciousness’ 
coming forth as the positive, that which is given a priori to the human mind – science 
now as a substitute for philosophy, but imbued with the same will to power. 
 La Problématique: To Bachelard thought, or rather the mode of thought that is 
science, is occupied with solving specific singular problems. Such problems are consti-
tuted as a problématique – a problematic:  
 
Immediately, the word rational is conscience of rectification. To describe all the span of rational 
realization [or realization of the rational], one must go from a disorganized given to an organized 
given in order to have a rational end. The universal doubt would pulverize irremediably the giv-
en in a pile of Heraclitian facts. It does not correspond to any real instance of the scientific 
research. The scientific research requires [calls for], instead of the parade of universal doubt, the 
constitution of a problematic. [Science] takes her real start in a problem, even if this problem is 
badly put [defined]. The scientific self is thus [then] a program of experiments [experience], 
whereas the scientific non-self is already a laid out problematic. In modern physics one never 
works on the total unknown. A fortiori, against all theses that claim a fundamental irrational [or 
“ism”], one does not work on an unknowable [my translation, emphasis in original].18 
 
To establish a problematic is to demonstrate a problem – to go from rough (often con-
tradictory) themes or a set of questions to a precise problem. A problematic therefore 
always develops within an already constituted web of positives, never from a void: an 
epistemological space is erected between problem and question where a solution can be 
constructed. A solution to a theoretical problem is a theory. In that sense, science func-
tions by posing questions: why is the practical problem there? A problem of thought is 
an anomaly in relation to our previous experiences and world view: it constitutes a 
problem in relation to out previous knowledge, understanding, and explanations of the 
world regardless of this deriving from our mundane being in the words or active 
knowledge creation. The notion is singular, yes, but also anti-representational: problems 
are not constituted as an inquiry of the essence of things. Rather, a problem is singular 
in the sense that it simultaneously determines the subject to think and the object to be 
thought: “We must first posit the object as a subject of the problem, and the subject of 
                                                
17 “Historians of science have to take ideas as facts. Epistemologists have to take facts as ideas and place 
them within a system of thought. A fact that a whole era has misunderstood remains a fact in the histori-
ans’ eyes. For epistemologists however, it is an obstacle, a counter-thought.” Bachelard, The Formation 
of the Scientific Mind, p. 27 
18 Bachelard, Gaston. Le Rationalisme Appliqué (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966), p. 51 
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the cogito as a consciousness of the problem.”19 In the ontology of problems there is no 
world and thinker division – subject nor objects, things nor minds exist in themselves – 
there is ever only the problem at hand that introduces the very possibility of the correla-
tion, the epistemological space.  
 The problematique is a construction: “[I]n Scientific life, whatever people may 
say, problems do not pose themselves. It is indeed having this sense of the problem that 
marks out the true scientific mind. For a scientific mind, all knowledge is an answer to a 
question. If there has been no question, there can be no scientific knowledge. Nothing is 
self-evident. Nothing is given. Everything is constructed.”20 To think is to problematize, 
to criticise the questions themselves, and to refuse their basis: “In self-questioning 
rationalism [le rationalisme questionnant], the basis for knowledge are themselves put 
to the test, and brought into question by the question [my translation].”21 This makes 
science an ‘antilogy’ – a refusal of previous webs of belief and usual concepts (especial-
ly those of everyday language). To progress scientifically there is need for a meta-
physical foundation: “On fonde en construisant” Bachelard would say. That something 
that is constructed is the given. Hence, when Galileo Galilei wrote that the universe was 
written in the language of mathematics, he was constructing reality: he is not making an 
empirical statement, but rather asserts a metaphysical foundation so that he can apply 
mathematics to the celestial bodies.  
 To Nietzsche the philosophical doctrine of realism –the belief that some aspects 
of our reality are ontologically independent of our conceptual schemes– didn’t make 
much sense. He charges against the realist intoxication with apparent and unveiled 
reality, that they should “[s]ubtract the phantasm and every human contribution from it, 
my sober friends! If you can! If you can forget your decent, your past, your training–all 
of your humanity and animality.”22 There simply is no way for human beings to trans-
cend their Lebenswelt. Along similar lines, French historical epistemologists would 
much rather talk of realisation than of realism: Émile Meyerson posits that “science is 
not positive”, it does not test the relationship between a theory and the empirical reality 
– rather science realises the world that it is attempting to know, there is identity between 
thought and reality, which is why thought asserts a new reality.23 According to Anaxag-
                                                
19 Ibid, p. 56 
20 Bachelard, The Formation of the Scientific Mind, p. 25 
21 Bachelard, Le Rationalisme Appliqué, p. 57 
22 Nietzsche, Gay Science, §57, p. 121 
23 Meyerson, Émile. Identity and Reality, translated by Kate Loewenberg (London: Routledge, 2002),  
p. 384 
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oras, the world is ordered as by a cosmic mind (nous), but human beings can only dis-
cover that order by constructing it themselves. The chaos of the world is transformed 
into order when the human mind is put to work: “science conjures up a world, by means 
not of magic immanent in reality but of rational impulses immanent in [the] mind.”24 It 
is through construction that reality really becomes real. Historical epistemology is not 
anti-realist however, there will always be a realization of the problem: thus the real is 
what emerges by advancing the problem. 
 There is more at stake than a simple loss of the heroism of science when the later 
generation takes over from Bachelard. When Foucault appropriates the concept of prob-
lématique, and renames it the problematisation, we also find the reconciliation of the 
subjectivist and conceptual versions of phenomenology – in one move there is phenom-
enological involvement as well as phenomenological detachment – a seemingly 
impossible position.25 To Foucault, thought “is what allows one to step back from this 
way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought and question it 
as to its meaning, its conditions, and its goals. Thought is freedom in relation to what 
one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, 
and reflects it as a problem.”26 Thus, it is the freedom and detachment that thought 
grants itself from everything else and focuses on a object as a problem – a problem that 
is at the same time something that this ‘thinking I’ is involved with. For as Foucault 
turns around and asserts in the following paragraph it is exactly the (practical) problem 
that conditioned thought in the first place:  
 
To say that the study of thought is the analysis of freedom does not mean one is dealing with a 
formal system that has reference only to itself [i.e. Bachelard’s science]. Actually, for a domain 
of action, a behavior, to enter the field of thought, it is necessary for a certain number of factors 
to have made it uncertain, to have made it lose its familiarity, or to have provoked a certain 
number of difficulties around it. These elements result from social, economic, or political pro-
cesses. But here their only role is that of instigation. They can exist and perform their action for 
a very long time, before there is effective problematization by thought. And when thought inter-
venes, it doesn’t assume a unique form that is the direct result or the necessary expression of 
these difficulties; it is an original or specific response—often taking many forms, sometimes 
even contradictory in its different aspects—to these difficulties, which are defined for it by a sit-
uation or a context and which hold true as a possible question.27  
 
                                                
24 Bachelard, Gaston. The New Scientific Spirit, translated by Arthur Goldhammer (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1984), p. 13 
25 Bachelard held that the two approaches could never be reconciled and he explored both in his writing. 
For his work with an emphasis on phenomenological involvement, see: Bachelard, Gaston. The Poetics of 
Space, translated by Maria Jolas (Orion Press, Inc. 1964) 
26 Foucault, Michel. ‘Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations: an Interview’, in Paul Rabinow (ed.) The 
Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault’s Thought (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), p. 388 
27 Ibid. pp. 388-389 [my emphasis] 
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We could say that the conditionality of freedom of thought is the (practical) problem, 
but with it nothing is determined, only “instigated”. By insisting on the primacy of the 
problem, Foucault avoids the traps of involved (hermeneutics) and detached (structural-
ist) phenomenology. He neither reduces all meaning to mere structure –a view from 
nowhere, where the analyst is mistakenly displaced from the context within which he 
unavoidable will always be– nor does he locate the problem in relation to essences or 
deep meaning, or meaning behind the structures; the only meaning the problem can 
have is that which it is embowered with in the context where they appears. Hence, if we 
talk about any given problem we can describe it in two ways, neither of which is tangi-
ble. It is all there within the problem itself. Foucault’s solution to this problem was what 
he called “déchiffrement” (akin to Heidegger’s “thinking”) – or we could call it the 
decipherment of a position in between them, where we can decipher, as it were, how the 
problem arises and is inscribed with meaning from within the context.28 That is, the 
decipherment of the problem has the status of interpretation of the situation: an interpre-
tation that amounts to an understanding that is radically different from that available to 
other actors. As such, problematisations are not polemical, nor are they a kind of decon-
struction – meaning and the political only arises posteriori. In its philosophical variant, 
we are not far away from Heideggerian fundamental ontology as the inquiry into the 
Dasein’s capacity to grasp Being – the work of thought is a ground-clearing exercise. 
 Foucault, contrary to Bachelard, uses problematisation as both noun and verb: 
that is, he takes problematisation as both a method for studying the history of thought as 
well as its object of study – if thought really only consist of those events that disrupts 
and redefines the character of consciousness, whether willingly or unwillingly, then 
there is no other choice than to take problematisations as the object of a problematisa-
tion. The problem just is… that much is clear from an ontology of problems: “What is 
the answer to the question? The problem. How is the problem resolved? By displacing 
the question. […] We must think problematically rather than question and answer dia-
lectically.”29 In that regard, ‘sexuality’ is not a part of human nature; rather it is a part of 
culture and history. Foucault therefore asks, to which question is sexuality an answer? 
The answer, which has an implicit solution, is ‘how should I conduct myself?’ As an 
object of study a problematisation is the “ensemble of discursive and non-discursive 
practices that makes something enter into the play of the true and the false, and consti-
                                                
28 Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Paul Rabinow. Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics 
(University of Chicago Press, 1983) 
29 Foucault, Michel. ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’, Critique, 282 (1970): pp. 885-908 
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tutes it as an object of thought.”30 The point is to backtrack form the problem to the 
question. Accordingly, we can take the problem as the object of study because it is 
within the problem in the way that it is problematized that we find both the questions 
behind it, but also the possible ways of handling the problem – i.e. the different practic-
es involved. Foucault explains it thus: 
 
[T]he work of a history of thought would be to rediscover at the root of these diverse solutions 
the general form of problematization that has been made them possible—even in their very op-
position; or what has made possible the transformations of the difficulties and obstacles of a 
practice into a general problem for which one proposes diverse practical solutions. It is problem-
atization that responds to these difficulties, but by doing something quite other than expressing 
them or manifesting them: in connection with them it develops the conditions in which possible 
response will be given; it defines the elements that will constitute what the different solutions at-
tempt to respond to. This development of a given into a question, this transformation of a group 
of obstacles and difficulties into problems to which the diverse solutions will attempt to produce 
a response, this is what constitutes the point of problematization and the specific work of 
thought.31  
 
 
[9] If conscious thought is based on a particular positive, and the thought at work in 
problematisation consists in constituting a new positive, it then counts as an event. With 
the concept of the ‘epistemological obstacle’ Bachelard introduced a caesural under-
standing of science – science is marked by its discontinuities; it does not progress in a 
linear fashion, it does so rhythmically between the constructed given and the realization 
of the problem. By doing so, differences are located: the goal is not hermeneutical – to 
derive meaning by appealing to common features in man, culture, or history – rather it 
is to show the difference in worldviews, to show how the old is in the new and how the 
new already was in the old. With historical epistemology, we can see that there are 
different layers of thought that are historically contingent. To August Comte these were 
the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive; to Bachelard, these became the pre-
scientific, the scientific, and the new scientific spirit; and with Foucault they were the 
renaissance, the enlightenment, the modern, and structuralism.32 It is the shifts in rules 
of interpretation between them that are characterized as events. 
 To Foucault, the problematisation is equal to a realization of the problem and it 
is only this that would count as an event; a somewhat anonymous process that breaks up 
                                                
30 Foucault, Michel. ‘Le souci de la vérité (entretien avec F. Ewald)’, Magazine littéraire, no 207 (1984), 
pp. 18-23 [my translation] 
31 Foucault, “Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations’, p. 389 [my emphasis] 
32 Comte, August. The Positive Philosophy, translated by Harriet Martineau (Batoche Books, 2000); 
Bachelard, Gaston. The Formation of the Scientific Mind: a contribution to the psychoanalysis of objec-
tive knowledge, translated by Mary McAllester Jones (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2002); and Foucault, 
Michel. The Order of Things An Archaeology of the Human Science, translation Tavistock/Routledge 
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and redraws the conventional lines of history. The problem never has only one father; 
rather problems are events – a reversal of interpretations that posits a new situation. 
What are the conditions for a given break to constitute an event? An event is an inter-
pretation:  
 
If interpretation is the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules, which in itself 
has no essential meaning, in order to impose a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its par-
ticipation in a different game, and to subject it to secondary rules, then the development of hu-
humanity is a series of interpretations. The role of genealogy is to record its history: the history 
of morals, ideals, and metaphysical concepts, the history of the concept of liberty or of the ascet-
ic life; as they stand for the emergence of different interpretations, they must be made to appear 
as events on the state of historical process.33 
  
Thus we should only consider those events that have implications for the problem at 
hand, that put it through transformations and displacements. A transformation is here 
the real but unconscious shifts that the problem goes through in its constant interpreta-
tion; and a displacement is a spatial term (along with territory, field, and domain), not a 
temporal or conceptual one, that connotes the dispersion and dislocation of the problem.  
 A problematisation is then a kind of formatting of a field that suggests solutions 
and particular models for their implementation. Deleuze and Guattari talk about de-
territorialisation and re-territorialisation as when a space (epistemological or physical) 
is cleansed of existing power structures only to be replaced by new ones.34 It is a pro-
cess of struggle. Read in this light, the history of thought is a history of how problems 
have been displaced at different points in time, how they have been duplicated into 
other fields, and how they have disappeared from others. With the idea of a formatted 
territory, a problematisation builds on already digested thought as though it simultane-
ously superimposes and embeds with an already occupied and problematic space. With 
emerging practical problems within one territory, a problematisation might present 
itself.  
 The realization of a problem is not an uncomplicated process, because problems 
always occur in an already formatted space, as when a new problem joins others in a 
given territory or when they clash over another. The problematisation of a new problem 
within an already existing framework of formatted space is like adding another instru-
ment to an already beating rhythm; it has to follow the rhythm that all the others are 
playing – it can choose to embed within them rather anonymously, or it can superim-
                                                
33 Foucault, Michel. ”Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, in Paul Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader: An 
Introduction to Foucault’s Thought (London: Penguin Books, 1984), p. 86 
34 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, translated by Robert 
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pose upon them and break into a violent solo One thing is for sure: the music doesn’t 
stop playing. 
 
[10] A problematisation is a focal point of experience. As human beings we have expe-
riences: to Homer, “We men are wretched things.”35 To Augustine, “For thou hast 
created us for thyself, and our heart cannot be quieted till it may find repose in thee.”36 
To Camus, “Man is the only creature who refuses to be what he is.”37 But what are all 
these experience of being human – how are these exact experiences possible and not 
others, why do we not experience the world in the same way? Because of the way in 
which we “think” about the world – because of the way in which thought structures our 
experiences. Everything is borrowed, everything comes from somewhere else – it is 
Nietzsche’s character of consciousness at play again. In that regard we can say that 
thought is a kind of focal point of experience. The life-world – Lebenswelt – is the 
horizon of all experience: it forms the background on which all things appear as them-
selves and as meaningful. What is the structure of these background practices? To 
Foucault, it is thought (as a problematisation) that is the focal point of experience, and 
its underlying structure is suspended between three points: “a game of truth, relations of 
power, and forms of relations to oneself and to others.”38 Such conditions are not de-
monstrable, but are tied to the problematic that varies with history, not historically (they 
are the focal points upon which any particular historical formation takes shape).39  
 Truth is an event – the genesis of something real (the realization of the prob-
lem). Human beings play different games of truth (les jeux de vérité) that consists of 
truth-acts. A truth-act is the manifestation of truth, what Foucault calls “alethurgary 
forms” – that is, the more or less ritualized manifestations of truth. 40 These games of 
                                                
35 Hom.Il.24 
36 Aug.Conf.1 
37 Camus, Albert. The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt, Translated by Anthony Bower (Vintage Inter-
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38 Foucault, ‘Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations’, p. 387 
39 Deleuze, Gilles. Foucault, translated and edited by Seán Hand (London: Bloomsbury, 1988), p. 94  
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truth are arranged not according to strict rules, but rather according to what Foucault 
calls “regimes of truth” (against truth as its own criterion, veritas est index sui et falsi) – 
“the type of relations that link together manifestations of truth with their procedures and 
the subject who are their operators, witnesses, or possible objects.”41 It is all a question 
of style; there are different styles of playing games of truth, different ways of being a 
truth-teller. 
  Power is a strategic relation: it is to be understood in terms of its concrete appli-
cation in strategies and tactics; that is, power as a force relation. To that end, power is 
about constructing “normative frameworks of behaviour” between human beings. 
Thought is implicated in the exercise of power. Foucault links the technical aspect 
gouverner (governing) with modes of thought – mentalité – and constructs the neolo-
gism la gouvernementalité (governmentality). 42  Governmentality is about conduit 
(conduct) in an ethical sense as the activity of conducting one self, and in a normative 
sense as conducting behavior.43 In the ethical sense, government is the effort to shape, 
sculpt, and guide choices, needs, and lifestyles of groups and individuals. It is to govern 
through freedom in a suggestive way. In the normative sense, government is to establish 
a code of conduct to which behavior can be judged and regulated. Government is a kind 
of behaviour; it is the act of exercising power, to conduct the conduct of others. Govern-
ing is the “conduct of conduct,” a behaviour that seeks to “structure the possible fields 
of action of others.”44 
 And last the Subject, or rather “subjectification” because the subject is not a 
predisposed thing that one is automatically because of ones humanity. Rather, the sub-
ject is created or formed through the creation of knowledge, through the formation of 
power relations, as well as through what Foucault terms “technologies of the self.” Such 
technologies take the shape of friendly conversations with friends, the confessions to a 
priest, or a therapeutic session with psychiatrist, and they aim to produce the truth of 
ones self, ones being: what am I, what can I be, how can I produce myself as a “good” 
subject? Subjectification is a process and additionally one that is not always the same 
historically. The modern subject is understood as something has a depth that must be 
analysed on its surfaces (behaviour), while the Christian self was one that had to earn 
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eternal salvation and thus needed to work on the formation of the soul. Thus, in the 
focal point of experience we see three distinct conceptual items: (1) a problem space, 
which (2) has a number of possible solutions, by which we are predisposed to solving 
problems in a particular way, by particular technologies and rationalities (governmental-
ity), and (3) how these solutions together are experienced. Just as there is thought 
involved in truth, there is thought in power, and there is thought in the way we become 
subjects. It is the history of experience (subjectification) in the history of normative 
frameworks of behaviour (governmentality) in the history of problems (forms of ve-
ridiction).  
 Foucault thus heuristically lodges the focal point of experience within the prob-
lem of truth, the problem of the exercise of power, and the problem of the self. All 
categories that seems hard to avoid when considering our present. Nevertheless, contra-
ry to what many Foucauldians might hold, the structure of positives that act as focal 
points of experience can however have alternate structures, as they are always deter-
mined by their specific problem (there are no universal points of fixation in thought, 
only casts of the dice); although this might be most clear outside the Western tradition. 
 
[11] There is an important distinction to be drawn between the concept of problematisa-
tion and what Foucault refers to as the “field of problematisation”: that is, the creation 
of concepts that correspond to a given problem (the process of thought); and the field of 
already constituted a priori concepts and practices. But while fields of problematisation 
are non-subjective and anonymous, their function is to determine and ground the possi-
bility and diversity of statements (connaissance) to a common theme, the act of 
problematizing (the process of thought) is supposed to be the constituting of such a field 
(as a kind of contribution or intervention). Hence, in so far as the field is what makes 
discourse possible, it also limits what can be thought and thus we must ask how the 
creation of concepts was possible in the first place? 
 We find a similar notion in Deleuze and Guattari’s “plane of immanence” and 
“conceptual persona” in their book What is Philosophy?.45 To them, “[t]he plane of 
immanence is not a concept that is or can be thought but rather the image of thought, the 
image thought gives itself of what it means to think, to make use of thought, to find 
one's bearings in thought.”46 In the movement of thought it is known only intuitively 
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and gives it directionality. Plane or field – both are geographical notions that need to be 
laid out: concepts are inscribed, arranged and organized in a diagrammed fashion and 
always in relation to a given set of problems emanating from a chaotic world.47 A tradi-
tion of thought is made up of many planes of immanence, potentially as many as there 
have been problems. The plane of immanence considered in this thesis, as I pointed out 
in the introduction, is the problematic relation between truth and politics (the problem 
of thought’s test in politics) with a set of correlated sub-problems that have their own 
concept formation: a topology is spun out between the problem of truth, the problem of 
political order, and the problem of the political game. 
 “If philosophy begins with the creation of concepts, then the plane of imma-
nence must be regarded as prephilosophical [as] something that does not exists outside 
philosophy” and thus thought requires an agent; the process of thought is always subjec-
tive in the sense that it is someone who thinks.48 That someone is, to Deleuze and 
Guattari, the philosopher (a dubious title). The philosopher however cannot ground 
concepts (in himself) and he therefore creates conceptual persona who think in their 
stead, the true agent of their enunciation, the operator of the conceptual machinery: 
Plato’s Socrates, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, or more abstractly Pascal’s Gambler are all 
examples thereof. But this is not a real persona, rather in his works the philosopher is 
linked to his conceptual persona, it is his or her idiosyncrasy and “the role of the con-
ceptual persona is to show thought’s territories….”49 The conceptual persona and the 
plane of immanence are therefore inseparable: the conceptual persona – the relational 
parrhésiast, the exhortative philosopher king, or the judgemental critic, (archetypes of 
their epochs) as we shall get to know them later – is situated between the plane or field 
(the web of positive beliefs) and the chaos of the world, where he performs the dual task 
of, on the one hand fabricating concepts that make up their topological features, he lays 
out the field in its “diagrammatic features” and arranges, organizes, aligns, and relates 
the concepts that populate it with their corresponding problems.50 The conceptual per-
sona accordingly mediates between the diagrammatic features of thought and the 
                                                
47 Deleuze and Guattari argue that other creative modes of thought that enthusiastically plunges into the 
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problematic features of concepts. There is nevertheless no one criterion for telling 
whether the persona created, the concepts invented, or the plane laid out is successful in 
dealing with the problem: “Philosophy thus lives in a permanent crisis. The plane takes 
effect through shocks; concepts proceed in bursts, and personae by spasms. The rela-
tionship among the three instances is problematic by nature.”51 In the concepts that I am 
trying to develop here, we can say that the process of thought thus has a fundamental 
circularity of problem, problematisation and practices.  
 
[12] There is a distinction to be drawn between a traditional history of ideas and a histo-
ry of thought whose focal point is the problem. Where the former is about the 
appearance and reappearance of concepts (Liberty, Justice, or Equality), their subse-
quent development, and the contextual setting of other concepts so as to ascertain and 
locate their exact meaning in their original ideological context.52 While the latter is 
about how something becomes a problem for someone: how practices that were previ-
ously taken for granted have become problematic, either by circumstance, their own 
development, or by them being in conflict with other practices. With Foucault:  
 
The history of thought is the analysis of the way an unproblematic field of experience, or a set of 
practices, which were accepted without question, which were familiar and “silent,” out of dis-
cussion, becomes a problem, raises discussion and debate, incites new reactions, and induces a 
crisis in the previously silent behaviour, habits, practices, and institutions.53  
 
Again, there is a sense of the background of the philosophical infrastructure that bub-
bles up and becomes the object of thought as something that makes us anxious and 
something that we want to break free from. Thus, rather than looking for an immanent 
meaning of a concept that would be valid across history, or one that could be used for a 
correction to present day you (a task of clarification for correct use), a history of 
thought is about how a concept became an object of care, of contention, something that 
presented a problem. In sum, a history of ideas is about concepts while a history of 
thought is about what made it necessary to think: i.e. the problem. Which is not to say 
that a history of thought is disinterested in concepts: it is not a history of concepts, but a 
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52 The most prominent examples would be Quentin Skinner and Reinhart Koselleck, yet there are also 
differences between them: where Skinner looks for what the author intended with his conceptualization, 
Koselleck locates the meaning of the concept solely by its opposition to other concepts, the author is in 
that regard arbitrary. See: Skinner, Quentin. The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume One 
The Renaissance (Cambridge University Press, 1978); and Koselleck, Reinhart. The Practice of Concep-
tual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts, translated by Todd Samuel Presner (Stanford University 
Press, 2002) 
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history of problems where concepts are involved – concepts are not always deployed to 
do the same thing. 
 
[13] Concepts are deployed in relation to a problem – a concept that does not address 
the problem at hand has little value, with Deleuze and Guattari, “concepts are connected 
to problems without which they would have no meaning and which can themselves only 
be isolated or understood as their solution emerges.”54 Thus concepts always correspond 
to a problem and it is from there that they receive their meaning and usage. But what is 
a concept? Or we could ask, with Deleuze and Guattari, what is the concept of concept? 
First, all concepts have a history, a becoming in which they relate to other concepts at 
the intersection of the problem: in their creation they contain components (which them-
selves can be considered as concepts); in that sense concepts “extend to infinity and, 
being created, are never created from nothing.”55 In relation to the problem of world 
order, hierarchy might be related to anarchy (as structured versus unstructured relations 
of power) but, conversely, it could also relate to historical concepts such as imperii (as 
the different between ruler and ruled). The order of concrete and abstract are here 
reversed; the more detailed the development of a concept is the more concrete, or rather 
the clearer it becomes. Second, concepts are a concrete assemblage of constituent parts 
and what makes them special (in relation to other concepts) is the way in which it ren-
der these components inseparable within itself: the concept is a constituted unity of 
multiplicities.56 Concepts are thus both endoconsistent and exoconsistent: their internal 
consistency is guaranteed by the inseparability of its heterogeneous components, while 
their relation to other concepts secures its place on a plane of immanence (hierarchy as 
the structure between powers). This is what makes concepts ambiguous, elastic and 
open for re-interpretation and therefore different from words (it is the context of the 
problem which transmutes the word into a concept).  
 Third, concepts are the meeting point of their singular components, which they 
constantly surveys (survol) and endlessly accumulate, arrange, and modify. Concepts 
are therefore intensive rather than extensive, meaning that they cannot be subdivided 
without also altering their kind and are therefore intensive multiplicities that are abso-
lute and relative at the same time. They are relative to their components, other concepts, 
the plane on which they are generated, and to the problem to which they are a solution; 
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and absolute in their condensation, their position of the plane, and the conditions they 
give to the problem. Furthermore and in so far as they are intensive multiplicities, con-
cepts constitute an event in thought. As such, a concept is an act of thought and 
consequently it has no referent (it is unescapably self-referential), which means that it 
cannot have a truth-value (understood as the correspondence between a proposition and 
a state of affairs).57 Rather, the reality of a concept is tested in experience; that is, they 
are either helpful or unhelpful in addressing the experience of problems. To Deleuze 
and Guattari, the creation of concepts (the practice of philosophy) is to be understood as 
constructivism and thus concepts are virtual – that is, “the concept is real without being 
actual, ideal without being abstract.”58 Fourth, and following from this, if concepts are 
constructed as acts of thought that are self-referential then they cannot also be discur-
sive entities: that is, they have no rules of formation (within a discursive formation 
philosophy would be impossible: thought has to remain free). Discussion and debate are 
antimonies to thought; they prevent the process of thought from creating concepts that 
are sufficient for addressing the problem because they never talk about the same thing. 
That is the proper meaning of philosophy’s test in politics; the arrogance of thought that 
says here is my concept, it will solve your problem! However, once philosophy has let 
go of its creation it can be picked up in discourse – we see and speak with concepts, 
they determine what is visible and articulable. The political features of concepts then 
appear as they are appropriated, rearranged, coupled with other concepts (positive and 
negative), purposed and repurposed, and aimed at the concepts of ones opponent before 
finally being deployed in political discourse (so much for political philosophy). 
 
[14] We usually think of theory and practice as separate and immutable realms, but if 
thinking is to ‘think’ in terms of problems (problematise) and there is thought in prac-
tices; a theory is a construction of thought. To Historical Epistemology, a theoretical 
language (in the sense of a spirit – esprit scientifique) is something that enables an 
interpretation of phenomena: an experiment (expérience) is not only an observation of a 
phenomenon; it is a theoretical interpretation of that phenomenon.59 Facts cannot de-
termine our interpretation; interpretations on the other hand decide what counts as facts. 
This does not result in a denial of facts, but rather the denial of access to brute facts. To 
                                                
57 Ibid., p. 144 
58 Ibid., p. 22 
59 Pierre Duhem (1906) La Théorie Physique: son objet et sa structure (Paris: Chevalier and Rivière), p. 
233, “Une expérience de Physique n’est pas simplement l’observation d’un phénomène; elle est, en outre, 
l’interprétation théorique de ce phénomène.” 
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think is to break with prior thought, to offer a new interpretation – hence the importance 
of the epistemological break (the belief in the access to brute facts is fatal to thought). 
Accordingly, a theory is not about a reality beyond the relation between the internal 
laws of the experiment; rather, a theory is a construction or model that permits us to see 
the real. The theory is a grasp on reality, not an assertion about it: the theoretical object 
(l’objet théorique) serves as a model for thought to grasp the real object (l’objet réel). 
We can consequently talk of a kind of Sedimentation of a theory in material reality: or 
rather there is sedimentation of thought in the material. This is the assertion that the use 
of a technical instrument is only possible on the background of a theory; that is, on the 
background of a theoretical interpretation of the phenomenon: with Bachelard, “instru-
ments are nothing but theories materialized.”60 It is clear then, that just like metaphysics 
is the foundation of a theory, theory is the condition for a technical instrument. Thought 
is like the Trojan horse, it sneaks into reality and materializes and imposes its order on 
the world. Hence, we can talk of the sedimentation of thought in architecture, institu-
tions, instruments, and the body – the theoretical object (l’objet théorique) is 
transmitted to the real object (l’objet réel).  
 
[15] Practices are the actualization of thought. As actions or doings of human beings, 
the actuality of human behaviour has a concrete material existence that can be observed. 
However, the concept of practice has three opposing registers: practice – as the patho-
logical view of actions as having irrational structures that are determined by the chance 
and indeterminacy of Heraclitian flux; practical knowledge (phronésis) – as the view 
that human behaviour is rooted in the skill of agents who either display a good or bad 
performance; and practices – the things that human beings do have a degree of aesthetic 
normality to them, because they are imbued with meaning they prescribe actions (the 
normal).61 To all three belong different notions of historical change: from the viewpoint 
of practice change is inevitable, from the viewpoint of practical knowledge change is 
defined as a possibility lodged within the agent, and from the viewpoint of practices: 
“Practices change but our observation of their change is never direct. It is always medi-
ated by a particular narrative structure or philosophy of history. How practices change, 
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61 Jorg Kustermans (2016) “Parsing the Practice Turn: Practice, Practical Knowledge, Practices”, in 
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the direction or meaning of their change and the impulses driving their change, remains 
a matter of appreciation, of irreducible theorisation.”62  
 These three concepts of action – practice, practices and practical knowledge – 
constitute the tripartite registers of actualized thought within any traditions of thought. 
They all relate to the encounter with a problem. Yet, to write a history of thought via the 
medium of practice would be to leave everything to chance, human beings would have 
absolutely no role to play; and writing a history in terms of practical knowledge 
(phronésis) would be an overemphasis of the individual – a conservatism and essential-
ism of a particular elite (the thinking elite; or the Aristotelian philosopher) transcending 
all time: behind every corner we find Plato lurking, waiting to share his eternal wisdom. 
If a history of thought is to remain anonymous, but not completely given up to the 
haphazardness of flux, it must strike the balance between them and choose to write its 
history in terms of practices – the clearest manifestation of thought. Which is not to say 
that the other two registers are irrelevant; in the process of actualizing thought, the 
attempt of performing a practice will depend on the one who performs it (thus depend-
ent on his or her practical knowledge), and things rarely go as anticipated by the 
programs of practices (thus resulting in the actual performance, practice). In other 
words, it is practices that provide the intensive force of practice and practical 
knowledge: it is within practices that we find ‘solutions’ to ‘problems’. To decipher 
how something came to be a problem they may prove as important, but practices remain 
the main register because the other two constitute themselves with an irregularity that 
makes analysis challenging. Everything might be up to chance, but that is an unliveable 
condition in the long run. Such practices are composed from background knowledge 
(the givens of a tradition), which depending on the problems experienced, can be either 
central or marginal to a culture.  
III 
[16] For now all that I have done is to develop of a number of concepts, all of which are 
happening in synchronicity: a) the problem, as a anomaly in relation to our practices; b) 
realization, as the event where history makes the problem emerge; c) the dialectic of 
field of problematisation, the specific discursive and non-discursive practices that make 
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something enter into the play of the true and the false and constitutes it as an object of 
thought; d) the sedimentation, of thought into practices; and e) practices, as part of a 
taken for granted background (doxa) of action. The task now is to show how the ar-
rangement can be stretched out so as to form a succession; the unison of thought has to 
be broken up in parts that can be placed one after the other – to form the process of 
thought. A model for how traditions of thought progress might look something like the 
following:  
 
 
 
(1) Practices1: the existent and taken for granted background practices (doxa) 
(2) Problem1: the (possible) actualization of a practical problem. 
îèRealisation: the realization of the problem as an interpretation of a question. 
(3) Problematisation: thought is put to work on the basis of existing background practices and 
the problem is strategically ‘resolved’ by processes of displacement or transformation. 
èSedimentation: the subsequent sedimentation of thought into un-thought where it either su-
perimposes or are embedded within existing practices. 
(4) Practices2: a new set of practices is gradually taken for granted and forms the background of 
intelligibility (doxa).  
(5) Problem2: the (possible) actualization of a new practical problem… 
 
This is a general model, which is to say that there is no content (no explicit thought) at 
the same time as it accounts for the processes of the creation of explicit thought (or 
rather the background on which they take place, their formation). It is also general in the 
sense that it is independent of the specific problem with which human beings are faced: 
the model can account for the change in thought whether we are analysing European 
society in the seventeenth century or the Mayan culture in the ninth century. Further-
more, it is also general in the sense that there is no specific societal or political view 
hidden within it; it is, however, anticonservative in that it is about how thought pro-
gresses by refusing that which is given at the present.  
 
[17] Following from the distinction between theoretical and real objects (l’objet réel), 
we can posit that reality is different from a model; it is messy because of the multiple 
problems in it and the thought that these produce. When we look at the world we see the 
actualization of thought: we see the circulation of human bodies, some on pilgrimage to 
distant places, others walking over London bridge like ants to work in the City, and 
others yet crossing borders in search for new opportunities; we see swords clashing and 
shields shattering, the guns of a battleship blazing on the inhabitants of a capital city, 
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the bombs of a plane dropping on an unintended target; we see a plough driven by two 
oxen though irrigated fields, the roaring combustion engine of a tractor stuck in the 
mud, the development and production of gene modified seeds which do not last more 
than one season; the erection of circular walls enclosing a small town, the tearing down 
of public squalor to make new light in the city, and monuments risen to the commemo-
ration of great men and the ones they vanquished. There is not automatically one prime 
positive that determines all (say modernity): because the reality of brute facts is messy 
thought has overlapping sets of positives addressing different problems and sometimes 
in conflict with one another. Hence, all the examples above aren’t even true brute facts; 
all of them are only possible to think of given the background thought of today: i.e. 
gene-modification necessitates a construction of the “gene” as a series of code. As 
actualised thought, a tradition of thought always folds in on itself. The present is consti-
tuted as its own history with practices emanating from its past problems: some are 
central, others peripheral, depending on the most recent encounter that forced the pro-
cess of thought, the others remain in the mix and yet some are lost to time. The purpose, 
therefore, of such an analysis attempted here is to make sense of the problématique; to 
outline its conjures and the problems that has shaped it present form. 
 
[18] In so far as we can talk about trajectories in the history of thought: this is a history 
without teleological points or hidden origins – it is neither about the forgetfulness of 
being, or the completion of rationality; rather it is with Wittgenstein a history about 
curved lines that constantly change direction.63 All there ever is and has been is a series 
of problems, practices and problematisations that move forward in a rhythmical fashion, 
with human beings being involved at every step. As such it has synchronic and dia-
chronic properties: each problematisation constitutes a synchronic slice that has its own 
structure and logic, that taken together one after the other forms a history of with a 
diachronic course towards the present. It is these episodes that are of interest in the 
history of a problem.  
 What all problems of thought have in common, however, is that they all result 
from our being-in-the-world. They originate in nature, and from our socio-economical, 
political, cultural, and material conditions of life – in short, the totality of our practices 
and their problematisations. They do so because our being-in-the-word limits us, and 
because our conditions of life often are contradictory and our actions carry with them 
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unintended and unfortunate consequences. In fact, our natural environment and condi-
tions of life determines what problems of thought we are presented with: without 
existence being dangerous and problematic, without practical problems that force a 
society to organize, there would be no reason to think. The history of any particular 
tradition of thought is therefore and foremost the history of the very problems that has 
ignited its existence. However, we should note that “human history and the history of 
philosophy [thought] do no have the same rhythm.”64 The intensity of the fundamental 
encounter that is the problem determines their connection; a problem might be discov-
ered in philosophy but remain hidden to society. 
 To Bachelard, human beings are a “mutating” species: most problems of thought 
originate from contradictions that we are directly confronted with in the form of practi-
cal problems.65 Bachelard talks of a “metaphysics of the contradictory”: that is, Being is 
not unitary, but contradictory – every ‘solution’ or synthesis (knowledge) to a given 
problems necessarily ends in a new paradox: “For the scientist Being can never be 
wholly comprehended by either experience or reason. It is therefore the task of the 
epistemology to explain the ever-changing synthesis of reason and experience, even 
though achieving such a synthesis philosophically might appear to be a hopeless prob-
lem.”66 We inhabit the universe of Dionysus, of eternal enigma of duality and paradox. 
If this is so, there will be no end to the positing of la problématique: reality is always 
changing because it is perpetually problematic. Thus, with such a model it might be 
easy to give into a kind of Cassandra complex, but we would only deceive ourselves if 
we think we can predict future mutations – the mutation remains dictated by the prob-
lem and the battle that follows in the kingdom of effective history ruled by “the iron 
hands of necessity which shake the dice-box of chance.”67 Perhaps, the only active part 
we can hope to play is to bring problems to the fore: to problematise. 
                                                
64 Deleuze and Guattari, What is philosophy?, p. 103 
65 This does not mean however that all problems of thought spring directly from practical problems or 
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withstanding. 
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IV 
[19] The natural consequence of maintaining that the catalyst of traditions of thought is 
a fundamental encounter with a problem that sensation is unable to grasp is that there 
necessarily are multiple and different traditions of thought. Such a fact posits epistemo-
logical relativism. There are many worlds, many ‘knowledges’ – all human beings have 
not been confronted with the same problems, neither have they necessarily considered 
them problems. This much is true historically as well as geographically, and the pletho-
ra of practices across the globe testifies to this fact. Different traditions of thought have 
developed different concepts, constituted different objects, been shaped by different 
power relations, which has resulted in different experiences (of being human) – all 
because they have had different problems to deal with. Consequently, even the value of 
knowledge differs form tradition to tradition, which is why the problems of European 
epistemology might seem completely unproblematic and irrelevant to other traditions.  
 
[20] Pointing to the historicity of that special kind of knowledge produced by the scien-
tific discipline of International Relations is nothing new. Such a starting point however 
inescapably, upsets what is taken for granted in the discipline of International Relations. 
Even though we insist that epistemological anarchy does not derive from political anar-
chy and conversely political anarchy does not emanate from epistemological anarchy, 
the existence of polities seems to originate with a particular set of problems. There is a 
critical distinction to be made however, that of traditions of thought on the one hand, 
and societal traditions on the other. Traditions as cultures or civilizations or societies are 
not of direct interest, such notions emerge only on the backdrop of traditions of thought. 
If problems are the catalyst of traditions of thought, they must be primary to any con-
cepts we must create to address them. Thus, the existence of other traditions of thought 
might not pose a problem to any one tradition of thought; conversely it might also pose 
the problem of that tradition. A parachronistic example would the blindness of Interna-
tional Relations to alternate political units than the territorially fixated state coming 
from other traditions than the Western one. This is probably one of the most prominent 
examples of something not being regarded as a problem today (though it was a blatant 
practical problem in the past). Furthermore, traditions of thought cuts across what we 
now call ‘national traditions,’ and thus to insist on national traditions would be to cut 
the implications short – the production of national knowledges would only be possible 
on background of the western tradition of thought. The planning of cities in Europe has 
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followed similar lines of developments in response to changing problems (particularly 
in response to warfare and economic development), whereas for instance the Mayans 
planned their cities to meet different challenges (in worship of the gods). That is, the 
very concept of a nation (society or polity) as what sets one human being apart from 
another is only derived at in the special context of the Western tradition and thus refer-
ring to “societal multiplicity” cuts it short, because society is a concept created in a 
response to a particular problem – a problem that cannot be demonstrated as being 
universal or trans-traditional. From the standpoint of Historical Epistemology, the very 
concept of a society only arises a posteriori of thought. Therefore, what should be the 
determent of traditions of thought is multiplicity of problems and the sought after solu-
tions (the different ways in which a problem is constituted). 
 
[21] In terms of ethics, we might approach the following questions normatively: what 
does it mean to maintain the primacy of the problem in relation to other traditions of 
thought? Does the existence of other traditions in their existence alone pose a problem? 
Can other traditions be swept aside for the greater good because they pose irrelevant 
problems? And on what criterion can such questions even be addressed? If we start with 
the problem, a normative a priori stance proves to be difficult – while each tradition of 
thought has a habit of dictating normative stances towards to outside word, it might here 
be useful to suspend traditional limitations and think atraditionally (to think without 
positives). Within the meta-physics of the contradictory, the emphasis would always be 
on the problem and thus its ethics is constituted in relation to the problem at hand alone 
and nothing else. Such thought takes place not in a vacuum, but between opposing 
traditions – there is no way to determine how such a confrontation might play out, nor 
determine what shape or form it might take (which usually tend to favour one over the 
other). Democratic values are definitely tested: the very premise of democracy is that 
there is certain agreed upon rules that are derived from constructed positives of a tradi-
tion of thought. The purpose of the nominalist exercise was thus to create as few 
concepts as possible so as to make them easier to translate to different traditions of 
thought. Yet, in so far as we can talk of incommensurability between traditions of 
thought there are still some problems to sort out; is there nothing but tedious work that 
prevents the translation of concepts from one tradition to another? 
 
[22] In conclusion, the theoretical position outlined in the chapter can be summed up as 
follows. It asks the question: how did it become possible to think differently? The basis 
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for the theory was taken from the French school of Historical Epistemology where the 
foundational distinction is between ‘conscious thought’ and the ‘un-thought’, which 
constitutes an ‘epistemological obstacle’ or background upon which conscious thought 
can appear. Accordingly, there is always an aspect of our thought that remains silent, 
yet indispensible because it constitutes the concepts (or positives) with which we think. 
The un-thought always stands in relation to the problem, which it was initially moulded. 
Tradition here signifies not the continuation of something, but rather the break with 
something specific: the old is in the new and the new was already in the old. What is 
different is the way in which the problem rearranges the order of things. Thus, a tradi-
tion of thought becomes a series of specific breaks with prior thought. The theory is 
constituted around three concepts: the problem, problematisation, and practices. A 
problematisation is the event of thought that sits in between the problem and the subse-
quent practices. The primary insight of this theory is that practices are problematized: 
That is, human beings cope with the material and social world in terms of problematisa-
tions that more or less strategically handle rather than negate or ameliorate problems. 
Things enter into a tension field between true and false and are constituted as objects of 
thought where they can be reflected upon in terms of problems that require solutions. In 
other words, this is the way that an epistemological space is erected between a question 
and a possible set of solutions. Any given epistemological space is thus populated by 
concepts and their corresponding problems, which condition and give meaning to dif-
ferent practices. The theory wages that thought should be studied through practices 
rather than conscious thought. The last section of the chapter was devoted to tentatively 
contemplating the current multiplicity of traditions of thought in world politics as a 
result of the encounter of different problems. 
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Chapter II: Parrhēsia 
*   *   * 
[1] This chapter describes what could be called the ‘beginning’ of the politics of truth in 
the Western tradition. It examines the historical rupture between a politics of truth 
which focal point is the ancient figure of the wise king and one with the democratic 
figure of the parrhēsiast. In other words, it surveys the displacement of one epistemo-
logical space by another with an altogether different conceptual topology. Through a 
reading of Homer, the chapter starts by (I) outlining the politics of truth of the wise king 
and its central mechanism the oath where one swears towards the gods that one is in the 
true, but truth as such does not appear. In this politics of truth knowledge and power 
cohere to each other; the wise king is in possession of both. This politics of truth is not 
exclusive to Greek thought and therefore some similarities with other civilizations in the 
ancient world are noted. At about the end of the 7th and 6th century BC (II), the two 
interconnected problems of ‘crooked judgement’ and the ‘rule of one’ (monarchos) 
appear in Greek thought. By selectively remembering the rules of oath taking the kings 
or aristocracy would pass crooked judgements, which was reflected in political practices 
as well. The response to these problems result in (III) the politics of truth where one 
‘says everything’ (parrhēsia), which involves two crucial changes: first, as a demand 
for straight justice truth would have to appear on the basis of a will to know; and se-
cond, the basic mechanism would remain the oath, but instead of swearing it towards 
the gods, one swears towards ones fellow man and thus involve a kind of contract. To 
Archaic Greek thought the practice of parrhēsia is situated in between on the one hand, 
a political order (politeia) that guarantees the freedom to speak what one genuinely 
thinks to be the truth (isēgoria); and on the other, the exercise of power (dunasteia) in 
the political game, where the point of problematisation was ‘ethical differentiation’, 
ones ascendancy to prevail in the contest (agōn) to deliver the most persuasive true-
discourse capable of governing the city. 
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I 
[2] The furthest we can get from our current hyper-real politics of truth would be one in 
which there is no manifestation of truth – one in which there is no will to know the 
truth.1 Indeed, it is difficult to find a politics of truth in which the truth does not have to 
appear, where there is no manifest distinction between truth and un-truth, where for 
some reason the difference of thought does not constitute the most immediate danger. 
And yet, before the democratisation of knowledge that made it possible to admit every-
one into the politics of truth, it is possible to reconstruct the epistemological space that 
governs the general politics of truth centred on the Homeric figure of the wise king. 
 
[3] The way in which the truth would be established in Homeric justice was not solely 
by decree or command of the king, an all too easy and unstable procedure (the king is 
not God). Rather, truth could be produced in two ways: one is by the oath; the other is 
by the ordeal. The oath consists in a test or challenge of truth that is launched against 
ones equals, whereas the ordeal is something that the king exposes his subject to, usual-
ly in the form of torture, with the aim of establishing the truth of their testimony or their 
guilt in committing a crime. Both involve being exposed to some undefined danger 
(Zeus’ thunderbolt or the physical danger of blows or wild beasts) which makes them 
alternatives to each other: when the parties were of unequal status the oath would not be 
accepted, and the one of lower status would be subjected to the ordeal. In the oath and 
the ordeal the truthful utterance would not be a testimony of factual observations about 
what has taken place that relies on perception, but rather one that is related to the ambi-
guity and uncertainty of future events – the anger of the gods, the survival of a test.  
 In Homeric juridical discourse the key concept is dikazein, meaning the “exer-
cise of a right” and the act of passing judgement or the ending of a dispute with a 
sentence. The derived noun dikastḗs constitutes the counsel of elders or some kind of 
official who would reside as judges; whether or not these were appointed with consent 
of both litigants is hard to say. In the dikazein the structure of juridical production of 
truth is as follows: first there is an initial struggle or act of violence, sometimes a fraud; 
then a confrontation by the party that is wronged and the assertion of rights by both 
                                                
1 Foucault pursued this question in the first lecture series that he gave at the Collège de France, which 
was heavily influenced by Nietzsche and in particular his remark about the invention of knowledge in a 
remote corner of the universe. See, Foucault, Michel. Lectures on the Will to Know – Lectures at the 
Collège De France, 1970-1971: and Oedipal Knowledge, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 
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parties; this is followed by the challenge of the oath of truth (do you dare swear to the 
gods that you are true in your claim and if not face the consequences?); lastly the con-
frontation with the gods by the one that accepts the oath, here the fact of the matter 
remains a matter between him and the gods. What is characteristic is that in this last 
phase the truth never manifests itself. The truth is imprecated by one party and remains 
in the obscurity of the future wrath of the gods – never able to escape the thunderbolt 
the one who takes a false oath will never be able to see it coming. Truth thus resides in a 
space of struggle or discord (agōnes or neikos) between the two parties, which is not to 
say that they stand alone; both bring witnesses who will take the oath with them. Such 
witnesses don’t testify to what they have seen or experienced, but are supporters who 
indicate his social standing of either party. If testimonies were given by either party 
these were equated with support and does not concern what actually happened: the 
judge was bound to side with the claimant who could gather the most support. The 
establishment of the truth hinges on two crucial points: the willingness of the parties to 
make an oath (acceptance usually means immediate victory and refusal, defeat) and the 
fact that the rules are followed – a difficult point because in it was up to the king (or in 
any case the judge, the histōr) to remember a specific set of rules (the thēsmos, unwrit-
ten rules). All justice was about reparations, not a matter of getting to the truth of the 
matter (who really did commit the crime and why?). Thus, the only justice lies in there 
being restitution and correct implementation of procedure; the truth as such remains 
immaterial or arbitrary to the final judgement, it is an autonomous force that one expos-
es oneself to and surrenders to.2  
 In the Iliad we are given a few examples of these ritualized productions of the 
truth: the engraving on Achilles’ shield made by Hephaistos depicting a legal dispute in 
peace time and later the chariot race where Menelaus challenges Anticlochos with an 
oath on him having cheated in the race are the most famous; but perhaps the most inter-
esting is when Agamemnon, persuaded by Zeus to attack the Trojans, decides to test the 
battle readiness of his army and they at his dismay all agree to go back home.3 I have 
picked this example because it tells us something about how the politics of truth is 
constituted around the wise king: how the source of the kings right to rule symbolized 
by the sceptre, how the structure of the true-discourse of the king which is given as an 
oath closely linked to the sceptre, and lastly how the relation to the assembly and in the 
                                                
2 Foucault, Lectures on the Will to Know, pp. 84-85 
3 See: Hom.Il.18.490f, Hom.Il.23.262ff, and Hom.Il.2.84ff 
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Homeric discursive practice does not provide an alternative to the wise king as it will 
for the later Greeks. 
 To begin with, Homer makes a point out of the sceptre – the one that Agamem-
non leans on when he addresses the Achaians in book two of the Iliad – being the work 
of Hephaitos and originally given to Zeus and through several other gods handed over 
to Agamemnon himself: each god named by his primary quality and thus by being in 
possession of the sceptre he embodies the qualities being the king of justice, guidance, a 
shepherd of the people, and rich in flocks.4 Likewise in both the Iliad and the Odyssey, 
king Odysseus is described as “resourceful”, the man of many devices (polytropos), he 
is a cleaver king and a hero with a thousand disguises.5 Furthermore, when the kingship 
of Odysseus is described by Mentor it is exactly as on of kindness, generosity, and 
justice, as a “fathers loving care” of his people (…).6 There is no reason to regress into 
hereditary principles of monarchy here: the king is the king because by wielding the 
sceptre he embodies these qualities (Oedipus will do the same later as he became king, 
not because he inherited power form his father Laos although he was his son, but exact-
ly because he possessed the knowledge that freed the city from the sphinx).7 Thus a 
king is a king because of his qualities, a theme that we can find in many other traditions 
of thought; and the fact that these qualities can coexist in one person, without being 
made into a problem is what is interesting – it is only when it becomes a problem that 
the king monopolizes these qualities that we see an epistemological break. 
 Immediately after the description of the sceptre, Agamemnon while “leaning on 
his sceptre” encourages the Achaians to sail for home in a failed attempt to test his 
troops. For a king to raise the sceptre while speaking is the same as giving an oath in the 
juridical sense.8 The right to speak the truth is thus symbolized by the wielding of the 
sceptre, and any man who was not a king was not able to address the assembly in any 
legitimate sense. Nevertheless, wanting to prevent total disaster Odysseus takes the 
sceptre and virtually assumes command, to the fleeing men he speaks in two ways: to 
kings and men of importance he would speak with gentle words encouraging them to 
come back and take their place in the public assembly, while the commoner would be 
                                                
4 Hom.Il.2.100-18 
5 Hom.Od.1.1 
6 Hom.Od.2.229-41 
7 Kingship is not necessarily passed on by a hereditary principle as Telemachus points out, unable to 
claim power as he is in the process of growing up while his city is suffering (Hom.Od.2.229). 
8 Arist.Pol.1258b3 
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addressed in a very different manner. To those commoners who complained he would 
smite with the sceptre and say: 
 
Fellow, sit thou still, and hearken to the worlds of others that are better men than thou; whereas 
thou art unwarlike and a weakling, neither to be counted in war not in counsel. In no wise shall 
we Achaeans all be kings here. No good thing is a multitude of lords; let there be one lord, one 
king, to whom the son of crooked-counselling Cronos hath vouchsaved the sceptre and judge-
ments, that he may take counsel for his people.9  
 
The very message of Odysseus to the commoner is revealing as to how it is only the 
wise kings discourse qua their link to Zeus that have any value. Everyone but the king is 
denied access to the production of political truth. But it is even more significant that the 
only man who dares to speak up against the plan is Thersites is described as loose-
tongued (ametroepēs) and given a rather disparaging description by Homer. By his 
behaviour he clearly violates the heroic code, which primarily values honour over life. 
Honour is here determined by the hero’s display of courage, the difficulty of the tests he 
faces, his physical attributes, social status, and the possessions acquired in victory.10 
Odysseus therefore quickly shots him down by beating his back and shoulders with the 
sceptre while challenging him with a very strong oath – which means that he is ready to 
expose himself to great dangers for his claims to truth.11 In this short example it be-
comes clear how a principle of juridical production of truth is transposed to the political 
realm: political struggles are settled in the same way as juridical disputes, by the mech-
anism of the oath. 
 Lastly, in Homeric Greece the assembly (agorēnde), aside form being the locali-
ty of true-discourse of the king, is portrayed as a rather negative phenomenon 
characterized by scruples and plotting.12 In particular, the scene with the suitors of 
Ithaca –all wanting to become the king– debating with Telemachus over their harass-
ment of the kings household in the second book of the Odyssey is one that demonstrates 
undesirability of the fluidity of power: in particular the story of Antinous (literally 
meaning the unwise), where he tells of the weaving and un-weaving Penelope is an 
illustration of how she holds them at bay (keeping them from claiming the throne) while 
at the same time her actions sustains their struggle.13 Penelope as the image of political 
power in conflict with itself is reminiscent of the past when Odysseus ruled – which is 
                                                
9 Hom.Il.2.197-206 
10 The code is also paradoxical: in so far as heroism demands courage it also leads to unwise and headless 
courses of action.  
11 Hom.Il.2.215 
12 See for example the scene of the plotting suitors, Hom.Od.16.375 
13 Hom.Od.2.6ff. See in particular the speech of Mentor (Hom.Od.2.229-241), there is a beneficial 
relationship between governor and governed, which needs to be sustained. 
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also reflected in her person. The scene thus casts as a negative image on the assembly, 
which has no real value and poses no real alternative the king. Primarily because the 
assembly does not posses or share in the qualities of the king; namely that they are not 
wise or have knowledge. What is valued is therefore kingship, which alone can rule and 
provide truth and justice thought its wisdom. If an assembly is called it is not to open 
for political true-discourse, but to display royal power.14  
 In Homer Greece we thus find a politics of truth constituted around the figure of 
the wise king: who first of all can speak the truth because he posses the sceptre, which 
indicates his wisdom and knowledge, and thus also his right to rule. This involves 
knowledge of the heroic code and knowledge as wisdom, a personal quality of the king 
(which could be acquired through wisdom literature). Secondly, the oath constitutes the 
mechanism by which truth is produced. Yet, this truth that the oath produces is like 
autonomous force always remains immaterial or arbitrary. Consequently, this politics of 
truth does not involve a will to know the truth – to ascertain it, to obtain knowledge 
about it, to define once and for all a division between true and false. In other words, the 
oath works equally well without there being an event or manifestation of truth. This is 
so because in the un-thought of the heroic code truth is not linked to knowledge, it is not 
a thing, but rather something that is not revealed in the contest between heroes. There 
was therefore no knowledge or un-thought which could be ‘opposed’ because it was not 
a common property. Or at any length, knowledge was the sole property of the king; it 
was not a general political question in which all could participate – the true-discourse 
given by oath is linked to the royal sceptre. The politics of truth was therefore for exclu-
sively for the king; the assembly does not constitute an alternative, rather it was 
dangerous to let everyone else speak the truth. We can therefore conclude that in the 
politics of truth, as constituted in Homeric Greece, the socio-political limit of thought 
resides in the wise king who alone could claim a right to thought – and yet this limit is 
hard to sustain because it requires the king to constantly confront the gods: but because 
the gods are in the world, what he really is confronting is always the world and the 
problems that it contains. So in fact, the wise king is not that free at all because the 
customs and rituals that enable him to mediate between the community and the gods 
bind him (he has to be a hero). Furthermore, some kings would also have to face up to 
his aristocratic counsellors, and in times of war sway the poplar assembly to fight for 
him, as we saw in the example above; yet neither of these are seen as real alternatives to 
                                                
14 As when Achilleus calls for an assembly to exchange insults with Agamemnon, Hom.Il.1.54ff. Note 
how Kalchas needs Achilleus’ support to gather the courage to utter his prophetic true-discourse. 
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the king, another aristocrat might take his place, but he still has to exercise power 
through the mechanism of the oath. 
 
[4] The wise king was not a native of Greece. The model of the wise king is old, per-
haps as old as the early Bronze Age as it requires some kind of social stratification: the 
king would belong to the scribe and/or religious class of the tribe or society.15 The 
model is certainly antithetical to egalitarianism. If we take the kind of problems that 
such societies were faced with serious, then it is not hard to see why: the tasks of the 
wise king was exactly to protect the population from attacking nomads and marauders, 
uphold internal order of the people by the means of law (language, culture, and myths), 
and provide sufficient resources so that the population could thrive. Whether or not such 
problems could be addressed on a basis of equality is beside the point, what is important 
is that this complex situation of problems is formulated around the figure of the wise 
king or the modes of production of the oath or the ordeal. Given such positionality, the 
king would govern though a monopolization of knowledge: by knowing the movement 
of the heavenly bodies the king would know when to plant and when harvest the crops; 
in that way he was the master over life and death as he could both starve and save the 
population. Therein laid his control of society and it was in exactly this way that 
knowledge was the central mechanism of power. 
 It is here not important to pinpoint the exact origins of the model of the wise 
king, but rather to notice that this way of thinking about the politics of truth was not 
unique to the Archaic Greeks – even though the heroic code rarely is found to dominate 
in other places to the same degree (greater emphasis would for instance be placed on the 
verisimilitude of knowledges). On an epistemological level what is interesting are the 
breaks in positives that are manifest between traditions of thought, not similarities or 
spurious breaks: in a word the specific structuring of the epistemological space. It is 
very likely that a politics of truth constituted around the wise king came from Mesopo-
tamia, where it had spread to the Minoan and Mycenaean kingdoms (a rather hopeless 
task, as there seems to be a universality to the practical problems that the model of the 
wise king developed against). At any length it is to be found in various forms through-
out the civilizations of the ancient world: the earliest example being the Sumero-
Babylonian epic of Gilgamesh, the earliest example of which dates back to the third 
                                                
15 The oath was the fundamental act in the Indo-European tradition: when a man would loose or deplete 
his live stock he would have to borrow from someone else, who would establish himself as chief and 
require an oath; the same is the case between chiefs. See Neumann, Iver B. and Einar Wigen. Stepping 
Off the Horse: The Steppe Tradition and European State Building (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 
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dynasty of Ur ca. 2100.16 The procedure of the oath or the ordeal is set out in the code of 
Hammurabi.17 In Egypt the pharaohs engaged in a politics of truth were the main prob-
lem had to do with upholding maat, a complex concept that ties the universe together 
associated with truth, balance, justice, and order.18 The best examples of the wise king 
from Judaism and which the Christian utilized to a full extent, can be found in the book 
of Solomon. In Indus valley as well, there were several texts that dealt with similar 
problems of a wise king: see for example, the Arthashastra (300 BC), the Mahabharata 
(900-400 BC), the Upanishads (800-400 BC), or the Rig Veda (ca. 1200-900 BC).19 Last-
ly, the civilizations that developed around the yellow river delta, in China, established a 
exemplar conception of the wise king: the mythical example was king Mu, who knew 
the times of the flood and could therefore predict when to sow the seeds.20 This was 
later formalized with Confucius as the sage or the sage king (sheng jen), later to be 
elaborated in The Mean (Chung yung) and Mo zi, whose critique of this politics of truth 
centred on the concern for ‘worthiness’ – that is, moral worth defined in terms of the 
concept yi (right action, righteousness, duty, and justice).21 
II 
[5] The earliest formulation of the problem of crooked judgement and the subsequent 
displacement of justice can be found in Hesiod’s Work and Days, where in the very 
beginning he introduces an opposition between dikazein and krinein (from krinō), a new 
kind of judgement:  
 
But you will have a second chance to act this way – no, let us decide our quarrel [diakrinōmetha 
neikos] right here with straight judgement, which comes from Zeus, the best ones. For already 
we have divided up our allotment, but you snatched much more besides and went carrying it off, 
                                                
16 The Epic of Gilgamesh: The Babylonian Epic Poem and Other Texts in Akkadian and Sumerian, 
translated and with an introduction by Andrew George (Penguin Books, 1999) 
17 The Code of Hammurabi: King of Babylon, about 2250 BC., translated by Robert Francis Harper 
(University of Chicago, 1904) 
18 For a small selection of lamentations, legal texts, royal inscriptions and teachings see: Wilkinson, 
Toby. Writings from Ancient Egypt (Penguin Books, 2016). In particular the lamentation ‘The Words of 
Khakheperraseneb’, contains the concepts and ideas that really show the complexity of the politics of 
truth in Egypt at around 1500 BC. 
19 The Mahabharata, abridged and translated by John D. Smith (Penguin Books, 2009); The Upanishads, 
translated from The Sanskrit with and introduction by Juan Mascaró (Penguin Books, 1965); The Rig 
Veda: An Anthology, selected, translated, and annotated by Wendy Doniger (Penguin Books, 1981). 
20 Zhōu Mù Wáng, 976-922 BC. 
21 Confucius. The Analects, translated with an introduction by D. C. Lau (Penguin Books, 1979); Lau 
Tzu. Tao Te Ching, translated with an introduction by D. C. Lau (Penguin Books, 1963); and Mo Zi. The 
Book of Master Mo, translated with an introduction by Ian Johnston (Penguin Books, 2013). 
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greatly honoring the kings, those gift-eaters, who want to pass this judgement [dōrophagous oi 
tēnde dikēn etēelousi dikassai] – fools, they don’t know how much more the half is than the 
whole, nor how great the boon is in mallow and asphodel!22 
 
The first thing that we should note is the apparent opposition between two kinds of 
judgement: while one clearly has a positive connotation the other has a negative, it 
constitutes a problem for the peasant part of the population. The later is that of the “gift-
eating kings” (which is here associated with dikassai), which relies on a payment and an 
unequal status between the king (who only knows the whole) and the peasant; and that 
of “straight judgement” (diakrinōmetha), which is reliant on equality between those 
who pass judgement – or at any length judgement between equals who “know how 
much more the half is than the whole” and those unfortunate enough to have been poor 
(mallow and asphodel is the poor man’s fare). The problem has to do with the structure 
of the oath, as it can be either true or false: “the bad man will harm the superior one, 
speaking with crooked discourses, and he will swear an oath upon them.”23 Indeed, this 
is a theme that we find in other traditions of thought throughout the ancient world – 
kings had to give ‘straight judgement’ or else they were not respecting the divine law of 
which they were charged with upholding. This was also the case for the Homeric wise 
king, but it was up to Zeus to determine whether or not this was the case. In contrast, 
Hesiod explicitly associates this occurrence with his own times; comparing it to the 
former races of man that Zeus had created. To swear a crooked oath is to give a false 
oath, which the gift-eating kings by selectively remembering the rules, seems here to be 
doing. Hence, there is a need for different kind of justice.  
 This new kind of judgement is krinein, which consist first of all in a simple 
displacement of the oath: rather than the two parties who competes to give the oath it is 
now instead the judge (formerly the histōr) that takes the oath and exposes himself to 
the wrath of the gods. By doing so he is allowed to superimpose and assign victory to 
one of the parties: he is the one who says ‘I judge’, the literal translation of krinō. But 
on what basis does he do so, which is the discourse that he speaks? The oath as it was 
elaborated in dikazein relied primarily on the kings memory (the thēsmos), which was 
the structural defect utilized by the king, so a new kind of justice needs to be defined. 
This form of justice was dikainon – that is, the just (observant of custom and social 
rules, well-ordered, civilized). 
 In Work and Days there is a crucial passage on the relationship between the just 
                                                
22 Hes.WD.34-41. 
23 Hes.WD.193-5. See also 165-94, 248ff. This objection to the oath is not idiosyncratic, but a persistent 
theme: “Injustice, I mean, should never triumph thanks to oaths,” Aesch.Eum.445 
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(dikainon) and pride (ubrin) that develops this restructuring of the epistemological 
space in greater depth.24 The calamities that follow injustice are the same as before, but 
there is an important shift in the distribution of them. With dikazein it was the perjurer 
himself, his blood, or race that faced the wrath of the gods, now with Hesiod these 
misfortunes concern the whole city; everyone suffers the wrath of the gods on the ac-
count of the king’s oath: “Often even a whole city suffers because of an evil man who 
sins and devises wicked deeds.”25 The fact that the whole city suffers on account of one 
evil man constitutes a practical problem: or rather, because these violations, perpetrated 
by one man, affect the whole city and everyone in it suffers there is a moral need to 
assign blame (in religious terms the city is stained and there is a need for purification). 
This morality of fault consists in a will to know whether a crime has been committed, by 
whom, and why. That is, there is a moral will behind the desire to know the truth. 
 Secondly, theologically the just (dikainon) is linked to the order of the world. 
That is, the discourse and practices of justice no longer deal directly with Zeus but 
rather with Dikē – the goddess of justice – who acts as a intermediary between the 
sovereign Zeus and the world of men: “Justice wins out over Outrageousness when she 
arrives at the end; but the fool only knows this after he has suffered. For at once Oath 
starts to run along beside crooked judgements, and there is a clamor when justice is 
dragged where men, gift-eaters, carry her off and pronounce verdicts with crooked 
judgements; but she stays, weeping, with the city and the people's abodes, clad in invis-
ibility, bearing evil to the human beings who drive her out and do not deal straight.”26 
Justice is both absent and present in the world at the same time: bad judgement drives 
Dikē away and this insult to Dikē incites the wrath of Zeus. To that end, we must recall 
that the proper meaning of the word cosmos is the reign of justice (dikē); it is a political 
term per excellence as is signifies divine justice – the order of the universe as envi-
sioned by the gods. Consequently, there are on the one hand those, which live according 
to justice, who reap all the benefits of just conduct; and on the other those who suffer 
the consequences of pride and outrageousness, however crucially, this in no longer the 
individual who commits an injustice, but rather the whole city. To not offend Dikē it is 
necessary that all the citizens do their best to live according to dikainon.  
 Thus lastly, for krinein to really be part of dikaion, for the judgment to really be 
just, it is necessary to align truth with justice (dikaion kai alēthēs). This is first of all 
                                                
24 Hes.WD.202-285 
25 Hes.WD.240-1. See also, 262-263 
26 Hes.WD.219-224 my emphasis, see also 256-263 
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involves (a) a different kind of memory, one that does not recall the rules of how to pass 
judgement, but rather the exact measure of identical things. Which also meant that the 
truth had to disclosed – no longer have to wait for when Zeus got around to passing 
judgement – speaks about what is the case (ēonta). Consequently the ‘I remember’ or 
the ‘I judge’ imposes a sovereign decision: it asserts this is the case; this is the order of 
things. Krinein is therefore characterized by a memory of the identical, the disclosure of 
truth, and the sovereign decision thereof. As such however, dikaion (b) extends far 
beyond the practises of justice: if a decision is just because it recalls the measure of 
identity, then any discourse that does so is just. In this way the correlation of truth and 
justice results in the disassociation of power and knowledge; it is the democratization of 
all knowledge that was previously the possession of the wise king. Power-knowledge is 
taken from the king and given to the people: knowledge is separated from the direct 
exercise of power and truth is instead associated with justice. Such a displacement is 
lodged in a conviction that all men are able and have the capacity to think for them-
selves, which does not mean that he is alone in that task; a view that we find clearly 
expressed in Hesiod: “That man is best who reasons (noēsis) for himself, considering 
the future. Also good is he who takes another’s good advice. But he who neither thinks 
himself nor learns from others, is a failure as a man.”27 A conviction echoed in Theog-
nis’ image of the poet whose duty it is to assimilate knowledge: “what good is 
knowledge if just one man knows?”28 Krinein is about disseminating knowledge, of 
giving advice as much as to pass sentence; Hesiod is the one who sings about the just-
ness of justice, who judges the judge. Accordingly, the last part of Work and Days is 
devoted to the formulation of a new system of just conduct (dikainon). Which (c) con-
sists in the formulation of several kinds of common knowledges, which defines the 
sameness of the un-thought. They concern: knowledge of the order of the world, 
knowledge of the time of the cycles, knowledge of promises of payment of debts, and 
knowledge of a common measure concerning the quality and value of things.29 Previ-
ously these forms of knowledge were linked to the political power of the wise king, but 
are now, with the democratisation of them, becoming a communal possession, the 
knowledge that every man needs to live according to the just dikainon.30 
                                                
27 Hes.WD.293-5  
28 Theo.El.772 
29 Foucault ascribes these kinds of knowledge to the Assyrians and Hittites. See, Foucault. Will to Know, 
pp. 111-113 
30 In this way krinein is a result of the development of a society based on familial ties to one based 
increasingly on economic relationships. Historically such changes can be associated with major social-
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 In conclusion, with Hesiod the problem of the wise king is one of equality, not 
in terms of an inequality of wealth, status, or power; but the inequality in who can speak 
the truth or who are eligible to take an oath that is the issue, who has the right to possess 
knowledge (particularly about the rules of justice). In board strokes, his solution was a 
spilt between power and judgement, as we saw with the establishment of Krinein, where 
the production of truth was displaced to a third party: the judge would now be the one 
who had to take the oath (the had to swear to the gods that he would uphold the rules of 
justice as they were written) and the claimants the ones who had to bring forth their case 
for him to hear. It is around the general regime of dikaion-alēthē, where knowledge 
makes equal, the politics of truth is reorganized: it is the justice of exact return, of a 
common measure, and of consent and mutual agreement; it is the realignment of the 
cosmic order of the gods and the world of men that the gift-eating kings had ruined.31 
Because anyone among equals can preside as judge all were equally able to participate 
in the production of truth, and on equal ground. In the dikazein of Homer the word of 
truth belonged to Zeus (to speak it whenever he pleased), in the krinein of Hesiod the 
word of truth becomes the property of every man of justice. 
 
[6] In what is commonly called the Age of Tyrants (650-510 BC) in archaic Greece, a 
troublesome period of history where the cycle of political systems was in full flow and 
the social structures were under transformation, the problem of crooked justice also 
emerges as the more general political problem of the monarchos, the ‘rule of one’ or the 
‘one who rules alone’.32 As a political term we know it as monarchy, which would have 
a positive connotation, but monarchos to the archaic Greeks would apply equally to the 
related terms of king (basileus) and tyrant (tyrannos). The word basileus is an old My-
cenaean word, and would be a king or the leader of a group of men.33 The word 
                                                                                                                                          
political changes: (a) the agrarian crisis of the Sixth and Sevenths century BC; (b) the reorganization of 
the army into hoplites, creating a worrier class; (c) the emergence of craft industry; and (d) more general 
political transformations. Foucault. Will to Know, pp. 121-129 
31 Foucault, The Will to Know, pp. 116 
32 Th.1.13 
33 A noticeable difference is that the Mycenaean’s had kings who they called wanax (wa-na-ka, translated 
as “king” – later in Homeric Greek it is simply anax), a term that also sometimes was used as a divine 
title. (For a critique see: Jorrit M. Kelder, The Kingdom of Mycenae: A Great Kingdom in the Late Bronze 
Age Aegean (CDL Press: Bethesda, Maryland 2010) pp. 11-17) And yet, there were other words that 
denoted ruler and status: Lawagetas, literally meaning “leader of the people” was another terms used, as 
either the second in command or someone of a higher status, like the king; while guasileus the prior form 
of basileus (“king” as the term with which Homer refers to Agamemnon) however, had a lesser signifi-
cance as the leader of any group of men. All the terms seem to correlate with those in Homeric times, but 
crucially there was no word for “tyrant”, as far we know. See: Chadwick, John and Lydia Baumbach. 
‘The Mycenaean Greek Vocabulary’, Glotta 41. Bd., 3./4. H. (1963), pp. 157-271. 
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tyrannos on the other hand is not originally Greek, but was at the time associated with 
wealth rather than despotism.34 To the Archaic and later classical Greeks there was no 
clear distinction between the two as there is today; at the time of the propagandist Athe-
nian tragedians both terms were used interchangeably.35 What unites all three is their 
autocracy – their contrast to the two other groupings of political rule prominent in 
Greek political theory, the few and the many. The concept of monarchos is through and 
through a critique of the wise king; it is the problem of crooked judgement transposed 
to the political sphere. Stated briefly, the problem has to do with what can happen when 
government is left in the hand of one. Take for instance the hostility towards the rule of 
one in Solon in his warning against Peisistratus, a future tyrant of Athens: “From great 
men comes destruction of a city, and the people fall though ignorance under the slavish 
rule of one man (monachos). It’s not easy for one who flies too high to control himself 
afterwards, but these things should be thought of now.”36 The man who “flies to high”, 
the monarchos is associated with lawless rule, the perpetration of nomos, and the bend-
ing of the rules laid out in the constitution – of this the king may be as guilty as the 
tyrant, what matters is that there is nothing that controls his actions any longer. The 
monarchos thus constitutes a very clear practical problem: a society fated to the chaotic 
                                                
34 Tyranny was originally associated with wealth Archilochus statement, “all the gold of gyges means 
nothing to” him – the fact that Gyges usurped his predecessor seem to be less significant (Htd.I.8-12, 
Pla.Rep.359c ff.). In the beginning wealth was the key characteristic of a tyrant: a tyrant was someone 
who, qua his wealth, had been able to take power of the polis, in most cases so as to change something it 
– its constitution, division of land, or for personal gain. Solon (W.5-6): “the citizens themselves, lured, by 
wealth, want to bring this great city down with their stupidities.” This association between wealth and 
tyranny is confirmed in the fifth century (see: Soph.OT.540-2; Thuc.I.13; Pin.Olymp.II.58-9). Thus, on 
the surface the tyrant and the king are similar figures – the normal distinction between a king and a tyrant 
is that one has inherited his power legitimately whereas the other historically had acquired it though 
wealth, while the way in which they govern is of the same nature. Which is somewhat confirmed by the 
fact that the terms initially were used as synonyms (i.e. “Zeus the tyrant”). The bad reputation that the 
tyrant receives from aristocrats like the poet Theognis is most likely due to the fact that a tyranny usually 
meant that their lands were brutally taken from them (Eu.1203-6); which was also one of the reasons why 
Solon refused to go so far as to become a tyrant in his reforms of Athens. This kind of brutal behaviour is 
where the bad sense of tyrant as a wicket and evil ruler came from. Even in the early days this was the 
dominant meaning of the word and contrarily our understanding is rather heavily influenced by the 
Platonic-Aristotelian synthesis where a tyrant is some kind of military leader who takes power in a mature 
democracy by demagoguery – a definition that fits their own time well, but not the early usage of the 
word with tyrants such as Dionysius of Syracuse. See: Ure, P. N. The Origins of Tyranny (Cambridge 
University Press, 1922). 
35 As per the observation of Hippias of Elis’ (Hypothesis to Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus): “The Poets 
after Homer have adopted a peculiar usage in referring to the kings before the Trojan War as ‘tyrants’ 
(tyrannoi). For this term was passed on to the Greeks rather late, in the time of Archilochus, […]. Homer, 
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mind of one is a society doomed to experiences evils. There is however more to this 
practical problem than that. Specifically, the figure of the monarchos constitutes a 
danger to the politics of truth for the following reasons: 
 1. An aristocratic fear. The monarchos has a special relationship with the 
people. It is a figure association with wealth and greed, who would often buy his way 
into office by bribing the citizens. For instance, Solon blames the citizens themselves 
for brining the tyrant Peisistratus to power by giving him a bodyguard with which he 
could take control of Athens: “Each of you follows the footprints of this fox, and you all 
have empty minds, for you watch only the tongue of the man, his slippery speech, but 
never look at what he actually does.”37 It was a danger for the polis that the citizens 
were becoming thoughtless in their lust for wealth. Likewise, Theognis prays that the 
city will not welcome a mounachoi, because of their swelling pride and stupidity: 
 
This city’s pregnant […] and I fear She’ll bear a man to crush [straighten] our swelling pride 
[hubris]. The people still have sense, but those in charge are turning, stumbling into evil ways. 
Gentlemen never yet destroyed a town; but when the scum resort to violence, seduce the masses 
and corrupt the courts to line their pockets and increase their power, then, […] you may know 
this tranquil town cannot remain unshaken very long. When wicket men rejoice in private graft 
then public evils follow; factions rise, then bloody civil war [stasis], until the state welcomes a 
dictator [mounachoi]. God save us from that fate!38  
 
The man who will crush their hubris is a tyrant. In this aristocratic correlation of tyran-
nos and monarchos as a form of divine punishment it is Hesiod’s conception of the just 
(dikaion) that shines through, as it is the citizens themselves that are blamed for the 
misfortunes of the monarchos. This aristocratic fear comes form the way in which the 
tyrants came to power. Many early tyrannies started with the bloody business of taking 
land form the aristocracy either by exile or murder. The appearance and elaboration of 
the concept of tyranny had a transitory role by destroying aristocracy it paved the way 
for democracy. The age of tyrants thus marked a turning point in Greek history, one that 
the aristocrats naturally dreaded.  
 2. A democratic fear. In contrast, however, tyranny was also a solution to a 
practical problem that is rooted deeper than merely a formal question of preferences for 
a political system. One of the reason for the success of tyranny had to do with this 
because they were able to challenge aristocracy on the basis of the idea that government 
could be done better by another man – revolt against a legitimate king or aristocracy 
would therefore be acceptable if he were to deliver better justice. Thus, to the polis as a 
whole the relationship to the tyrant is ambivalent: On the one hand the tyrant is the one 
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who knows, and is therefore a necessary figure for the functioning of the city; but on the 
other, he also has the possibility of keeping knowledge for himself, denying his fellow 
man access and thus claiming a position beyond reproach. Sophocles’ play Oedipus 
Tyrannos illustrates this brilliantly. Oedipus saved the town from the sphinx: “I have the 
knowledge, I solved the riddle of the sphinx, I freed you form this terrible danger, there-
fore I deserve to rule”, says Oedipus. Nonetheless, Oedipus is also the wise king as a 
figure of failure. For despite all his power and knowledge he did know the most essen-
tial thing: his origin story – a fact that only the commoner and a third party knew and 
could attest to. So while the tyrannos is someone who claims sole-rule based on his 
possession of knowledge, he is still fallible and will often commit terrible atrocities, 
making him a dangerous figure to have in power. What this democratic fear demands 
then, is that the wise king renounces either his power or his knowledge. He cannot be 
allowed to posses both; it is the monopolization of knowledge that is the problem. 
 3. Fear of violence. When Solon wrote the laws (thesmoi) of Athens he 
combined might and right (dikē) in order to strike a just balance between the rich (es-
thloi) and the poor (kakoi) in terms of the political power and privilege that each were 
granted. A point that he makes repeatedly is that he was the reluctant tyrant who exer-
cised restraint.39 In contrast, a monarchos is someone who is governed only by the 
unrestrained impulses of his own mind he will certainly behave accordingly. In all 
likelihood, this means that he will be violent as there is nothing to restrain him. “Lucky 
tyrants – the perquisites of power! Ruthless power to do and say whatever pleases 
them” Antigone taunts Creon.40 We find this problem already in Hesiod’s tale of the 
hawk and the nightingale, but not in Homer, where the king could commit all kinds of 
violent acts without offending justice.41 In Herodotus there are plenty of examples of 
the violent danger associated with the rule of one. That of Cypselus is probably one of 
the most memorable. It takes place in book V where the Spartans had proposed to abol-
ish political equality in response to the Ionian revolt. “There is nothing wickeder or 
bloodier in the world than tyranny” recalls a Corinthian and then tells the terrible story 
of how Cypselus, the son of the Eëtion who was the daughter of a prominent member of 
the Bacchiadae (the leading Aristocrats), was fated to bring justice to the city of Cor-
inth. The justice that he brings is against the nobility consisted in exile, confiscation of 
property, and even more were put to death. The metaphor of madness that Herodotus 
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uses to describes the rule of a tyrant is that of Thrasybulus walking thought the fields in 
silence “cutting off the tallest ears of wheat which he could see, and throwing them 
away, until the finest and best-grown part of he crop was ruined.”42 The problem is one 
of a liable system of ethics, as becomes clear when the rule of one –be it a tyrant or a 
king– is compared to other political system. Herodotus, in a very Greek sounding de-
bate, puts these words in the mouth of the Persian Oranes: “Monarchy is neither 
pleasant nor good. […] How can one fit monarchy into any sound system of ethics, 
when it allows a man to do whatever he likes without any responsibility or control?”43 
Thucydides replicates this very same aspect of truth and power in the Melian dialogue 
where the Athenians are portrayed as the tyrants who unnecessarily behave violently.44 
When might becomes right it constitutes a problem for the politics of truth, exactly 
because truth is only attainable through violence. 
 4. Fear of a foreign enemy. While the last three characteristics have to do 
with internal factors of in Greek culture and their political systems, the forth has to do 
with a foreign treat – namely that of the Persian Empire. By the end of the sixth century 
the Persian kings started to supported tyrants, whom themselves, when their power 
declined, took initiative to ask for alliances to endure in their local power struggles. It 
the Persian Empire was considered a danger, this was not only because of potential 
invasions or alliances that would alter the balance of power, but also because of the 
inherent ideological conflicts between Hellenism and Medism, from the Greek verb ‘to 
medize’ meant to collaborate with the Persians.45 The Persian Empire was the natural 
enemy of the Greek democracies, not just because they would install tyrants, but more 
importantly because they were the guarantors of the politics of truth of the monarchos. 
We find this theme repeated many times in texts dealing with Persian kings. For obvi-
ous reasons, Xerxes was the prime target of many texts that deals with this problem. In 
Herodotus’ accounts of how Xerxes came to the decision to launch his campaign we 
bear witness to how the Persian politics of truth operated.46 While most of the council-
lors advised Xerxes to invade, for their own personal gain, it was only his uncle 
Artabanus that dared speak against the king’s desires.47 Delivering a true-discourse of 
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tragic wisdom about the dangers of the campaign to the empire, he greatly angers Xerx-
es. Whether he finally reaches his decision because of the Persian nomos of conquest, or 
because of he is fated to this course of action, as the dream clearly forces him to realise, 
is a point of disagreement.48 One thing is nevertheless clear, in the politics of truth of 
the monarchos there is no room for the true-discourse, it either angers the king or is 
simply cast aside by a dream. Similarly, the theme of violence appears again when he 
mocks the reply of the Greek mercenary Demaratus who he had asked about whether or 
not the Greek would dare to fight him: upon giving a truthful account, Xerxes bursts out 
laughing signalling his destruction, but in the end let him go.49 An altogether clearer 
example is Aeschylus’ The Persians, a triumphalist account of the Greek victory at 
Salamis, but equally a piece of propaganda that ridicules the failure of the wise king in 
the form of Xerxes, condemned by the ghost of his father Darious – who the play por-
trays as wise. Upon the failed invasion the chorus chants: “Not long now will those in 
the land of Asia remain under Persian rule, nor continue to pay tribute under the com-
pulsion of their lords, nor fall on their faces to the ground in awed obedience; for the 
strength of the monarchy [basilsia] has utterly vanished. Nor do men any longer keep 
their tongue under guard; for the people have been let loose to speak with freedom 
[ēleutheros basō], now the yoke of the military force no longer binds the.”50 The practi-
cal problem of monarchos manifested itself as internal problem in the form of the king 
or the tyrant, as well as an external problem by the treat of the Persian Empire, but both 
cases were associated with a politics of truth dominated by the figure of the wise king. 
III 
[7] As is evident form the material discussed in the chapter so far, the notions of straight 
(ithunei) and crooked (skolion) were central to the archaic Greeks. Homer had used 
straight in this way in his description on Achilles shield where the one who “utter the 
straightest judgement” was paid two talons of gold.51 We learn the same form the The-
ogony, where Zeus himself is the image of straightness, which empowers the king to 
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give straight judgements.52 It is an image that naturally resonates because the phenome-
nological difference between them is clear enough; geometrically, straight lines are 
shorter than crooked lines. The ideal of political discourse in ancient Greece was to be 
straight (ithunei): a straight line had to go from mouth of the speaker to the mind of the 
listener, speech that was crooked or slippery was frowned upon exactly because it was 
suspicious by its very nature – why could you not just speak your mind, what hidden 
motivation do you have? It was for the same reason that speeches in the assembly were 
encouraged to be short.53 When Solon, the famous lawmaker (archon) of Athens, advis-
es his fellow citizens on the importance of good government (eunomia) he employs 
exactly these notions:  
 
Bad government brings the most evils to a city; while good government (eunomia) makes every-
thing fine and orderly, and often puts those who are unjust in fetters; it makes rough things 
smooth, stops excess, weakens hubris, and withers the growing blooms of madness (atē). It 
straightens crooked judgements, makes arrogant deeds turn gentle, puts a stop to divisive fac-
tions, brings to an end the misery of angry quarrels. This is the source among human beings for 
all that is orderly and wise.54 
 
So while the practical problems that ruptured the epistemological space of the Homeric 
politics of truth, one had to do with juridical practices the other the rule of one (monar-
chos), are framed by the contrast of these two concepts, so too do they help structure 
that which displaces it. It is nevertheless an epistemological space that emerges on the 
basis of a historical series or transformation: krinein establishes a link between the just 
(dikainon), the order of the world (nomos), and the organization of the city. Historically 
the disappearance of thēsmos  – which is neither written law or nomos, but a custom 
established from above (unwritten rule) – does obviously no all happen at once, but 
rather in three stages: first there is the stage of eunomia, in which written law fixes the 
rules and makes them public and the politics of truth now has to conform to a nomos; 
then second, there is the stage of isonomia, the guarantee of equal political rights; and 
the third stage demokratia, in which every citizen frankly speaks his mind.55 At each 
stage, straight discourse is what is sought after and the word and concept that comes to 
embody it at the time of Euripides is parrhēsia. Accordingly, the emergence of democ-
racy coincides with this problem of true discourse; there is in other words, a 
fundamental circularity between democracy and parrhēsia. Nevertheless, one must 
distinguish between a concept and a word; in this case the word parrhēsia is not as old 
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as the concept. As a concept that corresponds to a problem complex, it is reasonable to 
expect that straight discourse is present in pre-Socratic philosophy, a number of soph-
ists’ discourses, and most importantly the Tragedians. Indeed, the circularity between 
democracy and parrhēsia is not only clearly defined in the tragedies, but it is worth 
noting that both the theatre and democracy are very connection and roughly emergence 
simultaneously. In fact one of the functions of the theatre and the plays that were staged 
there was exactly to educate in the practices and associated problem of the straight 
discourse. There was indeed a time, before Plato and condemnation of actors, when the 
tragedian and comedic authors were able through their stage plays had a positive link to 
truth. 
 Nevertheless, this peculiar relationship between krinein and parrhēsia needs 
some specification: in contrast to krinein, parrhēsia constitutes the democratization of 
the oath, the manifestation of a risky truth rather than a truth that is strictly speaking 
known. Sure enough, krinein as a theme reappears in the concept of public critique: at 
this time a good two thousand years prior, however, krinein is not a political term, but a 
juridical one – parrhēsia is the proper political term, which nevertheless did not become 
possible before justice had been displaced from the power of the king to that of truth 
(dikaion-alēthē). This is why it is parrhēsia that constitutes the central concept of the 
democratic politics of truth: parrhēsia is what gives thought access to the outside realm 
of un-truth. In other words, it is by speaking with parrhēsia that one is able to establish 
an exterior truth to the truth of politics.  
 Thus, the epistemological space that emerges around the fifth and sixth century 
BC in Greek thought is the result of the displacements of three problems: from the 
mechanism of the oath, to a straight true-discourse captured by the concept of 
parrhēsia; form justice guaranteed by dikazein, to one based on dikaion that required a 
constitution (politeia) to function; and lastly, from the idea that truth resided in a space 
of struggle (agōn) where it never materialised, to one where the struggle to exercise 
power (dunesteia) was decided by the persuasiveness of ones true-discourse. It is to-
wards this diagram of thought that I now turn.  
 
[8] The word ‘parrhēsia’ is an Ancient Greek word that literally means ‘saying every-
thing’ or ‘to say all’ – from the roots ‘pan’ (all), and ‘rhēsis’ or ‘rehma’ (speech). It 
originated in the fifth and fourth century BC in Greek literature – first occurring the in 
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poetry of Euripides and later in philosophical and political writings.56 Parrhēsia is 
usually translated in English as ‘free speech’, in the sense that one speaks frankly, 
plainly, and boldly. The parrhesiastes, a person who uses parrhēsia, is someone who 
employs a degree of ‘free-spokenness’ in his or her attitude towards others. A person 
who ‘says everything’ is then someone who speaks without concealment, being re-
served about what one says, or refuses to use rhetorical or technical aids to disguise and 
cover up what that person really think – that is, what he or she regard as the truth. This 
positive sense of parrhēsia if found in particular the writings of Euripides, Aristopha-
nes, Isocrates, and Demosthenes who, for example, in the Second Philippic emphasized 
that he did not desire to speak without concern for reason – he did not want to “resort to 
insults” or “exchange blow for blow” – but rather he wanted to tell the truth with 
parrhēsia (ta alethe meta parrhēsia): “Ah! I will speak to you with open heart, I call on 
the gods to witness it, I wish to conceal nothing,” and he adds, “I vow that I shall boldly 
tell you the whole truth and keep nothing back.”57 Parrhēsia then is frank truth-telling 
where ‘telling all’ is tied to the truth: the whole truth is told without omitting anything, 
nor is the truth hidden behind something else. Like so, parrhēsia blends two kinds of 
true-discourse: firstly, it requires like krinein that the truth is manifested, and secondly 
it borrows from the mechanism of the oath that something is risked, that there is a cost 
to speaking.  
 1. personification of truth. First, parrhēsia involves an ontological com-
mitment to truth in so that it may materialise. That is, the practice of parrhēsia requires 
more than the establishment of a bond of belief between the speaker and the truth – 
spoken as if he was having an inner dialogue with himself. In this way, the parrhēsiast 
personally puts his signature to the truth he speaks; he is ontologically bounded to his 
true-discourse. Yet, this leaves open the possibility that anyone can bind them to any 
kind of truth that find authority beyond the one who speaks: the ruler can speak the truth 
about the laws that he authors; the teacher can recite grammatical rules; or the geogra-
pher can point at a map – truths which they genuinely believe and think are true. This is 
not parrhēsia. What distinguishes the parrhesiastes from others is that by speaking the 
truth the parrhesiastes risks something by confronting the other with the truth; in speak-
ing the truth to the other interlocutor the individual practicing parrhēsia risk the relation 
that exists between them. Thus, parrhēsia requires two bonds: first a bond between the 
individual who speaks and, second, a challenge to the bond that binds the two interlocu-
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tors: the parrhēsiat risk offending, irritating, provoking, angering the receiving inter-
locutor. Parrhēsia therefore carries with it a particular critical voice which is why it is 
interesting to note that instead of ‘pan’, parrhēsia can also originate from the root of 
‘para’ (against, contrary to). As in, against or contrary to popular opinion or against or 
contrary to the will of the King. The parrhēsiast is someone who speaks against prevail-
ing power, challenging what already counts as truth. In this sense parrhēsia is a true-
discourse of untruth, the not yet true. In other words, parrhēsia has a transformative 
force. 
 2. democratisation of the oath. It is thus very clear that there exists an 
asymmetrical relation of power between the subject who speaks the truth and the other 
– the receiving interlocutor. Given such asymmetry, it is also clear that parrhēsia is a 
practice that is always directed from below to above. If the relations of power would not 
be asymmetrical there would be no practice of parrhēsia. A king for example, can never 
speak with parrhēsia to his subjects; the powerful has little claim to this kind of true-
discourse. Yet, they still posses a role to play in the parrhēsiatic event, because both 
parties engage in what could be called a ‘parrhēsiatic pact’. In this pact, the parrhēsiast 
agrees to tell the truth, the whole truth without concealment [straightness], and thereby 
binding him or herself to the statement and agree to take to risk and consequences of its 
verisimilitude; while the other interlocutor – whether a friend, a assembly of people, or 
a king – agrees to accept what has been said no matter how unpleasant or provoking, to 
not take a course of action that would otherwise harm or leave the sole responsibility 
(the powerful has to be willing to share and show solidarity with the consequences) with 
the individual who showed the courage to confront them with the truth. Thus, by the 
parrhēsiatic pact we should understand a particular game of truth where the individual 
involved agree to play their respective parts. In historical motion it becomes quite clear 
however, that politics is not always played as the game of truth that is parrhēsia; most 
of the time there are no one willing – out of lack of courage or interest – to play the part 
of the parrhēsiast, at other times listening party does not accept what truth that has been 
spoken and either act violently or simply ignores what has been said. In any case, if the 
game of parrhēsia is played like this (if the pact is broken), the truth that is manifested 
in this very particular way is rendered without effect – the game fails, in a finite sense, 
where the truth then is produced by another game of truth. 
 The practice of parrhēsia can be brought about in two ways, it can be granted 
by an assembly or the monarch, or it can simply be taken – claimed by an individual 
who desires to speak out regardless of the consequences. In any case, it is always up to 
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the receiving part to honour the pact. Thus, whenever someone speaks with parrhēsia 
this person engages in a relation of power with another, usually someone of authority. 
This is always the case for simple moral matters – as in a relation between two people – 
as well as for political matters, where the role of the listener becomes more complex as 
their interaction has an effect on the whole community. Hence, as for the latter, and this 
might appear illogical considering the reciprocity of parrhēsia, there are at least three 
interested parties: the parrhēsiastes, the listener(s), and the society at large that the truth 
will impact. 
 
[9] Parrhēsia constitutes what Foucault calls an ‘alethurgory form’ – a particular way of 
manifesting truth, which is another way of saying that the practice of parrhēsia is a 
particular modality of truth-telling; one out of many ways of truth being manifested in 
the form of speech. It is all a question of style; there are different styles of playing 
games of truth, different ways of being a truth-teller. We shall get more into these dif-
ferent modalities of truth-telling in the chapter on the Ancient Greek problematiztions 
of parrhēsia – so for now this will have to do as a preliminary comment. For now, it 
will suffice to sketch out the different ways in which truth could be manifested through 
speech, as Foucault found them. Here, parrhēsia is contrasted to three other modalities 
of truth-telling, which can be found in Ancient Greek society, but no doubt also in 
alternate and evolved forms in other societies, including our own: the prophet (who 
speaks prophecy and fate), the sage (who speaks wisdom and being), and the teacher 
(who speaks technical ‘know how’ – technē). The contrast and comparison Foucault 
drives at is the of the structure of their speech, the way in which they constitute them-
selves and are recognized by others and subjects who are speaking with true-discourse.  
 1. in contrast to prophecy. The modality of the prophet (the truth-teller of 
fate) is characterized by it first of all being mediation, he does not speak in his own 
name, but in the name of a higher authority (usually God); second, he is in an interme-
diary position in that his speech is situated between the present and the future – it 
reveals to men what time conceals for them; and third, that when he discloses what is 
hidden his revelations are always obscure and spoken in riddles (their require interpreta-
tion), which at the same time means that there is always a chance that the interlocutor 
will not understand (or misinterpret) the truth unveiled.58 The modality of parrhēsia is 
the complete opposite to this; he by definition speaks only for himself. Second, the 
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parrhēsiatic never prophesies the future, rather he unveils that which is – he helps his 
interlocutors in their blindness of the truth, make them see their moral faults, their lack 
of discipline, or dubious practices. Third, he speaks plainly and frankly, not in riddles – 
and in doing so he leaves nothing to interpretation.59 
 2. in contrast to wisdom. The modality of the sage (the truth-teller of wis-
dom) speaks in his own name; the wisdom that he expresses is his own even if it 
originates from God, tradition, or arcane teachings. He himself is wise, which qualifies 
him to speak the discourse of wisdom and puts him in an intermediate position between 
timeless and traditional wisdom and his interlocutor. Second, there is nothing that natu-
rally compels the sage to speak with wisdom to other people, to teach or demonstrate it; 
he has no need to speak, his wisdom is first and foremost for himself. Foucault calls this 
the “structural silence” of the sage.60 Furthermore, and third, if he chooses to share his 
wisdom he says what is – that is, he talks about the being of the world and the order of 
things in abstractions and general principles of conduct. Even more so, he has no con-
cern for the reception of his wisdom and may prefer to speak in an enigmatic and 
convoluted language.61 In so far as the sage himself, is present in his true-discourse he 
resembles the parrhēsiatic. In contrast to him however, the parrhēsiatic has an obliga-
tion and duty to tell the truth; he cannot remain silent, but must confront his 
interlocutors with the truth, no matter then risk and danger, and he must do so as clearly 
as possible. Last, both the sage and the parrhēsiatic say what is; but where the sage’s 
true-discourse concerns the abstract and general, the true-discourse of the parrhēsiatic 
is signified by conjunctions and context, it is delivered in terms of “singularity of the 
individual”. Foucault furthermore adds, that there time and again is made a central 
distinction between:  
 
useless knowledge [wisdom of being] which speaks of the being of things and the world, on the 
one hand, and on the other the parrhēsiast’s truth-telling which is always applied, questions, and 
is directed to individuals and situations in order to say what they are in reality, to tell individuals 
the truth of themselves hidden from their own eyes, to reveal to them their present situation, their 
character, failings, the value of their conduct, and the possible consequences of their decisions.62 
 
In other words, there is in parrhēsia a predisposition towards practical wisdom 
(phronēsis).  
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 3. in contrast to technē. The teacher is someone who possesses techné 
(technical knowledge, or ‘know-how’) about a particular area or practice; he is someone 
who has gone through the hardship to learn this knowledge or truth and he has the 
ability to pass it on to others. Consequently, there exists a kind of a principle of obliga-
tion to speak the truth out of necessity – exactly so because, he would not have it if it 
were not for his own teacher. This sets the modality of the teacher apart from the sage 
and unites it with that of the parrhēsiast. And yet, the modality of the teacher is not 
identical to the modality of parrhēsia, for if he were to risk all he will not be able to 
pass on his valuable knowledge – thus he cannot speak his true-discourse at any cost. 
This, as we have seen, is exactly the obligation of the parrhēsiast who inevitably ac-
cepts all kinds of dangers. To practice parrhēsia one needs courage, whereas to teach 
one does not. Thus, while the modality of the teacher ensures the survival of knowledge, 
the modality of parrhēsia involves the risk of death. 
 Thus we understand the practice of parrhēsia more clearly, when we contrast it 
to the respective modalities of the prophet, the sage, and the teacher. Taken together 
these four modalities contain different personages, different modes of speech, and relate 
to different domains of being. Thus, while the prophet speaks the true-discourse of fate, 
the sage someone who speaks the true-discourse of wisdom, and the teacher speaks the 
true-discourse of techné, the parrhēsiast speaks the true-discourse of ethos – in that he 
speaks to the character of his interlocutor, turning him onto himself so that he will see 
what is hidden to him. 
 Furthermore, parrhēsia is not a technique (which, however, does not mean that 
it is void of technical aspects) that can be thought or learned. This makes it stand in 
strong opposition of rhetoric. Rhetoric, as a technique concerning the different ways to 
say things does not in anyway, contrary to parrhēsia, imply a bond between the person 
who speaks and what he says; a kind of speech which resembles a hollow shell that 
merely has an presentable exterior. The rhetorician is a person who a person who does 
not necessarily say what he thinks or believes, rather his aim is the effect of speech – to 
affect the person to whom he speaks, so as to alter their convictions, their conduct, or 
their belief. Rhetoric constrains the relation between speaker and listener by what is 
said. And while doing so, the rhetorician – if he is good – is able to effectively hide the 
truth. In this regard, rhetoric appears as a technique that enables people to flatter, lie, 
and deceive. Thus, parrhēsia and the technique of rhetoric are opposites. Foucault 
drives out the difference in saying, that: “the rhetorician is, or at any rate may well be an 
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effective liar who constrains others. The parrhesiast, on the contrary, is the courageous 
teller of a truth by which he puts himself and his relationship with the other at risk.”63 
 
[10] An initial definition of parrhēsia could be the following: the practice of parrhēsia 
is when an individual speaks with frankness, who opens up his inner dialogue of 
thought, who by speaking with a critical voice risk the relation with the other interlocu-
tor – their indifference, irritation, anger or potentially violent reaction. 
 1. straight discourse. According to Foucault, the practice of parrhēsia as he 
found it in Greek society has five characteristics: First, parrhēsia is characterised by 
frankness. That is, the parrhēsiastes says everything he has in mind and as such nothing 
goes unspoken, so that the audience can grasp precisely what the speaker has in mind. 
The parrhēsiastes does this in a way so that he makes it clear that what is said is his 
own opinion and he does so without technical aids. In contrast again to rhetoric, Fou-
cault explains: “Whereas rhetoric provides the speaker with technical devices to help 
him prevail upon the minds of his audience (regardless of the rhetorician's own opinion 
concerning what he says), in parrhēsia, the parrhesiastes acts on other people's mind by 
showing them as directly as possible what he actually believes.”64  
 2. a modification of the oath. Second, in parrhēsia, the parrhēsiastes’s 
relation to truth is very different to our modern way of understanding truth (in terms of 
proof); what could be called the Cartesian ‘mode of veridiction’. Foucault explains: “the 
parrhēsiastes says what is true because he knows that it is true; and he knows that it is 
true because it is really true.”65 Hence, in a way, there is always “an exact coincidence 
between belief and truth”, Foucault elaborates.66 The only measure of truth in parrhēsia 
would be the courage of the speaker, and therefore “what binds the speaker to the fact 
that what he says is the truth, and to the consequences which follow from the fact that 
he has told the truth.”67 Thus, there is a kind of ontological commitment on behalf of the 
speaker to which he is tied to the truth. 
 3. the politicisation of krino. Third, parrhēsia is a form of criticism. Be-
cause the danger or risk involved in parrhēsia comes from the speaker confronting the 
other, or the interlocutor. Foucault therefore describes this relation as the “game of 
truth” between the two parties. Thus, parrhēsia is a form of criticism because it is “ei-
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ther towards another or towards oneself, but always in a situation where the speaker or 
confessor is in a position of inferiority with respect to the interlocutor.”68 Foucault 
describes a criticism that comes from ‘below’ which is directed towards ‘above’. The 
parrhēsiastes is less powerful than the one to which he speaks to. This is the situation in 
which the philosopher risks angering the tyrant by confronting him with his way of 
ruling.  
 4. facing the wrath of the demos. Consequently, forth, parrhēsia entails a 
degree of risk and danger: “frankness is an aspect of liberty, but discerning the right 
occasion is hazardous.”69 It therefore requires courage (andreios). Contrasting parrhēsia 
to other “discursive strategies” such as rational demonstration, persuasion, teaching, and 
debating, Foucault shows that what distinguishes parrhēsia from all of them is the risk 
of danger inherent in parrhēsia. Thus, to be a parrhēsiastes requires the necessary 
courage to tell the truth, even if this means death. Foucault explains this by stating: 
“Parrhēsia, then, is linked to courage in the face of danger: it demands the courage to 
speak the truth in spite of some danger.”70 Consequently, people with power can never 
speak truth in the parrhēsiatic sense; it requires no courage to speak out from a position 
of power. Either to a tyrant or to the assembly, when one is being a parrhēsiastes there 
is always a risk of danger, either in the form of humiliation, exile or death. In the First 
Philippic, for instance, Demosthenes states: “I am well aware that, by employing this 
frankness, I do not know what the consequences will be for me of the things I have just 
said.”71 
 5. adhering to dikaion. Fifth, parrhēsia is characterised by a sense of duty. 
That is, telling the truth is thought of as a duty: “No one forces him to speak; but he 
feels that it is his duty to do so.”72 Foucault distinguishes between whether or not one is 
“compelled” to speak the truth, i.e. under torture or in a trail, and the sort of voluntary 
confession of the truth that is inspired by a sense of moral obligation towards a friend 
(in a political situation such as the city state, or to a king). Yet, while the context might 
demand duty the expression of the inner dialogue of thought of the parrhēsiast, which 
might go against it, has to be accepted. Parrhēsia therefore requires freedom or in other 
words: abiding to a sense of duty under conditions of freedom. It is in this respect that 
parrhēsia is useful to the community – in times of crisis, granted the necessary freedom, 
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the parrhēsiast will appear and confront the community with the necessary truth(s). 
From a more detached viewpoint we could also recite an argument made elsewhere, 
namely that: the room for critique is what keeps a community vibrant and adaptable. To 
exercise parrhēsia is to live in accordance with dikaion. 
 6. targeted at the nomoi (governmentality). Sixth, and this follows directly 
from the last point, parrhēsia aims at (political) action: in practicing parrhēsia there is 
an implicit desire to change the state of things – parrhēsia is never neutral to its context. 
In so far as one practices parrhēsia one is engaged in the government of self and others 
– in the very sense Foucault invoked to describe what he termed governmentality: that 
is, “the conduct of conduct.”73 Parrhēsia, by enunciating to the others the truth about 
their ethos, and doing so in a frank and critical way where the truth about oneself is 
revealed (ones inner dialogue) so that one summons risk and dangers. This particular 
way of calling for a certain course of action, furthermore makes the practice of 
parrhēsia stand in sharp contrast to much critical theory today, which does not aim at 
prescribing a course of action under conditions of risk and danger. Rather, such critical 
thinking reminds more of the modality of truth-telling of the sage who is reserved with 
regard to his wisdom.  
 To sum all this up and come to a preliminary definition, we can say parrhēsia is 
a particular manifestation of truth and that the practice parrhēsia is a form of speech 
where one says all and everything as frankly and plainly as possible; and by so doing 
established a particular relation to truth in that one only says what one really thinks, 
what is and appear to be the truth to oneself; what is said, is directed towards the other 
in a critical way; and by virtue thereof exposes the individual that speaks to risk and 
danger; one does so out of a sense of duty and for the common good of the polis. 
Parrhēsia, then is a kind of courageous practice where, under conditions of freedom and 
motivated by duty, a person utters a critical and frank speech that calls for a particular 
action, and subsequently exposes the speaker to personal risk and danger. 
 
[11] For the politics of truth to function, the problem of political order has to be dealt 
with in some way. In Greek thought it was primarily a problem of how the practice of 
parrhēsia could be guaranteed; how there within the polis could be made room for the 
true-discourse of parrhēsia. We have already seen how parrhēsia was linked with 
straight discourse and good government. 
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 Now when we turn to the problem of political order, the question of good gov-
ernment (eunomia) became a question of a good constitution (politeia), which goes back 
to the tension between harmony (nomia) and civil war (stasis). The politeia is what 
brings about the conditions for nomia; if left on the other hand these questions are not 
dealt with properly it can lead to stasis. In a specific sense politeia was the institutions 
of the state, it had to do with the process of political decision-making, the duties of 
magistrates, and the exercise of juridical power.74 Thus there was a whole series of 
problems associated with the politeia; most of which had to do with equality and all 
compounds terms beginning with iso-. They were largely problems dealing the frame-
work for political action, the constitution of authority and legitimacy: Who should rule? 
How decisions are to be taken? How should power be lawfully exercised? How should 
leaders be appointed and for how long? How should power be constituted? How should 
the power of institutions be delineated? Is it to be divided equally between factions 
(isokratia)? To what extend do citizens have equal rights (isonomia)? Who has the right 
to vote and who does not? Is there equality of birth (isogonia)? Are all equally account-
able to the law (isos)? In short, all the different sets of formalities associated with 
designing a constitution and which are familiar to us today. 
 Nevertheless, in Greek thought the concept of politeia retains a deeper meaning 
because it is linked clearer to the problem of true-discourse. It is thus far from meaning 
it has today of being the sum total of laws that govern society, even if that is the com-
mon and correct translation. Importantly, there is a link between the constitution, with 
all the problems outlines above, and a particular way of life. As the polis is a unit made 
up of citizens, politeia could also mean citizenship or citizen rights.75 As it was linked 
to the citizen it also had to do with his individual activities, his way of life so to speak. 
This is why the questions of politeia were not just about the total amount of laws of the 
polis (thesmoi), but rather the total political structure of a polis.76 In the Funeral Ora-
tion, Thucydides has Pericles make a close association between the politeia and the 
general way of life in Athenian democracy. To quote him at some length:  
 
It is true that our government (politeia) is called a democracy, because its administration is in the 
hands, not of the few, but of the many yet while;  as regards the law all men are on an equality 
for the settlement of their private disputes, as regards the value set on them it is as each man is in 
any way distinguished that he is preferred to public honours, not because he belongs to a particu-
lar class, but because of personal merits; nor, again, on the ground of poverty is a man barred 
from a public career by obscurity of rank if he but has it in him to do the state a service. And not 
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only in our public life are we liberal (eleutheros), but also as regards our freedom from suspicion 
of one another in the pursuits of every-day life; for we do not feel resentment at our neighbour if 
he does as he likes, nor yet do we put on sour looks which, though harmless, are painful to be-
hold.77 
 
What makes democracy, as a kind of politeia, stand apart is that it makes room for a 
particular kind of life. Like so, politeia signifies the formal conditions for the practice of 
parrhēsia, but as such it also implies a whole way of life that supports this practice. A 
particular politeia is linked to a nomos or more importantly nomoi, a way of thinking or 
a form of belief: being a democracy as opposed to a tyranny has an impact on how any 
particular state would act in relation to others; each would have different expectations of 
behaviour. Isocrates would later compare it to the soul: “for the soul of a state is nothing 
else that its polity.”78 The politeia is corruptible. Consequently, the problem of political 
order became a problem of how politeia can provide the conditions for a general way of 
life in which it is possible to practice parrhēsia. In his speech Against Timarchus, the 
democrat Aeschines highlighted the importance of providing political order though the 
law:  
 
autocracies and oligarchies are administered according to the tempers of their lords, but demo-
cratic states according to established laws. And be assured, fellow citizens, that in a democracy it 
is the laws that guard the person of the citizen and the constitution of the state (politeian), 
whereas the despot and the oligarch find their protection in suspicion and in armed guards. Men, 
therefore, who administer an oligarchy, or any government based upon inequality, must be on 
their guard against those who attempt revolution by the law of force; but you, who have a gov-
ernment based upon equality (isos) and law (ennomos), must guard against those whose words 
violate the laws or whose lives have defied them; for then only will you be strong, when you 
cherish the laws.79 
 
There is thus a constant need to depend the exercise of true-discourse through the medi-
um of the law, to provide political order by politeia. There are two basic values that the 
politeia needs to support for there to be parrhēsia in the city. These are the two aspect 
of democracy that Herodotus praises about Athens when it won its freedom (eleutheria) 
form tyranny and could provide its citizens with equal opportunity (isēgoria) to address 
the assembly.80  
 1. Liberty (eleutheria). The term eleutheria has at least two connotations, 
both of which were invoked by Thucydides in the quote above: liberty to live as one 
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pleases (private liberty) and participate in political institutions (political liberty).81 They 
are the fundamental democratic value which are praised by Ortanes in the constitutional 
debate in Herodotus, in the speeches of Athenian statesmen in Thucydides, or “to rule in 
turn” as proclaimed as the most important aspect of Athenian democracy in Euripides’ 
Suppliant Woman.82 However, the problem of political order is exactly that the life of 
eleutheria cannot guarantee itself and thus it has to be guaranteed by the politeia.  
 2. Equality (isēgoria). Usually equality would be discussed in terms of 
either equal political rights (isonomia), or equal opportunity to address the assembly 
(isēgoria); . While it might be said that if all men are to be guaranteed the opportunity 
to speak there must be some degree of natural equality between them – “A free (eleu-
therosas) state, with an equal (isopsephos) vote for all.”83 Opponents of democracy 
would usually ridicule isonomia as misguided idea, which either meant that the demo-
crats believed that they were equal in everything, or a radical idea that in practice 
created disorder.84 Nevertheless, to the Athenian democrats equality was exclusively a 
political term, there was no connotation to the social or the economical sphere, which is 
why it was never paradoxical for them to equate it with liberty: to have political equality 
would not reduce another’s liberty. It was isēgoria, the equality of opportunity to speak 
before the assembly, which was praised by the democrats: “Thus Freedom (eleuthero-
sas) speaks: ‘what man desires to bring good counsel for his country to the people? 
Who chooseth this, is famous: who will not, keeps silent. Can equality (isēgoria) further 
go?’”85 A returning problem is thus the theme of which politeia would best guarantee 
the freedom to speak the truth isēgoria? 
 
[12] Parrhēsia is embedded in what Foucault call “politics as experience” – also called 
dunasteia (form dunamis, meaning strength, power, or the exercise of power), to distin-
guish it from politeia, where the dominance or superiority of some allows them to 
address others and speak the truth and in effect persuading them so that they, as a result, 
can be said to exercise power over them.86 As with politeia, there is a series of problems 
related to dunasteia: first, the problem of how power is exercised – the procedures, 
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techniques, and practices of exerting power. In the Greek city-states the exercise of 
power was limited to the practice of truth-telling, which is only effective in so far as it 
succeeds to persuade either the people or the king. Second, dunasteia constitutes the 
political game or contest (agōn) in which the struggles for power play out in a democra-
cy. Finally, the problem of dunasteia is the problem of political man himself, his 
character, quality, and moral conduct in his relationship to himself and to others, the 
people he is governing. Towards this complex of problems Democritus warned: “Do not 
be competitive beyond what is proper, and do not acquire power for yourself contrary to 
the common good; for a well-managed polis is the most prosperous.”87 Thus, in thought 
the problem of the political game had to be delineated, which was defining not the rules 
of the game, but rather the point of the game. The point is excellence – to make the 
polis excellent by having excellent citizens that engage in an agōn to distinguish them-
selves from each other; showing their ethical worth and effectively take charge of the 
polis via the practice of truth-telling. This is what it meant for them to conduct them-
selves by a principle of ethical differentiation. But who and how should such ethical 
differentiation take place? 
 1. status. The initial concern of the problem of the political game is to be in 
the “first rank” (prōton zugon) of citizens.88 It thus not just citizenship that is required, 
it was also important that ones status was provided with parrhēsia as a birth right and 
that one could document the moral quality of ones ancestors.89 The most obvious exclu-
sions would therefore either be the foreigner could not claim parrhēsia as he had no 
birth right to make use of logos, or the exile who could exercise parrhēsia as he would 
be absent, which is why this exile was considered a great loss and punishment.90 New-
comers would also be frowned upon, as they had once been outsider.91 Yet, as a scene in 
the Bacchae show, parrhēsia is not limited to individuals in the first rank – but still 
status would be a potential point of objection.92  
 2. qualification. In Euripides’ Ion there is a moment when Ion in discussion 
with his newly revealed father Xuthus, contemplates the qualifications that he necessari-
ly must posses to engage in politics: 
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if I press to Athens’ highest ranks, and seek a name, of dullards shall I win hatred; for jealousy 
ever dogs success. Good men, whose wisdom well could helm the state, who yet hang back, who 
never speak in public, to them shall I be laughing-stock and fool, who in a town censorious, go 
not softly. And statesman who have made their mark, mid whom I seek repute, will hedge me in 
and check by the assembly’s vote. Tis ever so; they which sway nation, and have won repute, to 
young ambition are the battered foes93 
 
Ion thus divides the citizens into three classes: firstly there were the ordinary people 
who have no power, the adunatoi. Secondly, there were those who have power, but 
which are not ready to engage in politics, the sophoi. Thirdly, there were those with 
power and who are willing to engage in politics, the established politicians with whom 
he will have to compete. They are the ones with ability (dunamis) and are thus qualified 
to engage in a struggle to govern the city. The practice of parrhēsia concerns only this 
group because they re the ones who will take charge of the city; it is the problem of 
true-discourse in the relation to the problem of the political game. 
 3. agonistic structure. The tyrant or the king did not have to compete to 
exercise power – there is no choice one has to suffer the madness of the mad: “The 
unwisdom of his rulers must one bear. Hard this, that one partake in the folly of 
fools.”94 Again, this is the problem of the monarchos; the city is condemned to the 
haphazardness of a single mind without resistance. In contrast, the parrhēsiast engages 
in a kind of game where he competes to rule the city through his true-discourse, the use 
of his reason through speech, logos: “polei kai logō khrēstas.” Thus, because of it com-
petitive structure to exercise power parrhēsia acts as a check against the rule of one. 
But what does it mean to take charge of the city with ones true-discourse?  
 There is a scene in Orestes that may serve as an example. The assembly of Ar-
gos is gathered after the capture of Orestes, to discuss how he and his Electra should be 
judged for their matricide of Clytemnestra. It starts with the crier (keryx) putting the 
question: “Who wishes to speak?”95 According to ritual, after the opening ceremonies it 
would be common practice in the Athenian assembly to ask who wants to make use of 
logos (logō khrēstas).96 The first to speak was Talthybius , a foreign dignitary who is a 
known herald or spokesperson from the Iliad, which means that he per definition would 
not speak for himself but for already constituted power.97 The texts say: “he spake – 
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subservient ever to the strong (dunamenoisin) – half-heartedly (dikhomutha).”98 The 
word dikhomutha means ambiguous speak or double-talk – his speech would thus satis-
fy either side of the dispute equally and notably the text does not actually state what he 
argues for. Second to speak was Diomedes, also a figure form the Iliad the model of 
courage and eloquence. Going for the moderate path, he urges neither to condemn them 
to death nor to acquit them, but to banish them into exile. His speech has the opposite 
effect and left the assembly split on the issue, with some approving and others disagree-
ing. The first and second speakers are clearly opposites, so are the last two.  
 Then a third unnamed person spoke, based on the demagogue Cleophon, who 
argued that they should both be stoned to death.99 In the text this person is described as 
“one of tongue unbridled (athurhōylōssos), stout in imprudence (thrasēi), an Argive, yet 
no Argive, thrust on us, in bluster and coarse-grained fluency confident (thorhubō te 
pisunos parrhēia), still plausible to trap the folk in mischief.”100 The parrhēsia is de-
scribed as amathēs, uneducated, rough and course. That is to say it is problematic to the 
city, exactly because it is not indexed to the truth.101 A forth man objected to this last 
proposal, and urged the assembly that they be acquitted because they had done a great 
service by killing the one who had corrupted the city’s customs (nomos).102 In the texts 
he is described like this: “No dainty presence, but a manful (andreois) man, in town and 
marked-circle (agora) seldom found, a yeoman (autosurgos) – such as are the land’s 
one stay – yet shrewd (xunetos) in grapple of words, when this he would; a stainless 
(akeraios) man, who lived a blameless life.”103 This last figure possesses all the classi-
cal virtues of the parrhēsiast: he is described as having little beauty or a non-flattering 
appearance, yet he is courageous (andreois); he is described as xunetos, means that he is 
prudent – a man of intelligence capable of engaging in debate when he chooses; and 
lastly he is described as pure and without stain (akeraios) and as anepiplēktos, irre-
proachable. In short, he is described as having the classical virtues of courage, 
intelligence, and moral quality. Yet, there is an interesting addition, he is also described 
as a ‘yeoman’ or autosurgos – a man holding and cultivating a small landed estate – and 
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therefore rarely found in the city spending time in the agora. There is an important 
opposition between city life and the countryside life.104 A distinction that goes back to 
Hesiod’s Work and Days, where opposition between good strife to bad strife sets up his 
advice to Perses.105 It is a distinction that says something about how the parrhēsia 
functions in the general idea of justice and straightness. 
 Lastly, Orestes would speak himself and engage in the strife; but in vain, the 
outcome of the scene is that the demagogue carries the day and Orestes and his sister 
are condemned to death. Nonetheless, what should be noticed is that it is these four 
opponents structure the contest of dunasteia: the heralds who speaks aim to please 
constituted power, the heroes who aims at the moderate course, the demagogue who 
excites to violence and has no care for truth, and the good parrhēsiast who speaks the 
discourse of truth. This agōn is decided by the principle of ethical differentiation, a 
difference that emerges based on their qualities and abilities in making use of logos. It is 
this game of truth constitutes the conditions of the possibility for truth to appear; which 
is another way of saying that in Classical Greek thought the politics of truth is a compe-
tition between adversaries who compete through speech (logos) to govern the city – 
“polei kai logō khrēstas.” Dunasteia is that unavoidable part of the politics of truth; the 
agonistic and dynamic game that one has to engage in if one desires to change what is 
established as truth. 
 
[13] To show how the problematisation parrhēsia constituted a historical rupture, the 
chapter started with an examination of the model of the wise king and the practice of the 
oath. The most characteristic part was that in this was a politics of truth, the truth as 
such did not have to manifest itself and would reside in some future event. The problem 
of political order would in thought be problematized as a question of remembering the 
law (thēmos) while the political game would be a question of exercising ones right to 
decide (dikazein). In 7th and 6th century BC however, the danger of the king passing 
crooked judgements started to be regarded as a practical problem that would be dis-
cussed through the concept of monarchos (the oppressive rule of one). In Hesiod we 
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105 “do store this up in your spirit, lest gloating Strife keep your spirit away from work, while you gawk 
at quarrels and listen to the assembly. For he has little care for quarrels and assemblies, whoever does not 
have plentiful means of life stored up indoors in good season, what the earth bears, Demeter’s grain. 
When you can take your fill of that, then you might foster quarrels and conflict for the sake of another 
man’s wealth.” Hes.WD.27-34 
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find the emergence of the juridical concept of dikainon, which instituted a split between 
truth and power that in contrast demanded a manifestation of truth. At the same time 
laws were written down. This constituted an epistemological break that set the Greeks 
definitively apart from other traditions of thought in the ancient world where truth and 
power were not regarded as separate entities. In practical terms the break was accom-
plished by displacing the truth-discourse of the oath from the parties swearing an oath to 
the gods, to the judge swearing an oath to uphold the law. In democracy, the ‘I judge’ 
(krino) of the law became the property of the free citizen who could make use of logos 
parrhēsia to persuade the demos of his truth. The politics of truth was thus problema-
tized in thought as the ethical differentiation displayed by those who sought to govern 
the poleis by the practice of parrhēsia. Yet, at the same time, the problem of parrhēsia 
was situated between the problem of the constitutional (politeia) guarantee of the free-
dom to speak (isēgoria) and the problem of ones ability (dunasteia) to exercising power 
in the game of politics.  
 The socio-political limit of thought was thus governed by a principle of ethical 
differentiation where the limit of novel thought was constituted in the courage and 
persuasiveness of the individual truth-teller – the extend to which one could speak the 
truth, a truth of different and reproach, depended upon the social-mood being suscepti-
ble to it. Thus, the socio-political limit of thought with parrhēsia lies in the social-mood 
of the people who are addressed: are the tempered and eager to listen to complicated 
speeches, or are they angry and only willing to listen to flattering discourses? Because 
the use true-discourse need to be modified to fit with context in which it is spoken, it is 
easy to see why rhetoric and sophistry became as popular as they did in Greek society. 
The Sophists would make good profit of their art of persuasive speech also for the good 
of the city. Today their image is tainted, yet there was a time in which the trait made 
perfect sense – at least as long as the politics of truth was not destabilised by society 
becoming a danger to thought. With such a limit it is relatively easy to pinpoint the 
eventual crisis: if, in this struggle over shaping the social mood, there are some that 
does not have city interest at heart but only their own, they will easily be able to sway 
opinion to fit their aims. For it was not only the liberality of thought that destabilised 
the politics of truth, but equally the intolerance of the difference of thought as epito-
mised in the sentencing of Socrates. It was this intolerance that was utilised by the bad 
parrhēsiast – the demagogue who makes use of parrhēsia to further his own interests, 
rather than those of the poleis. Thucydides lays the blame for the Athenian defeat at the 
Peloponnesian wars at the feet of the demagogues who made use radical democratic 
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constitution, while Isocrates charges against the sophists that they have no interest in the 
truth.106 And where some, like Aristotle, would take a more hesitant stance towards the 
possibility of reconciling democracy and parrhēsia; others, like Plato, would see it as a 
choice between democracy and parrhēsia. I shall explore this in more detail in the 
following chapter. 
  
                                                
106 Thuc.II.65.10-11, Isoc.13.9, but see also, Isoc.8.75 and Aeschin.2.1763  
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Chapter III: Exhortation 
*   *   * 
[1] This chapter is about the emergence of politics of truth as exhortation. It covers a 
rather extensive period, but one that should nevertheless be justified by the fact that the 
epistemological space that delineates the politics of truth only goes through transfor-
mations rather than decisive breaks and displacements. That is, from an historical 
epistemological perspective, the social forces that underpin a politics of truth that takes 
the form of exhortation do not fundamentally change; the series of transformations are 
intensifications in the same points of problematisation. The first part (I) is devoted to a 
description of how parrhēsia constitutes a practical problem for democratic politics: 
first, in that it becomes too dangerous to confront the demos, and second, that democra-
cy is structurally incapable of making room for a true-discourse of differentiation. The 
second part (II) is devoted to the transformations and displacements of the politics of 
truth in Plato, who once again makes the king the focal point, but in a different constel-
lation: truth resides in the good (agathos) of which it is possible for the soul (psūke) to 
obtain knowledge through an active relationship with an advisor (sumbouleuo) and 
training (paideia). Lastly (III), I turn towards how exhortation is elaborated upon in the 
High Middle Ages and the Renaissance in discourse of Mirrors for Princes, with a 
particular emphasis on the danger of flattery, and how the problems of political order 
and the political game are ordered trough the concepts of the divine right of kings and 
court society with the institution of council – the moral figure of the proud homme.  
I 
[2] Two events are commonly associated with the downfall of democracy in Athens: the 
death of Socrates and the routing of the Sophists – one the original sin against philoso-
phy, the other his triumphing achievement. That, at least, is the story we are told by his 
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followers. Yet these events did not happen in a vacuum; there were strong social forces 
involved in both. On the one hand it was becoming obvious that the demos posed a 
danger to the politics of truth; their patience in listening to true-discourse that does not 
seek to please or flatter had become minimal at the same time as their appetite for it 
grew: “For now, stirred to fury and swayed by passion in all their counsels, they will no 
longer consent to obey or even to be the equals of the ruling caste, but will demand the 
lion’s share for themselves. When this happens, the state will change its name to the 
finest sounding of all, freedom and democracy, but will change its nature to the worst 
thing of all, mob-rule.”1 That was the danger of democracy to the politics of truth. On 
the other hand, the best – those who were supposed to participate in politics and speak 
with parrhēsia – were being replaced by anyone who was willing to pay money to learn 
how to speak at the assembly. Yet, this danger came from more than the homonym 
discourse of the Sophists; it came from the structural inability of democracy to make 
room for parrhēsia.2 These were the social forces that appeared as the two practical 
problems that led to a displacement of the politics of truth in a new epistemological 
space, which eventually would replace the diagram of thought that was parrhēsia, 
politeia, and dunesteia.  
 
[3] After the golden period of Athenian democracy, the erosion of democratic parrhēsia 
began during the Peloponnesian wars. The circularity between democracy and parrhēsia 
was always dangerous to the person making use of his true-discourse and the polis 
risking succumbing to a demagogue. Nevertheless, from Thucydides' report on how 
Pericles is confronted by the Athenians, or the debate between Cleon and Diodotes in 
response to the revolt of Mytilene, it starts to become evident how much this had al-
ready changed during time.3 In both these cases there is an abuse of parrhēsia: one is 
the people of Athens having to be reminded that they share in the responsibility of the 
war, the other is the abuse of parrhēsia by Cleon. In other words, parrhēsia as a form of 
politics of truth is facing a crisis; it is in the process of being replaced by ‘bad 
parrhēsia’. As a consequence of this parrhēsia is gradually given a negative connota-
tion. Parrhēsia comes to denote the kind of imprudent, thoughtless, careless speech that 
comes out when someone blabbers out whatever that person happens to be thinking; it is 
                                                
1 Polyb.VI.57.9-10. See also, Polyb.VI.9.4-5  
2 By focusing on these two problems I am taking my cue from Foucault, Government of Self and Others, 
pp. 197-201 and The Courage of Truth, pp. 40-43 
3 Thuc.II.60-65, Thuc.III.36-50 
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not so much saying everything, as saying anything. It is the kind of person who says 
anything that comes to mind or which suits the one who speaks purposes or interests – a 
genuine bull-shitter or chatterbox – without a concern for his discourse adhering to 
principles of reason and truth. This is parrhēsia as it occurs particularly in Plato’s 
Phaedrus, or Aristophanes’ Knights, where Cleon is ridiculed for claiming to speak 
with parrhēsia.4 In both these texts parrhēsia is associated with the figure of the dema-
gogue who seeks to flatter the crowd and represents a reversal of all parrhēsiatic values: 
he seeks to persuade through rhetoric instead of frankness, to tell untruths rather than 
truths, seeks personal safety over risk and courage, seeks to flatter instead of critiquing, 
and self-interest instead of interest of the community. These two major experiences, the 
danger to the speaker and the structural inability of democracy to make room for 
parrhēsia, can be elaborated further.  
 1. The danger to the parrhēsiast. First, the courage of the speaker is not 
respected, and it thus becomes too dangerous to show one’s courage in speaking the 
truth. This was exactly the case when Pericles had to remind the Athenians not to up-
hold their end of the parrhēsiatic pact: “I have been expecting these manifestations of 
your wrath against me, knowing as I do the causes of your anger, and my purpose in 
calling an assembly was that I might address to you certain reminders, and remonstrate 
if in any case you are either angry with me or are giving way to your misfortunes with-
out reason.”5 Another, but very clear example of this can be found in On the Peace (c. 
355BC), where Isocrates critiques Athens’ policy of aggression, which he sees as bring-
ing about the downfall of the city itself. The root of the problem, as he sees it, is that the 
citizens have developed a desire to only listen to orators who give pleasing discourses 
that encourage the policy of war. Even though democracy is capable of presenting them 
with all the relevant knowledge, they have elected not to listen to those who oppose 
them.6 The situation has become so tense that Isocrates declares: “I know that it is 
hazardous to oppose your views and that, although this is a free government, there 
exists no ‘freedom of speech’ (parrhēsia) except that which is enjoyed in this Assembly 
by the most reckless orators, who care nothing for your welfare.”7 Athens is a democra-
cy in name only; there is no room for practicing the principle of ethical differentiation. 
                                                
4 Plat.Phae.240e, Aristoph.Kn.1008 
5 As Thucydides points out this can be expense of neither party: “For in my judgment a state confers a 
greater benefit upon its private citizens when as a whole commonwealth it is successful, than when it 
prospers as regards the individual but fails as a community.” Thuc.II.60 
6 Iso.VIII.§9-10 
7 Iso.VIII.§14 
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Likewise, in the Areopagiticus he diagnosed Athens as a place that had come to under-
stand “lawlessness as liberty, impudence of speech as equality, and licence to do what 
they pleased as happiness.”8 In another oration, he argues against the agōn, claiming 
that it injures the commonwealth rather than benefits it: “when they do assemble in 
council, you will find them more often quarrelling with each other than deliberating 
together.”9 The healthy strife, which would guarantee that the best would rule the city, 
no longer exists – it has been replaced by an unhealthy strife that makes for a bad envi-
ronment for the parrhēsiast to speak. 
 In general, this is a practical problem that is associated with the unruly passions 
of the demos – clearly reflected in two crucial trials during the Peloponnesian war, 
namely the trial of Socrates and the trial of the generals who failed to recue their men 
from a storm after the battle of Arginusae, where the normal proceedings of the law 
were set aside.10 It is thus a problem that, at least in principle, could be reversed accord-
ing to the cycles of political regimes, as the people could once again acquire an appetite 
for isēgoria and parrhēsia – however unlikely that might seem to its contemporaries.11 
 2. The structural failure of democracy. In general, parrhēsia, when used in 
its negative connotation, would be attributed to a society of people as a way of life – 
and thus, generally speaking, there are good and bad forms of parrhēsia; where the 
former is identifiable with the individual, the latter is predominately associated with 
groups of people. In so far as it holds these two possible meanings, parrhēsia presents 
itself as a dilemma: if everyone has the right to freedom of speech, then anyone can say 
anything; then even the very worst citizens – the bad, the immoral, the incompetence or 
ignorant – may take charge and govern the city with disastrous consequences. Conse-
quently, the right to freedom of speech (isēgoria) presents a particular problem because 
it opens up for possibility of bad parrhēsia. Hence, there is a kind of structural failure 
inherent in democracy, which is making room for bad parrhēsia, resulting in the break-
up of the ‘fundamental circularity’ between parrhēsia and democracy. This structural 
inability has to do with the two distinctions between the worst (ponēroi) and the best 
(chrēstoi), and between the few (ligoi) and the many (hoi polloi). In the politics of truth 
of parrhēsia it was the fact that the few reproached the many in the contest of true-
discourse in order to obtain the good for the city that made them the good, which at the 
                                                
8 Iso.VII.§20; see also Ise.XII.§130-131 and Iso.XV.§316-317  
9 Iso.III.§19 
10 Xen.Hell.I.5-6 
11 The cycle of political regimes was a widespread idea in Greek thought. See: Polby.VI.9.10-11. 
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same time made the many the worst.12 The structural inability of democracy thus con-
sists in it not being able to distinguish between good and bad speakers, because it grants 
freedom of speech to everyone, the good and the bad alike.  
 A text that provides an early example of the structural inability of democracy to 
make room for parrhēsia, which has become problematic is the paradoxical and ironic 
Constitution of Athens by the Old Oligarch, dating from around the second half of the 
fifth century BC. According to the author, the general problem is that the constitution 
(politeia) of Athens “let the worst people (ponēroi) be better off than the good 
(chrēstoi).”13 The way in which the constitution has resulted in this is not by re-
appropriating their riches by exiling them, but it has done so in a way that the whole 
city is worse off. It is because of the ideals of democracy, to live as one pleases (eleu-
theria) and to have the freedom to speak (isēgoria), that Athens has bad government: 
“For the people do not want a good government under which they themselves are 
slaves; they first want to be free and to rule. Bad government (kakanomia) is of little 
concern to them. What you consider bad government is the very source of the people’s 
strength and freedom.”14 On the other hand, the author notes, “If it is good government 
(enomia) you seek, you will first observe the cleverest men established the laws in their 
own interest. Then the good men will punish the bad; they will make policy for the city 
and not allow madmen (hoi mainomenoi) to participate or to peak their minds or to meet 
in assembly (ekklēsiazein)."15 Good government is based on the distinction between the 
good (chrēstoi), who serve the interest of the city, and the bad (ponēroi), who serve 
their own interest. The bad should therefore be excluded because they are not in their 
right mind from government. But in a democracy, according to the author, it is exactly 
the opposite which occurs: “Someone might say that they ought not to let everyone 
speak on equal terms and serve on the council, but rather just the cleverest and finest. 
Yet their policy [the Athenians] is also excellent in this very point of allowing even the 
worst people to speak. […] But, as things are, any wretch who wants to can stand up 
and obtain what is good for him and the likes of him.”16 In other words, the democratic 
ideal of isēgoria makes it impossible to differentiate between good and bad speakers: 
the many (hoi polloi) cannot be the best (chrēstoi) and serve the interest of the city and 
                                                
12 Foucault, Courage of Truth, pp. 43-44 
13 Ps.Xen.I.§1 
14 Ps.Xen.I.§8 
15 Ps.Xen.I.§9 
16 Ps.Xen.I.§6 
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at the same time be free to serve their own interests. It is impossible to reconcile the 
desire for freedom of the many (hoi polloi) with the need for true-discourse. 
 A similar, but more complex, critique of democratic parrhēsia is to be found in 
Book VIII of Plato’s Republic, devoted to comparing the five different constitutions in 
terms of their politeia and the character (or soul, psūke) of the men ruling them.17 Socra-
tes starts by describing how democracy comes into being by the poor (ponēroi) being 
victorious in a civil war, having killed some and exiled others to share among them the 
business of ruling the city equally (ex ison).18 He goes on to explain how people that 
have divided the spoils of war according to equality (isonomia) live. As would be com-
monplace for the democrats themselves, Socrates notes the two characteristics of 
democracy: “To begin with, are they not free? and is not the city chock-full of liberty 
(ēleuthesias) and freedom of speech (parrhēsia)? and has not every man licence to do as 
he likes?”19 Acknowledging these two seemingly positive characteristics, he then con-
siders the consequences of them.  
 First, in such a constitution, where everyone is wholly free to arrange their life 
as they see fit, Socrates notes, you would naturally find people of all “sorts” (pan-
todapoi).20 This pantodapoi is an altogether negative term, a kind of ‘free for all’ where 
anyone can pick and choose his own constitution (politeia): to participate in government 
is a choice, to participate in war is a choice, and to participate in the legal system is a 
choice – none shall look down on those who prefer not to participate in the polis.21 The 
second consequence has to do with the conditions for the people who make use of true-
discourse. “What about,” asks Socrates in a passage that has been translated in very 
different ways because of the irony applied, “the tolerance of democracy, its superiority 
to all our meticulous requirements, its disdain for our solemn (semnunintes) pro-
nouncements made when we were founding our city, [what about the fact] that except in 
the case of transcendent natural gifts no one could ever become a good man unless from 
                                                
17 Respectively these are, from best to worst: the kallipolis which is rule by philosophers-kings whose 
soul is governed by knowledge of the good (540a); timocracy which is ruled by the spirited part of the 
soul, desiring honour and victory (550b); oligarchy which is occupied by people who are ruled by neces-
sary appetites (554a); democracy which is ruled by people whose souls is governed by unnecessary 
appetites (561a-b); and tyranny, which is ruled by someone whose soul has given into lawless and unnec-
essary appetites (571a).  
18 Plat.Rep.VIII.557a  
19 Plat.Rep.VIII.557b 
20 Plat.Rep.VIII.557d 
21 Plat.Rep.VIII.557e. The word pantodapoi (which means ‘of every kind’, ‘of all sorts’, or ‘manifold’) in 
central to the whole passage, it occurs at 559d and 561e as well. For other instances of the mixture of 
things in a democracy see: Ps.Xen.II.§8, Iso.III.16 
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childhood his play and all his pursuits were concerned with things fair and good?”22 
Democracy, according to Socrates, has none of it and has instead made a virtue out of it, 
“– how superbly (megaloprepōs) it tramples under foot all such ideals, caring nothing 
from what practices and way of life a man turns to politics, but honouring him if only he 
says that he loves the people!”23 Thus, democracy does not reward the best (chrēstoi) – 
those who because of their “transcendent natural gifts” have chosen to participate in the 
government of the city – but only those who flatter the crowd.  
 So because of its characteristics of isēgoria and parrhēsia democracy has a 
structure of non-differentiation: the problem is that democracy is that kind of constitu-
tion, which “assign[s] a kind of equality indiscriminately to equals and unequals 
alike.”24 Plato thus exposes the twofold problem of democracy: on the one hand, every-
one has freedom to the extent that they constitute their own political unit – they have 
their own politeia and are not necessarily a part of the collective; while on the other 
hand, they all have isēgoria, which allows anyone to say what he wishes (parrhēsia), 
especially the worst – those who only aim to please the crowd.   
 These characteristics of democracy as politeia also reflect on the democratic 
man himself. Drawing a distinction between necessary and unnecessary desires, Socra-
tes explains that the democratic man is one in whom the unnecessary desires have 
triumphed over the necessary, just as the democrats overthrew the aristocrats, taking up 
hold in the citadel they empty it of knowledge (mathēmatōn), honourable pursuits 
(epitēdeumatōn kalon), and words of truth (logos alēthēs).25 All these good qualities 
have been banished from the soul; at the same time it is the same pantodapoi that rules 
the desires and so the democratic man turns over “his soul to each as it happens along 
until it is sated, as if it had drawn the lot for that office, and then in turn to another, 
disdaining none but fostering them all equally (ex ison).”26 The democratic man who 
lacks logos alēthēs and who is ruled by unnecessary desires will then be completely 
haphazard; one day he will be “wine-bibbing and abandoning himself to the lascivious 
pleasing of the flute” and the next “drinking only water and dieting” – and yet more 
                                                
22 Plat.Rep.VIII.558b. Note that semnunintes has an ironical tone – ‘high-brow’ or ‘top-lofty’.  
23 Plat.Rep.VIII.558b. Here megaloprepōs is meant ironically cf. Symp.199c, Theaet.161c, Meno.94b 
24 Plat.Rep.VIII.558c 
25 Plat.Rep.VIII.560b, Plat.Rep.VIII.561c 
26 Plat.Rep.VIII.561b. The term equal (ex ison) refers back to the democratic takeover Plat.Rep.VIII 557a, 
for as Socrates explains next: “And he does not accept or admit into the guard-house the words of truth 
when anyone tells him that some pleasures arise from honourable and good desires, and others from those 
that are base, and that we ought to practise and esteem the one and control and subdue the others; but he 
shakes his head at all such admonitions and avers that they are all alike and to be equally esteemed.” 
Plat.Rep.VIII.561b-c 
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dangerous for the city he will, in his enslavement to unnecessary desires, drag the rest of 
it with him: “he goes in for politics and bounces up and says and does whatever enters 
his head. And if military men excite his emulation, thither he rushes, and if moneyed 
men, to that he turns, and there is no order or compulsion in his existence, but he calls 
this life of his the life of pleasure and freedom and happiness and cleaves to it to the 
end.”27 That is the problem of democratic man; he is wholly a devotee of isonomia.28 
Thus, to Plato neither democracy nor the democratic man is structurally capable of 
making room for logos alēthēs – the combination of freedom and equality leads to 
anarchy. 
 
[4] The democratic politic of truth erected around the concept of parrhēsia contains two 
paradoxes, which will eventually bring it to an end.29 First, while democracy needs 
parrhēsia to function on the one hand, parrhēsia introduces ethical differentiation to the 
egalitarian structure of democracy on the other. Second, while parrhēsia requires an 
antagonist structure to function, the demand for equality inherent in democracy stifles 
the difference of true-discourse. In other words, parrhēsia and isēgoria, the two princi-
ples of democratic government, are in practice shown to be irreconcilable. 
II 
[5] The displacement and transformation of the politics of truth from parrhēsia to ex-
hortation was in a sense both abrupt and gradual. On the one hand, it was the above 
constellation of social forces that constitutes the practical problem that triggered the 
break with the epistemological space stretched out between parrhēsia, dunasteia, and 
politeia in their democratic conception. On the other, the elaboration and transformation 
of the epistemological space of exhortation would take a long time before it came to full 
maturation. The initial break is anything but clean as the platonic model of exhortation 
is largely shaped on the model on parrhēsia. The complexities of this weak break are 
outlines with in this section (II), and the subsequent transformation in the next (III).  
 
                                                
27 Plat.Rep.VIII.561d 
28 Isonomia, not isēgoria is the term used by Plato here, Plat.Rep.VIII.561e 
29 Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, pp.183-184 
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[6] In the Seventh Letter, Plato provides us with a clear justification for displacement 
and transformation of the politics of truth from parrhēsia in a democracy to exhortation 
in the court of the king. It is a displacement that initially keeps many of the positives 
from parrhēsia intact, as Plato understands the problem of the politics of truth as a 
choice between parrhēsia and democracy. The letter is a description of how he carried 
out such an experiment in Syracuse acting as a political advisor to the new king Diony-
sius the Younger. The aim is thus to justification for autocratic parrhēsia and what that 
entails as a form of an exhortation. 
 Plato starts by explaining through two instances why he has been reluctant to 
enter public life despite his ancestry.30 The first has to do with the Thirty Tyrants, 
whom he, as a young man, considered joining because they promised to rid the city of 
injustice by instituting a new constitution. Yet, by the examples of their lawless rule, he 
soon came to see how the previous constitution had been a valuable thing. Plato ex-
plains how the Thirty tried to have Socrates, whom he considered the most just man of 
that time, take part in an illegal execution. Socrates bravely refused, which led Plato to 
dismiss the oligarchical regime as unjust. The second instance has to do with what 
happened when the supporters of democracy returned to Athens. Similarly, he describes 
how there were old scores to settle and how lawless rule would descend, even if those 
returning from exile would act with restraint. Again, Socrates is the centre of his reflec-
tions as, according to Plato, some powerful men accused him of impiety unjustly and 
the juries condemned him to death – the man who had the courage to stand for justice 
while they were in exile. This is the well-known story of the original sin against philos-
ophy. Nevertheless, upon experiencing these two instances, the kind of men who are 
active in politics (problems of dunasteia) and the importance of laws and customs 
(problems of politeia), Plato realises how difficult it is to govern the city’s affairs justly: 
one would need friends and loyal followers, but obtaining these would be a strike of 
good luck as both the written laws and customs of the city had been corrupted with 
immense speed.31 Plato thus concludes that:  
 
all existing states are badly governed and that constitution of their laws practically incurable, 
without some miraculous remedy and the assistance of fortune; and I was forced to say, in praise 
of true philosophy, that from her height alone was it possible to discern what the nature of justice 
is, […] until either those who are sincerely and truly lovers of wisdom come into political power, 
or the rulers of our cities, by the grace of God, learn true philosophy.32 
 
                                                
30 Plat.L.VII.324b-325c 
31 Plat.L.VII.325c-d 
32 Plat.L.VII.326a-b 
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The passage is reminiscent of his earlier work in the Republic and Laws.33 Critics, like 
Popper, rather crudely analyse it as a justification for totalitarianism; others would see a 
split between the two works.34 An analysis that nevertheless would neglect the reluc-
tance that Plato has with entering into political affairs: in both instances he was tempted 
to enter politics, but in the end did not. This is of crucial importance; to him they are 
two different and irreconcilable bodies that have to coincide (dunatai kai philosophēsōsi 
gnēsiōs te kai ikanōs).35 It is not the case that one dominates the other, Plato’s game in 
relation to politics is completely different: philosophy has to retain an exterior existence 
to politics. 
 
[7] Of what does this union consist? Philosophical counsel or advice (sumbouleuo) is 
not about what should be done, which courses of action should be followed and which 
shouldn’t – it is not practical advice on how to obtain political results. Rather, it is about 
confronting politics and political practice about what it (politics) is in essence; philo-
sophical counsel is about telling politics the truth about what it itself is: ‘you are the 
king’, ‘a king has these qualities’, ‘be a good king an rule like this’. This is the reading 
of Plato presented by Foucault in his lectures. According to Foucault’s reading of Plato, 
philosophy finds its own reality in an active confrontation with political power. It is not 
philosophy’s objective to test the truths of politics, but rather to test its own truths in 
politics. The philosopher is not a political actor; the philosopher has his own particular 
game to play in relation to politics. In other words, philosophical practice is character-
ized by its “restive exteriority” in which it brings ethical differentiation, just as with the 
game of parrhēsia, within the exercise of power into play.36 This is a heterodox reading 
of Plato, because it places the emphasis, not the systematisation of the contents of 
knowledge (mathēmata), but rather on philosophical practice as mode of being 
(askēsis).37 Thus, the platonic displacement is not a return to the model of the wise king 
precisely because the king remains structurally incapable of telling the truth; but instead 
of a struggle in which the best strive to rule the city through true-discourse, it is now the 
philosopher who counsels the king on how to obtain the truth. 
                                                
33 Plat.Rep.V.473c-d, Plat.Laws.VII.328a 
34 Popper, Karl. The Open Society and its Enemies, in 2 Volumes (London: Routledge, 2003); for a 
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 To Plato it had become a choice between philosophical true-discourse 
(parrhēsia) and democracy – he chose philosophy, and the only way to save it was to 
seek a model of autocratic parrhēsia.38 That is the moral will behind this displacement 
of the politics of truth – but nonetheless a moral will that rests on the concept of the 
good (agathos) to delineate the true from the false. 
 Now, in the text Plato explains how it can be tested whether a tyrant really has 
acquired knowledge about the good (agathos). The test relies on Plato's concept of the 
good: “For every real being, there are three things that are necessary if knowledge of it 
is to be acquired: first, the name; second, the definition; third, the image; knowledge 
(epistēmē) comes fourth, and in the fifth place we must put the object itself, the knowa-
ble and truly real being.”39 Although Plato does not state it here, the fifth thing is the 
good (agathos). In the text Plato gives the example of the circle, but the true extent of 
the doctrine is easier to grasp through his other works. In the Sophist, Plato distin-
guished between two kinds of copy-making: likeness-making (eikastikon), the faithful 
reproduction of an original because of an inner coherence to the ideal on the one hand; 
and appearance-making (phantastikon), which is intentionally distorted so as to please 
or persuade the viewer of its truthfulness, while it is really not it only has an external 
and illusory semblance to the ideal on the other.40 This distinction is mirrored in the 
practices of true-discourse: the former belongs to the statesman and the philosopher 
while the latter pertains to the demagogue and the sophist.41 The real aim of the distinc-
tion is therefore political; in the hands of these bad men the simulacrum is clearly a 
danger to the city. The same distinction reappears in the cave allegory from the Repub-
lic, but we are here given the principle by which the good copy can be distinguished 
from the bad.42 The story is a familiar one: a group of men are bound at the bottom of a 
cave and forced to only see the artificial shadows (skeuaston skia) cast on the wall in 
front of them by the reflections of figurines against the fireplace. Thus to the men in the 
cave “truth is nothing other than the shadows of those artefacts.”43 Then if one of the 
prisoners were released and is able to stand up, turn his head and face towards the light 
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– no doubt reluctantly because leaving the world of simulacra he would know would be 
painful and perplexing. After adjusting to his new environment, dispelling all the illu-
sions of his old world, he would recognize that “the sun … governs everything in the 
visible world, and is in some way the cause of all the things he used to see.”44 In the last 
instance the sun embodies the good (agathos): “In the knowable realm, the form of the 
good is the last thing to be seen, and it is reached only with difficulty. Once one has 
seen it, however, one must conclude that it is the cause of all that is correct and beauti-
ful in anything, that it produces both light and its source in the visible realm, and that in 
the intelligible realm it controls and provides truth and understanding, so that anyone 
who is to act sensibly in private or public must see it.”45 Just as the journey upwards 
caused confusion, wandering from darkness to light, so too the return from light into 
darkness will be filled with difficulty, ridicule, and anguish – possibly death.46 The 
return to the cave (to the “evil world” of humankind) is a dangerous but a wholly neces-
sary movement – it is at this point only that the simulacra can be dispelled (or to put it 
differently, the light of the sun can be tested in the darkness of the cave).  
 Reality according to Plato splits into the three orders of the original (idoles), the 
copy (icones), and the simulacra (phantasmes). There are however only two levels, the 
copies and the simulacra exist side by aside on the same level (they are both kinds of 
beings) – always (re)appearing is the question or problem of truth; only one of them can 
be true to the model. Herein lies the act of judgement (krinno) to weight the scales and 
discern the copy from the simulacra: the latter is not evil because it promotes the false 
over the true, or the evil over the good, but because it internalises the difference and 
thereby renders them indistinguishable, obstructing true judgement. The model is the 
Archimedean point from which everything else is defined. The level of the model (the 
ideas, the good) only functions as a means to an end, to sort the good copies from the 
bad by means of comparison – in other words it is in their relation to the model that the 
quality of the copy is decided. Now, the three phases of imprisonment, escape, and 
return each correspond to an order of reality: the imprisoned are condemned to the order 
of simulacra, the escaped are given the chance to discover the original in the light of the 
good (agathos), and the ones who return are fulfilling their promise to the polis. The 
very presence of the simulacrum upsets the order of reality, and thus it must be dis-
pelled. Thus, it is only by “turning around” (periagoge) towards the good, against the 
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world of appearance and simulacra, that one may obtain knowledge of the real world. 
That is the true purpose of education (paideia) – it is not about the mere transfer of 
knowledge, but a craft and a stylization of life: “to make the ascent and see the good” so 
that one may return to the cave and engage in the production of copy-making pertaining 
to the good, with the aim of binding the polis together.47 This is the heart of Platonism. 
The good (agathos) is thus only constituted in the moral decision to banish the malevo-
lent sophist, producer of the simulacra: what is required is the devotion to truth and 
correct method.48 
 But how is knowledge of the good obtained? How can the king be made aware 
of the good? How can the king make the ascent and see the good? Through the coopera-
tive efforts of philosophical counselling (sumbouleuo), answers Plato. In the Seventh 
Letter, when Plato explains how philosophical counselling functions he uses the doctor 
as a diagram: “When one is advising a sick man who is living in a way injurious to his 
health, must one not first of all tell him to change his way of life and give him further 
counsel only if he is willing to obey?”49 Thus, the relationship between a philosophical 
counsellor and a king is like that of a doctor and a patient. Nonetheless, there is also an 
implicit reservation, in that the patient has to be willing to receive the help of the doctor. 
This goes back to the parrhēsiatic contract, but in addition Plato set out a clear principle 
of engagement: “If they are fixed in a way of life that pleases them, though it may not 
please me, I should not antagonize them by useless admonitions, nor yet by flattery and 
complaisance encourage them in the satisfaction of desires that I would die rather than 
embrace.”50 This is also what allows the philosophical counsellor to back away from his 
duty, which was a necessity as the business of sumbouleuo would sometimes be dan-
gerous; a experience Plato would have himself with regard to Dionysius.51 
 The aim of philosophical counsel (sumbouleuo) is to reach a homologie – an 
agreement between the two who speak.52 Plato develops the idea of homologie in the 
Gorgias, where Socrates and a group of Sophists are discussing whether oratory is an 
art or nothing at all. Rhetoric, argues Socrates, is useless for advising the king on justice 
because it at the same time can be used unjustly – in other words, rhetoric cannot teach 
the just and the unjust at the same time without contradicting itself, as neither is intrin-
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sic to it.53 In contrast, the philosophical counsellor is like the touchstone used to test 
precious metals (bosanos); he possesses the qualities of knowledge (epistēmē), good 
will (eunosian), and frankness (parrhēsia).54 When Socrates is presented with a pains-
takingly long and honest rebuttal from Callicles, he recognises these qualities in him: “I 
run into many people who aren’t able to test me because they’re not wise like you. 
Others are wise, but they’re not willing to tell me the truth, because they don’t care for 
me the way you do. […] You have all these qualities, which the others don’t. You’re 
well-enough educated, as many of the Athenians would attest, and you have good will 
towards me.”55 The value that Socrates sees in Callicles is that of the basanos; he is 
because of his qualities able to make use of him and follow the Delphic oracle’s pre-
scription ‘Know thyself’. Through dialogue (dialoges) and the spirit of homologie they 
are able together to discover the truth.  
 As the choice of a way of life (bios) comes to the centre, the politics of truth is 
problematised around this relation between the sovereign and his philosophical counsel-
lor. Recall the tripartite theory of the soul from the Republic: the three necessarily 
opposed parts of the soul, the logical (logos), the spirited (thymos), and the appetitive 
(epithymia) – that of course also provides us with the three classes for the state.56 Now, 
while it is only proper that the rational part governs, the purpose of exhortation – being 
an attempt to work towards knowledge – then is to help the king to govern his soul 
according to justice.57 In the practice of counselling a king, the goal would be to teach 
the royal virtues, wisdom (sophia), justice (dikē), self-mastery (sōphrōn), and courage 
(andreia).58 The philosopher takes on the role of counsellor in an effort to influence and 
shape the sovereign’s ethical development, so that he may govern the kingdom in the 
service of the good (agathos). Like the demos who had to accept the ascendancy of the 
best, the sovereign must commit to play the parrhēsiatic game and accept what the 
adviser tells him, even if it is critical or unpleasant. In this way the focus is on the 
king’s ethical relation to himself and others, just as it was for the one who made use of 
parrhēsia in a democracy. Moreover, by limiting the number of souls towards which 
true-discourse is addressed, Plato argued, it becomes less complicated to establish this 
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ethical difference, as it is “only necessary to win over a single man.”59 The reality upon 
which the politics of truth acts is the soul (psūke) of the king – it is there that thought 
can test its own truth.  
 Thus, exhortation, in contrast to parrhēsia, is a politics of truth not about cosmo-
logical knowledge, but about self-knowledge – knowledge that is centred in the subject, 
its locus and horizon. That is the implication of the soul as the access to the good, but as 
Socrates also points out in Gorgias, truth is not public, but exclusively aligned with the 
individual: “You don’t compel me; instead you produce many false witnesses against 
me and try to banish me from my property, the truth. For my part, if I don’t produce you 
as a single witness to agree with what I’m saying, then I suppose I’ve achieved nothing 
worth mentioning concerning the things we’ve been discussing.”60 Thus, in exhortation 
one does not bind oneself to the truth as in parrhēsia – a wager that pre-Socratic philos-
ophers could invoke the cosmic order. Rather, the truth is a result of the collaboration 
(or rather the homologia) of a master and his student as Plato makes clear in the Seventh 
Letter: “Only when all of these things – names, definitions, and visual and other percep-
tions – have been rubbed against one another and tested, pupil and teacher asking and 
answering questions in good will and without envy – only then, when reason and 
knowledge are at the very extremity of human effort, can they illuminate the nature of 
any object.”61 Accordingly, the ‘unforced force’ of the better argument of parrhēsia is 
precluded by the good (agathos) – epistemologically the economy of forces is subjected 
to the regime of correctness within the human subject. In this way an epistemological 
space of exhortation opens up from within the already constituted space of parrhēsia, 
only to close it behind it. 
III 
[8] It may seem somewhat of a mystery, that for almost 1500 years – through the nu-
merous political transformations from the polis, to empire, to feudalism – the general 
structure of the politics of truth as set out in the model of exhortation was kept intact. 
Yet, with the problems associated with democracy and aristocracy receiving less and 
less attention, because of the potential dangers they would result in if introduced as the 
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politics of society, there is a stability or constant in political regimes as they were al-
most exclusively autocratic in nature. By that I mean something very limited and quite 
broad at the same time: namely, that the focal point of the autocratic politics of truth is 
the king’s soul. That is, all throughout this long period of history the epistemological 
obstacle of the politics of truth remained the problematic figure of the king – how could 
he reach knowledge of the good? What was required of him in terms of his ethics and 
training? What people were suitable company for him? Naturally, such problems go 
through a number of transformations; some problems are regarded as trivial, others 
receive more attention, some proposed solutions are in vogue and others are not, but 
crucially their point of convergence remains the same. In other words, the social forces 
that shaped this epistemological space could sustain it, and only underwent a series of 
minor transformation.  
 We may start to understand these transformations by recognising that as the 
politics of truth is displaced towards an autocratic relation between truth and politics a 
divide opens up in moral philosophy between two related styles of exhortation, or in 
giving advice and council: logos protrepsis and paraenesis.62 Neither of these ap-
proaches is simply a question of providing the king with advice on a course of action; 
both signify a kind of practice that works on his moral character. That is, they both are 
concerned with the formation and workings of the soul. Modern scholars, in contrast to 
classical philosophers, employ a sharp distinction between the two.63 Protrepsis signi-
fies a kind of conversion or transformation, where the aim is to make someone who is 
an outsider or practicing one style of living, to change his or her way of life and follow 
a particular path as spelled out by the protrepsis.64 In contrast, paraenesis signifies the 
continuation of the path that he or she is already on; the paraenesis aids in giving advice 
on how best to follow the current course.65 With a politics of truth centred on the con-
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cept of exhortation – of which both protrepsis and paraenesis are a kind – this division 
is of crucial importance when it comes to the socio-political limit of thought. During the 
development and elaboration of the model exhortation, a shift in the point of problema-
tisation occurs from that of questioning that which is given, towards that of following 
an already constituted way of life. In other words, with time the emphasis moves from 
protrepsis towards that of paraenesis. 
 1. Contemporaries. In the wake of the trial and death of Socrates the poli-
tics of truth is forked in terms of concepts. This is evident if we compare Xenophon and 
Isocrates to Plato’ practice of exhortation. Xenophon is mostly in agreement with Plato. 
His Cyropaedia, a biography of the Persian ruler Cyrus, was meant as an example to 
follow; it inquires as to “who he was in his origin, what natural endowments he pos-
sessed, and what sort of education (paideia) he had enjoyed that he so greatly excelled 
in governing men.”66 Yet, there is nothing particularly Persian about the upbringing that 
Xenophon describes; it is Greek through and through, with an emphasis on freedom of 
speech and self-control.67 The rather Socratic council that he receives from his father 
underlines this point – for no king who is not better than his subjects is fit to rule.68 
Likewise in Hiero, the poet Simonides counsels the tyrant Hiero on how to be a better 
ruler and obtain happiness by treating his country as his fatherland and surpassing all 
others in generosity and kindness.69 As the politics of truth, exhortation is as relevant a 
question for the tyrant as for the king.70  
 In the Cyperian Orations, Isocrates offers a politics of truth that is similar in 
form as that of Plato, but radically different in others. The displacement of the politics 
of truth from the demos to the king: “we should be right in pronouncing monarchy also 
a milder government, in proportion as it is easier to give heed to the will of a single 
person than to seek to please many and manifold minds.”71 To Demonicus is a showcase 
of the tripartite structure of a treatise on practical ethics: first the relation to the Gods, 
then the relation to other men and society in general, and lastly how he should govern 
himself, developing his character and soul. In To Nicocles, one of the first texts to pre-
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sent itself as an unconditional gift offered to a king, he notes, “a good counsellor (sum-
boulos) is the most useful and the most princely of all possessions.”72 He emphasises 
the importance of self-government (enkratia), education (paideia), and granting “free-
dom of speech (parrhēsia) to those who have good judgements, in order that when you 
are in doubt you may have friends who will help you to decide.”73 All teachings, which 
Isocrates locates in the gnomic poets Hesiod, Theognis, and Phocylides – whom he 
thinks are the best “counsellors (sumboulos) of human conduct.”74 Nevertheless, there 
are some crucial differences between Isocrates and the philosophers, and it is with this 
idealisation of these poets that it originates. Right before this recommendation Isocrates 
notes a stark difference between him and the philosophers: 
 
the truth is that in discourses of this sort we should not seek novelties, for in these discourses it is 
not possible to say what is paradoxical or incredible or outside the circle of accepted belief; but, 
rather, we should regard that man as the most accomplished in this field who can collect the 
greatest number of ideas scattered among the thoughts of all the rest and present them in the best 
form.75  
 
The purpose of philosophy for Isocrates is radically different from Plato: where the 
latter had emphasised that knowledge of the agathos was possible, even though the 
world seemed paradoxical, the former reduces philosophy to a practice of gathering all 
constituted truths together. One finds its model in dialectics capable of working out 
paradoxes, the other spouts out gnomic advice that would be tolerable within the bounds 
of tradition.  
 
I see, moreover, that fortune is on our side and that the present circumstances are in league with 
us; for you are eager for education and I profess to educate you are ripe for philosophy; and I di-
rect students of philosophy. 
 Now those who compose hortatory discourses addressed to their own friends are, no 
doubt, engaged in a laudable employment; yet they do not occupy  themselves with the most vi-
tal part of philosophy. Those, on the contrary, who point out to the young, not by what means 
they may cultivate skill in oratory, but how they may win repute as men of sound character, are 
rendering a greater service to their hearers in that, while the former exhort them to proficiency in 
speech, the latter improve their moral conduct. Therefore, I have not invented a hortatory exer-
cise, but have written a moral treatise.  
 
Isocrates’ paraenesis thus proposes to distinguished from the protrepsis of the philoso-
phers in that it exists in accordance with traditional values and beliefs; it was a politics 
of truth in which thought was sacrificed at the alter of already established truths. This 
contrast to the philosophers comes out more clearly in the Antidosis, in which Isocrates 
defends himself against the same charges that were directed at Socrates:  
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I maintain also that if you compare me with those who profess to turn men to a life of temper-
ance and justice, you will find that my teaching is more true and more profitable than theirs. For 
they [the philosophers] exhort their followers to a kind of virtue and wisdom which is ignored by 
the rest of the world and is disputed among themselves; I, to a kind which is recognized by all. 
They, again, are satisfied if through the prestige of their names they can draw a number of pupils 
into their society; I, you will find, have never invited any person to follow me, but endeavour to 
persuade the whole state to pursue a policy from which the Athenians will become prosperous 
themselves, and at the same time deliver the rest of the Hellenes from their present ills.76 
 
According to Isocrates himself his true-discourse was thus distinguished from the dia-
lectic philosophers in two respects: their teaching was untraditional or different from 
what was already taken for granted, whereas his was uncontroversial; and the philoso-
phers sought fame and private gain, whereas he was neutral and only sought to promote 
the interests of the polis. In short, Isocrates did not seek to provoke; his was not an 
attempt to propose a different truth. To him, the problem of the politics of truth is pre-
sented in such a way that there is no need to challenge that, which is already 
established, as true.  
 While Plato in his model of exhortation had rejected rhetoric as being unable to 
teach justice, Aristotle brings it back into philosophy. In the Art of Rhetoric he attempts 
to establish rhetoric as technē: “rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic. For both treat of 
such things as are in a way common for all to grasp and belong to no delineated science. 
Accordingly, indeed, all men engage in them both after a fashion”77 Thus, philosophy 
needs rhetoric to be effective in its exhortation to the king. Aristotle also wrote the 
Protrepticus, a thesis that defends the theoretical as well as practical relevance of phi-
losophy, which only exists in fragments.78 In it he argues for a disinterested position of 
philosophy – philosophy (or thought) in Aristotle is then on its way to disentangling 
itself from the politics of truth. 
 2. Romans. Long after Democracy had been deemed too dangerous in 
Greece, the Roman Empire would remain a republic with the difficult challenge of 
maintaining a moderate and mixed constitution.79 Accordingly, Cicero’s exhortation on 
practical ethics, De Officiis, and the more theoretical works De Republica and De Legi-
bus, similar to Aristotle all expose hesitations about the autocratic politics of truth.80 To 
Cicero, the institution of council (consilium) is both that which is necessary to govern 
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well and the founding acts of the commonwealth; an institution which he thinks Caesar 
ruined: “when everything passed under the absolute control of a despot and there was 
no longer any room for statesmanship (consilio) or authority of mine.”81 Later, in the 
time of the Caesars, the autocratic displacement would be more prominent; Seneca, a 
master at exhortation, would advise the young emperor Nero, and Dio Chrysostom 
would write four discourses on kingship addressed to the emperor Trajan.82 Plutarch’s 
Moralia also contains a number of texts that deal with exhortation. In To an Uneducat-
ed Ruler, Plutarch notes how it is “difficult to give advice to rulers in matters of 
government,” because “they are afraid to accept reason as a ruler over them, lest it 
curtail the advantage of their power by making them slaves to duty.”83 They falsely 
maintain that the best aspect of ruling is the freedom from not being ruled. “Who, then, 
shall rule the ruler?” – the law (nomos), “not the written outside him in books or on 
wooden tablets or the like, but reason endowed with life within him, always abiding 
with him and watching over him and never leaving his soul without its leadership.”84 
Exhortation thus falls to the philosopher. The benefit of autocratic exhortation, Plutarch 
reasons, is all the greater than exhortation aimed at the general public, for if the teach-
ings of the philosopher take hold of a ruler’s soul, the many benefit more than if they 
themselves were taught.85 If the teachings of philosophy achieve this they “acquire the 
force of laws.”86 This theme of autocratic exhortation also what appears to be a protrep-
tic text (or at least it is a second part to a protreptic text), by pseudo Plutarch, which 
poses the question of what the best form of government is for exhortation?87 It only 
exists in fragments, but goes about answering the question by largely following what 
Plato argues in the Republic, namely monarchy. For monarchy is the only form of gov-
ernment in which the politeia does not also control the statesman; it is the only one in 
which the politics of truth does not deteriorate.88 
 3. Church Fathers. As the Roman Empire was ‘Christianised’ – a highly 
complex social process that cannot be done justice here – the politics of truth was taken 
up and reinterpreted with the same problems associated with exhortation in St. Ambrose 
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of Milan, St. Augustine of Hippo, and St. Gregory the Great.89 It is thus more prudent to 
talk of a continuation rather than a break in the history of the politics of truth. Once 
Ambrose had declared the emperor a son of the church (filius ecclesiae), it became a 
matter of paraenesis rather than protrepsis: with this Christian emphasis the emperor 
becomes a subject to Christian self-government rather than pagan ethics.90 Likewise, In 
the City of God Augustine provides a brief exhortation for the Christian emperor, where 
he emphasises virtues of justice, humility, mercy, and benevolence – the true happiness 
of the emperor was to be found in following the precepts of the Christian God.91 Chris-
tian self-government is a particular art of government, which works through a moral 
codex of prohibitions and the technology of confession (it is through the act of confes-
sion that the truth is brought to light and man is set ‘free’) – there are strict rules that 
needs to be observed if the soul (self) is not to be subdued by a dangerous mentality of 
evil.92 With the king being part of the church he would submit to the same governmen-
tal technologies. From here, the politics of truth evolves into a big body of political 
thought concerning how that prince should govern himself and his kingdom called the 
mirrors for princes.  
 4. Mirrors for Princes. Today we refer to this collection of texts as the 
mirrors for princes, although in the beginning these works rarely refer to any actual 
mirrors, but are rather a collection of accounts of the life of the king, mixed with refer-
ences to the biblical kings David and Solomon that his successors and subjects may 
follow as an example. That at least is the case with a number of texts from the Early 
Middle Ages, there among Gregory of Tours’ History of the Franks, which attests to the 
need for government through Christian exhortation in a turbulent time of social and 
political unrest and change; Alcuin’s De virtutibus et vitiis liber (c. 800), a short exhor-
tamenta on wisdom (de sapientia) faith (de fide) and literary study (de lectionus studio) 
and a whole range of other topics; and the two accounts of Charlemagne’s life given by 
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Einhard and Notker the Stammerer.93 In the tradition of exhortation these mirrors for 
princes are best understood as textbooks intended to guide or instruct the prince on how 
to rule his kingdom. In contrast to their more religious predecessors, these textbooks 
pay greater attention to practical matters of how to rule than to abstract thought. They 
are closer to the paraenesis of Isocrates than the protreptic of Plato. They are texts that, 
in a moralizing, encouraging, or biographical way, seek to create the ‘ideal’ prince, 
which both includes the prince’s characteristics (virtues and vices) as well as the legiti-
mization, duties, and temptations of the prince. The mirrors deal with a wide range of 
problems relating to government: sovereignty, justice, authority, legitimacy and the law, 
but the theorizing on these points is usually a mixture of Christian teachings and pagan 
philosophy – De regimine principum written in 1267 by the master synthesiser Thomas 
Aquinas testifies to this.94 More importantly they continue the politics of truth of exhor-
tation in dealing with the problem of the structural inability of the king to speak the 
truth. As such, this body of literature thus reveals a specific interest in who can, will, 
and should speak the truth to the prince, what legitimates their true-discourse and what 
duties fall upon the prince upon hearing such speech.  
 They are both an attempt to claim that position by usually being an offering or 
unconditional gift to the king and at the same time they seek to establish such bounda-
ries within the text itself. The mirrors written after the reintroduction of Aristotle in 
Europe were all addressed to a king or prince with the specific purpose of being an 
exhortation on kingship: Godfrey of Viterbo’s Speculum regum, from ca. 1183, was 
dedicated to Frederick II and his son Henry VII; the Norwegian Konungs Skuggsja, 
from 1275, was written for the sons of Håkon Håkonsson; Giles of Rome, De Regimine 
Principum, from around 1279, was written for Philip the Fair; and William of Pagula 
wrote Speculum regis, from ca. 1331, for Edward III of England. The fact that these 
texts are always offered by one party to another underlines the two-part structure of 
exhortation. The peculiar name of a ‘mirror’ is usually ascribed to Seneca’s opening 
remark in De Clementia, where he states, “I have undertaken, Nero Caesar, to write on 
the subject of mercy, in order to serve in a way the purpose of a mirror (speculi), and 
thus reveal you to yourself as one destined to attain to the greatest of all pleasures.”95 
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Thus, the function of the mirror underlines exhortation, a point that is already made by 
Plato in Alcibiades.  
 Socrates and Alcibiades are pondering what the inscription ‘know thyself’ above 
the Delphic temple might mean. “Suppose that,” says Socrates “instead of speaking to a 
man, it said to the eye of one of us, as a piece of advice—‘See thyself’– how should  we 
apprehend the meaning of the admonition? Would it not be, that the eye should look at 
that by looking at which it would see itself?”96 To which Alcibiades asks if he means a 
mirror (katropton) or something of that sort. The eye does exactly that replies Socrates, 
noting that when a man looks into an eye his own face appears like in the mirror. He 
then concludes by saying that “an eye viewing another eye, and looking at the most 
perfect part of it, the thing wherewith it sees, will thus see itself. […] And if the soul 
too, my dear Alcibiades, is to know herself, she must surely look at a soul, and especial-
ly at that region of it in which occurs the virtue of a soul—wisdom, and at any other 
part of a soul which resembles this.”97 It is the externality and reflection of the mirror 
that is capable of making the soul the focal point of exhortation.98 Thus, in contrast to 
wisdom literature, which generally consists in a series of statements of sages and wise 
men, mirrors for princes are preoccupied with working on the soul that takes place 
between self and other. Exhortation is specifically a practice that involves two parties 
because truth and power are split: the king does not have access to the truth through a 
confrontation with the gods or otherwise, he requires a counterpart with whom he can 
work together to obtain it. 
 This point is also clear if we compare this particular Christian genre to other 
traditions of thought: the Byzantine and Islamic mirrors for princes, both of which were 
heavily influenced by the Greeks and in particular Aristotle, follow this two-part struc-
ture of exhortation; whereas the Indian and Chinese literature that addresses the 
problem of how the king should govern his kingdom does not.99 With the latter two, the 
politics of truth are constituted differently: for instance, none of these ever discuss 
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theories of government in terms of the problems associated with politeia, nor would 
they outline a similar political game to that of dunasteia.100 
 
[9] The politics of truth is also a question of form and presentation: what kind of dis-
course is necessary to speak the truth? Can the person who is telling the truth be 
distinguished from the one who doesn’t by the way in which he or she speaks? At the 
heart of the problem of parrhēsiatic discourse was the distinction between rhetoric and 
parrhēsia, where the former provided the speaker with technical means to make his 
argument. Here, the problem of flatterers was known, in particular how flattery is a kind 
of rhetoric designed to gain the favour of the crowd or king: flattery is aligned with 
rhetoric. Nevertheless, as the politics of truth breaks with parrhēsia, rhetoric is no 
longer seen a dangerous. Rather than being opposites and excluding one another, the 
frankness of parrhēsia and eloquence of rhetoric merged and became one and the same; 
in relation to government the distinction disappeared with true-discourse becoming just 
another form of rhetoric. It was Isocrates that established rhetorical skill as a legitimate 
means in the governance of the city. Yet, it was mainly due to Aristotle’s efforts in 
making room for rhetoric in the philosophical discourse by recognising it as a technē 
that it became a positive part of the politics of truth.101 It is much the same endeavour 
pursued by Cicero in his theory of rhetoric: is rhetorical skill a science or an art?102 Both 
would ponder the relation between rhetoric and the governance of the state; and both 
would be careful to define limits for the good use of rhetoric in relation to it.103 In fact, 
for exhortation to be effective in governing the king it must study and make use of 
rhetoric; it must be eloquent.104 Later with the re-discovery of Aristotle, which became 
quite influential in the later years of the mirror for princes genre, the emphasis on rhe-
torical skill and eloquence would intensify.  
 These problems are taken over by the mirrors for princes. To Giles of Paris for 
example the purpose of rhetoric was to serve practical intelligence, in particular that 
which would seek to promote the common good of society. During the Italian Renais-
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sance we find the same elements of true-discourse: that is, there were a desire and posi-
tive view of the way in which the men at court spoke and acted with effortlessness, or 
Sprezzatura (nonchalance), as well as an appreciation of this speech being effective and 
able to persuade the interlocutor. The first aspect can be found in Baldesar Castiglione’s 
The Book of the Courtier, where he praises the effort to “practice in all things a certain 
nonchalance which conceals all artistry and makes whatever one says or does seem 
uncontrived and effortless.” The goal is to conceal the art; conceal the effort one puts 
into making one’s speech. Idealizing the ancient orators – who “made their speeches 
appear to gave been composed very simply and according to the promptings of Nature 
and truth rather than effort and artifice” – truth becomes shrouded in a concealment of 
effort; this problematisation of the politics of truth does not require the speaker to ‘say 
all’ and speak his mind without concealment as in parrhēsia. It is by this linking of 
truth and nonchalance that the politics of truth is submerged into a specific aristocratic 
stylisation of life. The second is more in line with the ideals about persuasiveness 
known from parrhēsia and game dunesteia. In chapter XV of the Prince, when Machia-
velli turns to the issue of “how a prince must regulate his conduct towards his subjects 
or his allies” he makes a sound point about exhortation.105 To this question however, 
Machiavelli is after what he call an “original set of rules” for the prince to follow and 
thus he famously states: “I have thought it proper to represent things as they are in a real 
truth, rather than as they are imagined.”106 He then warns that the “gulf between how 
one should live and how one does live is so wide that a man who neglects what is actu-
ally done for what should be done moves towards self-destruction rather than self-
preservation.”107 Most analysis of the passage focuses on aspect of della cosa – the 
realm of reality, the thing; they emphasize the real-political qualities of Machiavelli’s 
argument. In doing so they neglect the vocal and lingual aspect of effective truth. If we 
come at the sentence from the problem of how one ought to speak to and address the 
prince, the picture changes: Machiavelli is after what he calls verita effectuale della 
cosa (effective truth of the thing or matter), which he intends to show the prince. Thus, 
by emphasizing this aspect we are drawn towards that fact that the discourse of exhorta-
tion should be able to communicate the truth to the prince effectually. In other words, 
Machiavelli wants to speak a discourse of effective truth. Consequently, rhetoric is the 
proper instrument of the statesman to persuade the king to govern in accordance with 
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the common good. Thus, rhetoric itself did not contain the distinction between ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ rhetoric; rather, the opposite of proper rhetoric would be flattery. So much is 
also evident in the writing of Erasmus, who at some point in the first chapter of The 
Education of the Christian Prince, elaborates on how around the prince there should be 
created an “atmosphere of civilized talk” – e.g. there should be no need for flattery or 
bolstering rhetoric in the company of the prince.  
 
[10] The main danger to the politics of truth of exhortation is flattery. The danger posed 
by flattery was not a new one: “we observe that flattery does not attend upon poor, 
obscure, or unimportant persons, but makes itself a stumbling-block and a pestilence in 
the great houses and great affairs, and oftentimes overturns kingdoms and principali-
ties” remarked Plutarch in his famous How to tell a flatterer from a Friend. 108 
Nevertheless, with parrhēsia the flatterer was more or less conflated with the dema-
gogue: that is, someone who makes use of bad parrhēsia to flatter the crowd. He was a 
public figure whom it was possible to confront. The problem of flattering the king did 
not occur in this politics of truth, as the king was not the focal point. In relation to the 
King, the flatterer stands both alone and stronger; the demagogue is isolated outside the 
court and especially the church that had many demagogical figures that it would prose-
cute and burn.109 The flatterer can be countered neither by parrhēsia nor the oath; both 
he incorporates in his defence.110 The aim of the flatterer is dangerous because, accord-
ing to Plutarch, “the flatterer always takes a position over against the maxim ‘Know 
thyself’, by creating in every man deception towards himself and ignorance both of 
himself and the good and evil that concerns himself; the good he renders defective and 
incomplete, and the evil wholly impossible to amend.”111  
 A number of texts, dating from the 1150s to the 1530s, develop this theme of 
flattery (and to some extent tyranny) as a particular danger for the government of the 
kingdom. Four of these texts are especially noteworthy: Book III and Book VII of 
Salisbury’s Policraticus where he discusses flattery in the former and the difference 
between academics and philosophers in the latter; the set of chapters in Christine de 
Pizan’s The Book of the Body Politic where she talks about how the prince should take 
advise, and from whom; The second chapter, the Prince must avoid Flatterers, in Eras-
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mus’ the Education of the Christian Prince where he addresses the, as he sees it, biggest 
challenge for a new prince; and a passage from Baldesar Castiglione’s book IV of the 
Book of the Courtier in which Ottaviano elaborates the highest duty of the courtier. 
 1. John of Salisbury’s Policraticus: Of the Frivolities of Courtiers and the 
Footprints of Philosophers is in many ways a very peculiar book: first of all it is one of 
the last works of politics written before the re-discovery of Aristotle’s Politics; it is also 
a work that is put together anachronistically and compiled over many years of exile and 
service; and it is usually published incomplete.112 The entire work consists of about 
250.000 words divided into eight books: Book I and II are mostly concerned with just 
government (which mostly consist of the idea that the ones who govern should first of 
all govern themselves in their pursuit of pleasure) and the problems of truth; that is, 
John devotes a series of chapters to criticizing a variety of practices – soothsaying, 
dream interpretation, astrology, and so on – that proclaim to (as magicians) be able to 
reveal truth. Book III is entirely about the problem of flattery, which we shall turn to in 
a moment. Books IV, V and VI, the last parts to be written, represent the most “politi-
cal” sections of the book; they each deal with the problem of Divine Right, the best 
constitution, and military matters. Meanwhile, book VII is about the differences be-
tween academics and philosophers and book VIII is about tyranny; written at a stage 
when Henry II had exiled John from Canterbury. They form an interesting pair: thought 
and truth par tyranny.  
 In book III John writes about the problem of flatterers. The objection to the 
flatterer is not so much his methods of fraud and deceit, under a facade of love and 
faith; neither the fact that he seeks favour with the prince, or rather his goal of attaining 
the ear of the prince and forwarding his own interest at court; no, the true reason for 
despising the flatterer is that he is “inimical to all virtue” – “he plugs up the ears of his 
audience in that they do not hear the truth.”113 The flatterer stands in direct opposition to 
truth – “men of this sort all speak towards the end of pleasure, not truth.” – and the 
superfluous use of pleasure leads to unjust government.114 Again there is a strict need 
for moderation on behalf of the ruler. Rather, truth is the opposite of flattery, John 
explains: “Truth is harsh and very often is the parent of difficulty in so far as it will 
refuse to flatter anyone. For the bitter truth is more useful and more esteemed by a mind 
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of integrity than the distilled honey of a prostitute’s speech.”115 Thus, truth is the essen-
tial link between the art of government and virtue: it is only by being confronted by the 
truth that prince is able to follow the path of virtue.  
 There is a particular link between those who would speak the truth, the specific 
act of them taking the liberty of doing so, and the interlocutor who has to somehow 
react to this confrontation. This triad of actors and act is explored in the two last books 
of Policraticus – book VII and VIII. Having spent the first three books making clear 
who cannot or does not intend to speak the truth – the magicians and the flatterers – 
John has outlined the problem clearly: who can and who is willing to tell the prince the 
truth? The problem is constituted mainly between two parties: the truth-teller and the 
ruler; how these two parties play their respective roles determines ultimately what they 
are. The danger comes from flattery, which if it not kept in check will leave no space for 
true-discourse: “There are no elements of true and natural liberty, however, where 
flattery claims everything for itself, where vanity claims everything, leaving behind 
nothing of either truth or virtue.”116 
 For the truth-teller, John explores in Book IV two possible characters: the aca-
demic and the philosopher. The main difference between the two is that the academics 
are more modest and uncertain about what they examine than philosophers, who seem 
to be more rashly interested in contradictions and always sure of themselves: “As if 
bound by an oath of Pallas they [the ancient philosophers] talk only of paradoxes and of 
authoritative doctrines, and they affirm those to be at all times true. But Academics, 
evading the precipice of falsehood, are more modest in these sorts of matters because 
they hardly disavow their defects and, in a position of ignorance about things, they are 
entirely uncertain about each one.”117 The distinction between philosophers and aca-
demics is only a temporal one, John stresses the different ways in which the two 
different truth-tellers are attuned to truth: while the academic can demonstrate the truth 
through the authority of the senses, or by reason, or by religion, the matter is completely 
different for the philosopher, whose truth is much more dependent on him being per-
sonally involved in it. He states: “There are no philosophers expressing both the true 
and the false, teaching both the good and the evil. Even the mere futile imitator of the 
philosopher teaches correctly sometimes, but he who correctly follows that which he 
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teaches is the true philosopher [my emphasis].”118 Thus, while the academic is depend-
ent on the successful demonstration of his truth the philosopher is himself integral to the 
truth, what he say is true becomes so out of him speaking and acting it.  
 The character of the ruler is more straight-forward because it is dependent on 
whether or not the ruler is subordinate to the law: thus, “the tyrant is … [the] one who 
oppresses the people by violent domination, just as the prince is [the] one who rules by 
the law.”119 But that is not all, as John argued already in the third book, the only time 
flattery can be permitted is when it is to please the tyrant – for “it is only permitted to 
flatter him whom it is permitted to slay.”120 Thus the second difference between the 
tyrant and the prince is that the tyrant is beyond truth – or rather, truth is no longer a 
possibility – while the prince is capable to truth; that is, the link between truth and 
power is maintained by the virtue of temperance in the prince.  
 This link between the truth-teller and the ruler consists of the liberty (or rather 
parrhésia) the truth-teller makes use of towards the ruler. Liberty, according to John, 
“judges in accordance with the free will of the individual, and it is not afraid to censure 
that which seems to oppose sound moral character.”121 It is not possible to separate 
liberty from virtue: rather there is, John argues, a circularity between them so that virtue 
“does not arise in its perfection without liberty, the loss of liberty demonstrates that 
virtue is not present. And, therefore, anyone is free according to the virtue of their dis-
positions (habitus) and to the extent that one is free the virtues are effective.”122 Liberty 
also places itself between two aspects of political life apart from the truth-teller and the 
ruler: that is, the law – John refers to how there are “laws were introduced in support of 
liberty” – and the concrete exercise of power taking place at court society – how, says 
John, “historians [are] continually mentioning what great deeds were done for the love 
of [liberty].”123 So liberty is that activity that can bring forth virtue, while it on the one 
hand is seated in the laws, because rule without law remains tyranny; and on the other is 
dependent on the court society in which it takes place. 
 After John writes about a few examples of the practice of liberty, he turns to 
how the two parties should conduct themselves. The ruler should react with temperance 
and moderation when someone practices liberty and tells him the truth about himself: 
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John explains, “the best and the wisest man is moderate with the reins of liberty and 
patiently takes note of whatever is said to him. And he does not oppose himself to the 
works of liberty, as long as damage to virtue does not occur.”124 Even though the ruler 
would be tempted, “patience with censure is among wise men far more glorious than its 
punishment.”125 The truth-teller on the other hand is faced with a different dilemma: is 
he going to be an academic or a philosopher – that is, will he be able to govern himself 
in what he says? While according to John the philosopher talks with rashness and opens 
up his mind, the academic will govern his tongue and only say what he can demonstrate. 
When it comes to the practice of telling the truth the difference is very slight, perhaps 
only a matter of degree, to John because “those things which are said and done freely 
are devoid of rashness just as of timidity and, so long as the correct path is advanced, 
they are entitled to praise and esteem.”126  
 2. Christine de Pizan’s The Book of the Body Politic is an attempt to outline 
the “virtues and manners” that will lead to a life, which attains honour.127 It has three 
main parts: Book I deals with princes, their duties, qualities, and problems they are 
faced with; Book II lays out conditions for the honour of knights and nobles; and Book 
III deals with the common people and their relation to the two other classes. There are 
many dangers associated with the government of the kingdom, as well as the prince 
himself; all such dangers crystalize themselves into the problem of who can speak the 
truth? What is the answer to the problem of advice or council? Who can inform the 
prince of the truth of the state of the world and himself so that he may govern success-
fully? Within Book I there is a series of chapters that talk to the themes of giving advice 
and what kind of people may be able to give advice, which ones the prince should listen 
to: that is, different modes of veridiction that the prince can chose from when governing 
the kingdom. In this series of chapters Christine de Pizan outlines four, all too familiar 
to the Greeks, possible answers: the sage, who speaks of wisdom; the expert, who 
speaks of technical knowledge; the prophet (or philosopher as Christine calls him), who 
can predict the future in the constellation of the stars; and last, in a chapter that has 
interestingly different style, a mirror that can tell the prince about his adherence to the 
virtues. 
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 Drawing from Aristotle and Cicero, Christine de Pizan considers who would be 
best to advise the prince: the young or the old? As the young have bodily strength they 
often give bad advice; the old have experience from which they can draw, but that is not 
enough. There are two kinds of age, however: the one “which follows after a well-
ordered and temperate youth” and the other that “comes after a wasted and dissolute 
youth.”128 Where the latter ends in “misery and many is not worth recommending” the 
former leads to wisdom which is praiseworthy.129 The old and wise are characterised by 
having “understanding, discretion, and knowledge” – but here another aspect of the age-
old link between truth and sensual abstinence comes to the fore: “There is no evil that 
sensuality will not attract the human spirit to do. It is that which extinguishes the 
judgement of reason that blinds the human soul, and it has no affinity nor connection 
with virtue.”130 Consequently, for the sage to acquire wisdom he must exercise absti-
nence from all sensual pleasures: the relation that the sage has to truth is established 
through his moderation of sensuality; the relation to truth is constituted on the freedom 
from pleasures.131  
 While the sage might be a good generalist, there are areas of which he knows 
very little other than its general relevance and application. He would not possess tech-
nical know-how gained through hard work. “[O]ne ought to believe each expert in his 
art.” To Christine de Pizan “[t]his means that the good prince ought to consult a variety 
of people according to the variety of things they do.”132 There are many forms of exper-
tise and the prince should be aware that soldiers and knights know not how to advise on 
matters of law and that equally clergy and jurist know not about strategy and fighting; 
each craft has its own techné. And thus, as Christine de Pizan explains through exempla, 
“everyone to take care of the branch of knowledge to which one was devoted, no 
more.”133 The challenge, both for the prince as for the expert whose advice he chooses 
to follow, is to resist the temptation to think that one know about everything. 
 Having dealt with what is general and what is particular, with epistéme and 
techné, Christine de Pizan now turns to that which is yet to be known, the future. There 
are certain benefits from following the wise, or rather those of them that are “serious 
speculative philosopher” – which resembles the alethurgary form of the prophet, whose 
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truth comes not from himself but is written in the stars. The prince “should not repudi-
ate the science of astrology”, but rather welcome it to his councils. To show this, 
Christine de Pizan tells the story of how Archimedes, with his “good sense” (that is, his 
ability to predict the future) helped defend the city of Syracuse against the Romans; the 
prophet runs into an obvious problem when he, despite having predicted his own death, 
stayed in the city: how can we know that his predictions are true? That is, there seems 
not to be any criterion for when the “science of astrology” is real, other than of course 
when their predictions turn out to be true: as Thales, who became rich by predicting that 
olives would be abundant one year and not the next, can be used to show the practical 
application of astrology. The language of the prophet, however, is obscure and hard to 
understand for the Christian prince, who is easily misled. Christine de Pizan captures 
this aspect when she says: “the good prince ought to be careful that only wise men 
establish his particular affairs so that he is not deceived by abusers (my emphasis).”134 
Abusers, Christine de Pizan tells us, are those “who by the illusion of learning simulate 
knowledge, but know nothing and often deceive and mislead princes and lay persons by 
their trickery.”135 Due to the uncertainty of the future and the language that the prophet 
uses, the problem of whether or not the prince should listen to the prophet becomes 
difficult to answer; the prince will no doubt have to run the risk that the advice he fol-
lows turns out to be wrong. 
 The sage can offer advice on general matters of the government of the kingdom; 
the technician on particular problems; and the prophet can predict the future so that the 
prince may make the right decisions – these are all more or less lumped together as “the 
wise” in the text; but from all these modes of veridiction there is none that speaks to 
virtue – what Christine de Pizan at the beginning of the book stated was the central 
thing to posses if one desired honour. Towards the end of Book I however, Christine de 
Pizan introduces a fourth person who will tell the prince the truth. Here she tells us that: 
“[A] good prince out to control himself from something so repugnant and degrading” as 
anger and hatred, which every powerful man is naturally bound to sometimes be.136 As 
an example, Christine de Pizan explains that Valerius “even spoke to princes thus: 
‘Often persons, especially when they are high and powerful, commit great cruelties 
through impetuous hatred.”137 Valerius then went on to distinguish wrath from hatred, 
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in that while the former can be satisfied the latter cannot. Two things are of interest 
here: first, the fact that there is a concrete problem of the prince showing a vice – not so 
much which one or how bad it is; second, that Valerius “even spoke to princes thus” 
would mean that the prince was not able to correct his own behaviour, someone else had 
to step in and make the clarification between the two vices and make him exercise self-
government. The prince, as well as everyone else, therefore is dependent on someone 
who will provide him with the proper guidance on how he should govern himself: “Let 
these things be a mirror for the prince, in which to look at himself, and all others should 
do so as well. For let us suppose that there was one of these vices to which one were 
naturally inclined. If the person does not learn how to master himself, an conquer it, it is 
a sign that he is not virtuous, and a person without virtue is not worthy of honour.”138 
 To the prince the problem is quite clear: who offers the right council to the 
prince? How from all these different truth-tellers, who all are represented as the wise, 
does the prince choose the one that will lead him to obtain honour? The old and wise 
stands in contrast to the young and reckless; the technician and artisans stand in contrast 
to each other offering contradictory advice; the prophet stands in contrast to those who 
are his imposters and abusers; but the mirror or the person willing to tell the prince the 
truth about himself does not, at least in Christine de Pizan’s text, have a opposite. Be-
cause of these problems “it is necessary for the good prince to be a good judge” and 
furthermore, it is expedient that [the prince] be wise himself and know something of the 
sciences, […].”139 To that end, the kind of government of himself that the prince is 
supposed to conduct is not just temperance and judgement, but he should also able to 
speak well and wisely: “there is no doubt that wise and well-ordered speech out of the 
mouth of the prince s more weighty and willingly heard than when it comes from an-
other.”140 Christine de Pizan joins “bodily movement” with speech: “When eloquence is 
combined with gentle moment of the body, it affects the listener […]” by bringing 
delight to their spirit, eyes, and ears.141 Thus, the problem complex exposed here is one 
that has two positive images – that much becomes evident when Christine de Pizan 
refers to Plato: “the world will be happy when the wise begin to rule, or kings begin to 
be wise” – but there is always the risk that someone with ill intentions comes between 
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the prince and the wise, no matter how wise the prince himself might be; in there lies 
the trick of not being flattered.142 
 3. Erasmus had started The Education of a Christian Prince with a long 
exhortation and praise of that particular kind of wisdom that was to be desired by the 
prince: “Whenever kings invite her to their council and cast out those evil counsellors – 
ambition, anger, greed, and flattery – the commonwealth flourishes in everyway and, 
knowing that it owes its felicity to the wisdom of its prince, says with well-earned 
satisfaction: ‘All good things together came to me with her’.”143 Already here Erasmus 
outlines some of the issues which the prince should keep in mind when governing his 
kingdom: first, that there exists a strong link between good government and truth 
(which he takes from Plato); second, that the successful government does not depend on 
his wisdom alone, but that “no man does the state a greater service than he who equips a 
prince’s mind, which must consider all men’s interest, with the highest principles, wor-
thy of a prince” – (which he takes from Plutarch); and third, that the kingdom will 
always be in a state of danger, so the best thing the prince can wish for is unshakable 
determination – that is, governing himself as only the ideal prince would (this art of 
self-government he takes from Diogenes).144 
 To attest to the importance and the dangers associated with the prince being 
dependent on wisdom – how he attains it and subsequently uses it to govern his king-
dom – we should note that the chapter called The prince must avoid flatterers is 
positioned in a very special way in relation to all the other chapters in Erasmus’ book; 
peace, taxation, laws, treaties, marriage, alliances, and war are all subjects that can be 
dealt with after this very important subject. This particular problem is paramount for the 
successful resolution of any of the other issues facing the prince. Erasmus starts by 
saying: 
 
The prince must avoid flatterers; but this cannot be brought about unless flatterers are kept at bay 
by every means, for the well-being of great princes is extremely vulnerable to this particular 
plague. Youthful innocence in itself is particularly exposed to this evil, partly because of the 
natural inclination to enjoy complements more than the truth, and partly because of inexperi-
ence: the less suspicious the prince is of trickery, the less he knows about taking precautions.145 
 
There are in a prince’s life certain times and places when he particularly vulnerable to 
the tricks and schemes of these flatterers – these “repulsive depraved little men … [who 
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are the] masters of the masters of the world” – we could say that flattery is constituted 
around four distinct axes: from the upbringing of the prince, the court society, the prince 
himself, and from the various titles a prince would have.146  
 First, flattery can come from the upbringing of the prince: that is, first of all the 
nurses that take care of the prince in his youth; these usually take “take on the emotional 
tendencies of the mothers, the majority of whom frequently spoils the character of their 
children by over-indulgence.”147 Thus, the first time the prince encounters the danger is 
within an encounter with the opposite sex, with women. The next threat is the compan-
ions of the prince who need to be “well-bread” and “groomed” by the tutor; who 
furthermore need to create an “atmosphere of civilized talk” that is without the need for 
“using pretence or lies to gain favour.”148 Lastly are the “attendants” who “often pander 
to a boy’s predilections, either through stupidity or in the hope that some sort of recom-
pense will come their way.” If these positions cannot be filled with “prudent and 
honest” men and women, Erasmus considers a measure of “public punishment” to be rid 
of such behaviour. Of course there is the tutor himself who would be the greatest threat 
of the four, because he is inclined “conduct his business with a view not to passing out a 
better prince but to walk out a richer man himself.”149 
 Second, the very antagonistic structure of the court society incentivises flattery: 
if the goal of the social game is to advance in the ranks, gaining the favour of the king 
becomes one of the prime strategies – and here flattery will in many cases prove a suit-
able tactic. And thus, many figures loom within the court society, all willing to corrupt 
the prince’s soul: “Officers of state do not give frank advice and counsellors do not 
consult with … enough openness at heart. […] The priests are flatterers and the physi-
cians are yes-men.”150 Nor is there any hope that frankness is to be found from the 
prince’s enemies from aboard, because everywhere it has become a custom to welcome 
“undiluted praise” from “orators from abroad”. The ones who enjoy the most intimate 
contact with the prince – the ‘royal confessors’ – do not make proper use of it. In fact, 
with the continuous practices of all these kinds of people who are in regular contact 
with the prince, an undesirable structure emerges: “while each one is looking out for his 
own interest the means of serving the common good are neglected.”151 There are other 
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groups of figures, which have less access to the prince and therefore are less harmful: 
“poets and orators” for example, talk more to their own inspiration than to the prince’s 
achievements and shortcomings. Far more dangerous figures are the “Magicians and 
soothsayers” who promise the prince “long life, victory, triumphs, pleasures and king-
doms and then again threaten others with sudden death, disaster, affliction, and exile, 
trading upon hope and fear.”152 Just the same are the “astrologers who foretell the future 
from the stars,” – whose “science” Erasmus is particularly sceptical of.153 The worst of 
them all, however, are the ones that “operate with apparent frankness” – these Erasmus 
does not describe in full, but instead refers to Plutarch’s work on the matter.154 In sum, 
we see that court society is filled with potential flatterers and people bent on telling the 
prince lies and hiding the truth from him, and there are more sources of danger within 
the structure of court society; these last two however, have not to do with the people 
surrounding the prince, but rather the prince himself. 
 Hence, third, the prince is also prone to folly, which always brings self-love with 
it – that is, “when someone is his own flatterer.”155 This is shown in all the kinds of 
implicit flattery that can be seen around the prince: in portraits, statues, and inscriptions, 
the prince has the potential to forget who he really is (in truth) and can instead have 
artists portray him as legends of the past, as god-like figures, all-powerful and larger 
than life. The danger is doubled because self-flattery does not only mean that the prince 
flatters himself, but he also is more willing to let others do the same. Fourth, the very 
honorary titles that are central to the projection and manifestation of the asymmetrical 
power relation between the prince and his subject can also be a source of flattery: de-
spite there being a clear need for a “tribute of respect”, Erasmus prefers these to be “of 
such a kind that they remind the prince in some way of his office” – meaning only that 
there are a set of honorary titles that are acceptable and a set that are not, which are 
essentially arbitrary; the point is that the prince should be able to decide which titles are 
flattering and which are not.156 Erasmus reminds us of Alexander Severus who “regard-
ed all flatterers with such a hatred that if anybody saluted him too obsequiously or 
bowed his head too humbly, he would at one noisily denounce the man and send him 
packing.”157 
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 With all these sources of flattery, what is the prince to do? Erasmus offers two 
solutions: first, and this a most humanist solution – the prince ought to read books: 
because “very often he may learn from these what his friends have not dared to bring to 
his attention.”158 Upon saying that, Erasmus has a large curriculum to offer the prince, 
but books need no courage, they are as spoken from a distant past yet still relevant in 
the present provided that the prince can draw the right lesson from them; and thus he 
ends by cautioning: “Whenever the prince takes a book in his hands, let him do it not 
for the purpose of enjoyment but in order that he may get up from his reading a better 
man.”159 Thus the first solution to the problem of flatterers rest solely on the prince 
being wise enough to read and draw the right lessons from the books at his disposal, but 
the solution has an obvious flaw: there is no one like the guardians of Plato to keep the 
prince honest to himself; that is, truth does not exist in a dynamic relationship to power, 
rather power all too easily becomes truth. The prince has but to stop reading and the 
wisdom of the book ceases to speak to him. The second solution to the problem of 
flatterers that Erasmus provides the prince with is one the Greeks would have recog-
nized as well, namely the parrhēsiatic pact: “nobody speaks the truth more honestly or 
more advantageously or more candidly than do books; but the prince must nevertheless 
accustom his friends to the knowledge that they find favour be giving him frank advice. 
It is indeed the job of those who keep the prince company to advise him opportunely, 
advantageously, and amicably, but it will nevertheless be well to forgive those whose 
advice is presented clumsily in order that no precedent mat deter those who would 
advice him properly from doing their duty.”160 That is, the advisor agrees to tell the 
truth, the whole truth without concealment (such is his duty), and thereby binding him-
self to his statement and agrees to take the risk and consequences thereof, while the 
other interlocutor, the prince, agrees to accept what has been said no matter how un-
pleasant or provoking, to not take a course of action that would otherwise harm or leave 
the sole responsibility (the powerful has to be willing to share and show solidarity with 
the consequences) with the individual who showed the courage to confront them with 
the truth. 
 4. In Baldesar Castiglione’s book IV of The Book of the Courtier, the char-
acter Fregoso Ottaviano starts with a long discourse on what he sees as the central task 
of the courtier – the book is divided into four chapters, each representing a day of con-
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versation and the previous days they had been discussing everything from the qualities 
that a perfect courtier must have, life at court, to the role of ladies.161 Now, the passage 
starts with drawing a distinction between on the one hand what he calls “sterile court-
ship” - that which associates the “fruit” of courtship with merely the fact of the courtier 
being of “noble birth, gracefulness, charms and skills” – and on the other, the kind of 
courtship which is good, not as something that is good in itself (here Ottaviano men-
tions temperance, fortitude, and health), but because it is directed towards a particular 
end (like laws, liberality, or riches).162 The specific problem with the latter, according to 
Ottaviano is that fewer will posses the courage to “die” and “take a risk”.163 Instead the 
“activities of the courtier” should be directed towards “the virtuous end” – what exactly 
this “virtuous end” consists of we shall return to shortly. The distinction is clearly be-
tween a particular kind of passive being (drawing its roots in the specific background 
practices necessary to navigate the court society) and an affirmative doing; the courtier 
should ideally be a man with purpose. 
 For such a “perfect courtier”, Ottaviano says, the end is “to win himself the 
mind and favour of the prince he serves that he can and always will tell him the truth 
about all he needs to know, without fear or risk of displeasing him”.164 The courtier 
should “be in a position to dare to oppose [the prince] … [to] persuade him to return to 
the path of virtue.”165 The prince has two aspects or qualities, the former established in 
books I to III, that is, he should be “quick-witted, and charming, prudent and scholarly,” 
– while the latter, the specific aspect of being able to confront the prince. While the 
former is what Ottaviano considers the “flower” of courtiership the “real fruit” – the 
latter aspect – “is to encourage and help his prince to be virtuous and to deter him from 
evil.”166 Here, in regard to this latter aspect, Ottaviano reminds us of the double role that 
the courtier has: that is, he has “to choose a truly virtuous end” and “to know how to 
find convenient and suitable means for its attainment.”167 That is, he has both a spiritual 
role as well as a secular; an exercise of power aimed at the individuality of the prince’s 
soul as well as at the totality of the territory, solving its practical matters. 
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 Ottaviano then goes on to characterize the “present-day rulers” who have many 
faults, of which the greatest are “ignorance and conceit.”168 These are rooted in “false-
hood” – “a vice rightly detestable to God and man and more harmful to princes than any 
other.”169 The problem of falsehood is not only a problem in terms of it corrupting the 
prince’s soul, but also in more practical matters of government. The courtier has two 
tasks before him: to ensure that the prince is “truly virtuous” and to find “convenient 
and suitable means” of solving practical matters.170 Consequently: “princes lack most of 
all what they must have in the fullest measure, namely, someone to tell them the truth 
and remind them of what is right.”171 There are two potential candidates that can help 
the prince overcome this problem of falsehood: on one hand are his enemies who, alt-
hough they might wish the prince harm, “dare not criticize the prince openly for fear of 
being punished.”172 While on the other hand there are his friends who, according to 
Ottaviano, do not have free access to him in the same way that they have to ordinary 
people: reproaching the prince comes as a risk due to the asymmetrical power relation 
between the friend and the prince. This structural logic of this relation leads to the result 
that “from being friends they become flatterers” – that is, they speak and act in ways 
that produce the very falsehoods they should help the prince to get rid of.173 The conse-
quences of this are clear:  
 
[A]part from never hearing the truth about anything, princes become drunk with the power they 
wield, and abandoned to pleasure-seeking and amusements they become so corrupted in mind 
that […] they pass from ignorance to extreme conceit. […] they never accept anyone else’s ad-
vice or opinion; and, believing that it is very easy to know how to rule and that successful 
government requires no art or training other than brute force, they devote all their mind and at-
tention o maintaining the power they have and they believe that true happiness consists in being 
able to do what one wants.174 
 
This leads to a reversal of perspective when it comes to the prince: from having virtue 
as the ideal, it becomes his own happiness that is the ideal, which in consequence leads 
him to despise all virtuous things. Seen from the prince’s view, reason and justice exer-
cise their dictatorial power over him; as a result, the reversal means that the prince 
resists all government of his person. He becomes the tyrant; everything is subordinate to 
his private happiness. It would seem that there is no way out of this spiral: that neither 
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the enemy nor the friend (who is doomed to be a flatterer) is able to convince the prince 
that he has become a tyrant bent on his own pleasure. This is truly absurd, thinks Otta-
viano: “for they who realize how outrageous and pernicious it is when subject, who 
must be governed, are wiser that the rulers who must govern them.”175 The gap between 
the wise and the ruler – between truth and power – becomes a problem for the governed, 
not when the prince’s talents in music, dancing or riding is in question, but when his 
ability to govern them is. How can the government of the wise by the rulers be legiti-
mized? To this end, Ottaviano turns to the ancients for examples, and he finds three: 
“Cimon was censured for loving sine, Scipio for loving sleep and Lucullus for loving 
banquets.”176 The idea is all along the same, censure; the prince needs to be censured on 
those aspects where he fails to govern himself. Ottaviano therefore praises the Ancients 
rulers’ willingness to correct themselves – “they took meticulous care in ordering their 
lives on the pattern of exceptional men.”177 This is a model to be followed and thus, 
Ottaviano says: 
 
“If some of our rulers [today] were to be confronted by a strict philosopher, or indeed anyone at 
all who openly and candidly might wish to show them the awesome face of true virtue, teach 
them a good way of life and how a good prince should conduct himself, I am sure that as soon as 
he appeared they would loathe him as if he were a serpent or mock at him as if he were dirt.”178 
 
There are a few things to note here, however, that beg questions: first, what does it 
mean that “anyone at all” can confront the prince with his wrongful conduct of his own 
person – does this not place less emphasis on the figure of the courtier, could it just as 
well be the kitchen boy who confronted the prince? That is, what importance does it 
play that the one who confronts the king should be well versed in the background prac-
tices of the court society? Second, what emphasis should we place on the discourse 
being with an “open and candid” spirit – was that the very problem that faced the enemy 
and courtier before? That is, what limits are there imposed on the kind of speech the 
interlocutor can make use of? Third, will loathing and mockery of the prince bring 
about a change of heart of the prince, or is it simply a remark on how irreversible the 
development has become? The only way out of these predicaments is to phrase the 
practice (for both parties) as in a dilemma or paradox: that is, the prince needs the cour-
tier to confront him with the truth, but at the same time courtier is reluctant to do so 
because the prince – at least in Ottiviano’s day - do not get how this functions (which is 
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extremely important for the further development of the practice) – which is due to the 
asymmetrical power relation not being willing to tolerate any such discourse. Thus, 
Ottiviano has three parts to his problematisation of exhortation: there is the courtier, 
with his training and his duty to the prince (the qualities and this double role of leisure 
and advisor); the prince and his qualities and tendencies towards tyranny – which is 
where the third part of the triad comes in; the specific problem of flatterers who are the 
root cause of falsehood and the tyranny of the prince. So the problem of how it can be 
ensured that the prince governs in accordance with virtue seems to be at a point where 
the only way forward is an ever-deeper commitment to the structure between divine 
right, court society, and the specific problem constituted by the flatterer. In other words, 
Ottaviano has no way of reconstituting the problem and thus the commitment and cou-
pling of exhortation to the prince and virtue remains. 
 
[11] In archaic and classical Greek thought, the problem of politeia framed the funda-
mental circularity between parrhēsia and democracy. In contrast, the problem of 
political order would with the politics of truth of exhortation be framed by a relationship 
between the ruler and the gods as it once was with the wise king. The question of who 
would have authority to rule over the dominion of men was debated through the concept 
of the divine right of kings, a biblical concept that was traced back to the Jewish kings 
Saul and David. The concept contains three parts, each of which could be formulated 
and developed as a problem. First, responsible government: God gives power for a 
purpose, namely the well-being of the people committed to the ruler’s charge. There is 
thus a kind of contract between God and the ruler. Second, sovereign authority: the ruler 
stands supreme in his God-given authority. The subjects have to respect the ruler like 
they would God – that is, there is a contract between the king and his subject that is 
guaranteed by God. Third, earthly unaccountability: the ruler is accountable to God 
alone and even should he fail to fulfil his obligations he must still not be resisted. This 
was a particularly delicate point, but one which was rarely discussed, as questioning this 
part of the concept would effectively be a rebellion against God. In sum, it is the three 
ideas of responsible government, sovereign authority, and earthly unaccountability that 
are inherent to the divine right to rule; if broken, the right to rule was lost. Thus, the 
question was who would be God’s rightful representative on earth and rule in his stead? 
To St Ambrose of Milan, for example, the clash between the all-embracive autocratic 
powers claimed by the emperor and the Church’s right as a place of worship, led him to 
treat the emperor as a “son of god” – “divine things are not subject to the imperial pow-
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er.”179 That is, the emperor was not above the Church but in it: the idea of the emperor 
as the humble prince, ready for penitence and willing to heed the authority of his bishop 
emerges; the ruler, just like everyone else, was a Christian and thus subject to ecclesias-
tical censure. These issues would be discussed all the way up to Dante’s Monarchy, 
John of Paris’s De potestate regia et papali and Marsilius of Padua’s Defensor pacis. 
Despite these struggles over hierarchy, one thing that was widely agreed upon was the 
source of authority in writing the laws of man. That source was God; the only question 
was who was closest to him. God was the creator of everything, and thus, like every-
thing else, political power existed by God’s will alone and those who would wield it did 
so by the grace of God. 
 Furthermore, as with the circularity between parrhēsia and democracy, there is a 
secondary constitutional element in divine right and the circularity between God and 
truth. Through the many reinterpretations of the Neo-Platonists and Christians, the 
concept of the good (agathos), particularly as Plato had developed it in Timaeus, was 
associated with God. Yet, despite his divine right to rule the king would remain struc-
turally unable to discover the truth for himself. That truth is something that remains 
hidden from the king, yet linked with the conception of the world as the unfolding of 
God’s eternal will, is very clear from a long passage in the Norwegian text Konungs-
Skuggja called “The Speech of Wisdom” where the Son ask the Father about the 
sources of wisdom: 
 
Father: “It ought not to cause displeasure to have one inquire closely into subjects which one is 
not likely to understand without some direction. But God's mercy reveals and makes known 
many things to mankind, which would be largely hidden from them, if He were unwilling to 
have them revealed. And many things, which were formerly concealed in His own knowledge; 
He has made, known to us, because He wishes man to take a profitable interest in the wealth of 
knowledge, which he draws from the divine treasures. But as a guide toward this interest, which 
we have just mentioned one should take special note of the words that Wisdom used concerning 
herself when she spoke in these terms.”180 
 
And so it goes on for a while. The father later ends by saying: “However, it is the duty 
of every king to know thoroughly all the accounts that Wisdom has given of herself or 
wise men like those just mentioned have written, and each day to ponder some part of 
those speeches, if the duties of his office leave him any time for that.”181 It is an im-
portant point here that this circularity was independent of the law; no law, secular or 
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ecclesiastical, could guarantee that the king would govern in accordance with the truth: 
only the practice of exhortation and divine right of kings are dependent on one another.  
 
[12] With the practice of exhortation the problem of the political game also changes: in 
the wake of the democratic game of dunasteia – where the political game was ordered 
according to experience – what me might call ‘court society’ emerges as the political 
game. This does not have anything exclusively feudal about it, but there is a higher 
degree of social stratification about it than the tripartite division of the political game of 
dunasteia. This involves three changes: First of all, there is a relativisation in two sens-
es: politics is a way of life as well as a practice – it is a personal choice that is not 
foreground in one’s status; and, one exercises power in a network as one node among 
many where there is a certain rotation; one is now the ruler, now the ruled. Second, 
there is an emphasis on political activity and the moral agent: building on Greek politi-
cal thought, the art of governing oneself in relation to governing others is still very 
much important – the political man must establish his own ēthos, take care of himself, 
his soul. He should be governed by prudence. Third, there is a sense of political activity 
and personal destiny: the precariousness of fortune (the Roman goddess Fortuna spin-
ning the “wheel of fortune” remained a popular image throughout the Middle ages) 
introduces into the political game an economy of favours (as opposed to merit) and a 
sense of an ultimate purpose in the form of bettering one self, to do the ethical work on 
one’s own person. To overcome the unevenness of fortune one needs to gain favour and 
to sculpt one’s character.182 What started with a stylization of the way in which the 
citizen should govern himself in order to govern others, became with time more and 
more intensive – it was a matter of proving himself capable of governing others; and 
even later this self-government take its form as rules and codes of conduct (there was a 
genuine mistrust in the individual), although this took some time for the Christians to 
establish. 
 
[13] To conclude: in this chapter I have attempted to show how the politics of truth is 
displaced from the practice of parrhēsia in a democratic setting to the practice of exhor-
tation in relation to the soul of the king. What initiated this shift was the realization of 
the danger of the demagogue as practical problem and the paradoxical demand for 
freedom in a democracy that had to be dealt with in thought. Then, I tried to show how 
                                                
182 Foucault, Michel. The Care of the Self: History of Sexuality, Volume III, Translated by Robert Hurley 
(Penguin Books, 1984), pp. 87-95. 
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the politics of truth was problematized in thought around the relationship between a 
philosophical counsellor (sumbouleou) and the king. The condition of the possibility of 
truth was the existence of the good (agathos), which rested on the moral decision to 
banish the sophists and required devotion to truth through correct method. Being inca-
pable of discovering the truth for himself, the king would through rigorous education 
(paideia) and by working together with the counsellor in a homologie, confess the 
thoughts residing in their soul (psūke) they would obtain the truth. My main source for 
elaborating these concepts was Plato, but I also showed how Xenocrates and Isocrates 
dealt with the same problems. Here I found that the socio-political limit of thought 
differed depending on the application of the two concepts of protrepsis and paraenesis 
– where the latter would appeal to tradition, the former would welcome the activity of 
thought. Then, I turned to the perceived danger of the flatterer as it was elaborated in 
the mirrors for princes and how exhortation would act as a remedy. Lastly, I briefly 
summarised how the concepts of divine right and court society would be used to con-
template the problems of political order and the political game of feudal societies. 
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Chapter IV: Public Critique 
*   *   * 
[1] The topic of this chapter is the changing topology of the politics of truth starting 
from the sixteenth century. First (I) a new epistemological space was emerging, realised 
by the social forces involved in the practical problems of the European wars of religion 
and the new degree of tyranny of the European monarchs; both of which were associat-
ed with the danger of superstition in Early Modern thought. It is in this period that there 
in the politics of truth is (II) a break from autocratic exhortation to public critique, 
where the concept of krinō moves from the margins of the un-thought to the centre; and 
the divine right of kings is (III) replaced by popular sovereignty of the modern state, 
guaranteeing the possibility of true-discourse through freedom of the press; while (IV) 
the political game of court society is replaced by a public sphere governed by a princi-
ple of toleration, in which true-discourse circulated with the king as a glorified 
spectator. Accordingly, the socio-political limits of thought, in which thought would test 
its reality, was now established by a new diagram of thought stretched out between 
critique, the state, and toleration. 
I 
[2] The metaphysics of the contradictory dictates that all practices eventually become 
problematic, either in the conflict with other practices or on their own terms, when the 
assumptions that underpin them collapse (that is, they become paradoxical in relation to 
experience). For a new world to be conjured up (realised) by thought, it requires that 
problems represent a lasting encounter – that is, the encounter must have a certain 
weight and impact that demands a response (intensity, to borrow Deleuze’s concept), in 
the proper sense of a problem as an obstacle that has to be overcome. The practical 
problems that give rise to a new epistemological space of the relationship between 
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philosophy and politics – the horrors of the European wars of religion and the intolera-
ble tyranny of princes, as seen from the point of view of the nobility and later the 
bourgeoisie – do exactly this.1 
 
[3] From the early sixteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth, Europe was rav-
aged by religious wars: The peasant revolts in Germany, supported by Protestant clergy, 
and the Swiss Reformation between the thirteen cantons; the Eighty Years War between 
catholic Spain and the Seventeen Provinces with their different variants of Protestants 
with its series of Beeldenstorm –the Iconoclastic fury– on catholic churches; the Massa-
cre of Vassy in 1562 that started to the French wars of Religion; the Thirty Year war 
between 1618 and 1648 that involved most of Europe; and the War of the Three King-
doms on the British isles. These conflicts were complex because of the divisions 
between the various Catholic and Protestant factions that were spread territorially and 
intertwined with conflicts between political elites, as in France with the Huguenot 
Bourbons, the Catholic Guise, and the royal family of Valois. These wars therefore took 
the character of civil wars that, fuelled by extreme fanaticism, had turned into the sav-
age butchery where all the killing took place in close quarters and by hand-to-hand 
combat; the slaughter of Magdeburg, the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, and Crom-
well’s model army’s sacking of Drogheda all bore witness to this.2 Such ferocity was an 
expression of religious passions that drove the conflict, passions which were a result of 
a fundamental disagreement about the nature of God and the proper relationship be-
tween man and God. The Catholic Church viewed itself as the embodiment of the Holy 
Spirit, instructed by Christ to Peter and thereafter passed on via a hereditary principle, 
with the organized hierarchical clergy acting as a conduit between God and man. Lu-
ther’s objections that sparked the Reformation were not just about the immoral and 
                                                
1 There are no clear-cut criteria for what makes an encounter lasting. A way to get at one however would 
be to look at how a given problem would change thought – thus we could say that there is a lasting 
encounter when there is an epistemological break and a epistemological space is constituted. Consider the 
gravity of one of the problems, the European wars of religion: In Dieu et les hommes, Voltaire estimated 
that religious wars throughout European history had claimed 9,468,800 victims – the majority of which 
had died after the Reformation. Voltaire is not far off, contemporary estimates run from four million to 
eleven million for the Thirty Year War and from two to four million for the French Wars of Religion. The 
reality of such numbers is terrifying and it opens the cracks of nihilism (the world stops making sense) 
that sets off the process of thought. 
2 The devastation of these events was heavily imprinted on the minds of the sixteenth century. See for 
example the paintings of François Dubois, a Huguenot painter born circa (1529), St. Bartholomew's Day 
Massacre or that of Johann Philipp Abelin, (†1634) Sack of Magdeburg 1631, imperial troops conquer 
the toll redoubt and the suburbs in April 1631. For a graphical description of the Sacking of Magdeburg 
see Foxe’s Book of Martyrs – the book’s many examples of atrocities also helped cement the sectarian 
lines throughout Europe.  
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abusive practices of this “mediating” church noted in the 95 Theses, but about the fun-
damental disagreement about the nature of God and his relationship with man. In 
contrast to the Scholastic metaphysics upon which the institutions of the Catholic 
Church rested, Luther held that there was an unbridgeable gap between divine being and 
created being, which he had absorbed from his nominalist predecessors.3 Only Christ is 
a source of unity that can bridge this gap, he does so in an inexplicable manner through 
the Incarnation and thus the only access to truth about being is though faith: sola fides, 
sola gratia, and sola scriptura – faith arises only though grace and grace only though 
scripture.  
 In the previous chapter we saw how the ideal of the philosopher king translated 
into the pious Christian prince that governed by divine right and could tell flattery from 
truth if he would only remain moderate towards the subject who dared speak the truth. 
Such a practice rested on the assumption that the circularity between divine right, court 
society, and eloquence in the council (of which the clergy was the important participant) 
remained intact, but with the advent of the religious wars these positives had eroded 
because of the corruption of the church: if the prince could buy plenary indulgences 
there was no need for him to govern by the truth, he could neglect the quality of his 
court and let himself pamper in flattery.4 The tendency to worry about this problem, as 
                                                
3 The deeper cause of the Reformation itself – and the thought-ammunition that Luther was armed with – 
lie in the nominalist revolution within Scholasticism, where Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and others 
found a predictable and beneficent God irreconcilable with the fact of life that they were presented with: 
The Western Schism within the Catholic church over who was the right Pope, the Hundred Year War 
between France and England, the Black Death that ravaged Europe from 1346 to 1353 that killed 75 to 
200 million people, the beginning of little Ice Age in the fourteenth century that had disastrous economic 
consequences, and finally the displacements of peoples that was a product of urban development, social 
mobility and the Crusades. All such practical problem fuelled a paradox that traditional Scholasticism – 
with their realist insistence on extra-mental existence of universals – did not provide good answers to. 
And thus the nominalist God, who was unconstrained by nature and reason, unknowable, unpredictable, 
and all-powerful, a fearsome god indeed that was indifferent to good and evil entered the stage. The 
natural order that God had created with man occupying an exalted position that had organized thought for 
almost a millennium collapsed. See, Gillespie, Michael. The Theological Origins of Modernity (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 2008) pp. 19-43. A point of discussion, however, would be whether this 
collapse was inevitable because of the re-introduction of Aristotelian texts in the Western tradition of 
thought, or because of the emergence of these practical problems that demanded answers to paradoxes 
emanating from the evident clash between lived experience and Scholastic doctrine. Though, in other 
periods of the Western tradition the denial of a beneficial and predictable God was not conditioned upon 
the availability of Aristotelian texts. 
4 For the Catholic side, see Francisco Suárez (1613) Defensio fidei catholicae, in which he defended 
Catholic faith against Anglicanism. Here he argued that it was impossible for the universal catholic to err 
or commit heresy because of a. the promise of Christ (to Peter) and b. that the institution of the Church 
constitutes the pillar of truth: “if the Church could err”, how, he asked, “could the faith of believers, or 
the truth of things to be believed, depend on it?” – by implication to deny the truth of the church would be 
to deny the Christian God and that would mean that the whole Lebenswelt would collapse (I, Ch. 4). At 
the end of book III he draws the following conclusion: distinguishing between the temporal and spiritual 
power by which the world is governed, he urges the king to recognise that he should “[k]now that you are 
a sheep of the flock of Christ, not a pastor” – scito te ouem gregis Chrifti effe, non paftorem (III, summa). 
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we have seen, was evident in all humanist writers of the Renaissance. Erasmus in The 
Education of a Christian Prince considers the dangers of a single tyrant versus an en-
tourage of tyrants of the court and opts for the status quo as he sees no clear-cut 
solution, and therefore urges the prince to “avoid all innovations as far as proves possi-
ble: for even if something is changed for the better, a novel situation is still disturbing in 
itself.”5 Crisis demands action and thus the humanist endorsement of the status quo was 
fatal. Luther had already noticed a similar, but to him necessary, problem when he 
remarked, “Frogs needs storks” – a natural consequence of the nominalist conception of 
God. If anything, there was no need for the king to be pious, rather he was God’s hang-
man on earth: as Luther writes in On Secular Authority: “If a prince becomes wise, 
pious or a Christian, it is one of the great wonders, and one of the most precious tokens 
of divine grace upon that land.”6 To Luther there was no paradox, no need of a govern-
ment of truth. It was totally irrelevant, only faith could save the soul and faith was 
between man and God alone. If kings are either the hangmen of God or they, guided by 
the cunning hand of the devil, follow their pride, their self-interest, their reason or even 
their concern for their fellow man in a quasi-Machiavellian fashion, the result can only 
be devastating war. 
 To later generations, however, the wars of religion were a manifestation of how 
the problematisations of the relationship between philosophy and politics, that had 
stated out with the political principles of Plato and since then reformulated in the Chris-
tian mirrors for princes, had become problematic on their own terms. The wars of 
religion were a pressing problem in sixteenth century France where the minority groups 
of the Huguenots and the majority Catholic groups alike regarded the problem of reli-
gious wars emanating from the existence of the opposite side (they in truth, the other in 
error). Different were the Politiques – a group of moderate Catholics and Huguenots 
loyal to the intentions of Michel de l’Hôpital, the Chancellor of France from 1560 to 
1568 – who argued for sovereign impartiality and religious toleration. They, at least 
initially, recognized that the prince would always be presented with an uncomfortable 
dilemma if he heeds the exhortation of religious councillors that demand the enforce-
ment of religious unity, cuirus region eius religio. Jean Bodin alluded to this exact 
dilemma when debating the merits of monarchy in relation to popular rule, the latter of 
                                                                                                                                          
This however does not resolve the problem that the faith had; it exactly did not provide good answers for 
the harsh fact of life. 
5 Erasmus, The Education of The Christian Prince, p. 71 
6 Luther, Martin. Luther and Calvin On Secular Auhority, edited and translated by Harro Höpfl (Cam-
bridge University Press, 1991) p. 30 
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which holds that sovereignty is vested in a divided people. He notes that a monarchy is 
preferable exactly because the sovereign is a third party that can bring them to reason by 
attuning to their general mood, like a musician playing a tune to a lunatic to calm him 
down.7 This is, according to Bodin, exactly what happened during the religious wars – 
coercion proved a futile means when it came to demands of religious unity. The mon-
arch should always strive to be the judge and arbiter of his subjects’ conflicts, regardless 
of his own religion (even if it is the true religion, Bodin tells us). 
 Later still, in the seventeenth century, a similar problematic is found in the 
writing of Samuel Pufendorf. Having distinguished between the two autonomous nor-
mative realms of a “civil kingdom” and a “kingdom of truth”, pertaining to the prince 
and the clerical teacher respectively, Pufendorf asks “why should Sovereigns be too 
forward in deciding Religious Differences, which are of much greater Moment, (the 
eternal and temporal welfare of Millions of People do depend thereon) unless they be 
very well instructed in every thing that has any relation to it?”8 The great danger is, as 
history demonstrates, that over-zealous clergymen turn princes into tyrants that commit 
the most gruesome atrocities against the populous they are charged with caring for. But 
neither Bodin nor Pufendorf’s solution to the problem solved it by displacing the ques-
tion entirely – only parts of it, namely that of sovereignty. 
 
[4] If the wars of Religious exemplified a problem on one side of the game of truth – 
that of a fanatical true-discourse – then tyranny exemplified the other side of it: the 
recipient king. Thus, we should consider the European wars of religion a related, yet 
separate, problem to that of tyranny. Most certainly intertwined – political reality is 
rarely neat and dissected beforehand – these wars were also politically motivated, but 
the savagery with which they were fought was undoubtedly inspired by religious fanati-
cism, which was of great consequence to how the wars were understood at the time – as 
two separate evils in league against humankind.9 Today we would probably understand 
the problem of tyranny to have more to do with the centralization of political power – or 
rather, the emergence of the modern state. Yet, this would be a presentist reading of 
                                                
7 Bodin, Jean. Six Books of the Commonwealth, abridged and translated by M. J. Tooley (ed.) (New York: 
Barnes & Noble, 1967) IV, VII. p. 142-3 
8 Pufendorf, Samuel. Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion in Reference to Civil Society, translated 
by J. Crull (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002) p. 110 
9 See for example the 1643 illustration of the perceived danger of king Charles I “body politic” half 
papist and half cavalier – one preaching fanaticism, the other arrogant flattery. 
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history, taken on their own accounts the story is a different one.10 Furthermore, as we 
saw in the second chapter, tyranny is not a new problem to the government of truth. 
Rather, what I want to show here is that tyranny is a problem that to sections of the 
nobility and the bourgeois becomes intolerable – it is their problem, and they decide to 
do something about it.  
 An exemplar of the problem is the debate over whether the execution of the 
English monarch Charles I was a regicide or a tyrannicide. The history of the English 
civil war is well known: the quagmire of sectarian divides between Arminians, Episco-
palians and Royalists on the side and Presbyterians, Independents and Republicans on 
the other; Charles’ many suspensions of parliament, general taxes and the more contro-
versial Ship Money, and his strong authoritarianism exemplified thereby. After a 
horrible civil war the Independents eventually gained the upper hand and Charles I was 
tried, convicted and executed for high treason in January 1649. 
 To execute a king was not a common event – at least since the days of the Ro-
man Empire. Unlawful regicide or tyrannicide, John Milton attempted to rationalize the 
decision. The problem of tyrannicide was a well-known one: there were two kinds of 
tyrants, that of a tyrant by practice and that of a tyrant by usurpation (usually foreign 
and by conquest) – the difference consisted in one of legitimacy. The positions on who 
could be resisted were thus mixed. What was typically at stake was whether individuals 
(that is, subjects and not inferior magistrates) could lawfully resist tyrants in practice, 
and within the doctrine of Dei Gratia there was little room for citizens lawfully rising 
up against their king.11 In fact, this doctrine made resisting a monarch almost impossi-
ble, because it would effectively be the same as resisting God. In Greek antiquity, 
however, the word Tyrant had a positive as well as a negative connotation – an ambi-
guity Bodin would later play on  – but there were plenty of justifications for resisting a 
                                                
10 The scholarly discussion of what motivated these wars has favoured different opinions: either it is 
religion or the political elites (the formation of the state) that caused them. For example, William T. 
Cavanaugh, who argues that, “to call these conflicts ‘Wars of Religion’ is an anachronism, for what was 
at issue in these wars was the very creation of religion as a set of privately held beliefs without direct 
political relevance. The creation of religion was necessitated by the new State's need to secure absolute 
sovereignty over its subjects.” See, ‘A fire Strong Enough to Consume the House: The Wars of Religion 
and the Rise of the State’, in Modern Theology, 11:4, (1995) p. 398. Exactly, these wars of religion meant 
the separation of ecclesiastical and secular power: the communities of the middle age rested exactly on 
these two pillars – the faith and the crown – but it would be imprudent not to ask why this was so; the true 
discourse that this constellation produced and relied on to sustain it was subdued by the dangers of 
superstition and flattery. Whether we call them religious wars or the formation of the state matters little to 
the argument I want to make, which is that these wars meant the end of the autocratic relation between 
philosophy and politics.  
11 See the religiously motivated works that still think in terms of divine law and therefore stops short of 
allowing the resistance to tyrants by practice: Loci Communes by Peter Martyr, Theodore Beza’s De Jura 
Magistratum (1574) and the Huguenot theses Vindiciae contra tyrannos from 1579. 
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tyrant.12 Milton would have to strike a balance between the Ancient and Christian world 
when he developed his concept of tyranny. And thus while Milton drew on Xenophon, 
Cicero, and Seneca to establish his definition tyranny, he ultimately justified tyrannicide 
by the example of Ehud against Eglon the King of Moab; a line of argument that he 
strategically followed to convince the Presbyterians and later continental Europeans for 
whom heathen sources were objectionable to say the least. 
 Charles I had, like his father King James I, made a point out of his divine right 
to rule, for which he found support in the Absolutists theories of John Heywood, Robert 
Parsons, Calybute Downing, and Sir Robert Filmer. In The Tenure of Kings and Magis-
trates Milton therefore starts with the rationally founded argument that a common 
wealth is established by men that are all naturally born free and who “communicated 
and deriv’d” their individual power to Kings and Magistrates.”13 Milton discusses four 
problems: the power of the king, which according to Milton is not bestowed upon them 
by God, but is “committed to them in trust from the people [my emphasis].”14 The 
inheritance of the crown makes the citizen nothing but the king’s slave, to which Milton 
objects major singulis, universis minor – the king is greater than each individual citizen, 
but inferior to the people as a whole. To the accountability to God alone, he asks: “How 
then can any King in Europe maintain and write himself accountable to none but God, 
when emperors in their own imperial Statutes have writt’n and decreed themselves 
accountable to Law.”15 And lastly, that of regicide – if the power of the king originates 
from the people, they might take it back (regardless of him being a tyrant). In the con-
firmation, Milton strives to show what a tyrant is and what the people may lawfully do 
to him. It is here that Milton constructs a new problematic by deploying a new concept 
of tyranny which makes a different distinction: rather than maintaining a difference 
between a tyrant by practice and usurpation, he annulled the difference altogether and 
thus all tyrants were tyrants – whether foreign, an enemy, or by special warrant – and 
could be resisted lawfully by his subjects: “A Tyrant whether by wrong or by right 
coming to the Crown, is he who regarding neither Law nor the common good, reigns 
only for himself and his faction.”16 
 The first reaction to Milton’s rationalization was the royalist propaganda pam-
                                                
12 Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, Book II, IV-V.  
13 Milton, John. Milton: Political Writings, edited by Martin Dzelzainis and translated by Claire Gruzelier 
(Cambridge University Press, 1991) pp. 8-9 
14 Ibid., p. 10 
15 Ibid., p. 13 
16 Ibid., p. 17 
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phlet Eikon Basilike, which proclaimed Charles a martyr – to which Milton responded 
with Eikonoklastes. A more serious attack was that of the Protestant scholar Claudius 
Salmasius in Defensio Regia Pro Corolo I, in which the main lines of attack were that 
the people was not the origin of the kings power and that the king was legibus solutus – 
above all positive laws. Milton’s reply, an inflammatory polemic (you old windbag of a 
man Salamasius, as he starts chapter I), Pro Populo Anglicano Defensio defends the 
Commonwealth’s cause to the Europe public by reiterating a less radical position in 
Tenure. In 1652 Sir Robert Filmer published Observations, where he restated his posi-
tion from Patricia, which had been written from the 1620s onwards (finished in 1631), 
but published posthumously in 1680.17 To Filmer, the principle of natural freedom of 
mankind to choose their own government was faulty and he could not tell “whether it be 
more erroneous in Divinity or dangerous in policy.”18 Contrariwise, he held that (6) no 
man is born free and (1) the only possible form of government was monarchy: (5) “there 
is no such form of government as a tyranny.”19 Hobbes, another opponent of the Inde-
pendents, thought that Milton and other writers suffered from Tyrannophobia and he 
warns, “[t]he toleration of a professed hatred of Tyranny, is a Toleration of hatred to 
Common-wealth in general.”20 He was however no absolutist and did not uphold the 
divine right of kings, thus playing along, he sought to defend monarchy on similar 
grounds as Milton and others had attacked it. His Leviathan is famous exactly for the 
unintended consequences in displacing the question in order to defend the monarchy. 
Some thirty years later, Algernon Sidney wrote Discourses Concerning Government 
(published in 1698), a completely mirrored refutation of Filmer’s Patraircha, and 
Locke who started his Two Treatises of Government (1689) with the following com-
plaint: 
 
                                                
17 See: Skinner, Quentin. ‘Genealogy of the Modern State’, in Proceedings of the British Academy, 
Volume 162, 2008 Lectures (2009), pp. 330 
18 Filmer, Sir Robert. Patriarcha and other Political Works, edited by Peter Laslett (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1949), p. 53 
19 Ibid., p. 229 
20 Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, edited by C. B. Macpherson (Penguin Books, 1968), p. 226 and 486 
Nevertheless, Hobbes had already objected to tyrannicide in De Cive (1642). As he saw it, the problem 
was that to the Ancients “anyone whom they want killed as a Tyrant, rules either by right or without 
right.” (if he hold power wrongly, fine, it can be hosticide [from hostis, public enemy]). However, “if he 
holds power rightly, the divine question applies: Who told you that he was a Tyrant, unless you have 
eaten of the tree of which I told you not to eat [Genesis 3. 11].” Therefore, Hobbes concludes, “one may 
easily see how dangerous this belief is to commonwealths, and particularly to Monarchies, by recognizing 
that it exposes any King, good or bad, to the risk of being condemned by the judgement, and murdered by 
the hand, of one solitary assassin.” Hobbes, Thomas. On the Citizen, edited and translated by Richard 
Tuck and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 133-4 
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“In the last age, a generation of men has sprung up among us, who would flatter princes with the 
Opinion, that they have a Divine Right to absolute power […] to make way for this doctrine they 
have denied Mankind a Right to natural Freedom, whereby they have not only, as much as in 
their lies, exposed all Subject to the utmost Misery of Tyranny and Oppression, but have also 
unsettled Titles, and shaken the throne of Princes […]; As if they had design’d to make War up-
on all Government, and subvert the very Foundations of Human Society, to serve their present 
turn.”21 
 
The problem of regicide was not just an English phenomenon, the execution of Charles 
I was a spectacle that would send shockwaves throughout European monarchies: if the 
king could be executed with impunity then power-relations would be permanently 
subversive. Chaos ensues.22 What Charles had done in England was not that different 
from what other monarchs had been doing – the Tudor period before him had already 
seen the creation of a centralized state. The process of centralisation and state formation 
was always open to interpretation as a form of tyranny: struggles over authority in 
medieval Europe were always zero-sum games. All over Europe the process of centrali-
zation had been on-going for at least a few decades. The formation of the state can 
therefore be seen as the compromise between the kings’ attempts to centralize power 
and the view that this is tyranny: centralization only became possible by the king giving 
up some of his power. The efforts of the kings to centralise undoubtedly posed a partic-
ular problem to the nobility and although there can be many explanations for why this 
was, what is central is that the government of truth cannot be arranged around the king 
if he is a tyrant per default. Thus, the dispute was at least in part about the concept of 
tyranny: how could it be determined that a king was indeed a tyrant, and what did that 
mean for his subjects? Moving the parameters for what constituted the problem of 
tyranny was crucial because it made a different kind of knowledge possible – his people 
could now judge a king a tyrant regardless of him being one. 
 
[5] The theoretical problem that renders the practices of the autocratic relation between 
philosophy and politics can now be specified a posteriori. On the one hand, there are 
                                                
21 Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government, edited by Peter Laslett (Cambridge University Press, 1988) 
p. 142. “Tyranny is the exercise of power beyond Right”, (§199, p. 398) and Locke is more concerned 
with distinction between the dissolution of government and the dissolution of society; to him the break-
down of society is worse still than un-lawful regicide. See, pp. 406-428 
22 In the pamphlet The Power of Kings, and in particular, of the King of England written in 1648, Filmer 
notes: “Oh how many tyrants should there be, if it should be lawful for subjects to kill tyrants? How 
many good and innocent princes should as tyrants perish by the conspiracy of their subjects against them? 
He that should of his subjects but exact subsidies, should be then, as the vulgar people esteem him, a 
tyrant: he that should rule and command contrary to the good liking o f the people, should be a tyrant: he 
that should keep strong guards and garrisons for the safety of his person, should be a tyrant: he that 
should put to death traitors and conspirators against his state, should be also counted a tyrant. How should 
good princes be assured of their lives, if under colour of tyranny they might be slain by their subjects, by 
whom they ought to be defended?” Filmer, Patriarcha, p. 325 
   Public Critique 
 146 
the two religious wars and the tyrannical behaviour of monarchs, on the other, the ideal 
model of the philosopher king. The philosopher king might have been able to deal with 
these problems in isolation – the fanatic could have been send away and a new and 
better king might have followed – but both at the same time leaves little of the autocrat-
ic game of truth intact in experience. The relation between the two problems is 
apparent: one implies the other and vice versa, we could perhaps talk about a synthesis. 
Neither practice of parrhēsia nor that of exhortation are able to address the practical 
problems that the government of truth is suppose to solve, and thus a crisis in 
knowledge (at the level of the un-thought) was apparent. The purposes of the practices 
are reverted and a paradox emerges: How can the true-discourse of exhortation be rec-
onciled with either the prince or the advisor if its principles are being reversed? It is 
history that realises a new problem: the government of men, both spiritual and secular, 
was infested with what was perceived to be corrupt doctrines. On one hand, it was the 
speaker of the most important true-discourse (that of the ecclesiastical elite) that had 
been corrupted not just by flattery, but also by fanaticism; on the other, the prince was 
no better, he had himself given into his passions and become a inoperable tyrant. This 
was not an idiosyncrasy, the same held true for either side of the divides; whether you 
were Catholic or Protestant, whether you were a Royalist or against monarchical power. 
 The exemplar of Luther illustrates the vulnerability of the autocratic relation 
clearly. The underlying premise in government of truth of the mirrors and Plato’s phi-
losopher kings was that the king, through either his wisdom or his piety (the Christian 
version), would be able to discern the truth. Faith as the arbiter of truth however, 
amounts to nothing but fanaticism: as the distance between philosophy and politics 
diminishes, there instantaneously is no dynamism, no power to oppose truth, no politics 
of truth. Truth is power and power is truth. The politics of truth rest on the premise of 
differentiation – if the king occupies the same position as the interlocutor then there is 
no possibility of a true-discourse. Superstition, as we shall see, was what was identified 
as the cause of these problems. Voltaire captures this dilemma when he says: “Supersti-
tion is the most horrible enemy of the human race. When it controls the Prince, it stops 
him from seeking the good of his people; when it controls the people, it causes them to 
rise against their prince.”23 Superstition effectively meant that the prince could not abide 
by the pact with religious truth – accordingly, the production of truth becomes problem-
                                                
23 Voltaire, Political Writings, translated and edited by David Williams (Cambridge University Press, 
1994), p. 216. See also: Bayle, Pierre. Various Thoughts on the Occasion of a Comet, translated by 
Robert C. Bartlett (ed.)(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), §153 and §154, pp. 190-193 
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atic if truth is conceived as a unity (deus veritas est).24 If truth is unitary on the one 
hand and two people lay claim to it on the other, how can the prince judge which true-
discourse is really true? Minerva's owl is dead, the zealot's arrow struck – the arrogant 
assertion of the one true faith rings hollow in the face of the bare facts of life. 
 
[6] Early on the 14th of November 1680, the German astronomer Gottfried Kirch dis-
covered a comet with his telescope. The comet would later reappear in December the 
same year and would attract much attention across Europe: Astronomers and laypeople 
followed with great excitement and awe. The comet had a long golden tail, and it was so 
bright that it could be observed during the day. But what did it all mean? Why would 
such an occurrence happen, was it a cause to celebration? Or was it rather a sign of 
God’s displeasure with humanity and a sign of his impending judgement; was the comet 
a warning that something terrible was about to happen? All kinds of beliefs and inter-
pretations of the event circulated in Europe: some held that the comet was a bad omen 
that would cause war, death, and famine; others thought it was a sign that such terrible 
occurrences had already happened.25 
 Indeed, superstition was seen a great danger to humanity from the sixteenth to 
the eighteenth century. Superstition is not only a religious problem, but also an episte-
mological and therefore ultimately a political problem. That is the exact point of 
Bayle’s Pensees diverses sur la comete, a book that was a response to all the outrageous 
things that people were saying and writing about the occasion of the comet. In it he 
aruged that “[t]o maintain that comets are the efficient cause of wars, the establishment 
of new religions, conspiracies, and such other plagues on society as depend on the free 
will of man and on the coming together of a thousand fortuitous things” is both profane 
and absurd. Rather, he wanted to show that: “Comets are not what one imagines, […] 
they are bodies as ancient as the world that, according to the laws of movement by 
which God governs the vast machine of the universe, are determined to pass from time 
to time within our view and to send the sun's light to us, modified in such a way that we 
perceive a long train of rays either in front of or behind their head.”26 “[T]heir passage 
into our world” Bayle continued, “is of no consequence either for good or ill, any more 
                                                
24 Augustine. On the Trinity: Books 8-15, Edited by Gareth B. Matthews and translated by Stephen 
McKenna (Cambridge University Press, 2002), VIII.1.2, p. 5 
25 The association between natural phenomena and societal events was typical of natural philosophy: in 
Theatrum Universae Naturae Jean Bodin for example, held that eclipses were related to political events. 
A claim that was not uncommon with the episteme of similitude. 
26 Bayle, Various Thoughts on the Occasion of a Comet, pp. 312-314 
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than the voyage of an Indian into Europe. It is nevertheless permitted each, according to 
the movements of his piety, to become mortified at the sight of this phenomenon.”27 
Superstition is a danger to society, Bayle maintained, and the main goal of the book was 
therefore to undermine the influence that superstition had on political life – by way of 
suggesting a moral law and society based on atheism. The example is a famous one and 
was much discussed during the Enlightenment. Bayle’s argument builds on experience 
and he reasoned thus, 
 
If it is true, then, as history and the course of common life suggest, that men can plunge them-
selves into every sort of crime while they are convinced of the truth of their religion, which 
teaches them that God severely punishes the sinner and that he magnificently rewards good 
works, one must agree that those who give us this conviction as a proof and pledge of the good 
life are necessarily mistaken and that it is to reason poorly to conclude from the fact that a man 
is an idolater, that he lives in a manner morally superior to an atheist.28  
 
The example of the atheists shows that religion is contrary to society: that is, it has a 
social function rather natural one. If religion is contrary to society and has socio-
political utility, then it can also be used for creating strife and conflict – and in that, it 
thrives on the superstitions of a populous or of the princes. 
 Likewise, in his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Spinoza starts by saying that: 
“If men were always able to regulate their affairs with sure judgment, or if fortune 
always smiled upon them, they would not get caught up in any superstition.”29 Supersti-
tion is the danger that befalls men that have little or no sense of judgment or self-
knowledge; being incapable of self-reflection as to why things are as they are with 
regard to their actions and practices – and in their senselessness, they oscillate between 
hope and fear making them ready to believe almost anything. Because most people are 
plagued by dread and despair, “fear” Spinoza holds “is the root from which superstition 
is born, maintained and nourished.”30 Their superstition thus leads them to “develop an 
infinite number of such practices, and invent extraordinary interpretations of nature, as 
if the whole of nature were as senseless as they are.”31 In a word: religions. In fact, it is 
in this way that superstition is directly linked to power and politics: commenting on his 
age, he says, “there are many men who take the outrageous liberty of trying to appropri-
ate the greater part of this authority and utilize religion to win the allegiance of the 
common people, who are still in thrall to pagan superstition with the aim of bringing us 
                                                
27 Ibid., p. 314 
28 Ibid., p. 180 
29 Spinoza, Benedictus de. Theological-Political Treatise, edited by Jonathan Israel and translated by 
Michael Silverstone and Jonathan Israel (Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 3 
30 Ibid., p. 3 
31 Ibid., p. 4 
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all back into servitude again.”32 The preaching of prophecy, the practices of religious 
ceremonies, and the postulation of miracles are all ways in which the church has been 
able to secure the obedience of the people. Faith is nothing but “credulity and prejudic-
es” to Spinoza, and what happened when the church started to harness the fear of the 
common people was riots and ferocious wars:  
 
Churches became theatres where people went to hear ecclesiastical orators rather than to learn 
from teachers. Pastors no longer sought to teach, but strove to win a reputation for themselves 
while denigrating those who disagreed with them, by teaching new and controversial doctrines 
designed to seize the attention of the common people. This was bound to generate a great deal of 
conflict, rivalry and resentment, which no passage of time could heal33 
 
The same goes for monarchies, which are able to sway men to sacrifice their blood and 
life for the glory of a single one man. Spinoza makes little distinction; the state and 
church both are responsible for the many horrors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries Indeed the influence of superstition on politics and government can be great, as 
Montesquieu remarks, when discussing the way in which the Natchez Indians of Loui-
siana have come to experience despotism by the force de la superstition: “the prejudices 
of superstition are greater than all other prejudices, and its reasons greater than all other 
reasons.”34 Superstition, Hume tells us, is “enemy to civil liberty”, and it “renders men 
tame and abject, and fits them for slavery,” which is why superstition is advantageous to 
priestly power and ambition.35 To Voltaire, superstition was directly responsible for the 
horrors of the religious wars in France, England and Bohemia. He states: “It is supersti-
tion that had Henry III, Henry IV, and William of Orange, and so many others 
assassinated. It is superstition that has made rivers of blood flow since the time of Con-
stantine.”36  
 Superstition was a danger to political order.37 But what exactly is supersti-
tion?38 In De Cive, Hobbes linked it with atheism, but where atheism was characterised 
                                                
32 Ibid., p. 6-7 
33 Ibid., p. 7 
34 Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat. The Spirit of the Laws, translated by Anne M. Cohler, Basia 
Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone (eds.)(Cambridge University Press, 1989), XVIII, chap 18, p. 
294 
35 Hume, David. ‘Of Superstition and Enthusiasm’, in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, edited by 
Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), pp. 60-62 
36 Voltaire, Political Writings, p. 216 
37 This was not necessarily the case before and under the Wars of Religion, Bodin for example still 
considered atheism more dangerous than superstition, see: Bodin Six Books of the Commonwealth, p. 145. 
This is likely because of the way in which the previous episteme was constituted: If knowledge consists in 
understanding resemblances between things (believed to be created by God) it would not necessarily be 
wrong to believe that a walnut would cure headache (God had created both so naturally they were good 
for each other), but atheism would because it denied the system. On the other hand, if knowledge consists 
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by “opinion of reason without fear”, superstition was “fear of the invisible when sepa-
rated from right reason.”39 For Locke superstition was “false opinion of a deity” and to 
Hume it was “the corruption of true religion.”40 Thus, superstition was a kind of false 
religion and philosophy that much was sure: but for a long time the problem remained 
how to tell one from the other. The purge of reason by reason itself in the Critique of 
Pure Reason is well known and absolutely necessary, because according to Kant, rea-
son itself gives way to superstition. The root cause of the danger was of course the very 
nature of what he describes as the Kampfplatz of metaphysics.41 Or rather, the highly 
speculative and unfounded basis of metaphysics (sought through either intuition or 
experience) that gives rise to all sort of impossible beliefs that is politically dangerous. 
Accordingly, “if it is disputed that reason deserves the right to speak first in matters 
concerning supersensible objects such as the existence of God and the future world, 
then a wide gate is opened to all enthusiasm, superstition and even to atheism” as he 
wrote en What is Orientation in Thinking?42 In the essay What is Enlightenment?, su-
perstition takes the form of self-incurred tutelage or immaturity, depending on the 
translation: “Immaturity [Unmündigkeit] is the inability to use one's own understanding 
                                                                                                                                          
in analysing representations via mathesis and taxonomia this becomes another matter. See, Foucault, The 
Order of Things, pp. 79-84, 122-123. 
38 Superstition is of Latin origin: sŭperstĭtĭo, ōnis, f. super-sto; orig as in standing still over or by a thing 
in amazement, wonder, or dread (especially of the divine or supernatural). In Cicero (De rerum Natura) 
superstition thus means excessive fear of the gods, unreasonable religious belief, (superstition is different 
from religio, a proper, reasonable awe of the gods) – “superstitio, non religio, tollenda est” – religion is 
permissible superstition is not. The opposition to superstition goes further back to the early search for (or 
will to) truth in Ancient Greek philosophy, but it is not yet called by the name superstition but religion: 
Epicurus and Lucretius attacked the belief in gods and punishments after death not as superstition, but as 
religion; the two were closely related. Superstition also had a positive connotation with reference to an 
instrumentum regni: to Polybius superstition (deisidaimonia; meaning superstition, but also religion in 
general) was what maintained cohesion within the Roman State by providing the multitude of the com-
mon people with an “invisible terror” (Poly.Hist.VI.56), a solution that was only necessary because the 
state was not made up of wise men. Superstition has however also an antagonistic usage: as in “religio 
veri dei cultus est, superstitio falsi” according to Lactantius (DivInst.4, 28, 11), the political and religious 
advisor to the Roman emperor Constantine, implying that other kinds of worship than the Christian is 
false. In a pagan sense however, this juxtaposition makes little sense; to them superstition equalled 
religion that was external to the state religion: for example Pliny the Younger describes to emperor Trajan 
the Christians as a perverse and extravagant superstitio, a plague that has infected the lands 
(Plin.Ep.10.96). Later in the 17th century Christian theologians sought to purge all undesired practices 
which they branded superstition and persecuted as heresy. The way in which superstition is used in the 
17th to the 18th century is similar, but instead of being in opposition to religion, it is opposed to reason – 
religion that cannot be defended within the bounds of reason is seen as superstition (religion = supersti-
tion < reason). The sense in which superstition is used here plays only on negative elements, Polybius’ 
positive use as an instrumentum regni, is viewed in a negative sense by Bayle, Spinoza, Kant and Voltaire 
in particular. 
39 Hobbes, On the Citizen, XV, I, p. 187 
40 Locke, Superstitio, in Political Writings p. 292-3; and Hume, ‘Superstiton and Enthusiasm’, p. 61 
41 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p. 99-105 
42 Kant, Immanuel. ‘What is Orientation, in Thinking?’, in Religion and Rational Theology, translated 
and edited by Allen W. Wood (Cambridge University Press, 1996) p. 15 
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without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack 
of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of 
another.”43 
 Between the opposing forces of superstition and philosophy a great battle was 
about to unfold over the human mind – with modification, “écraser la superstition!” 
Voltaire proclaimed: “In becoming perfect, reason destroys the seed of religious wars. It 
is the spirit of philosophy that has banished this plague from the world.”44 Superstition 
is therefore perceived to be the danger laying behind the two all dominating problems of 
the time; all the more so because it effectively means that the relation between philoso-
phy and politics is non-existent. The epistemological space in existence was unable to 
provide good answers to superstition. If anything, they made the problems worse, as we 
have just seen some authors emphasize.45 
II 
[7] We have seen how in the sixteenth up until the eighteenth century it was thought 
that superstition was the danger that caused the very real problems of religious wars and 
tyranny with which they were faced. Towards this danger of superstition, we hear a 
boasting rallying call: “In it becoming perfect, reason destroys the seed of religious 
wars. It is the spirit of philosophy that has banished this plague from the world. […] If 
Luther and Calvin were to come back,” Voltaire affirms, “they would make no more of 
an impact than the Scotists and the Thomists. Why? Because they would be born in a 
time when men are starting to become enlightened.” 46 Still, Voltaire is not completely 
wrong with his assertion, as the diagram of thought really does change and the age of 
enlightenment does confront superstition. It does exactly so by the displacements of the 
three problems: the question of the conditions upon which one claims to speak the truth 
is reformulated as a question and method of individual doubt where pour et contra form 
the basis of ones use of reason. In other words, a model of eloquence is replaced by one 
of critique. Second, the reference to the divine right of kings is displaced by the ques-
                                                
43 Kant, Immanuel. ‘What is Enlightenment?’, in Kant: Political Writings, translated and edited by Hans 
Siegbert Reiss (Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 54 
44 “écraser l’Infâme”, Voltaire, Political Writings, p. 214 
45 Voltaire for example wrote: “Superstition is the most horrible enemy of the human race. When it 
controls the Prince, it stops him from seeking the good of his people; when it controls the people, it 
causes them to rise against their prince.” See, Political Writings, p. 216 
46 Ibid., p. 214 
   Public Critique 
 152 
tion of the origin of the power of the state. Which then becomes a problem of natural 
law rather than of an inflexible hierarchy created by God. If such a hierarchy is no 
longer as each individual can claim the same authority to speak the truth. In such a 
situation, the political game needs to be governed by a principle of toleration so as to 
not deny anyone the freedom to search for and speak the truth as he finds it.  
 It is towards this circulation and flow between critique, the state, and a political 
game governed by the principle of toleration that we now turn. Together these dis-
placements form a new diagram of thought, a diagram that we might call the règne de la 
critique. The clearest manifestation of this diagram was formulated by Kant: by taking 
up the same problematic as Plato in a very important section of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant confronts a central question of the recurrent present; namely, that of the 
proper relationship between truth and politics. The clearest encapsulation of the circu-
larity between the problem of truth, the problem of political order, and the problem of 
the proper political game can be found in Kant’s the principle of reason which can only 
be found by reason itself. In approaching the problem of truth and politics we are in 
searching for “a constitution providing for the greatest human freedom according to 
laws that permit the freedom to each to exist together with that of others (not one 
providing the greatest happiness, since that would follow of itself) is at least a necessary 
idea, which one must make the ground not merely of the primary plan of a state’s con-
stitution but of all the laws too; […] and in it we must initially abstract from the present 
obstacles, which may perhaps arise not so much from what is unavoidable in human 
nature as rather from neglect of the true ideas in the giving of laws.”47 That is, the free-
dom to apply one’s thought (as the ideal of critique), the guaranteed by a state of laws 
and rights that are not arbitrary, and lastly the freedom to exist together and exercise 
ones freedom, a principle of toleration. 
 This new epistemological space sets up as the solution to the danger of supersti-
tion and quite schematically we could say that this is how, in early modern thought, the 
relationship between truth and power, philosophy and politics was conceptualized and 
thought to function in practice. At the centre of this problematisation was the concept of 
critique, which addressed the problem of truth in a way where it imposes certain limits 
upon the method of inquiry around a subject-centred use of reason, as well as structure 
the alethurgary game by a harmless civil war where reason is met by reason. Both the 
most immediate aim and guarantor of this game is the concept and reality of the state – 
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that is, the state is assigned the double role of the protector of the conditions of critique 
on the one hand and being the object that is continuously critiqued on the other. 48 Final-
ly, because the concept of truth is no longer monolithic as when God assured it, the 
political game necessarily had to be one in which there is room for different truths; and 
yet such a space was never distributed without a cost. The social strata therefore had to 
be modelled on the toleration of difference, but with the natural exclusion of the un-
tolerable.  
 
[8] Critique in French, Kritik in German, and criticism in English all derive from the 
same word in ancient Greek krínō – from krei-, to differentiate, select, judge, decide.49 
As a verb krínō means, “I separate”, “I order”, “I judge”. Yet, the way in which the 
concept has been established or constituted on particular backgrounds has changed quite 
a lot, and therefore, to discuss the early modern usage of the word critique, we should 
explore the development of the concept itself. In general we can say that the critical 
attitude has is origins in the pastoral self, from the Greek technè technon and the Roman 
ars artium – they give rise to an art of government in pedagogical, political, and eco-
nomic terms. Where in the sixteenth century the question of government becomes 
inseparable from the question of: comment ne pas être gouverné? – how not to be gov-
erned, or at least how to be governed less? Critique evolved from there on different 
levels: a critique of the bible, a critique of the law, and a critique of science.50 
 In the Odyssey, Homer mostly uses it in the sense to ‘pick out’ or to ‘choose’, 
but he also uses it in the sense of deciding upon a dispute; as when Odysseus describes 
the resurfacing of his mast and keel, to which he was clinging on, while they were 
sucked down into the deep between the rocks Scylla and Charybdis whirlpools, as that 
exact moment when a judge rises for supper after a long day of deciding on many dis-
putes (krínōn neikea polla).51 Being a kritikos is a weighty business and it is always 
caught up between forces (gods or moods) pulling in different directions. In the Iliad, 
                                                
48 The transference from divine to a sovereignty achieved through reason. Gillespie “The apparent rejec-
tion or disappearance of religion and theology in fact” Gillespie tells us, “conceals the continuing 
relevance of theological issues and commitments for the modern age.” We should therefore talk about 
secularization or disenchantment as a process of re-enchantment; that is, as “the gradual transference of 
divine attributes to human beings (an infinite human will), the natural world (universal mechanical 
causality), social forces (the general will, the hidden hand), and history (the idea of progress, dialectical 
development, the cunning of reason).” See, Theological Origins of Modernity, p. 272-3 
49 I have already discussed the concept of krino in terms of juridical practices, but here I want to elabo-
rate on it as a concept applied to a wider set of problems.  
50 Foucault, Michel. The Politics of Truth, translated by Lisa Hochroth and Catherine Porter and edited by 
Sylvère Lotringer (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 1978/2007), pp. 23-29  
51 Hom.Od.12.440 
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Agamemnon speaks in a similar fashion when he urges his men to contest with hateful 
war the whole day (krínōmeth Amri) – this is the hour by which their fate is decided by 
contest (agōn).52 Again one finds oneself caught up in the situation pulled back and 
forth and thus we could speak of a critical art (kritike techne, or techné technon) that 
enables one to overcome the situation.  
 Predominately, the concept of krínō was about jurisprudence and the juridical 
system: in a court of law, the critic (kritikos) would be the one who blames, the one who 
accused; while in its co-concept of crisis, which at the time was the exact same word 
(krínō), had an objective connotation.53 A critic is therefore able to weigh the scales or 
in other words consider ‘pro and con’ in a given case. To the ancient Greeks this critical 
art (kritike techne) was about the ability to distinguish, evaluate, and reach a decision, 
which makes this critical attitude distinguishable from more contemplative and theoreti-
cal ones. Nevertheless, from its attachment to the juridical system the concept had a 
wider usage. When discussing the merits of democracy over oligarchy, Thucydides uses 
the same sense of krínō by saying that while the rich would be the best guardians of 
property and the wisest the best councillors, the many (tous polla) would “after hearing 
matters discussed […] be the best judges.”54 This same power of discerning also be-
longs to the king: in the Statesman, Plato shows that the politikos is not just a spectator 
(theatmn) who has the ability to judge, rather he has a dual function like that of a mas-
ter-builder; that is, they both posses the art of judging (kríticōs, he contributes 
knowledge) as well as the art of governing (epitaktikōs, he assigns tasks).55 Thus, this 
critical art is not just about jurisprudence but also relevant to the wider field of politics 
and ethics. In this sense, critique connotes the ability to establish future guidelines for 
future actions and considerations. Accordingly, a last connection between politics and 
critique is that critique establishes and addresses the problem of political order. This can 
be found in Book III of Politics, where Aristotle argues that the essential element of the 
state is its citizens: the citizens are defined by their right to deliberate in the juridical 
bodies and participate in the offices of the state; hence, only the ones who participate in 
the office of judge (aikm) can claim to be citizens.56 In that sense the art of criticism or 
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53 Dem.21.64. Crisis is was then most known for its specific medical use. Krisis constituted the event 
(what had happened) while kritik the reaction (what was to be done) – Crisis was a medical term in 
Hippocrates and Galen and the Romans largely restricted crisis to medical usage (Augustine.6.Conf.I), 
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judgement is the creation or establishment of order – no judgement, no political order, 
and the polis must be ordered so as to keep on enjoying its independence.   
 Furthermore, critique is also a more epistemological and philosophical connota-
tion. In Plato’s Theaetetus, Socrates is the one who can help men “distinguish between 
the real and the false” (krínein to alethēs te kai mē).57 Like the good midwife who helps 
the woman at the critical stages of birth, Socrates helps men, with their soul heavily in 
pain over being in labour, give birth to their judgements. And again we should notice 
that like the midwife, Socrates is sterile when it comes to wisdom (he has none); in fact, 
he has little choice himself in the matter, the “god compels me to act as midwife” he 
stubbornly claims. 
 In the Roman world krínō becomes cerno, (crēvi, crētum). Criticism and critique 
still denote the ability to decide juridical dispute (to decide for something, reach a deci-
sion, conclude); just as well, in the forms of struggle and fights.58 The Greek technè 
technon becomes ars artium, the art of art – that is, logic, to reason correctly and reach 
correct and valid inferences. The emphasis in cerno is thus more on philosophical us-
age: to distinguish by the senses, predominantly the ability of eye vision (video, “I 
see”). This is especially the case with Lucretius in the first book of De Rerum Natura 
where he lays out the ultimate constitution of the universe as infinite atoms in infinite 
space. Here, he wrestles with the existence of “first bodies” or particles and how they 
affect our senses. He argues that our eyes do not perceive (cerni) primary things; he 
illustrates this with the example of wind he concludes: “we know the varied smells of 
things; Yet never to our nostrils see them come; With eyes we view (cernere) not burn-
ing heats, nor cold; Nor are we wont men's voices to behold. Yet these must be 
corporeal at the base; Since thus they smite the senses: naught there is; Save body, 
having property of touch.”59  To Lucretius, the senses are in error, they are not capable 
of perceive the real mechanics of the world. Subsequently, critique is transferred to be 
the ability to comprehend or understand an intellectual object.60 In that regard, criticus 
is still the one that is capable of judgement, suitable for deciding on a particular matter, 
but the matters of concern have rather to do with the authentication of historical texts 
than the political matters. Displeased with the division of labour between rhetoricians 
and teachers of literature (the criticus) in the education of young boys, Quintilian seeks 
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to put Grammatrice (the science of letters) in its rightful place so as to give the power of 
eloquence back to rhetoric.61 According to him grammatrice had “gathered strength 
from the historians and critics and [had] swollen to the dimensions of a brimming river, 
since, not content with the theory of correct speech, no inconsiderable subject, it [had] 
usurped the study of practically all the highest departments of knowledge.”62  
 This situation remains almost the same a thousand years later towards the end of 
the medieval Christian world. During the Italian Renaissance critique is with expanded 
to works of art and architecture – both historical and contemporary. Yet, it is only in the 
middle of the 17th century that critique gains distinct principles, which are then after-
wards generalised. In Critica Sacra (from 1632 but published in 1650) Louis Cappelle 
attacked the verbal foundation of scripture by comparing and pointing out the invari-
ances of various translations to the original Hebrew Bible. Later, in Histoire Critique du 
Vieux Testament (1678), Richard Simon appropriated this method and devised an argu-
ment against the Protestant insistence on Scripture being the only link between Man and 
God. He reasoned that, if the rules of criticism are external to faith, then the Protestants 
must abide by them as well. Likewise, Spinoza had in Tractatus Theologico-Politicus 
proposed a revolutionary method of textual criticism. Spinoza’s proposed method of 
interpreting Scripture consisted first of all in freeing the mind of all theological pre-
judges and only examine its data by the natural light of reason: “the method of 
interpreting Scripture,” Spinoza held, “does not differ from the [correct] method of 
interpreting nature, but rather is wholly consonant with it.”63 The view of nature as 
mechanical causes and effects can equally be applied to scripture. Thereafter followed a 
careful reconstruction of the historical context, which included the thought systems 
central to any interpretation of text written in a past epoch; Spinoza intended to “assem-
ble a genuine history of it and to deduce the thinking of the Bible’s authors by valid 
inferences from this history, as from certain data and principles.”64 Not surprisingly, the 
difficulties of language play a big part in Spinoza’s analysis. In the preface to Diction-
naire historique et critique, Bayle notes similar principles of analysis.65  
 Thus it is first with the early moderns that critique becomes a generalised con-
cept, even more so than in its Homeric origins. From the very beginning to critique is 
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then to resist power – a power of the gods that compels, the social moods which push 
one to actions that one does not agree with, the complex web of opposing individuals 
that might want to absorb ones independence. Nevertheless, it seems that the concept of 
critique mainly changes it character in relation to the person who practices it. Accord-
ingly, the criticism of the ancients was always a public matter; it was always constituted 
in socio-political existence. The parrhēsiast was someone who attuned to the mood of 
the public to deliver his or her true-discourse: there was little choice, criticism was 
either public or it did not exist at all. By the time the Christian world emerged, con-
science was something private, a matter between oneself and God; or rather this relation 
was mediated by the pastor, though the practice of confession. And thus, in the early 
modern world the use of reason, to make judgements, to critique, is a private matter – 
Descartes’ thinking thing is alone in the world contemplating the object before he even 
considers talking to anyone else. There is a reversal of order: we move from the inside 
and out, not along the social surface as an exteriority. Critique was a private matter, is 
so far as it was individual reason: “Have courage to use your own understanding!”66 
Yet, and this is crucial, such personal use of reason is prone to error unless it is tested 
against others use of reason – i.e. personal reason has to be tested in the public at large. 
By making it a matter of public use of reason, critique becomes a generalised concept 
applicable to everything. It is from this position that Kant starts his critiques – as he 
proclaims in the preface to the Critique of Pure Reason: “Our age is the genuine age of 
criticism, to which everything must submit. Religion though its holiness and legislation 
through its majesty common seek to exempt themselves from it. But in this way they 
excite a just suspicion against themselves, and cannot lay claim to that unfeigned re-
spect that reason grants only to that which has been able to withstand its free and public 
examination.”67 Everything has to be judged in that public court of law that is reason; 
everything is a potential object of criticism. 
 To be critical was a personal attitude. This mode of being is perhaps presented 
most clearly in Kant’s essay What is Enlightenment? Here Kant insisted that enlighten-
ment consisted in having courage to make use of ones own reason.68 Enlightenment is 
that which frees one from one’s own tutelage and “for enlightenment of this kind,” Kant 
says, “all that is needed is freedom. And the freedom in question is the most innocuous 
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form of all – freedom to make public use of one's reason in all matters.”69 Yet, every-
where this freedom is inhibited by authorities crying, ‘don’t argue, obey our command!’ 
The only result is that freedom of thought is restricted and limited in all areas of life. 
The question that Kant asks is what kind of limitation can be put on the use of reason so 
as to ensure that the old guardians, who governed men’s reason through dogmas and 
formulas, will not come to dominate the masses. He answers this question by drawing a 
distinction between the private use of reason on the one hand and the public use of 
reason on the other. The private use of reason is the reason that is used when an indi-
vidual is “a cog in a machine,” or when one “has a role to play in society and jobs to do: 
to be a soldier, to have taxes to pay, to be in charge of a parish, to be a civil servant.” 
This kind of reason may be limited exactly because it does not present the progression 
of enlightenment. The public use of reason, which is the “reasoning as a reasonable 
being […], when one is reasoning as a member of reasonable humanity” as cannot be 
limited and should completely free without any restrictions. Kant identifies a dilemma 
that he admits is paradoxical by it nature: “A high degree of civil freedom seems advan-
tageous to a people’s intellectual freedom, yet it also sets up insuperable barriers to it. 
Conversely, a lesser degree of civil freedom gives intellectual freedom enough room to 
expand to the fullest extent.”70 Critique cannot therefore be anything but public – the 
critic is always a public figure. The private use of reason is not critique because it never 
tested, but only comply with given structures of thought. 
 Thus, when it comes to the concept of critique, within the Règne de la Critique, 
there are two parts of that needs to be considered: first of all, the positives that forms the 
character of the critic, and second the public realm in which he is active – its structure, 
principle, and relation to other realms of thought (i.e. politics). We could talk about a set 
of interrelated internal and external limitations to thought as un-truth set up by the 
practice of critique. 
 
[9] We may start by recalling that the critic is the one who judges. To the Early 
Moderns, the access to truth is obtained the use of reason (not courage, rhetorical skill, 
or faith). That reason is therefore central to the concept of critique comes as little sur-
prise. The concept of critique, if we focus on its internality, is made from a number of 
components, all of which can be identified from different themes within its discourse; 
and it is from studying these that we can elaborate on some of the general characteristics 
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of the practice of critique: 
 1. The need for a foundation. The (modern) individual of Petrarch and 
Descartes was the foundation of the critic, who finds support in his own experiences 
rather than the divine logos. The question of what constitutes this foundation of such an 
individual is therefore a major theme in the problematique. In the first meditation, Des-
cartes talks about a “general demolition” of his opinions that is necessary because of the 
“large number of falsehoods” that he had come to accept as true in his childhood, which 
had later come to constitute the foundation of his whole edifice of beliefs.71 The main 
problem that Descartes identified was there he had no secure knowledge of the exist-
ence of God – a problem that was central to the religious wars (do we know God though 
scripture or the institutions of the church).72 It is reason that now leads him to think, to 
the task of correcting his beliefs. The demolition famously starts with the process of 
doubting everything until Descartes reaches what he takes to be an irrefutable founda-
tion of existence; the realization that the only thing he can be certain of is that he is a 
thinking thing – expressed in the cogito. From this basis, Descartes believed that all his 
former falsehood could be corrected with the application of a deductive method. Des-
cartes was not the only one to contemplate such a foundation in response to falsely held 
beliefs about the world – it was a general epistemological problem. The theme of the 
need, foundations in the form of the individualized use of reason as a kind radiating 
natural light shows up almost everywhere. Faith or blind belief is juxtaposed as the 
unfounded, a position that only leads to error. In Bayle, we learn that “all particular 
Doctrines, whether advanc’d as contain’d in Scripture, or propos’d in any other way, are 
false, if repugnant to the clear and distinct Notions of natural Light, especially if they 
relate to Morality.”73 In Spinoza, it comes out in his complaint about organized religion 
that it, “turn[s] rational men into brutes since they completely prevent each person from 
using his own free judgment and distinguishing truth from falsehood.”74 Similarly, to 
Locke there is a problem with faith as being the access to truth: “Credo, quia impossible 
est [I believe, because it is impossible] might, in a good man, pass for a mark of zeal, 
but would prove the very last rule for men to choose their opinions by.”75 Kant touched 
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on the same theme when he insisted that, while metaphysics is too frail an endeavor to 
have any lasting impact on the moral and ethical world, there still is a “thought must go 
all the way back to the elements of metaphysics” because any practical philosophy 
cannot retain any coherence without it.76 This element of metaphysics Kant had already 
located within man himself: “Any such [moral] principle is really an obscurely thought 
metaphysics that is inherent in every human being because of his rational predisposi-
tion.”77 By that Kant constitutes a moral positive inherent in every human being as the 
categorical imperative. The foundation of philosophy – of the liberty that thought grants 
itself from politics – is thus lodged within the confines of man, the secured metaphysi-
cal foundation from which all truth can be asserted: “reason is  by its nature free and 
admits of no command to hold something as true  (no imperative ‘Believe!’ but only a 
free credo [I believe]).”78 
 To trace this development we can say that in this particular moment faith is 
contrasted to reason. Reason was not as partisan concept which one side had a monopo-
ly on; rather it was a truly doxic concept, which was deployed in the struggle between 
Catholics and Protestants by both sides. The access to truth went through the personal 
use of reason, and thus the establishing of a relation to truth works by a different logic. 
We go from the act of attuning to social-moods, to the Middle Ages where faith had 
been the foundation upon which one could have access to truth, to finally a state of 
doubting within, provides one with basis from which one can then reproach others. The 
burden and difficulty that this places on the individual making public use of his reason 
is necessarily greater than that of the parrhēsiast of the Greek city-state, whose mood 
based true-discourse was already attuned to the interlocutors (for this same reason the 
demagogue has a innate advantage because he is already tapped into the mood of the 
crowd). But when the foundation is the universal being of Man, all claims to truth sub-
sequently has to be universally applicable, there is no longer any possibility particularity 
or idiosyncrasy (banishing the idiot means that the demagogue becomes a universalist 
by nature). 
 2. A perpetual process. Critique is a continuous process because by being a 
faculty of a limited humanity the nature of reason is to err. Reason no sooner than it has 
made one judgment will change and arrive at another. There is therefore an unavoidable 
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ambiguity to human reason that constituted it as problematic at its core: “Our reason is 
only suitable for making everything perplexing and for raising doubts about everything. 
No sooner has it built something than it provides the means for destroying it. Reason is 
a veritable Penelope, unravelling during the night what she had been weaving during the 
day.”79 Bayle at times sees reason as an utterly hopeless project. In his entry on the 
Manicheans he proclaims: “Human reason is too feeble for this. It is a principle of 
destruction and not of edification. It is only proper for raising doubts, and for turning 
things on all sides in order to make disputes endless…”80 Reason has a inherent weak-
ness that constantly misleads the ones who attempt to make use of it; by its uncertainty, 
flexibility, and changeability all our inquirers are turned “in all directions like a weather 
vane.”81 Bayle has a profound doubt in reason to deliver, but he also sees necessity in 
the struggle against superstition – even though it may lead to other dangers.82  
 3. The need of an orientation. Related to this theme of critique being a 
perpetual process that and changes direction as “the wind blows” therefore runs the risk 
of degenerating into delusion, is the theme of orientation. The obviousness in critique 
and thought more generally being oriented towards some end was not clearly stated 
before Kant wrote What is Orientation in Thinking? perhaps, but as Kant also points out 
in the essay there is no thinking that does not have an orientation. The problem is, as he 
states, that if one is not aware of this orientation one will most certainly be led astray. 
Though rational beliefs are completely self-contained, their components can only be 
found in pure reason: “All believing is a holding true which is subjectively sufficient, 
but consciously regarded as objectively insufficient.”83 A rational belief is not the same 
as (sure) knowledge, but rather it is subjectively certain on the basis of a feeling – a 
feeling that when considered in terms of reason manifests itself as a need. Kant here 
emphasizes:  
 
A pure rational faith [belief] is therefore the signpost or compass by means of which the specula-
tive thinker orients himself in his rational excursions into the field of supersensible objects; but a 
human being who has common but (morally) healthy reason can mark out his path, in both a 
theoretical and a practical respect, in a way which is fully in accord with the whole end of his 
vocation; and it is this rational faith which must also be taken as the ground of every other faith, 
and even of every revelation.84 
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If we do not allow reason to speak first in matters of thought, the danger of superstition 
will dominate our thinking. Such domination is evident when the deviation from an 
orientation of thought given by reason naturally leads to the civil coercion of thought, 
the destruction and denial of any actualization of morality, and last a declared lawless 
use of reason. Reason should only be subject to the laws, which “it imposes on itself.” 
The declared lawlessness in thinking which is the opposite of thought based on rational 
belief will result in a situation where Kant predicts a terrible outcome: “Since reason 
alone can command validly for everyone, a confusion of language must soon arise 
among them; each one now follows his own inspiration, and so inner inspirations must 
ultimately be seen to arise from the testimony of preserved facts, traditions which were 
chosen originally but with time become intrusive documents - in a word, what results is 
the complete subjection of reason to facts, i.e. superstition, because this at least has the 
form of law and so allows tranquility to be restored.”85  
 
[10] “How  can the truths of philosophy become more universal and useful for the 
benefit of the people?”  was a prize question asked by the “patriotic society” that Herder 
responded to in an anti-universalist essay.86 “The people […] is the greatest, the most 
venerable, part of the public, in contrast to which philosophy [Weltweisheit] is a troglo-
dyte-people living in caves with Minerva’s night-owls!” If the philosophers have 
something of value to present to the people they have a duty to do so; yet if they have 
nothing to offer or are “useless to the state” then better be rid of them and “let their 
caves be destroyed and let the night-owls of Minerva be taught to look at the sun.”87 
The ‘people’ is to Herder any citizen that obeys lives by the law (a totality which he 
equates with the state), which is opposed to the category of ‘philosophers’ – the philo-
sophoumenos, an arrogant Pyrrhonist figure who sets himself apart from the people. 
Herder wants philosophical discourse to be one with the people, be at home and speak 
the same language; he wants Popularphilosophie. Thus, the opposition between philos-
ophy and politics is not necessarily presented as one between the state and the critic (as 
in the autocratic relation): the power relation between the public and the philosophers 
who form part of it is therefore complex and diverse. The theme is considered many 
times and the philosophers are not there for their own sake or for wisdoms sake (as a 
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Sage in the mountains), but for the public as a whole – a public that they themselves are 
inseparable from (they are critics, like everyone else).88 This constellation of circularity 
and changing roles or positions presents a number of problems, which are addressed 
though a set of themes we can here identify as:  
 1. An antagonistic structural principle. The game of critique operates on 
the basic principle of antagonism that sets up a structure of the war of all against all - 
bellum omnium contra omnes. Yet, this is not a violent and brutish war that ensures the 
survival of some and the death and destruction of other; rather it is a “peaceful” war 
where no one is really hurt. Bayle described it in his dictionary in an entry on Catius as 
the Règne de la Critique:  
 
This commonwealth is a state extremely free. The Empire of Truth and Reason is only acknowl-
edged in it; and under their Protection an innocent war is waged against any one whatever. 
Fiends ought to be on their guard, there, against their Friends, Fathers against their children, Fa-
ther-in-law against their Sons-in-law, an in the Iron Age. […] 
 
Non hospoes ab hospite tutus – non focer a genero (Ovid)  
NO right of hospitality remain, The Grief by him, who habour’d him, is flain. The Son-in-law 
purfues his Fathers life, &e. Dyden 
 
Every body, there, is both Sovereign and under every-body’s Jurisdiction. The laws of the Socie-
ty have done no Prejudice to the Independency of the State of Nature, as to Error and Ignorance: 
in that respect, every particular Man has the Right of the Sword, and may exercise it without 
asking leave of those who govern. […] It is very easy to know why foreign Power ought to leave 
every on at liberty write against Authors, who are mistaken, but not to publish Satires. It is be-
cause Satires divert? A Man of his Reputation, which is a kind of civil Homicide, and 
consequently a Punishment, which ought only to be inflected by the Sovereign; but the criticiz-
ing of a book tends only to shew, that an Author has not such and such a degree a Knowledge. 
Now as he may enjoy all the Rights, and all the Privileges, of the Society, with this Defect of 
Knowledge, without his Reputation of an honest Man and a good Subject of the Common-
Wealth receiving the left Blest by it; no Usurpation is made on the Majesty of the State, in shew-
ing the public of faults, which are in a Book.”89 
 
The game of critique is a court or a tribunal without a presiding judge or king, but 
where everyone is the prosecutor and the persecuted. Critique is not an exhortation, it 
does not prescribe certain kinds of action; it constitutes new grounds for action. The 
antagonism is therefore not about telling the people in power what to do in this or that 
situation as in providing council as much as it is about clarifying what is was their 
prejudices prevented them from seeing. 
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 2. The strategic need for a (differentiated) space. The game of critique in 
being played set up a designated space a network of critics that share a common object. 
Such a space operates by it own rules – the rules of the perpetual game of critique.90 
The constant danger of intrusion by an outside party that does not share the goals, nor 
the principles of the critics, is always present – hence Bayle’s warning against foreign 
powers. Any given space (territory) within the state can be de-territorialized and subse-
quently re-territorialized with a game of critique: the game of critique is therefore actu-
actualized in a variety of contexts (the arts, religion, and politics). Although Bayle stood 
alone in maintaining that the game of critique was a completely separate game from that 
of politics, to most thinkers critique was integral to politics in that there was a public 
sphere consisting the use of individual reason opposing a political sphere proper of the 
state.91 It was at such a site that “public opinion” was produced.92 At any event, the 
republic of letters, men of letters, the public sphere, the règne de la critique sets up the 
two poles of state and critique (understood as private reasoning) by means of a public 
sphere where flows circulate between them. In that way, public opinion feeds back to 
the state and provides it with its foundation. As Diderot explained it in the preface of 
the Encyclopédie:  
 
A society of men of letters and artisans, working in different places, each occupied with his own 
subject, bound together only by the general interest of humanity and a sense of mutual goodwill. 
[…] If governments were to become involved in such an enterprise, it would never be complet-
ed. The sole influence which government should have upon it must be limited to that of 
rendering assistance. With a single word, a king may make a palace rise up from a field, but a 
society of men of letters is not like a gang of workmen. An encyclopaedia is not produced on 
command. It is an enterprise better pursued with obstinacy than begun by zeal. Work of this na-
ture is conceived in courtyard, by chance, through conversation.93  
 
So what was this ‘assisting’ role of the state in all of this? To the early moderns there 
was a kind of ‘pact of critique’, between the state on the one hand –that is, in last in-
stance the king (as its representative)– and the population in the other hand. Critique is a 
great spectacle that takes place on the “stage” of the public as a war of all against all 
where everyone indulges, sometimes even the king (Frederick the Great or Catharine of 
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Russia). Yet, the formal sovereign power of the monarch is not expected to be on this 
stage – rather, the political power of the monarch has become more mysterious and 
secretive, painstakingly trying never to have its exercise caught in the public eye; the 
state institutes a differentiation between it and civil society. The King could therefore 
enjoy the whole show from the comfort of his balcony – only occasionally would a 
Wilkes Booth character with an unloaded gun show his face, he was out in the open 
after all. He was no longer in the spotlight representing itself publically. Nor is the King 
the judge, reason is – and not the kind of governmental reason that the rulers had al-
ways submitted to. Contrary to the mirrors with its philosopher king and the 
gentilhomme, who pointed out the rights of the king, critique consists in making distinc-
tions – and distinction may very well work against power. What is the role of the king 
then? If anything, the king’s very practical role is to guarantee that the game of truth of 
critique that is occupying the stage keep on going – like a janitor or grounds keeper. The 
good monarch is the one who says: “Argue as much as you like and about whatever you 
like, but obey!”94 There is a necessary bifurcation in the game of critique where roles 
are assigned: the critics have to only let themselves govern by their own reason while 
the king has to ensure the integrity of the game itself – he only asks them to obey when 
the game gets out of hand (when it turns into counterproductive and bad critique). This 
is absolutely necessary: “a faculty that is independent of the government's command  
with regard to its teachings” Kant states, “one that, having no commands to give, is free 
to evaluate everything, and concerns itself with the interests of the sciences, that is, with 
truth: one in which reason is authorized to speak out publicly.  […] For without a facul-
ty of this kind, the truth would not come to  light (and this would be to the government's 
own detriment).”95 To Kant, critique involves rejecting any mode of thinking or acting, 
which cannot be adopted by all (including the king). He therefore ultimately was a 
subject to reason, and not the other way around. We find this same insight in the blatant 
irony of Voltaire when he stated that “A king who is not contradicted can hardly be 
wicked” is that it is only when he is contradicted that he will show his true nature.96 If 
the king abides by the pact of critique he will not be contradicted; he would have sub-
mitted to reason. The king must submit his rule to reason, and now contrary to in the 
past that means critique; or in other words, it is the king’s tolerating posture towards 
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critique is what is important.97 But it was not only the king and his patience that were 
bound – the critic too had to be of an earnest posture. In works of critique was therefore 
commonplace to give a kind of oath to the sovereign, which clarified that, the intention 
of the critique that it was clear and earnest that the king may now do with it as he 
chooses (this is not flattery; just saying). From Spinoza to Kant, almost everyone has a 
place where they present their work with humility this or the other king – a gesture that 
goes back to the autocratic relation and not that interesting because its purpose is to 
assure that there are no ill intentions in the work presented. It is as if they say, “oh kind 
prince, let me publish these wise words, I assure that they are not superstitions dema-
goguery” and then hope not to be censured.98 Therefore a pact of critique to which both 
parties agrees to concede.  
 3. The dynamic of censure of self-censure. There are two ways in which the 
game of critique was censured that follow different logics and would unavoidably cross 
each other. The first is external and was motivated by those who stood relatively outside 
the game of critique itself: as reason sets up what is reasonable and tolerable those in 
power will (against their own interest, or so the argument usually went) attempt to 
prevent others from making use of reason. “…if this freedom [of the pen] is denied, we 
are deprived at the same time of a great means of testing the correctness of our own 
judgments, and we are exposed to error” Kant writes as a warning of the problematic of 
censure in the Anthropology.99 This was an old struggle between those in power and 
those striving to replace them, and thus the theme was nothing new; Milton had in 1644 
written Areopagitica – a speech for the liberty for unlicensed printing that was at the 
time denied by Charles I. “People have wanted to appoint guardians for this eternal 
minor, the censors” writes Herder, “but as experience has shown, with fruitless effort 
and for the most part with the most unpleasant outcome.”100 Clearly there was a contra-
diction in insisting on the game of critique being governed by reason alone and, at the 
same time, having an appointed censure act as a judge over what was worthy of publica-
tion. The appointed censer, Herder held, will never be able to outweigh the “voice-vote 
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of the public” – he has no legitimation: “The author will hence always have the ground 
of objection against him that he is usurping in advance the judgment of the world.”101 
The problem was dynamic as became apparent with the French Revolution; something 
that Diderot was not too interested in when he wrote: “Undoubtedly, freedom of the 
press produces these drawback [?]. But they are so trivial and short-lived, in comparison 
with the advantages, that I shall not bother to dwell on them.”102 There is yet still not a 
firm conviction that the positive effects of the freedom to publish ones thoughts could 
be overshadowed by its negative consequences. 
 When Voltaire proclaimed that “in a republic worthy of the name, the freedom 
to publish one’s thoughts in the natural right of the citizen. He can use his pen as he 
uses his voice; he must no more be forbidden to write than to speak, and crimes com-
mitted with the pen should be punished in the same way as crimes committed by word 
of mouth” a second logic appears in the end.103 This second logic of censure that was an 
intramural part to the game of critique is that of self-censure. That reason takes the form 
of unreason has become a dominating theme today, but to the internal logic of the game 
of critique it did not follow: there was still a belief in the ability to tell truth from lie by 
means of the public use of reason. Yet, there were strong warnings about the damages 
of inflammatory language in many works of the time.  “Satires divert”, as Bayle pro-
claims, they should not be written. As he states in another place in the Dictionnaire: 
“This Republic [of letters] has nothing to do with “libellés diffamatoires” and “satire” – 
it has a non-polemical nature.”104 Bayle also complained about the damaging nature of 
Milton’s writings: “he everywhere acts the part of a droll and buffoon.”105 Another 
example is how Voltaire, after they had broken the bonds of friendship, would complain 
about Rousseau’s enflaming writing in the Social Contract: “when a man, whomever he 
might be, thinks enough for himself to give lessons on public administration, he must 
give the appearance of good sense and impartiality, like the laws themselves which he is 
invoking.”106  
 4. The price of admission. To be critical was an attitude that had a cost – 
there is a price to be paid to enter the game of critique; and not just any price, but one 
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that is deeply personal. The experience of participating in the game of critique is there-
fore associated with something like a sacrifice – it is of course a re-iteration of an old 
theme, which is revealed when Kant returns to the Socratic midwife to explain his 
doctrine of methods of ethics in Metaphysics of Morals.107 In the preface of a second 
letter to Bordes, Rousseau contemplates the cost of his many critical engagements 
throughout his life – costs suffered as blows inflicted upon his character, like the ridi-
cule he had suffered in Charles Pilissot’s the Philosophers, where Rousseau upon all 
four proclaims that he would confine himself to the animal kingdom rather than con-
verse with fools. Although Rousseau professes a “duty … to tell them the truth or what 
I take to be the truth” with a “dangerous frankness” that demands all his “courage” – the 
maxim vitam impedere vero “to dedicate life to truth” that he would develop in the forth 
of the Reveries of the Solitary Walker (“know thyself” was not as easy a maxim to 
follow as he held in Confessions).108 Faithfully establishing factual truths of places, 
times and persons will not do, that act of committing a life to truth is a sacrifice, there 
has to be a cost.109 Yet, this would still be the public at large that he is addressing  
 Furthermore, there is even a kind of ritualistic offering the realm of critique 
when true-discourse is delivered: in most prefaces to books there is an almost ceremoni-
al offering and plea, not to the gods who one hopes will hear one’s discourse and help it 
set the mood, nor the king placed on his throne by God almighty, but to the realm of 
critique – to the reader who will take care to read ones work carefully and without 
prejudices, that they will think long and hard over the issues raised, and engage in a 
debate over what they did not find convincing. So Hobbes writes to the reader: “I offer 
this little book more for your criticism than for your praise, since I have come to know 
by sure experience that opinions gain favour with you not by fame of the authors or the 
novelty of the views of the attractive way they are presented, but by the strength of their 
reasoning.”110 Sometimes such gestures are even followed by a declaration that if the 
readers critique is sound and just the author will strive to answer them point-by-point. 
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III 
[11] In a world that is dominated by Zealotry and superstition, how does one safeguard 
philosophy but prevent spurious true-discourses from contaminating thought and poli-
tics – that is how the game of critique comes to fall under the problem of political order; 
a problem, which is defined in terms of authority and community. The absolutist had 
already dealt with this problem by banishing all true-discourse than that of the state, but 
the question then became how to open enough space for critique and at the same time 
prevent it from spinning out of control, a balance that many thinkers at the time strug-
gled with. 
 “In a free state,” Spinoza proclaimed, “everyone is allowed to think what they 
wish and to say what they think”111 To be one’s own judge of what is true and what is 
false is up to each individual, not a government bent on oppressing its people and con-
trolling their minds: “No one, therefore, can surrender their freedom to judge and to 
think as they wish and everyone, by the supreme right of nature, remains master of their 
own thoughts.”112 And yet therein lies also a danger because on the other hand making 
each individual the master of his own thoughts, there would also be a real risk that he is 
fooled by some demagogue or gruesome person who persuades him. The problem as 
Spinoza identified it was that “if it is impossible altogether to deny subjects this free-
dom, it is, on the other hand, likewise very dangerous to concede it without any 
restriction. For this reason we must now ask how far this freedom can and ought to be 
granted to each person, so as to be consistent with the stability of the state and protect-
ing the sovereign’s authority.”113 And he therefore continues:  
 
the fundamental principles of the state which I explained above that its ultimate purpose is not to 
dominate or control people by fear or subject them to the authority of another. On the contrary, 
its aim is to free everyone from fear so that they may live in security so far as possible, that is, so 
that they may retain, to the highest possible degree, their natural right to live and to act without 
harm to themselves or to others. It is not, I contend, the purpose of the state to turn people from 
rational beings into beasts or automata, but rather to allow their minds and bodies to develop in 
their own ways in security and enjoy the free use of reason, and not to participate in conflicts 
based on hatred, anger or deceit or in malicious disputes with each other. Therefore, the true 
purpose of the state is in fact freedom.114  
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The role of the state becomes very explicit; it is to safeguard the game of critique, and it 
does so by setting limits to what kind of true-discourse is possible. With the danger of 
superstition and bad critique – i.e. slander and insult – these limits are set towards the 
state itself, its citizens, and a designation as to what kind of knowledge that is permitted 
to be created. 
 This unavoidably makes the state the target of critique and in a way it is exactly 
the critique of the state, which brings the state into existence–thought conjures up a 
world that can then be experienced. The origin and strength of the authority of the state 
lies in the many efforts to question the basis of its authority; from Hobbes and Spinoza 
to Locke and Rousseau, all philosophies of natural right have tried to unmask the state 
with a state of nature. Imagining it away to reveal its absolute necessity. Critique is thus 
a way of appropriating the state (the critics claim to authority), to bend it to ones will 
and thus, the bourgeois, by insisting on popular sovereignty and natural law appropri-
ates the state from the absolutist king. But like Bayle’s Penelope who would unravel at 
night what she had weaved at day, critique is perpetual and without end, then so is the 
state appropriated, re-appropriated and under the way given new purposes. There is no 
critique without the state and there is no state without a critique of it. In Jens Bartel-
son’s words, “criticism shares the conditions of possibility of its object.”115 To that end, 
there is a fundamental circularity between the game critique, as it emerges at the middle 
of the seventeenth century, and the state: for there to be critique, there needs to be a 
state that creates the possibility of such a critique and for there to be a state, there needs 
to be an unmasking of authority that redefines and sets the limits to the problem of 
political order. It is critique (i.e. the freedom of thought) that conjures up the reality of 
the state, which we then can experience. 
 
[12] The concept of the state has at least three components that are given by two distinc-
tions that provide it with its two boundaries. First distinction is that between the inside 
and the outside of the state: the constitutive outside. It is constitutive, because it is ex-
actly on this background that the state receives its unity. The political disorder that once 
existed within the state is displaced beyond its boarders by the constitution of sover-
eignty. Today we predominately know this distinction as that between the domestic and 
the international. Second distinction is that between government and civil society. This 
differentiation constitutes the government as the sole holder of authority over the multi-
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plicity of individual as well as collective actors within civil society. While the first 
distinction is absolute because it secured the states integrity, the second is fluid as there 
can always be more or less government. Within this concept of the state that authority, 
community, and imposing limits on knowledge, which can be identified in the following 
three themes: 
 1. The displacement of authority. Everything has to be questioned, that is 
the spirit of critique. This includes political authority. The problem of political order 
always rested on mythical foundations: just like discussion of the politeia was rooted in 
the concept of dikaion, the kings’ authority to rule was bestowed upon him by the grace 
of God (usually justified through the rule of Abraham), so too does the authority of the 
state come from the critique of it. What this critique aimed to do was to displace the 
problem of political order by posing it as a different question. The question no longer by 
what right can the king claim to rule. Rather, the question was: what is the origin of 
society? The answer to the question is the problems of the state of nature and the social 
contract. The positive of thought thereby moves from the concept of a king’s divine 
right, to a society formed on the basis of a social contract entered into by free individu-
als. Thus, political order came to be constituted in an abstract principle rather than by 
the political personage of the king and the theological-cosmological continuum is re-
jected over rational government. 
 Because of the obvious paradoxical characteristics of the state of nature –in 
whatever way the different authors conceptualise it– it is always the very antinomy of 
society, but somehow it contains and elucidates in advance the ideal of the society to be 
created. And thus the second implication is that where the natural inequality of men that 
is characteristic of feudal society is challenged and replaced by a bourgeois doctrine of 
a social contract between men equal status there was always a critique of the legitimacy 
and authority of the state.116 This constant rehashing of the foundations of society keeps 
the basis for state authority in suspense, a process that can only create civil conflict. 
After Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, and Rousseau had debased the foundation of state au-
thority and posited their own version of the origins of political order – positives that 
nourished the various conflict in Europe, Kant sought to put a stop to this inquiry by 
constituting a limit to the critique of the state: “[t]he origin of supreme power … is not 
discoverable by the people who are subject to it. In other words, the subject ought not to 
indulge in speculations about its origin with a view to acting upon them … Whether in 
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fact an actual contract originally preceded their submission to the state’s authority, 
whether the power came first and the law only appeared after it, or whether they ought 
to have followed this order – these are completely futile arguments for a people which is 
already subject to civil law, and they constitute a menace to the state.”117 
 2. A community united in the authority of the law. “Freedom consists in 
being dependent only on the law,” proclaims Voltaire.118 If the realm of critique is to 
function, there must be self-imposed limits on who can critique and who cannot; the 
right and law of a community of citizens was therefore another important theme in the 
discourses on the state. If the state is to guarantee any kind of stability in the relation 
between truth and politics then the citizens must be provided with rights that are secured 
by the law. It too late for appeals to isēgoria or to a benevolent God who would install a 
ruler in his own image; rather, these rights and laws had to be given in reason. And thus 
this theme of the “rights” and “duties” of the citizen toward the state (i.e. themselves) 
appear in almost all treatises of political thought at the time, something that was com-
pletely foreign to the Mirrors of Princes, where the subjects had different duties towards 
the king based on their caste as well as he to them. In the discourses on natural right the 
common problem is to define exactly how far the right of the state should impose on the 
rights of the citizen. That power is transferred to the sovereign is always the case, but 
how much and what does comes in return: “Each one therefore surrendered his right to 
act according to his own resolution, but not his right to think and judge for himself,” is 
an example of how Spinoza approaches the problem when the theme becomes the right 
of each citizen to practice critique.119 This theme is special because, according to Spino-
za, attempts to impose restrictions on freedom on thought has only ever resulted in 
“schisms” within the “ecclesia” (community), and later he proclaims that “freedom of 
judgment must necessarily be permitted and people must be governed in such a way that 
they can live in harmony, even though they openly hold different and contradictory 
opinions.”120 Spinoza illustrates this with two examples: the republic Amsterdam and 
Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants (as the negative example where settling reli-
gious disputes by law ended in a the Orangist coup d’état), of which “the real agitators 
[were] those who attempt to do away with freedom of judgment in a free republic – a 
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freedom which cannot be suppressed.”121 Thus the question becomes what rights can be 
given to the citizens of the state by means of law, and how does that secure their ability 
to use their own reason to think and judge for themselves? 
 And, in so far as the rights of the citizens and laws of the state are established 
though knowledge –that is, by drawing distinctions– theories of natural right sets of 
structures that inclusion and exclusion thought the social contract, i.e. the law. This is 
exactly the same theme that we find later in Kant: if we could talk in terms of an “origi-
nal contract,” Kant declares, there are three principles that can be established according 
to pure reason, and thus are not a real state (phenomenal) but an ideal (noumenal).122 
First of all, freedom (liberty) where “each may seek his happiness in whatever way he 
sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon the freedom of others to pursue a similar 
end which can be reconciled with the freedom of everyone else within a workable gen-
eral law – i.e. he must accord to other the same right a he enjoys himself. […] This right 
of freedom belongs to each member of the commonwealth as a human being, in so far 
as each is a being capable of possessing rights.”123 Second, equality (…) of citizens, 
understood as a state where all members in the commonwealth has the right to coerce 
one another except the head of state who is a non-member but a preserver that is not 
subject to the laws, but also that of a meritocracy where the appointment to any office or 
rank within the state is independent of any hereditary privileges (the bourgeois principle 
of equality).124 And lastly independence (sibisufficientia), by which Kant means, “any-
one who has the right to vote on this legislation is a citizen (citoyen, i.e. citizen of the 
state, not bourgeois or citizen of a town). The only qualification required to be a citizen 
(apart, of course, from being an adult male) is that he must be his own master (sui iuris), 
and must have some property (which can include any sill, trade, fine art or science) to 
support himself. In cases where he must earn his living from others, he must earn it only 
by selling that which is his, and not by allowing others to make use of him; for he must 
in the true sense of the word serve no-one but the commonwealth. In this respect, arti-
sans and large or small landowners are all equal.”125 
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 3. A specialized knowledge. Ever since the discourse of Raison d’État, the 
search for a proper Scitentia Politica has been a well-known theme. It is one we find in 
the writings of Hobbes, Montesquieu, and Vico as well as many others. When it comes 
to the game of critique as a break from the game of vir civilis (and eloquence), however, 
it is particularly telling how the absolutist authors rehash the exact same themes as those 
of the autocratic relationship between truth and power when it comes to how philosophy 
is to relate politics. In Politics drawn from the very word of holy scripture, for example, 
Bousset devotes a large discussion which completely rehashes the themes of the past: 
“the king does not have to justify his use of reason,” “royal authority is subject to rea-
son,” “the prince must know himself” he must have a “love of truth,” the prince “must 
take council and give full freedom to councillors,” he must choose them well and be 
aware of bad ones, etc. Filmer did much the same thing in his Patraircha. Yet, someone 
who is even more puzzling is Hobbes, who cannot decide how the question should be 
addressed, let alone posed: he either starts from the position of power (the monarch) or 
he starts with truth (the production of knowledge). He first takes up a position in favour 
of the new scientific way of producing political knowledge, where after he revises this 
position in light of the historical circumstances of the English revolution. To Hobbes 
there is no easy solution, because one excludes the other and vice versa, and thus in the 
end he sides with the king and inevitably with the old model. A relationship that when 
put into practice has shown to be problematic on its own terms.  
 In De Cive, he proclaims that “if the patterns of human action were known with 
the same certainty as the relations of magnitude in figures, ambition and greed, whose 
power rests on the false opinions of the common people about right and wrong (jus et 
iniuria), would be disarmed, and the human race would enjoy such secure peace that 
[…] it seems unlikely that it would ever have to fight again.”126 The old models of 
eloquence and the “teaching of fables” that mystify the origins of authority (Hobbes’s 
way of reject the Homeric Greeks) have not made any attempt to obtain such results. In 
fact, says Hobbes:  
 
the war of the sword and the war of the pens is perpetual: there is no greater knowledge (scien-
tia) of natural right and natural laws today than in the past; both parties to a dispute defend their 
right with the opinions of philosophers; one and the same action is praised by some and criti-
cized by others; a man now approves what at another time he condemns, and gives a different 
judgement of an action when he does it than when someone else the very same thing.127  
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A science that is occupied with intellectual exercises may contain errors, he concedes, 
but a science occupied with government that contains errors will have terrible conse-
quences. Any such science should therefore according to Hobbes be based on true 
principles so as to avoid these and mentions the following problems as the result of 
deliberation of “private men”: the false doctrines of tyrannicide, unlawful conquest, 
sovereign kings reduced to servants of society, and whether the king’s commands are 
just or unjust is a private matter necessarily discussed. A science of politics therefore 
“belongs to princes and to show whose business it is to govern mankind. ”128  
 The starting point of science, Hobbes proclaims, is reason: “in the very shadows 
of doubt a thread of reason (so to speak) begins, by whose guidance we shall escape to 
the clearest light.”129 And thus, after rejecting the structure of conventional rhetoric, 
Hobbes proposes to go about taking apart the state as an automatic Clock – a complex 
thing that is “best known from its constituents.” By the reductive method he can subse-
quently split the commonwealth into three parts and relate them back into a coherent 
whole: a Libertas, which constitutes the nature of man, an Imperium, which is the gov-
ernment, and Religio, which reconciles natural law with divine right, thus showing how 
this method is not in conflict with holy scripture.130 To Hobbes, it should not be a ques-
tion of whether one is able to persuade others of the value of science – its method 
secures that its results would be followed; they are after all given by nature. 
 In Leviathan, however, Hobbes returns to the themes surrounding the problems 
of eloquence, and not surprisingly the discourse on council in this text on natural law is 
almost identical to those seen in the Mirrors for Princes. Except, and this is important, 
there is a new task for philosophy hidden in there, one which is moved further away 
from politics, yet has remained closer: there is clearly a change in emphasis (?).131 In the 
preface to Leviathan Hobbes had proclaimed that salus populi was the business of the 
state and that counsellors would have an important role to play because they knew 
everything that was useful. Yet, when it comes to chapter twenty-five, where he dis-
cusses the problems of council, Hobbes is wonderfully suspicious of any attempt of 
exhortation –“Counsell vehemently pressed”– and sees immediately three problems with 
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this kind of council: it is he who gives it that decides to give it not the listener, it is 
always given in a multitude and can therefore not be interrupted and examined, and 
those who give it are corrupted by their own passions and by their own interest.132 And 
yet Hobbes struggles here, because the new model for philosophy and politics based on 
reason and a proper science makes little sense in the eyes of the old model because it 
has no persuasive power in it rhetoric – the only possible way in which philosophy can 
have a relation to politics is if it remains a distinct entity. In other words, there has to be 
reason in council and so we end up with a sort of mix where Hobbes ends by conclud-
ing that “in all Deliberations, and in all Pleadings, the faculty of solid Reasoning, is 
necessary: for without it, the Resolutions of men are rash, and their Sentences unjust: 
and yet if there be not powerful Eloquence, which procureth attention and Consent, the 
effect of Reason will be little.”133 Hobbes therefore concludes: “Reason, and Eloquence, 
[…] may stand very well together.”134 
 The ambiguity of Hobbes is hardly surprising, as the theme of political 
knowledge has obviously always been central to discourses on politics; yet in periods of 
revolution and transformation of thought such questions always have different points of 
entry. The emergence of the state within the discourse of critique has the purpose to 
limiting the activity of critique itself by subjecting it to a set of rules – that is, critique 
should only permitted in relation to the state (the realm of politics proper) if it comes in 
the form of a science.  
 The most ambitious and extreme example of this kind of thinking is probably 
that of Spinoza’s idea of the state as a ‘single mind’. He starts his discourse by com-
plaining about how the old philosophers conceived of “man not as they are, but as they 
would like them to be,” and thereby rejecting the model of exhortation. The authorita-
tive basis of the state has to be different from that of a politeia and divine right of 
kings.135 Rather, the authoritative basis for the state is reason: “the commonwealth that 
is based on reason and directed by reason is most powerful and most in control of its 
own right. For the right of a commonwealth is determined by the power of a people that 
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is guided as though by a single mind. But this union of minds could in no way be con-
ceived unless the chief aim of the commonwealth is identical with that which sound 
reason teaches us is for the good of all men [my emphasis].”136 The aim is, of course, 
the salus populi suprema lex estoi and the maintenance of freedom. We see again how 
the typology of constitutions ceases to matter because what really needs to be estab-
lished is a “single mind” of the people – which is the only way in which true reason can 
govern.137 In other words, the type of government is irrelevant as long as it governs 
according to reason alone. The model mirrors that of the critic himself: “the king is to 
be regarded as the mind of the commonwealth, and this council as the mind's external 
senses or body of the commonwealth, through which the mind perceives the condition 
of the commonwealth and does what it decides is best for itself.”138 So great is Spino-
za’s faith in a reasonable nature that a strict division is instituted between the “single 
mind” of the government and the citizen – everything is to be mediated between a coun-
cil, and also communication with other governments. 
 By the creation of this monotone entity of a “single mind,” Spinoza compart-
mentalizes thought into (Scientia Politica) and (Philosophia), and thereby the creation 
of political science effectively limits the relationship philosophical discourse can have 
to politics. Or rather, the scientia politica constitutes a limit, a barrier put up by politics 
that is placed on philosophy’s ability to test its reality in politics. The true-discourses of 
the parrhēsiast and the philosophical counsellor are only admissible in so far as they are 
given in the language of this new ‘political science’, which per definition they are not; 
consequently they are either, as discourses, eliminated or mocked. Similar limits are 
constituted in Montesquieu’s proposed solution to this, where the proper task for phi-
losophy was work out the dialectic of history, aligning principle with nature within the 
totality of the state.  
 Between freedom and necessity, natural law leaves little room for any dynamism 
between politics and philosophy – everything is necessarily predetermined by the mind 
of God, who designed the natural law. The scientia politica was supposed to resolve this 
paradox between freedom and nature. Yet, “whatever conception of the freedom of the 
will one may form in terms of metaphysics,” Kant argued, “the will’s manifestation is in 
the world of phenomena, i.e. human action, are determined in accordance with natural 
                                                
136 Ibid., p. 692 
137 “how a community governed as a Monarchy or as an Aristocracy should be organised if it is not to 
degenerate into a Tyranny, and if the peace and Freedom of its citizens is to remain inviolate.” Ibid.,  
p. 680 
138 Ibid., p. 704 
   Public Critique 
 178 
laws, as is every other natural event.”139 And thus taking Kepler or Newton as a model, 
Kant thought that the “only way out for the philosopher, since he cannot assume that 
mankind follows any rational purpose of its own in its collective actions [the great 
world-drama of folly and childish vanity] is for him to attempt to discover a purpose in 
nature behind this senseless course of human events, and decide whether it is after all 
possible to formulate in terms of a definite plan of nature a history of creatures who act 
without a plan of their own.”140 It is therefore up to the critical philosopher to try in 
error, until he succeeds with his political science. Kant was aware of this when he for-
mulated his idea of what a scientia politica can achieve in The Metaphysical Elements 
of Right, where he lays out the principles of the categorical imperative that forms the 
basis for his ‘moral science’. And what an inherent contradiction it is: the state becomes 
immune to novel thought (thought that is not useful as inflexible determined before-
hand), meaning that the state is a resilient solution to the problem of political order 
(before there was a range of political anatomies available; monarchy, aristocracy, and 
democracy, and everything in between). Worse still, no re-imaginations of the question 
of political order are acceptable because only the state can safe guard the game of cri-
tique – the limit of critique is its very object.  
IV 
[13] We should recall that the problems of political game consisted mainly in the pro-
cedures, techniques, and practices that governed it, as well as the character, quality, 
and moral conduct of the political man. Indeed, the salons of France, the coffee houses 
of England, or the Tischgesellschaften of Germany; the architecture of the buildings and 
the display of culture in public theatres, concert halls, and art museums; the various 
technologies in the printing presses that produced the many journals and gazettes; or the 
structure of the bourgeois family and the individualization of political man whose most 
intimate spaces are oriented towards the dumbstruck audiences – all constitutes the 
material possibility and limitations of the game of critique. The critic is sustained by a 
combination of entertainment and paper sullied in ink, and when it gets a little too dull, 
coffee and sugar. But these procedures and techniques do not in themselves provide us 
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with a principle that governs the relation between politics and philosophy, but their 
conditionality. And probably more so, they produce and govern the same – the produc-
tion and reproduction of a modern subjectivity in the proper double sense of the word. 
We can therefore not look here for a principle that would govern the political game in 
such a way as to leave open a space, however small, for novel and authentic thought. 
What about morality and moral writings? In the political treatises of the time, it is true, 
morality –ever since it was separated from politics under the Absolutists– was a central 
concern in early modern and modern thought: how could morality and politics coexist? 
Yet, morality does not function as the principle by which game of critique is governed – 
or rather, there is nothing new to the theme of morality after the Mirrors of Princes had 
prescribed moral behaviour to king and commoner alike. The régne de la critique did 
not make the distinction either; but it was also a different game all together. And for all 
that it could not be governed by the same principle that had structured the court society 
(nor for that matter that of ethical differentiation, as the antagonistic structure produced 
moods that the religious demagogues had used). This is exactly what happens when 
Kant grounds the principles of morality and ethics in the categorical imperative which 
was anchored in reason – by comparison, the ethics and morality that it produces looks 
much like those produced by earlier techniques and strategies.  
 We might consider the story of the protestant merchant Jean Calas –a man who 
was falsely accused by furious crowd of murdering his own son, and condemned to be 
broken on the wheel by a court of eight judges in Toulouse in 1762– who, according to 
Voltaire, only showed that “in the age when philosophy has made too much progress, 
and a hundred academics are writing for the improvement of our morals! It would seem 
that fanaticism is angry at the success of reason, and combats it more furiously.”141 Here 
was a man whose faith was sealed by the superstition of the crowds that would celebrate 
the murder of thousands of their own citizens, the corruption of a court of law that 
although all the evidence pointed to the innocence of the man had convicted him none-
theless, and the indifference of the king and general populous, even the “devout”, that 
had only contempt for the man and considered it better to sacrifice one innocent man 
over the integrity of the court. This was only one incidence, but to Voltaire one that 
stressed the gruesomeness of the wars that followed the reformation, and the spectre of 
fanaticism that had swept though Europe lead him to propose the following principle of 
toleration: “every citizen shall be free to follow his own reason, and believe whatever 
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this enlightened or deluded reason shall dictate to him […] provided he does not disturb 
the public order.”142 Toleration is primarily about the freedom of religious conscience 
and is one of the most well known themes of Early Modernity and the Enlightenment; it 
is also about the use of one own reason, which is exactly why it is central to the game of 
critique. We can now explore how the game of critique is governed by the principle of 
toleration more broadly. 
 
[14] Toleration was hardly a new concept in the sixteenth century, but it became central 
to political-philosophical discourse because of the religious-political conflict that rav-
aged Europe after the Reformation. Toleration comes from Latin tolerantia (to tolerate) 
meaning to bear, support, or endure – from tolerātus  (past participle of having endured, 
to have been tolerated), from tolerō  (“I endure”). Cicero, in line with Stoic thought, 
used toleration (tolerantia) to denote the virtue of endurance – virtus tolerantiae – for 
when a person would withstand suffering, pain, or injustice by inner strength and self-
control.143 Later in the early Christian discourses, toleration is considered on the one 
hand as an attitude to oneself, or rather to God, and on the other toleration denoted the 
relation to others – mutua tolerantia – that is, to other religions. Augustine speaks of 
God reserving an “eternal reward” for the “pious endurance of temporal ills”, while 
Tertullian used toleration in a juridical considering of how Christians were treated in the 
relation to other religions in the Roman Empire, while Cyprianus’ plea for the toleration 
of Christian was based on reason and humanity.144 To the Christians, only faith based 
on inner conviction was pleasing to God. True faith cannot therefore be attained by 
external force; the dictum credere non potest nisi volens (one can believe unless he is 
willing) thus constituted the most important justification for the freedom of con-
science.145 
 Later on the discourse on toleration in the sixteenth century were both about 
religious coexistence as well as political stability – but predominantly the latter as it was 
religious intolerance that was the pressing challenge of the age. Therefore in particular, 
toleration could not be defended on religious grounds as such a defence would neces-
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sarily mean that whatever arguments were used would be intrinsic to one party’s reason-
ing, and so toleration had to be defended on political grounds (an external position): and 
so Bodin, in Six Books of a Commonwealth, justified toleration on political grounds, 
because what was at stake for him and the politiques was the stability of the state.146 
Contrary to the original prudential outlook, this shortly led to policies of intolerance 
under the later Absolutist – a point that disappoints Bayle greatly.147 Hobbes, for exam-
ple, quite explicitly banishes worship that is not that of the sovereign to a private sphere 
because he saw uniformity of religion as the basis of a well-functioning commonwealth: 
“Publique, is the worship that a Common-wealth performeth, as one person […] Pivate, 
is in secret Free.”148 Publically the states religion had to be performed, privately one 
could pray as one pleased – a dogma with a Roman ethos. However, later this insistence 
of making the discourse of religious toleration a matter of the state would link it to the 
famous problem and theme of moderate government: not as the moderation that one had 
to exercise over oneself to gain self-mastery, but as a moderation that had to be imple-
mented in the government of others. That is, it was not the king that had a problem with 
moderation, but rather the compulsions and predispositions of the peoples he was 
charged with governing that were to be moderated. Thus, when addressing the question 
of religious tolerations “we are political men not theologians,” says Montesquieu, and 
argues that we must reason by the principle that “every religion which is repressed 
becomes repressive itself”, and that therefore when there is a reversal of power-relations 
the repressed religion will become tyrannical. It is therefore necessary to ask of all 
religions that “they not disturb the state, but also that they not disturb each other.”149 
Toleration is a principle that applies equally to the whole stratum of society. Yet, Mon-
tesquieu qualifies this by recommending that once it is established a religion is to be 
tolerated, but because religion are intolerant towards one another the state should strive 
to prevent them from establishing themselves. 
 Before him, Locke had formulated the most noticeable statement on religious 
toleration in his Epistola de Tolerantia. In some of his early notes for the essay, Locke 
frames the problem of religious toleration in a similar fashion as Bodin and the early 
Absolutists: “In the question of liberty of conscience both parties have with equal zeal 
and mistake too much enlarged their pretensions, whilst one side preach up absolute 
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obedience, and the other claim universal liberty in matters of conscience, without as-
signing what those things are which have a title to liberty or showing the boundaries of 
imposition and obedience.”150 Thus it is from the “impartial” third position that Locke 
starts his inquiry. The argument is well known: Locke seeks to distinguish civil gov-
ernment from that of religious government by defining one as having to govern matters 
that are external to the individual whereas the latter govern matter that are internal to the 
individual – that is, civil government is about (bona civilia voco) life, liberty, and the 
welfare of the citizens and religious government is about the salvation of their eternal 
soul.151 Thus, contrary to Absolutist like Hobbes, Locke makes it the explicit duty of the 
state to tolerate; secular government should not concern itself with the care of souls. 
Having allocated a role for the magistrate, the question he has to answer is this: what 
ought to be tolerated and what ought not to be tolerated in order to obtain the goal of 
preserving the commonwealth?  
 Firstly, it naturally follows that there are a number of practices which might be 
unwanted and problematic on their own terms that nevertheless does not come within 
the magistrate’s purview and therefore are worthy of toleration: like speculative opin-
ions towards divine worship, the unorthodox practices by which one is indifferent 
towards others (like polygamy and divorce), or other actions or practices that might 
conflict with moral teachings of various kinds.152 The second problem that Locke sees is 
one where “men herd themselves into companies with distinctions from the public,” 
only to grow in size and become a menace to society.153 These are the fanatic and other 
dissidents of Christianity. However, because violence and persecution are unable to 
change their opinions and because they are inconstant in their beliefs, Locke holds that 
the different parties amongst themselves are “so shattered into different factions are best 
secured by toleration.”154 Yet, the real problem is with those that like the papists, who 
according to Locke, held opinions that are destructive to government; would deny toler-
ation of others where they had power; and were irreconcilable enemies in both 
principles and interests because they answer to the Pope alone. As he states in the Let-
ter: the Catholics “can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate which is 
constituted upon such a bottom that all those who enter into it do thereby ipso facto 
                                                
150 Locke, John. ‘An Essay on Toleration’, in Locke: Political Essays, edited by Mark Goldie (Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), p. 135 
151 Locke, John. A Letter Concerning Toleration, edited by Mario Montuori (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1963), p. 14 
152 Locke, Essay on Toleration, pp. 136-144 
153 Ibid., p. 147 
154 Ibid., p. 157 
Tyrants of Truth 
 183 
deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince.”155 Differently 
from the fanatics and dissidents, these were real competitors to the prevailing order and 
“toleration cannot make them divide amongst themselves” – they could therefore only 
be dealt with by intolerance.156 Conversely, to enforce uniformity is also problematic in 
and by itself, there are certain dangers associated of establishing uniformity: Locke 
submits the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of the Huguenots (1572) and the Shima-
bara Revolt (1637-8) in Japan as evidence, and asserts that: ”If anyone thinks 
uniformity in our church ought to be restored, though by such a method as this, he will 
do well to consider how many subject the king will have left by the time it is done.”157 
Thus, there are four initial problematiques to deal with, and the various strategies that 
Locke comes up with for determining the answer to these questions are unequivocally 
inventive rationalizations of a political position – as when he is unable to unite his 
political principles with why exactly it is the Catholics that are intolerable. They are 
also quite different from those of Bayle, who accepted atheism: the strategic distinction 
that he made did not allocate respective realms to state and religion, but showed by the 
fact that atheists could live in relative peace with one another that it was in fact religion 
that was external to society.158 
 
[15] Following these developments of the discourse on toleration, we can now begin to 
explore how the political game was regulated by the principle of toleration. When 
discussing the practical problem of the wars of religion we touched upon toleration as a 
policy, but we could also more abstractly talk about toleration as a concept that consti-
tutes a part of a field of problematisation. The difference is striking; where the former is 
formulated so as to dictate specific actions – tolerate this, but do not tolerate that – the 
latter is a concept that resides in the un-thought and from there structures the way in 
which such policies are articulated. In theoretical terms, a policy of toleration is always 
a particular program against the general model of toleration that makes it possible (i.e. 
thinkable). Here, we should think of toleration as a necessary principle of action in the 
régne de la critique, without which the spirit of reason would lose its momentum. That 
is, the structure of the concept of toleration as it was developed at the time predominate-
ly as a way to society containing more than one religion, but the same problem was 
reflected in; if the game of critique is to function its players must be tolerant towards 
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one another, else the game will break down. To be sure, it is the principle of toleration, 
like the principle of differentiation and principle of before it, which regulates the game 
of critique. Three themes appear:  
 1. A stratum of toleration. Being a principle of exclusion, toleration con-
tains two boundaries: there are those practices and beliefs that one agrees with; those 
that are found to be in error but tolerated; and lastly those, which are rejected and de-
termined to be intolerable. Thus there are three realms: a realm of truth, a realm of 
error, and a realm of the intolerable. The drawing up of any such boundaries was one of 
the ways in which the discourse on toleration functioned as a political tool: here, tolera-
tion is a concept deployed in a relation of power that makes it possible to justify the 
persecution of one opponent. The concept of toleration contains at least three compart-
ments (or unoccupied components): one of which is unproblematic because it is the 
same; another which contains that which can be tolerated; and a third of the behaviour, 
practices, or beliefs which cannot be tolerated for this or that reason. It matters little 
whether toleration is religious or secular; it always contains a principle of exclusion. In 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, more often than not this principle was deter-
mined by political concerns.  
 2. Tolerance of what? The discourse concerned with the concept of tolera-
tion always contains a normative component: there is always something that is the 
object of toleration, be it freedom of conscience, obscure practices, or more broadly the 
freedom to philosophize. In other words, there is always a goal of toleration: political, 
religious, critical – why should we tolerate? That is, can the practice of critique be 
tolerated in society? And to what degree does the game of critique function without the 
concept of toleration? If truth is really split into a thousand pieces with an individual 
critic hold onto each of them, then they each have to tolerate each other’s point of view. 
This is both an individual test of toleration, in the stoic sense, as well as a societal test in 
which a group of critics may be excluded because of the opinions they hold. The crucial 
focus was here on the toleration of philosophy within the context of politics; and surely 
this was a theme as well in the sixteenths and seventeenth centuries. Spinoza talked at 
great length about libertas philosophandi (freedom of thought) as the free and unre-
stricted thought and expression, which as he saw it was entirely different from what 
Cartesian theologians took it mean; that is, the freedom to philosophize on everything 
that did not impose on interpretations of scripture and theological issues. It was thus a 
much wider category that transcended the immediate worldview in which it was con-
ceived. Spinoza’s thesis is that this kind of “freedom (libertas philosophandi) may not 
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only be allowed without danger to piety and the stability of the republic but cannot be 
refused without destroying the peace of the republic and piety itself.”159 To Bayle the 
toleration of true-discourse was essential for all aspects of the règne de la critique; it 
was completely gratuitous to imagine that, after a critical conversation among equals, 
people would dispute no more, and that there would be the veritable “death of contro-
versy”, something Bayle expressed as: “if I propose objections to which you cannot 
reply, I cannot fail to hope to convert you; for since you do not claim that evidence is 
the mark of theological truth, the obscurity of your reason and the weakness of your 
arguments will never seem to you a mark of falsehood. It would thus be in vain for me 
to reduce you to silence. Your taste would, for you, take the place of a demonstra-
tion.”160 Later we find a similar theme in Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws. Here, he 
talks about “Philosophical liberty” as the “exercise of one’s will” or rather of “one’s 
opinion” that one is exercising ones will – and “political liberty” on the other hand as 
being about security, specifically the “opinion one has of one’s security” – “When the 
innocence of the citizen is not secure, neither is his liberty,” exactly because such laws 
depends on the accused being able to defend his innocence.161 “Liberty can be founded 
only on the practice of this knowledge” and thus to Montesquieu, philosophical liberty 
is what makes politics (and political liberty) possible in the first place, whereas political 
liberty provides the conditions for philosophical liberty. 162 There is therefore to Mon-
tesquieu a fundamental circularity of between philosophical liberty and political liberty 
as guaranteed by right of the citizen and the laws of the state; as he tells us “the citizen’s 
liberty depends principally on the goodness of the criminal laws.” Kant was no excep-
tion either, he argued in the Conflict of the Faculties that, “it is absolutely essential that 
the learned community at the university  also contain a faculty that is independent of the 
government's command with regard to its teachings; one that, having no commands to 
give, is free to evaluate everything, and concerns itself with the interests of the sciences, 
that is, with truth: one in which reason is authorized to speak out publicly.”163 “For 
without a faculty of this kind,” Kant continued:  
 
the truth would not come to light (and this would be to the government’s own detriment); but 
reason is  by its nature free and admits of no command to hold something as true  (no imperative 
‘Believe!’ but only a free credo [I believe]). - The reason why this  faculty, despite its great pre-
rogative (freedom), is called the lower faculty lies in human nature; for a human being who can 
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give commands, even though he is someone else's humble servant, is considered more distin-
guished than a free man who has no one under his command.164 
 
 3. Toleration and the problems of political game. To the extent that the 
principle of toleration makes the political game flexible and prevents relations of domi-
nation to develop and become be irreversible it requires that some elements are rendered 
intolerable; something had to be excluded, namely those elements that are seen as coun-
terproductive to the goal of toleration.165 With regard to the toleration acting as the 
principle that governs the political game its triadic structure has to be implemented. 
There are many examples of this: Locke’s different arguments as to why the Catholics 
should not be tolerated and Bayle’s objections of the duty of intolerance in the proverb 
“compel them to come in” have already been discussed. But even earlier than that, in his 
essay Of True Religion, Milton showed his dissatisfaction with Charles II’s toleration of 
the Roman Catholics because of their politically dangerous nature, and he built his 
argument for intolerance upon the following distinction: “true religion is the true wor-
ship and service of God, learned and believed from the Word of God only,” whereas 
heresy, hereunder popery, “is a religion taken up and believed from the traditions of 
men, and additions to the word of God” – and because the Catholics fell into the latter 
they should not be tolerated.166 Much later, the same theme of intolerance reoccurs in a 
letter to Voltaire, where Rousseau discusses the theme of toleration. Here he wanted to 
work out a principle by which he could exclude, without exception, those that parties 
that were a danger to society:  
 
Among these dogmas that ought to be prescribed, intolerance is easily the most odious; but it 
must be checked at its source; for the most bloodthirsty Fanatics change their language as their 
fortune changes, and when they are not the strongest they preach nothing but patience and gen-
tleness. Thus I call intolerant on principle any man who imagines that one cannot be a good man 
without believing everything he believes, and mercilessly damns all those who do not think as he 
does.167  
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Bayle and Kant were somewhat unique by the fact that they defined these boundaries in 
a different language (that of reason), but the effects are not that different at all from how 
the concept of toleration has functioned in the règne the critique all along.168  
 Accordingly, in the game of critique what is intolerable to reason is unreason. 
Everything has to submit to critique, even reason; or in other words reason has to sub-
mit to an examination by reason. Consequently, everything that falls short or is outside 
reason, which is just about any thought that is not founded on the basis of reason is 
therefore intolerable. When reason establishes such a boundary –the boundary between 
the reasonable and unreasonable– then all beliefs that do not abide by the principles of 
reason are naturally excluded. Only reason is tolerable because it includes both truth 
and error – the possibility of failure is intrinsic to the process of critique. Its antithesis 
on the other hand is unreason, which can only ever be in error; the possibility of truth is 
here only accidental. Reason can therefore not tolerate anything but itself: the margin 
between the tolerable and intolerable therefore grows ever smaller as reason comes to 
dominate cultures and societies. In fact, it is a margin that becomes so infinitely small 
that all other ways of life seem inherently false and are therefore any intervention in 
them is unquestionable justifiable. 
 
[16] In conclusion we can say that critical thought, just like all other kinds of thought, 
conjures up a world: it establishes boundaries. Not necessarily boundaries that are 
drawn up for egotistical reason, but always boundaries that are drawn up in a response 
to particular problems. And so, discourses on toleration were a response to particular 
problems that the culture was faced with: chiefly among them religious schisms be-
tween Protestants and Catholics. Schematically we might say that, where the problems 
of the political game in the ancient Geek polis had to do with how one could govern 
oneself so as to differentiate oneself from others so as to govern them, and the problems 
of the court society of the Roman and Christian societies had to do with rhetorical elo-
quence and piety, the problems of the political game in the règne de la critique have to 
do with toleration. The principle of toleration was necessary for the political game to 
function – without it there would be no room for the game of critique with politics: in 
other words, the game of critique would have remained unrealized thought, a virtuality. 
Where the former two were characterised by courage and piety, it was now reason by 
which truth was accessed; and because of the transformative nature of reason, toleration 
                                                
168 Reasons intolerance of superstition follows naturally from its irreconcilability and can be extended to 
anything that is unreasonable, see: Synergists, Bayle, Dictionary, quoted in Political Writings, p. 277 
   Public Critique 
 188 
was a requirement, intolerance on the other hand would thwart reason and superstition 
would once again come to dominate – a completely deplorable outcome. In sum, we 
have seen the ancient Greek conception of dunesteia with its antagonistic structure of 
persuasive true-discourse; the court society with its hierarchical structure of pious and 
moralising true-discourse; and we have now seen the concept of toleration unfold a 
juxtaposed structure of rational true-discourse comes to define the principle by which 
the relationship between philosophy and politics is to be governed: the boundary of 
reason as perceived in the minds of a public distinguishes the true from untrue. A 
boundary that as we shall see becomes so narrow that it is unable to sustain the very 
game of critique that constituted it. 
 The socio-political condition of thought can be formulated as such: thought –
liberty to philosophize– is permissible on the condition that it abides by the rules of 
reason and do not in any way attempt to set up boundaries that that will prevent the 
transformational power of the spirit of reason. Thus there is a fundamental circularity 
between critique, the state, and toleration: you have your reason and I have mine, only 
experience will be the judge of who is right and establish the truth, and because of that 
we have to tolerate one another – a toleration that at the same time is inscribed in the 
state as the guarantor and constant object of our use reason, our critique. Thereby the 
field of problematisation consists in these three concepts of critique, the state, and toler-
ation; and all problematisations that wanted to come to terms with the practical 
problems of the European cultures of the time ties their thinking to these concepts in 
one way or the other. 
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Chapter V: Hyper-real Politic 
*   *   * 
[1] This chapter is about the hyper-real politics of truth, a kind of politics where the 
precession of simulacra makes it no longer possible to separate reality from the model 
of the real, and the true from the false. All epistemological spaces are sustained by an 
inherent logic particular to them, even if this logic has to be discovered rather than 
created. It is certainly the case that hyper-real politics is discovered rather than formu-
lated by anyone in particular; as any form of politics of truth, it is the result of complex 
strategic situations – a constellation of social forces, each striving for different goals. 
Nevertheless, hyper-real politics of truth is perhaps for this very reason also the hardest 
to account for, as any attempt to disentangle these relations will inevitable itself be 
caught up them. To complicate matters further, it is hard to identify a clear historical 
rupture between public critique and hyper-real politics, before a series of transfor-
mations that may rightly be associated with modernity, which is also the reason for the 
chapter’s erratic structure.  
 The chapter first (I) deals with these transformations of the epistemological 
space of public critique – a period I have tried to describe as the interregnum of the 
revolutionary. For that purpose, I have used as a helping hypothesis that the realization 
of modern thought brings about practical problems that will later make way for hyper-
real politics. The chapter then turns to (II) the practical problems of technological ad-
vancements and population growth that will result in the involuntary break from public 
critique. Through the Lippmann-Dewey debate, the chapter demonstrates how public 
critique becomes difficult and later the clash between the social forces behind mass-
society and scientific government inherent to Modernity. In fact (III), hyper-real politics 
is the unintended consequences of this clash between mass society and scientific gov-
ernment logic of factual reality. That is, in this confrontation, scientific government 
quickly degenerates into the scientism. Meanwhile, political order is in thought prob-
lematized as silent majorities and cybernetic systems, while the political game is a 
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question of the spectacle. Thus taken together, hyper-real politics of truth sets the socio-
political limit of thought in factual truths; the techno-scientific production of truth that 
follows can then only result in a hyper-reality completely hostile to thought.  
I 
[2] Modernity usually plays a crucial role in a genealogy of any concept in the late 20th 
century. Indeed, the period where public critique undergoes a series of transformations 
to make room for hyper-real politics could be called the ‘interregnum of the revolution-
ary’ – a politics of truth that is dominated by the figure of the revolutionary who’s true-
discourse is a promise about and invitation to participate in a promising future. The 
question is how distinguished this figure is from the critic and whether it merits atten-
tion; in any case, I cannot do it justice here. I shall therefore confine the analysis to the 
series of transformation that make the historical rupture possible.  
 
[3] Accordingly, even if the French Revolution provides the earliest background against 
which the emergence of hyper-real politics can be observed, it would remarkably not be 
anticipated this early in modern thought. A series of transformations would have to be 
completed before it was possible to break with the epistemological space of public 
critique; in some aspects we are still tied to the modes of thought particularly associated 
with it, unwilling to give them up as we attempt to live in a nostalgic version of the past. 
 In the thick of Jean-Paul Marat publishing his dreadful lies in L’Ami du peuple 
and the Reign of Terror brought on by Robespierre and the Jacobins, it would seem that 
the same generation that championed the practice of public critique was also the genera-
tion that undermined it. In was during the Revolution, in the hands of the famed men of 
letters who enjoyed a liberality like never before, critique finally became hyper-critique: 
the image of reason, as a Penelope that constantly weaves and un-weaves, which Bayle 
so dreaded, was irreversible realized. Yet, the scaffolding of public critique – the natural 
rights of men and the toleration and freedom of thought – are not cast into total doubt. 
Rather, we see a slight movement towards the edges of this epistemological space, an 
exploration of the tension between the problems of true-discourse and political order in 
the limits of natural vis-à-vis civic rights: where Edmund Burke, in Reflections on the 
Revolution in France, rejected the absolute and theoretical proclamation of the rights of 
men insisting, “men cannot enjoy the rights of an uncivil and of a civil state together” 
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and thus had to give up their natural rights including those of freedom of thought.1 
Thomas Paine, in Rights of Man, argued that it is only when we fail to execute our 
natural rights perfectively that civil society may step in, and thus “a man, by natural 
right, has a right to judge in his own cause; and so far as the right of the mind is con-
cerned, he never surrenders it.”2 Paine mounts a sound defence for the revolution and is 
firmly committed to the ideals of the enlightenment wherever they may lead: the man of 
reason “sees the rationale of the whole system, its origins and its operation,” – the om-
nipresent citizen, moulded by the ideal of the critic, still possessed the sole rights to 
true-discourse and novel thought.3 Where the revolutionary Paine thought that he was 
looking forward, the conservative Burke would prove to have greater foresight [nature 
of man]. The critical proclamation of Burke that the “age of chivalry is gone,” does not 
make it possible to discern the future: the emergence of “barbarous philosophy,” and the 
reactions of “a swinish multitude,” which he bemoans is not yet the mass-society that is 
to come, neither are the men of letters who “act [as if] in a body, and with one direction, 
have great influence on the public mind,” yet the well-oiled propaganda machines of 
totalitarian states.4 
 Even framing the debate as such, the epistemological space remains the same 
and although it is pushed to its limits (there is a paradox looming in this conflict), it 
does not cave in. We are thus not yet at that point where Western thought was coming 
to the realization that the practices build around public critique were showing cracks at 
their deeper levels. Yet we may say that the dissolution has commenced. Thus, despite 
all the irrationalism of the revolution, neither discovers the limits of the epistemological 
space erected by public critique; the hidden forces within man did not appear to its 
contemporaries. 
 
[4] At a greater distance from the French Revolution and after Napoleon would mobi-
lize the force of the masses to the detriment of European monarchies, the problem of the 
tyranny of the majority started to emerge in the thought of Tocqueville and Mill. In his 
                                                
1 A civil state can only be established if “no man should be judge in his own cause. By this each person 
has at once divested himself of the first fundamental right of uncovenanted man, that is, to judge for 
himself, and to assert his own cause.” Burke, Edmund. Reflections on the Revolution in France (Penguin 
Books, 1986), p. 150  
2 “But what availeth it him to judge, if he has not power do redress? He therefore deposits this right in the 
common stock of society, and takes the arm of society, of which he is a part, in preference and in addition 
to his own.” Paine, Thomas. The Rights of Man, Common Sense, and Other Political Writings (Oxford 
University Press, 2008), p. 120 
3 Ibid., p. 190 
4 Burke, Reflections, p. 213 
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analysis of the French Revolution, Tocqueville pointed out the dire consequences when 
the frame of mind of the critic – the man of letters – is applied to the materiality of 
politics: “The writers provided the nation not only with the ideas which brought the 
Revolution into being but also with its character and mood. […] The Result was that, 
when the time came at last to act, the nation brought all the habits of literature into 
politics.”5 The writer of prose and the mob were governed by the same impulses:  
 
They reflected the same attractions for universal theories, comprehensive systems of legislation 
and an exact symmetry in the laws; the same contempt for existing facts; the same faith in theo-
ry; the same taste for the original; the ingenious and the novel in shaping institutions; the same 
desire to reconstruct the entire constitution at one and the same time following the rule of logic 
and according to a single plan instead of seeking to reform it in its separate parts. A frightening 
spectacle!6  
 
And when, in Democracy in America, he talked about the problem of the “tyranny of 
the majority,” he noted, how in American democracy, an immaterial despotism ruled 
over the exercise of thought – surpassing in power all known forms of rule in Europe.7 
Likewise, John Stuart Mill in On Liberty warned against the problem for independent 
thought posed by the “Tyranny of the Masses”.8 “There is a limit to the legitimate inter-
ference of collective opinion with individual independence; and to find that limit, and 
maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human 
affairs as protecting against political despotism.” Human history, Mill argues, testifies 
to the fact that “men are not more zealous for truth than they often are for error.”9 The 
pronunciation of truth is therefore always in danger of being extinguished. Meanwhile 
in his present day, Mill claims the “individuals are [all] lost in the crowd. […] public 
opinion now rules the world,” and public opinion is for Mill nothing more than the 
                                                
5 Tocqueville, Alexis de. The Ancien Régime and the Revolution, translated by Gerald Bevan (Penguin 
Books, 2008), p. 148 
6 Ibid., p. 148 
7 Where the power of the sovereign consisted in the violence that followed by speaking the truth, the 
democratic republic would go straight for the soul and encircle the exercise of thought. Anyone who 
dares speak the truth would be met with apathy: “Thought is an invisible and almost intangible power that 
makes sport of all tyrannies. […] You are free not to think as I do; your life, your goods, everything 
remains to you; but from this day on, you are a stranger among us.” Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in 
America, translated and edited by Harvey C. Mansfield and Delbra Winthrop (University of Chicago 
Press, 2000), pp. 245-7  
8 Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty (New York: Cosimo, 2005), p. 7 
9 Rightfully situated the whole quote: “It is a piece of idle sentimentality that truth, mere as truth, has any 
inherent power denied to error of prevailing against the dungeon and the state. Men are not more zealous 
for truth than they often are for error.” Ibid. p. 35. This is not the same as claiming that truth is relative, as 
Mill continues: “The real advantage which truth has consists in this, that when an opinion is true, it may 
be extinguished once, twice, or many tomes, but in the course of ages there will generally be found 
persons who rediscover it, until some one of its reappearances falls on a time when from favourable 
circumstances it escapes persecution until it has made such a head as to withstand all subsequent attempts 
to supress it.” Ibid., p. 36 
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“only power deserving the name is that of masses.”10 There is a risk that the power of 
public opinion swallows up all other forms of power. Taken together, the monotony of 
thought inherent to the masses and the repression of true-discourse steer public opinion 
towards despotism. This presents a particular problem for exercise of public critique 
(freedom of thought has no basis) – to which Mill’s diversity of opinion is the only 
remedy: “only through diversity of opinion is there, in the existing state of human intel-
lect, a chance of fair play to all sides of the truth.”11 Yet, the diversity of opinion of 
which Mill talks is nothing but a version of the principle of toleration that governed the 
political game of public critique.12 Mill therefore talks of an idealized version of a “real 
morality of public discourse” – one in which nothing is kept back, while at the same 
time calmly restraining from unnecessary abusive language. In the third chapter of On 
Liberty, this translates into an eccentric ideal of the individual – of the individual that 
maintains an attitude of nonconformity towards public opinion and the masses: “In this 
age, the mere example of nonconformity, the mere refusal to bend the knee to custom, is 
itself a service. Precisely because the tyranny of opinion is such to make eccentricity a 
reproach, it is desirable, in order to break through that tyranny, that people should be 
eccentric.”13 The “chief danger,” we are told, is that so few dare be eccentric. Neverthe-
less, while Mill’s problematisation contains many themes from past thought on the 
subject, it does not anticipate the full extent of the future, the way in which the episte-
mological space will turn the eccentricism of individuals into the core value of hyper-
real politics. To put it in another way, Mill still thinks within an epistemological space 
in which eccentrism is not a means of distraction and spectacle. 
 The thought of Tocqueville and Mill represents a kind of interregnum: while it is 
still very clear that it is before Marx shows the degree to which man is alienated by 
society through labour, before Freud exposes the irrational nature of the unconscious, 
and before Nietzsche proclaims that the will to truth leads to the relativity of all 
knowledge and truth, thought has embarking on a remarkable transition into a new 
milieu. Western thought had not yet passed by the threshold of hyper-real politics where 
the displacement of the problems of true-discourse, political order, and the political 
game are totally situated in a new epistemological space. That is, we are yet to see the 
                                                
10 Ibid., p. 80 
11 Ibid., p. 58 
12 Although, in all fairness, Mill does not base his principle on reason alone, discovering the truth is 
rather a matter of reconciling opposites: it is a question of epistemological perspectivism, the only criteri-
on of discussion should be temperament and toleration of opposite opinions because else we would never 
discover the errors committed by the one-sided ness of prevailing opinion. 
13 Ibid. p. 66-67 
Hyper-real Politics 
 194 
emergence of hyper-real politics. We might even be puzzled today that even after all the 
chaos of the French Revolution, it was not possible to identify it as the demise of public 
critique – rather we might say that at this point in time, public critique takes on an 
ethereal existence: it surely is a problem that grabs the attention of thought, but it is still 
not clear to what degree the new forces are unleashed by presuming an omnipotent 
citizen (a tension that surely is not as visible in Burke and Paine as it is in Tocqueville 
and Mill). Failing to read our own history, it would seem that this has all been forgotten: 
while we in our present day speak of public critique as the foundation of our societies, 
clinging to the hopes of traditional liberalism of western civilization to save us from the 
post-factual society, we do not comprehend how the failure of public critique led direct-
ly to hyper-real politics. 
II 
[5] A short sociological-historical excursion reveals that in the nineteenth century, the 
public sphere – which constituted the conditions of possibility of the practice of public 
critique – was faced with two practical problems: technological advancements and 
population growth. Technological advancements, such as the invention of the telegraph, 
which makes it possible to instantaneously transmit information across great distances, 
and new printing techniques, that makes it inexpensive to print and publish books and 
newspapers, put pressure on the public sphere by breaking down the barriers of accessi-
bility and participation (which does not necessarily mean democratization). Thus, the 
importance of distance diminishes and the capabilities for distributing large amounts of 
information increased. Meanwhile, population growth, apart from creating urbanization 
and large cities that requires increased bureaucratization and centralization of the state, 
also increases the number of the potential audience and participants of the public 
sphere, putting pressure on its functionality and cohesiveness. 
 By the end of the nineteenth century, the public sphere started to erode when it 
penetrated more spheres of society by technological means and at the same time lost its 
political functions due to the enlargement of the public.14 On the one hand, due to the 
commercialization of the media, guided by private interest and business advertisement, 
                                                
14 See in particular chapter five “The Socio-structural Transformation of the Public Sphere” and “VI The 
Transformation of the Public Sphere’s Political Function” in Habermas, Jurgen. The Structural Transfor-
mation of the Public Sphere 
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the public sphere changes from a debating culture where the main lines of communica-
tion go between citizens and new-papers to a consuming culture where citizens 
passively absorb news without the possibility of answering back. 15 On the other hand, 
the growth of administrative and bureaucratic bodies coupled with the practices of 
public relations and opinion management shift the onus onto “non-public opinion” 
(specialized knowledges that are not shared but are aimed at the manipulation of and 
legitimation before the public), which severs the production of truth from civil society 
(the public discourse between rational citizens) to the state. Taken together, these two 
tendencies result in a displacement from “critical publicity” to “manipulative publicity” 
– in this “refeudalization”, the affairs of state are no longer subjected to the reason of 
the public.16 Thus, a genuine transformation of the public sphere is taking place where 
power shifts from the citizenry to a narrow group of powerful individuals.17  
 
[6] While it is apparent that the formulations of this problematique inherent in the trans-
formation of the public sphere were plentiful (the Dreyfus Affair would only be the 
most obvious), I shall dwell with only one, namely that of the Lippmann-Dewey debate 
because it apprehends the epistemological space of hyper-real politics which is opening 
before them, which makes a different set of questions conceivable.18 If anything, the 
debate illustrates the point in time when the concepts of the public critique, the state, 
and toleration are slowly dissolving under the pressures of technology and mass-
society. 
 In 1922, on the backdrop of the First World War and the creation of the League 
of Nations, Walter Lippmann wrote Public Opinion – a book that received much ac-
claim – and in 1925, The Phantom Public, which proved too grim in its view of the 
world for the general American reader. Lippmann started by exploring the epistemolog-
                                                
15 In Power Elite, C. Wright Mills notes how the classical democratic public was characterized by (1) the 
ratio between giver and receivers of opinion was not proportionally skewed towards to the former; (2) it 
was possible to answer back to an opinion giver without obstruction from informal structures of opinion 
leadership; (3) the formation of opinion was directly linked to the realization of social action; and (4) the 
public enjoyed relative autonomy from institutional authority. It is these characteristics that are under 
transformation. Mills, C. Wright. The Power Elite (Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 302-3 
16 Habermas, Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p. 201 
17 C. W. Mills differentiates between a classical democratic public, a totalitarian mass media, and a 
synthesis between the two, which he thinks is predominant in America in the 1950s; the question then 
becomes which model is predominant. To Mills, at least at the time, peer-to-peer conversations were 
more effective in shaping public opinion than mass media. See, ‘Mass Media and Public Opinion’, in 
Mills C. Wright. Power, Politics and People: Collected Essays of C. W. Mills, edited by Irving Louis 
Horowitz (Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 577-598 
18 For an overview see: Bybee, Carl. ‘Can Democracy Survive in the Post-factual Age?: A return to the 
Lippmann-Dewey debate about the politics of news’, in Journalism & Communication Monographs vol. 
1 (1) (1999): pp. 28-66 
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ical problem of the gap between real events and our experiences of them, which is 
mediated by mental pictures: “the real environment is altogether too big, too complex, 
and too fleeting for direct acquaintance.”19 Rather, “what each man does is based not on 
direct and certain knowledge, but on pictures made by himself or given to him.”20 That 
is, we do not directly know the world we inhabit; it is wholly mediated by mental repre-
sentations. These inner worlds of pictures with which we perceive the outside world, 
Lippmann terms a “pseudo-environment” and explains that they are comprised of 
manmade myths and fictions that provide us with maps that are wholly necessary to 
navigate in social existence: we live in the same world, but we are likely to believe and 
act as if there were different worlds. In other words, our actions are wholly dependent 
upon our pseudo-environment. Because of this gap between events and experience, our 
mental pictures are per definition always misleading, they are never finished and can 
always be more clear or nuanced. The process of adjustment that follows is limited by 
external and internal factors: thus, on the one hand we are limited by the inevitable 
prejudices and stereotypes given to us by our culture that colours our perception; on the 
other, Lippmann explains, we are limited by:  
 
the artificial censorship, the limitation of social contracts, the comparatively meagre time availa-
ble in each day for paying attention to public affairs, the distortion arising because events have 
to be compressed into very short messages, the difficulty of making a small vocabulary express a 
complicated world, and finally the fear of facing those facts which would seem to threaten the 
established routine of men’s lives.21  
 
Later, in Phantom Public, Lippmann would develop a more sophisticated Heraclitian 
position in which he held that we would always be at odds with the world, as problems 
emanating from the external and always changing world elude us. If the fractured nature 
of the public originates in these external and internal limitations, how then is communal 
action possible at all?  
 Public opinion, in so far as we can speak of one, Lippmann asserts, can be right-
fully said to only consist of those misleading pictures that groups of people and 
societies act upon.22 The public does not express its opinion, but rather aligns itself for 
or against an already articulated position on a given topic. There is no common or na-
tional will, no group mind or social purpose. Lipmann thus rejects traditional liberal 
political theory (to which the notion of vox populi, of the natural endowment where 
                                                
19 Lippmann, Walter. Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922), p. 16 
20 Ibid., p. 25 
21 Ibid., p. 30 
22 Lippmann, Public Opinion, p. 29 
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rational citizens come together to form a common will was so central) as it fails to deal 
with this complexity because it assumes that the rational individual is capable of perfec-
tively knowing the outside world. In practice, public opinion can only ever appear, 
Lippmann argues, by skilfully playing on the irrationality of man and the ambiguity of 
symbols – that is, as every political leaders know, public opinion has to be manufac-
tured by the technical use of symbols to produce an illusory yet effective common will. 
Lippmann terms this the “manufacture of consent” and asserts:  
 
The creation of consent is not a new art. It is a very old one which was supposed to have died out 
with the appearance of democracy. But if has not died out. It has, in fact, improved enormously 
in technic, because it is now based on analysis rather than rule of thumb. And so, as a result of 
psychological research, coupled with the modern means of communication, the practice of de-
mocracy has turned a corner. A revolution is taking place, infinitely more significant than any 
shifting of economic power.23 
 
Public opinion is the mobilization of force.24 Thus, when leaders claim to represent the 
public opinion, the “public” as such does not exist: public opinion is wholly manufac-
tured by special interest groups with advanced techniques to serve their interests. 
 It is not only because the press is organized as a business where advertisement is 
necessary since consumers are unwilling to pay the real costs of gathering quality in-
formation (a free press means that news are practically given away); or because of the 
relative nature of news where events are only newsworthy when they truly stand apart 
from the general background of happenings in the world; but also because of an episte-
mological distance between news and truth that modern mass communication media 
(whether in the form of print, radio, or television) fail to produce a genuine public opin-
ion which can guide communal action. As Lippmann points out: “news and truth are not 
the same thing, and must be clearly distinguished. The function of news is to signalize 
an event, the function of truth is to bring to light the hidden facts, to set them into rela-
tion with each other, and make a picture of reality on which men can act.”25 It is only 
those rare points of disinterested social conditions that require little knowledge to com-
prehend that bodies of truth and news overlap. The journalist does not, in contrast to the 
scientist, have special access to truth. Yet, Lippmann observes that the press has slowly 
become the main actor in the public sphere; it has, in the absence of well-functioning 
                                                
23 Lippmann, Public Opinion, p. 248. For a further and perhaps more famous elaboration of the concept 
today, see: Chomsky, Noam and Edward S Herman. Manufactured Consent: The Political Economy of 
Mass-Media (Pantheon Books, 1988) 
24 Lippmann suggests that we are only now coming to grips with what these new innovations in the art of 
persuasion will change the way in which we think about the political game and its premises. Ibid.,  
pp. 248-9 
25 Ibid., p. 358 
Hyper-real Politics 
 198 
institutions, falsely become the vital organ of direct democracy: “The Court of Public 
Opinion, open day and night, is to down the law for everything all the time.”26 The 
Press, Lippmann explains: 
 
is too frail to carry the whole burden of popular sovereignty, to supply spontaneously the truth 
which democrats hoped was inborn. And when we expect it to supply such a body of truth we 
employ a misleading standard of judgement. We misunderstand the limited nature of news, the 
illimitable complexity of society; we overestimate our own endurance, public spirit and all-
round competence. We suppose an appetite for uninteresting truths which is not discovered by 
any honest analysis of our own tastes.27 
 
The problem, Lippmann argues, lies deeper than the functioning of the press: it lies in 
“the failure of self-governing people to transcend their casual experience and their 
prejudice, by inventing, creating, and organizing a machinery of knowledge.”28 The 
common citizen “lives I a world which he cannot see, does not understand, and is una-
ble to direct.” It is therefore impossible to “move him … with a good straight talk about 
service and civic duty, nor by waving a flag in his face, nor by sending a boy scout after 
him to make him vote.”29 The private citizen “gives but little of his time to public affair, 
has but a casual interest in facts and but a poor appetite for theory.”30 Thus, the problem 
is not with the press, but the conditions and foundations of the practice of public cri-
tique – its assumptions have through the experiences of mass-democracy been shown to 
falter and collapse: the critic whose omnicompetence and reason was flawed, the per-
petual construction of the state by a genuine vox populi, and the principle of toleration 
necessary for a smooth political game shown to be unrealistic in the face of divided 
special interest groups. 
 Having rejected the traditional theories of public opinion, Lippmann turns to-
wards (social) science to safeguard democracy from the challenges emanating from the 
complexities of the world. He envisions a “machinery of knowledge” – made up of 
social scientists working for the various agencies of government – that may ameliorate 
the “failures of self-governing people to transcend their casual experience and their 
prejudice.” In Public Opinion, Lippmann’s version of a realistic democracy thus rests 
on the ability of this new scientific aristocracy “neutral to their prejudice, and capable of 
overcoming subjectivism” to discern the truth about the world.31 For Lippmann, the 
                                                
26 Ibid., p. 363 
27 Ibid., p. 362 
28 Ibid., p. 365 
29 Lippmann, Walter. The Phantom Public (London: Transaction Publishers, 1991 [1927]), p. 4-5 
30 Ibid. p. 14-5 
31 Lippmann, Public Opinion, p. 396 
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point of democracy is not that everyone engages in self-government (how could they 
ever achieve this in the modern world) but to realize the “good life”. He therefore does 
not see this elitism as an enemy of democracy, but rather a necessary measure to save it. 
Yet, when in The Phantom Public from 1925, Lippmann rejected Newtonian and Dar-
winian science (that because it is based on metaphysics of certainty that makes 
knowledge of universal and unalterable truth possible) and started to explore the epis-
temological space of uncertainty that opened up because of the advancements in 
quantum physics, he stood in awe: science, he now believed, could no more than the 
mass communication media produce a public opinion that could face up to the world 
and he thus restrained himself to only talking about the “neutralization of arbitrary 
force” by “workable adjustment” as the only way to deal with the challenges to the 
social body.32  
 In response to Lippmann’s two books, John Dewey published in 1927 the Public 
and its Problems where he talked about the “eclipse” of the public: “the public is so 
bewildered that it cannot find itself.”33 Yet, while he recognized the false basis of tradi-
tional political theory, he did not agree that the public as such did not exist. Thus, he 
attempted to conceptualize the public differently by merging the concepts of public and 
state: “the public is a political state,” it is an organization of associations between peo-
ple that takes the form of a state.34 Only an externality (a communal problem) can call 
the public into being: “Indirect, extensive, enduring and serious consequences of con-
joint and interacting behaviour call a public into existence having a common interest in 
controlling these consequences.”35 Thus, there is an inherent democratic nature of hu-
man experience that cannot not be swatted because we will always form communities 
(which does not amount to public critique). Yet, in the “machine age” – in that new age 
of human relationships in which the proliferation of associations and impersonal rela-
                                                
32 Lippmann, The Phantom Public, p. 57 
33 Dewey, John. The Public and its Problems (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012), p. 108. Prior 
to this, Dewey had written two reviews of Lippmann’s books – The Public and its Problems was an 
attempt to elaborate on the points raised in these. 
34 Ibid. p. 58. He explains: “The lasting, extensive and serious consequences of associated activity bring 
into existence a public. In itself it is unorganized and formless. By means of officials and their special 
powers it becomes a state. A public articulated and operating through representative officers is the state; 
there is no state without a government, but also there is none without the public.” p. 76. The epistemolog-
ical space that Dewey expands is – by focusing not on the facts of interpretation but on the fact of social 
association the state co-aligns with the public – even though Dewey discards a lot of political theories of 
the state his conception comes close to the ideals of […] “The State is pure myth” (p. 37). Dewey elabo-
rates this epistemological position in The Quest for Certainty: A study of the relation of knowledge and 
action (New York: Minton, Balch and company, 1929) where he distinguishes cognitive experience from 
aesthetic experience – as the dynamism between the two unfold historically, one aspect of experience 
overshadows the other. 
35 Dewey, The Public and its Problems, p. 109-110 
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tions reveal the ineptness of individualistic philosophy – Dewey maintains that the 
public is obscured because of the existence of too many diffused and scattered publics 
originating from the great many different problems, that are in the world, of too many 
different political parties with vested interests (that again claim the public opinion) and 
of the availability and variety of amusements and distractions that muddle and jam their 
smooth communication of the publics. The picture painted is a grim one: “Men feel that 
they are caught in the sweep of forces too vast to understand. Thought is brought to a 
standstill and action paralyzed.”36 Yet, it is not unsalvageable.37 The public, Dewey 
asserts, can only regain a sense of self with the perfection and improvement of commu-
nication – an achievement that is only attainable if scientific knowledge is presented in 
an artful manner, which is able to “break through the crust of conventionalized and 
routine consciousness.”38 In the end, Dewey still had hopes in the revitalisation of a 
truly democratic public; in no way did he grasp the degree to which its conditions were 
about to disappear.  
 Despite these insights on the politics of truth, the solution for both Lippmann 
and Dewey was to place the social sciences in a central role: where Lippmann initially 
formulated an elitist solution, that in Public Opinion would rely on scientific govern-
ment, he would later in Phantom Public display a great disbelief in science to provide 
the necessary guidance to govern society. 39 Dewey, in contrast, insisted on a democratic 
solution, where the public would only exist in so far as it was willing to engage with a 
particular problem.  
 What becomes clear from debate is that the practice of public critique is in 
crisis. As Lippmann’s central concept of “manufactured consent” is based on a currency 
of symbols rather than reason, it becomes clear that the basis for the smooth functioning 
of public critique does not exist: the dynamism that was supposed to exist between truth 
and power – between novel thought and politics – would suffer to the point of nonexist-
                                                
36 Ibid., pp. 114-5 
37 Because the public comes into being when a group of people are confronted with a problem it will 
always have the potential to re-form itself even when lose track of its self-interest and is eclipsed, it will 
never disappear or become a phantom. 
38 Ibid., p. 141. Dewey’s account is not a wholesale account of pure science: he remains critical towards 
the power and destructive potential of science and maintains that the value of science depends on its use 
application in human concerns not to them. See, p. 40 and pp. 135-137  
39 Drawing on Charles Peirce, Lippmann raged against the religious worship of scientific materialism. As 
he saw it, it was unable to fulfil human desires for truth: “When we say that something has been ex-
plained by science, we really mean only that our own curiosity is satisfied. [As science advances, it] does 
not yield a certain picture of anything which can be taken naively as a representation of reality, [but only] 
provisional dramatizations which are soon dissolved by the progress of science itself.” There is no formal 
limit to search for truth. See: Lippmann, Walter. A Preface to Morals (London: George Allen and Unwin 
ltd., 1929), pp. 129-131 
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ence. Dewey, on the other hand, would remain hopeful that the public could welcome 
the activity of thought, but much to his dislike, his hopes would be in vein. Neverthe-
less, whatever their hopes might have been, the epistemological space that was 
unfolding would have little room for the kind of democratization of knowledge (as 
opposed to scientification) that Dewey and Lippmann were concerned with; rather the 
bandwidth of this space was severely narrowed to the point where the democratization 
of thought was withdrawn. Although both were sensitive and critical to the social forces 
that pushed their inquiry Lippmann would stand in fearful awe of the space that was 
expanding before him without a clear remedy while Dewey would prove to be a more 
fortitudinous guide for future travellers. The social forces of early twentieth century 
pushed the socio-political conditions of thought over the “threshold of scientificity” – 
although it’s pundits would not realize the consequences of their actions.40 Thus, the 
Lippmann-Dewey debate might have ended with downplaying the role of science, but 
the social forces did not; and the politics of truth was displaced from the common man 
and restricted to the scientist – the final arbiter of reality.  
 
[7] The growing irrationalism of the emergent mass-society gave cause for concern for 
many writers.41 Mass-society was dangerous because it threatened and cast into doubt, 
as we have seen, the positives of public critique: reason, the state, and toleration. With 
the Russian revolution in 1917 and the Nazi takeover from 1933 and onwards, all these 
fears materialize in the danger of totalitarianism: when the critique surrenders to ideolo-
gy, it only engages in eternal rotation and is unable to discern the truth; simultaneously, 
the atomized public of mass-society is completely unreceptive to any form of critique. 
In there lies the theoretical problem; it is neither the case of hypocrisy on behalf of the 
critic nor of a hermeneutics of suspicion (seeks a deeper layer of explanation that has to 
be critiqued into existence), but ideology – the false representation of reality (true and 
false). If public critique has become ideological, how can it truthfully inform the people 
and free them from tutelage? Reason and critique after Hegel becomes ideological 
critique: Liberalism, Marxism, and Fascism are all guilty of the same error, but it is the 
latter two that pose the biggest and most immediate danger because of their swift trans-
formation into totalitarianism. Totalitarianism, like demagoguery and superstition, 
signals the collapse of power and truth into one another – in other words, it has a “spirit 
                                                
40 Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 187 
41 Le Bon, Gustave. The Crowd: A study of the Popular Mind (The Floating Press, 2009 [1896]); Gasset, 
Ortega y. The Revolt of the Masses (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1930); and Lederer, Emil. The 
State of the Masses: The Threat of the Classless Society (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1940) 
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of complete cynicism as regards truth” which is denied as exterior to politics.42 The 
dynamism between truth and politics dies out. To Voeglin, totalitarianism is a form of 
Neo-Gnosticism – Hitler is the reappearance of the wise king having waited in the wings 
of the historical scene for decades.43 Indeed, in Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism, 
we find that it is a danger that emanates wholly within the Western tradition of 
thought.44 Totalitarianism as a kind of modern sophism is not merely about winning the 
argument at the expense of truth, but instead demands a lasting victory over reality 
itself; the very factuality of history – the totality of human events and not just their 
interpretation – is at stake.45  
 In the added chapter from 1958 in Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Gov-
ernment, Arendt asks whether there is such a thing as totalitarian government, as 
distinguished from other forms of tyranny and despotism? There is: its principle of 
action is terror, its nature is found in ideology, and its basic experience is loneliness.  
 1. Terror. Totalitarianism interprets all laws as laws of movement, laws of 
race struggle, and laws of class domination. In presiding over society, terror claims 
neither wisdom nor justice, but only that it is the realization of a law of a supra-human 
force such as nature or history. As such, terror is not the lawlessness of tyrannies but 
lawfulness: “Terror is the realization of the law of movement; its chief aim is to make it 
possible for the force of nature or of history to race freely through mankind, unhindered 
by any spontaneous human action.”46 Terror establishes the socio-political limit of 
thought in totalitarianism in the realization of movement – there is no room for anything 
else, there is only the truth of the terror. The principle of terror is Solzhenitsyn’s princi-
ple: it is not because everything is done in secrecy and with the aid of deceptions, but 
because everyone knows – it is the truth of terror that freezes action.47  
 2. Ideology. Ideologies have a pseudo-scientific character (although its logy 
– logoi would indicate otherwise); they apply the logic of a single idea to the explana-
tion of history. They thus impose the strait jacket of logic upon their followers – not as 
                                                
42 Hayek, F. A. The Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 167. This is in particularly visible 
with totalitarian propaganda which is “destructive of all morals because [it] undermine[s] … the founda-
tions of all morals, the sense of and the respect for truth.” p. 159 
43 Voeglin, Eric. Hitler and the Germans, in Maurice P. Hogan. The Collected Works of Eric Voeglin: in 
34 Volumes (University of Missouri Press, 2001) 
44 On this point see especially the end of part II where internal and external dangers to political communi-
ty are discussed, Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism (Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 391-6.  
45 Ibid., p. 11 
46 Ibid., p. 610 
47 “Terror is precisely governmentality in the naked, cynical, obscene state. In terror it is the truth and not 
the lie that immobilizes.” Foucault Michel. On the Government of the Living – Lectures at the Collège De 
France, 1979-1980, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 15-6 
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the control of thinking, but as the singular mover of thought (one determines form, the 
other content). There are totalitarian elements within all ideological thinking: they are 
first oriented towards the motion of history and the explanation of becoming (not be-
ing), which they claim to explain in its totality (past, present, and future). Secondly, by 
doing so, they claim to emancipate thought from experience and reality for which they 
have no need (once in power, ideologies overturn the order of reality into realization). 
Third, since this is in principle impossible, according to Arendt, ideologies proceed by a 
method of demonstration: “Ideological thinking orders facts into an absolutely logical 
procedure which starts from an axiomatically accepted premise, deducing everything 
else from it; that it, it proceeds with a consistency that exists nowhere in the realm of 
reality.”48 It is out of the fear of self-contradiction that the original idea is abandoned in 
favour of the logical process that could be developed from it: “the tyranny of logicality 
begins with the mind’s submission to logic as a never-ending process, on which man 
relies in order to engender his thoughts. By submission, he surrenders his inner freedom 
as he surrenders his freedom of movement when he bows down to an outward tyrant. 
Freedom as an inner capacity of man is identical with the capacity to begin, just as 
freedom as a political reality is identical with a space of movement between men.”49 It 
is this space – the space in which the possibility of different thoughts exists – that van-
ished when ideologies come to total domination. 
 3. Loneliness. It is in here, at the mercy of the tyranny of logicality, that the 
basic experience of loneliness resides. This is not the isolation and powerlessness in 
relation to the realm of political life that we find in traditional tyrannies (in these politi-
cal contracts there were always left some degree of private space), but the loneliness 
that involves the whole of human life. Neither is it a kind of solitude where there still is 
a possibility of both thought and a return. Like Kafka’s protagonist K in The Trial, this 
atomized individual, isolated and without normal social relationships, is confronted by 
an impenetrable and alienating world that it cannot hope to understand.50  What makes 
loneliness so agonizing is that “[s]elf and world, capacity for thought and experience are 
                                                
48 Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 619. Arendt has earlier explained that “what convinces masses 
are not facts, and not even invented facts, but only the consistency of the system of which they are pre-
sumably part” (p. 460) and thus the masses escape the fortuitousness of reality only if propaganda is able 
to sustain a consistent fiction.  
49 The ideal subject for totalitarian rule, writes Arendt, is that person ”for whom the distinction between 
fact and fiction (i.e. the reality of experience) and the distinction between true and false (i.e. the standards 
of thought) no longer exist.” Ibid., p. 622 
50 See discussion Ibid., pp. 407-427 
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lost at the same time.”51 The only kind of thinking that is possible in a state of loneli-
ness, because it needs neither self nor other or experience for that matter, is logical 
reasoning. By the beginning of the twentieth century, mass-society had made the atom-
ized and individualized subject an everyday experience ripe for the tyranny of logicality 
totalitarian movements; if mass society had not created this kind of loneliness, the basis 
for ideologies to develop into totalitarianism would not have existed.  
 
[8] From the middle of the 19th century, it is possible to identify a growing faith in the 
ability of science to govern society. Lippmann’s proposal of scientific government was 
nothing new, it had been one of the main ideas driving the nineteenths century and the 
rise of Modernity. A precursor can be found in the physiocratic idea that if politics were 
guided by the rules of evidence, it would not be the struggle for power, but the things 
themselves (i.e. the world) that would governed. After the revolution was over, Henri de 
Saint-Simon claimed that it was time to start imposing scientific conclusions on society 
by law. The “government of men” must give way to the “administration of things” he 
stated: “In the present state of enlightenment, the country no longer needs to be gov-
erned, but to be administered as cheaply as possible; now, it is only in industry that one 
can learn to administer cheaply.”52 Later, the student of Saint-Simon, August Comte, 
elaborates these ideas into an all-encompassing project for the development of society.53 
Similar ideas also found their expression in the utilitarianism of Bentham and Helvetius 
and in the Marxism of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Taking a less ideological approach, the 
most extreme proponents of scientific government would be formulated in the logical 
positivism of the Vienna Circle. In the Wissenschatliche Weltauffassung, they laid out a 
scientific conception of the world and claim that “the scientific world-conception knows 
no unsolvable riddle. Clarification of the traditional philosophical problems leads us 
partly to unmask them as pseudo-problems, and partly to transform them into empirical 
problems and thereby subject them to the judgment of experimental science.”54  
 There are more moderate or reflective proponents as well. To Russell, “scientific 
society” was caught between two tendencies: on the one hand it drove technological 
advancement that could discern the truth of the world, and on the other free spirit of 
                                                
51 Ibid., p. 627 
52 Saint-Simon, quoted in Foucault, On the Government of the Living, p. 24 
53 Comte, August. A General View of Positivism, translated by Bridges, J.H. (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009) 
54 Hahn, Hans, Otto Neurath, and Rudolf Carnap. ‘The Scientific Conception of the World. The Vienna 
Circle 1929’, in Sarkar, Sahotra, ed., The Emergence of Logical Empiricism: from 1900 to the Vienna 
Circle (New York: Garland Publishing, 1996) pp. 321–340 
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science which was based on a doctrine of fallibility.55 Although it was not without its 
dangers, the attraction of scientific society for Russell was that it provided an escape 
from the real-politics of national? states. Later, Popper would advance similar ideas in 
the Open Society and Its Enemies, where the scientific, or rather open society would be 
one in which disputes would be addressed through the mediator of science. Scientific 
government becomes a kind of piecemeal social engineering, in contrast to the utopian 
kind of Plato. Popper applies the principle of falsification to society: “The piecemeal 
engineer will, accordingly, adopt the method of searching for, and fighting against, the 
greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather than searching for, and fighting for, its 
greatest ultimate good.”56 The legitimacy of social engineering, for Popper thus rests on 
the same principles of science. His description of the scientific process was that it rests 
on public criticism, the scientific community works by sharing and criticising each 
other’s work. The concern is not only with the place of science in the public discourse, 
but also with the purification and health of science itself: the scientific community, if it 
were to be of any use to the open society, needed to be cleansed of political interest. 
That much is clear from Popper’s critique of the sociology of knowledge, which he 
claims is an instance of “historicism” that leads straight to totalitarian society.57  
 At the core of scientific government is the belief in the ability of science to 
discern a factual reality. Indeed, it is the ability of science to delineate factual reality 
that legitimizes the interventions of scientific government. The desire to rid science of 
political concerns, however, is where the notion of scientific government starts to be-
come problematic. The only way science that can become non-political is by either an 
agreement on metaphysics or banishment of metaphysical questions. (The politics of 
science is a difficult question, which I unfortunately will not have room to discuss here). 
While the agreement on metaphysics would amount to a quasi-prohibition against 
thought (as there would be no possibility of changing positives), in the (positivist) 
rejection of metaphysics however, science denies the existence of its own metaphysical 
presuppositions. Thus, it rejects the interrogation of metaphysics only to posit its own 
discourse beyond reproach. Now, it is important to point out that this is not the case for 
                                                
55 It is not possible to go through Russell’s many writings on the problems of scientific society, but see: 
Russell, Bertrand. The Impact of Science on Society (New York: AMS Press, 1953), The Scientific Out-
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Routledge, 2010) 
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the practice of science in and by itself; it is only the attempt to install science as the 
master of the politics of truth that I am here criticising.  
III 
[9] As I pointed out earlier, all epistemological spaces are erected and sustained by 
social forces – there is a will behind them. The epistemological space of hyper-real 
politics is no exceptions: the interplay of the social forces, the masses, the elites, and the 
technological developments, which both enjoy, establishes the epistemological field 
upon which a post-factual society may grow: where the problem of the problem of truth 
is solved by simulation and simulacra; the problem of political order in thinkable in 
terms of the masses (or cybernetics system); and the problems associated with the polit-
ical game are dealt with in terms of the spectacle. It is, much like Hobbes proclaimed 
four hundred years earlier, the unintended consequences of scientific government, and 
like Bousset who kept on writing as if the power was still at the court of the king. We 
too, express a reluctance to recognise this new epistemological space presented to us. 
But why is that?  
 From the nineteenth century till now scientism – the belief that science is the 
only mode of knowledge capable of truly comprehending the world – has played an 
increasingly important role in shaping society. To Voegelin, scientism amount to the 
“reductionist theory that all reality should be knowable by the methods of the natural 
sciences (especially mathematical, quantitative method). Tends to involve the expecta-
tion of control of man through scientific knowledge and technique.”58 Scientism is a 
political project as much as it is scientific. To Voegelin scientism has succeeded in 
building an alliance between science and social power that be. Accordingly, the scien-
tific breakthroughs like those of the Einstein and quantum physicist will have no social 
effects: “The damage of scientism is done.”59 Yet, at the same time scientism is a whol-
ly liberal phenomenon: that totalitarianism deploys a scientific discourse is all too 
obvious – Nazism naturalness of racism and for Stalinism history – but as soon as it 
obtains power it discards it.60 Scientism can therefore only survive in liberal societies, 
where it acts as a kind of total ideology. 
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59 Ibid., p. 463 
60 See: Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, pp. 451-454 
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 The dynamic that establishes hyper-real politics can be described as the catalyst 
of scientism. That is, scientism produces hyper-reality and thereby the experience of 
post-factual society, more than bullshitting or lying, exactly because it combines the 
success of science with the dogmatism of realism it produces vast amounts of truth (that 
is, experiences of truth, or moments of truth). Post-factual society is less about lying 
than about a world saturated with facts: the overproduction of facts and truth to the 
point where they no longer matter or have any bearing on our lives. To be more specif-
ic, the catalyst of scientism is what occurs when a new hierarchy is between philosophy 
and science is established. While it is true that thought is inherently disorderly and 
disruptive, the solution of scientism is to subjugate it to scientific methods; thought has 
to not only be scientific, it also has to restrict itself to contending with factual reality 
only.61 Thought is no longer able to overthrow or overturn what counts as true – only 
factual reality counts as true. There have been many critiques of this mode of thought 
from when it was first proposed. Kant was the first to warn against the superstition of 
the fact as it robs thought of its freedom. In The Crisis of European Sciences Husserl 
worried that “merely fact-minded sciences make merely fact-minded people.”62 Thus, 
the problem with scientism is that in its distain for philosophy and thought, fails to 
recognize the epistemological space it extends. 
 It is perhaps fitting to understand the result of scientism as what Baudrillard 
refers to as “the height of reality.”63 The hyper-real is not the loss of reality – of truth or 
knowledge – at the expense of the malevolent forces of politics. It is rather the “height 
of reality” a manifestation of our scientific achievements: “We labour under the illusion 
that it is the real we lack the most but actually, reality is at its height. By our technical 
exploits, we have reached such a degree of reality and objectivity that we might even 
speak of an excess of reality, which leaves us far more anxious and disconnected than 
the lack of it. That we could at least make up for with utopianism and imagination, 
whereas there is neither compensation for – nor any alternative to – the excess of reali-
ty.”64 The oppositions, he adds: “Today, the world has become real beyond our wildest 
expectations. The real and the rational have been overturned by their very realization.”65 
Accordingly, the process is not one by which truth and politics are folded in upon each 
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other by the manipulation of propaganda, but rather a collapse of truth and politics 
which we are caught up in a way where all concepts are inverted or reversed: the true 
becomes the false, the false the true. 
 The epistemological space of hyper-real politics is a result of the clash between 
scientism and mass-society. It is characterised by the conviction of scientism and the 
relativism that comes with the indifference to contradictions of mass-society. 
 
[10] In hyper-real politics, truth is problematized as simulation. The closely related 
problems of simulation and simulacra have long received the attention of thought in the 
West – of which Plato account as outlined in Chapter III is the most influential.66 The 
question of the truth of simulation can only be posed in terms of what it attempts to 
simulate, that is, its likeness to an original. Yet, if we take the measure of truth to be a 
measure of comparison, then we will miss the hyper-real logic of simulation: that the 
simulation is out to convince us that it is better than the original. It is the doubling of the 
real in dual sense of both being a copy of the real and at the same time being better. 
Thus, the verisimilitude of simulation is therefore dependent on an altogether different 
set of characteristics. 
 1. The doubling of the real. The problem is a famous one; we know it from 
Borges’ fable about the map that covered the territory, from Eco visits to the wax muse-
ums and superman’s fortress of solitude, and from Baudrillard’s visits to Disneyland. 
Yet, it is perhaps easier to understand how this secondary layer, that is being spread all 
                                                
66 This powerful and versatile division has stuck for a great variety of reasons, none more so than as an 
eternal source of power, with our tradition of thought. On a easy note, illusions and simulacra have 
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mock the man that Prometheus moulded in clay as a simulacrum, a bad copy of God’s divine creation 
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like the Jewish Golem, an anthropomorphic magical being that was conjured up from clay and mud to 
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the simulacra is something dangerous, something which we need to fear as it constantly alters appearanc-
es. “Nothing is absolute reality; all is permitted” says the protagonist Hassan-i Sabbah in the novel 
Alamut, by Vladimir Bartol. Unmistakably, it would seem that this Platonic moralism permeates the 
whole of Western thought. 
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over the real world, is being ritualistically produced if we consider Boorstin’s concepts 
of a “pseudo-event” and the image. When Boorstin developed these concepts he saw 
both as rooted in our attitude towards the world: “By harbouring, nourishing, and ever 
enlarging our extravagant expectations we create the demand for the illusions with 
which we deceive ourselves.”67 That is, we have too high expectation in terms of the 
amount of novelty in the world and secondly we exaggerate our own power to mould it. 
“We have become so accustomed to our illusions that we mistake them for reality.” He 
states, “They are the world of our making: the world of the image”68 It is this synthetic 
novelty, flooding our experience that is called “pseudo-events” by Boorstin, that have 
the following characteristics: a pseudo event is not like a real event (i.e. an earthquake 
or some other natural occurrence that naturally draws people together in experience), it 
only “comes about because someone has planned, planted, or incited it.”69 The pseudo-
event is not spontaneous, but planned, like an interview (it involves planning and care-
ful execution). Secondly, there is no genuine or un-interested purpose behind the 
instigation of the event, there is only “immediate purpose of being reported or repro-
duced” – to be put in circulation and create derivatives. The question of newsworthiness 
takes precedence over reality because its success is measured not in terms of how accu-
rately it depicts reality, but how fast it spreads. Next: “Its relation to the underlying 
reality of the situation is ambiguous” – the question is not what happened but whether it 
really happened. Lastly, the pseudo-event is usually intended to be a self-fulfilling 
prophesy.  
 2. The logic of proximity and the loss of aura. The logic of proximity is as 
follows: by placing a copy next to a lesser reproduction of the original, it is possible to 
make the copy seem more real than the original. The effect is produced by two orders of 
fakes: the copy and the lesser copy, and the original completely removed. Eco encoun-
tered this logic many times in American waxwork museums: “So, in one museum after 
the other, the waxwork scene is compared to a reduced reproduction carved in wood, a 
nineteenth-century engraving, a modern tapestry, or a bronze, as the commenting voice 
insistently urges us to note the resemblance of the waxwork, and against such insuffi-
cient models, the waxwork, of course, wins.”70 The purpose of the reproduction is to 
free us from the desire of the original – to make us contend with the fake. This logic is 
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70 Eco, Umberto. Faith in Fakes: Travels in Hyperreality (London: Verso, 1998), p. 19  
Hyper-real Politics 
 210 
particularly applied in the medium of television where the commentator will be casted 
weaker depending on the interest that the network seeks to promote. But, if the reality of 
the fake can be amplified by a logic of proximity, then it is just as much because the 
“aura” of the original had been cast aside: while we used to think that truth shines bright 
(the inherent truth-value of reality), it’s light is now diminished by the shear force of 
sensual discharge that we have become capable of. In The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction, Walter Benjamin explores how works of art have lost their 
aura.71 While traditionally a work of art had in principle always been reproducible, it 
became possible at the beginning of the twentieth century to make technological repro-
ductions that gained the status of an independent artistic mode. Yet, “[e]ven with the 
most perfect reproduction, one thing stands out: the here and now of the work of art – 
its unique existence in the place where it is at the moment.”72 This is the context of a 
work of art – a context that can, as we have seen, be altered by proximity. Thus, in 
relation to technological reproduction, a work of art does not keep its authority: firstly 
because, “a technological reproduction is more autonomous, relative to the original, 
than one made by hand.” – and secondly, “it can also place the copy of the original in 
situations beyond the reach of the original itself.”73 Here Benjamin introduces the con-
cept of “aura” in relation to a work of art: “Reproductive technology, we might say in 
general terms, removes the thing reproduced from the realm of tradition. In making 
many copies of the reproduction, it substitutes for its unique incidence a multiplicity of 
incidences. And in allowing the reproduction to come closer to whatever situation the 
person apprehending it is in, it actualizes what is reproduced.”74 These two simultane-
ous processes of multiplication and actualization warp the work of art so that it loses 
aura. This loss of aura is not a point about reality, but about potentiality. of simulacra in 
hyper-real politics. Here, truth no longer possesses an aura and in effect truth is repro-
ducible everywhere: first in radio, then TV, and now the Internet.  
 3. Visualization. In hyper-real politics there is no longer a requirement for a 
particular orientation of thought (courage, piety, reason) as the real simply manifests 
itself through technical reproduction. “The much-vaunted ‘virtual reality’ is not so 
much a navigation through cyberspace of the networks. It is, first and foremost, the 
                                                
71 Benjamin, Walter. The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction (London: Penguin Books, 
2008) 
72 Ibid., p. 5 
73 Ibid., p. 6 
74 Ibid., p. 7 [italics in original] 
Tyrants of Truth 
 211 
amplification of the optical density of the appearances of the real world.”75 The way in 
which technology (technē) and realism have moved closer to each other and the way in 
which this alters out conception of truth, is a theme in itself.76 The realism of the medi-
um, only brought about by technical achievement, is superb at rendering something that 
would normally be inauthentic as completely authentic.77 Thus, one of the ways in 
which the lawlessness of thought has been dealt with is by equating thought with the 
visual: by saying “thought is a picture”, Wittgenstein equated the two. The real purpose 
of “picture-thinking” was of cause to render thought a system of signs. The photograph-
ic medium thus comes to play a particular disruptive role: again with McLuhan we 
could say that there is constantly the necessity to think how the medium dominates the 
message; or should we say thought, because it is the epistemological field that is domi-
nated by a kind of thinking where it is only legitimate to think in terms of the visually 
representable. Thought imposes a limit of visualization upon itself. When Umberto Eco 
set out to explore hyper-reality, he did it not with spectacular cases in mind – Pop art, 
Mickey Mouse, or Hollywood – but with photorealism, that more secret yet public side 
of American culture that proudly parades its two slogans “the real thing” and “more”. 
Hyper-reality is about conveying information, not authenticity (complete non-
engagement with the problem of authenticity); it therefore fabricates a reality that is not 
historical but visual: “everything looks real, and therefore it is real.”78 By that standard, 
the sensory orgies of modern cinema contain more truth than reality itself – blood never 
looks more real than on the screen. But what is cinematography, if not an illusion – the 
optical illusion of movement created by a series of images (simulacra). 
 If photorealism is complicit in the production of simulacrum and hyper-reality, 
why is it then that we buy so strongly into photo-realism? In Camera Lucida, Barthes 
outlines a phenomenology of the visual spectrum. The photography consists of three 
elements: The operator, the spectator, and the objects photographed (the image or eido-
lon “a kind of little simulacrum”) which Barthes calls the “spectrum” as it resonates 
with it being a spectacle.79 The crucial thing is not just how in photography the subject 
is transformed in object – how it changes our behaviour – but the degree to which this is 
perceived to be really true: “… every photography is somehow co-natural with its refer-
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ents [spectrum], I was rediscovering, overwhelmed by the truth of the image.” 80 This is 
because, explains Barthes, the photographic referent is a “necessarily real thing” placed 
before the optic lens of the camera and in contrast to painting and discourse; phenome-
nologically a photography is authentic and not merely a representation, we cannot deny 
that this object really has been there.81 The photograph is not merely something that is 
“is no longer”, but something that really “has been” – the latter being photography’s 
noeme. Accordingly, and without really noticing in what process we are engaged, we 
perceive “Every photograph [as] a certificate of presence” – the presence of reality, of 
truth. We are all like Barthes’ Photo-realist: “the realists, of whom I am one and of 
whom I was already one when I asserted that the Photograph was an image without 
code – even if, obviously certain codes do inflict our reading of it – the realist do not 
take the photograph for a “copy” of reality, but for an emanation of past reality: a mag-
ic, not an art.”82 The photography truly displays the magic of simulacra – a photography 
is really only laborious when it fakes. It is flat, a banality in the true sense because we 
cannot penetrate it and expose it as the simulacrum it really is: “I exhaust myself realiz-
ing that this-has-been; for anyone who holds a photograph in his hand, here is a 
fundamental belief, an ‘ur-doxa’ nothing can undo, unless you prove to me that this 
image is not a photograph.”83 Photography can only be tamed segregating it as an art 
form, or by plunging headfirst and with total commitment into its reality – with the 
former; its realism remains relative, with the latter absolute. With hyper-real politics, 
we have opted for the latter. 
 4. The digestion of other forms of discourse. There is no shortage of exam-
ples of how, in hyper-real politics, all previous practices of true-discourse are prone to 
being simulated. In fact, if they are even attempted with the outmost earnestness prac-
ticed within an epistemological space of hyper-reality, they succumb to the logic of 
hyper-real politics. All too easily, they become their opposites: the critic naturally be-
comes the hyper-critic (Baudrillard), the political advisor becomes the fanatic 
(Kissinger), the parrhēsiast becomes the demagogue (Trump). This is so because in 
hyper-real politics, the obviously synthetic, i.e. the inauthentic, becomes the very mark-
er of the authentic. Yet, the simulation of authenticity in hyper-reality will only ever 
appear as the inauthentic if viewed from the semblance of the original epistemological 
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space. In hyper-real politics, there is no difference: if all the conditions of these true-
discourses, the environment in which they made sense, are removed, then it is no longer 
possible to tell the genuine critic from false, vice from virtue, or courage from coward-
ice. As a consequence, it is no longer possible to turn back and reclaim these practices 
in any meaningful sense. 
 
[11] With the emergence of hyper-real politics, the traditional formulations of the prob-
lem of political order are displaced. That is, the social force of mass society constitutes 
a new problem complex for thought about political order: the concept of the masses. In 
the Shadow of Silent Majorities, Baudrillard attempts to capture the nature of the mass-
es. It is like a “statistical crystal ball,” that is “swirling with currents and flows,” much 
like the image of matter. As we know it from natural elements, it is just as hard to grasp 
for the imagination.84 The mass stands in defiance of social concepts like individuals, 
classes, or social relations in general; it is, Baudrillard tells us, “an in vacuo aggregation 
of individual particles, refuse of the social and of media impulses: an opaque nebula 
whose growing density absorbs all the surrounding energy and light rays, to collapse 
finally under its own weight. A black hole which engulfs the social.”85 Mass is therefore 
a peculiar and problematic concept for thought: the mass does not possess qualities, 
attributes, or referents – its most basic characteristic is its radical lack of definition, “It 
has no sociological ‘reality’. It has nothing to do with any real population, body or 
specific social aggregate.”86 A fact that sits hard with traditional political analysis is that 
without either law (written or remembered) or hierarchies, political order is dictated by 
the weight of the masses alone. Where in the past, political order was something that 
could be managed somehow, today it is out of our control. Two characteristics of the 
concept of masses deserve brief attention for their source of authority in cybernetics and 
the way in which they produce political order by silent majorities.  
 1. Cybernetics. How is it possible to think in terms of masses as opposed to 
other concepts of political order? One possible answer can be found in the epistemolog-
ical rupture of how modern science views the world. In the 1940es and 50es, the 
American mathematician Norbert Weiner published two books in which he explored the 
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concept of cybernetics as a way of viewing and understanding the world.87 In these two 
books, Weiner was interested in positing a new metaphysics of science; in particular in 
physics and chemistry, that replaces the Newtonian universe. He writes: “This revolu-
tion has had the effect that physics now no longer claims to deal with what will always 
happen [certainty], but rather with what will happen with an overwhelming probabil-
ity.”88 The key here was the concept of entropy, also known as ‘the arrow of history’. 
Weiner argues that statistical probability dictates that the universe of entropy is a uni-
verse in which “order is least probable, [and] chaos most probable.”89 In a universe 
where order is least probable and chaos most probable, human beings have to organize – 
they have to set up systems of control. Weiner says it like this:  
 
We are immersed in a life in which the world as a whole obeys the second law of thermodynam-
ics: confusion increases and order decreases. Yet, as we have seen, the second law of 
thermodynamics, while it may be a valid statement about the whole of a closed system, is defi-
nitely not valid concerning a non-isolated part of it. There are local and temporary islands of 
decreasing entropy in a world in which the entropy as a whole tends to increase, and the exist-
ence of these islands enables some of us to assert the existence of progress.90 
 
The concept of order in cybernetics is thus radically different from those in thēsmos or 
the divine right of kings, and particularly that of the state, where the power of the state 
is equal to that which the people gives it. Even so, cybernetics derives from the Greek 
word kubernētês – meaning ‘steersman’, the same Greek word from which we eventual-
ly derive our world ‘governor’. To Weiner, communication and control are classed 
together: that is, communication is a form of control (the channels for giving orders), 
and control a form of communication (the giving of orders). The limits of communica-
tion is the cybernetic system which consists of three components: first, the information 
being communicated; second, the difference between what is send and what is received 
caused by interference and noise; and third, the feedback loop which allows for correc-
tions and evolution of the system. 
 This is a general outlook of cybernetics and systems of control that can be seen 
throughout society and the physical universe. The brain is a cybernetic system, the 
animals on the savannah form a cybernetic system, the oceans, the planet, and off cause 
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the masses are all cybernetic systems.91 Any cybernetic system provides order in terms 
of code. A code is a means of conveying information, as such it determines what bits of 
information is allowed to pass and what is not.92 The code itself as a concept of order 
comes from biology (the genetic code of DNA orders the organism, determining its 
characteristics and its life). The ‘will’ and ‘call to order’ of the masses constantly has to 
be called into existence by asking it through statistical surveys, polls, and other tests.93 
When the order of the universe is found in code, the silent majorities that characterize 
the masses are but the algorithmic side product of communication bobbles, visible only 
through the crumb trail of data that they leave behind. In fact, their silence is completely 
paradoxical, “it isn’t a silence which does not speak, it is a silence which refuses to be 
spoken for in its name.”94 Anyone can claim to speak in their name; yet it is the masses 
that are in control. As Baudrillard poses the question: “Are the mass media on the side 
of power in the manipulation of the masses, or are they on the side of the masses in the 
liquidation of meaning, in the violence done to meaning and in the fascination that 
results? Is it the media which induce fascination in the masses, or is it the masses which 
divert the media into spectacle?”95 It is not the media, but the masses, that controls the 
means of communication. 
 2. The silent majorities. I have already noted how ‘the masses’ was an 
unclear concept when it first appeared, no doubt because it was Man that constituted the 
main focal point for modern thought. As such, it was a dangerous entity, one that, if 
thought through the concept of man, became the locus of the dark desires within him. 
With Nietzsche, we could say that the presence of the masses would mean the amplifi-
cation of the herd instincts. As a silent majority, the masses have a peculiar relationship 
to true-discourse in that only that which is already a part of the code (i.e. the sameness 
of truth) can be reincorporated. The external position that constitutes the ground upon 
which the confrontation of thought can be mobilized is disbanded. About the fruition of 
technological reproduction and its confrontation with the masse, the onus of critique has 
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reversed as written by Benjamin: “The conventional is enjoyed without criticism, the 
truly new is criticized with aversion.”96 The masses are truly hostile to novelty, they 
would much rather enjoy in distractions: “The audience is an examiner, but a distracted 
one.”97 Benjamin thereby downplays the role of contemplation, the demand for recep-
tion of new pieces of art requires only of us getting used to them. In that respect no one 
is exempt, even political correct culture display just as much unwillingness to consider 
other points of view as legitimate as those whom they are trying to combat; through 
‘intolerance’, the aim is to control discourse. 
 
[12] Where in the past there would be dunasteia or toleration, now the political game is 
problematized in thought as one of spectacle. That is, in hyper-real politics the problem 
of the political game is always tied to the concept of spectacle. We must be careful not 
to understand the spectacle as an occasional event, like the gladiator games in the an-
cient Rome, nor the horrific execution of a criminal designed to scare the populace 
during the Wars of Religion. By the spectacle, we should also understand more than the 
“manufactured public sphere” that Habermas talks about, although it is not entirely 
unrelated.98 In other words, the problem of spectacle is not purely a matter of elites 
exercising power over society by putting on displays of spectacle – even if this is the 
dominant way of framing the problem.99  
 The problem of the spectacle is not only about publicity. Rather, the problem of 
spectacle must be understood conjoined with the problem of order as cybernetics; in the 
same way as the codes of the silent majorities leaves nothing unaffected, the spectacle is 
something that permeates all social relations. Similar statements of the problem can find 
in Boorstin’s concept of the “pseudo-event” or McLuhan’s dictum the medium is the 
message, but in Guy Debord’s Society of the Spectacle, we learn that “life is presented 
as an immense accumulation of spectacles. Everything that was directly lived has reced-
ed into representation. […] The spectacle is not a collection of images; it is a social 
relation between people that is mediated by images.”100 Thus understood, the spectacle 
is the medium through which people experience reality: under such conditions, the 
political game becomes as spectacle as well, even if the parties involved in a conflict are 
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presented as irreconcilable antagonisms, they are actually a part of this same system.101 
There is nothing outside it and it treats everything else as if it was inside it. Thus, the 
spectacle produces truth in accordance with the logic simulation: “The spectacle, where 
the real world is replaced by a selection of images which are projected above it, yet 
which are at the same time succeed in making themselves regarded as the epitome of 
reality.”102 At the same time the spectacle is driven by the logic of images, appearances, 
and representations: an example would be terrorism, which displays a gruesome appe-
tite for the spectacular. Terrorism only works by creating images of terror, if it fails to 
do so it would be nothing but an empty murderous gesture. It is only through its absurd 
brutality that it can obtain an effect. Transposed to politics, what this means for our 
understanding of the political game is that it is exclusively about the creation and 
maintenance of images. The inflated personalities of movie stars, celebrities, and politi-
cians are all preoccupied with maintaining and projecting an image: harder, better, 
faster, stronger. Like the pseudo-event, they display nothing but “pseudo-
qualifications.”103 “Our politics, religion, news, athletics, education and commerce have 
been transformed into congenial adjuncts of show business, largely without protest or 
even much popular notice. The result is that we are a people on the verge of amusing 
ourselves to death,” as Niel Postman states in the aptly titled Amusing Ourselves to 
Death.104 In describing the logic of the spectacle, Eco compares politics to pro-
wrestling: “The virtue of all-in wrestling is that it is the spectacle of excess.” – “The 
public is completely uninterested in knowing whether the contest is rigged or not, and 
rightly so; it abandons itself to the primary virtue of the spectacle, which is to abolish 
all motives and all consequences: what matters is not what it thinks but what it sees.”105 
This is another way of saying that the public agrees not to think in exchange for being 
contend with the reality they are presented, regardless of how contradictory or banalized 
(as in treating fundamentally important questions as banalities) it has become. We are 
so accustomed to living with contradictions and paradoxes that they no longer bother us. 
Meanwhile the critique of mass-culture has become so popular that it itself is mass-
culture. It is only what can grab their attention that is allowed to subsist.  
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[13] In conclusion, I have in this chapter attempted to show how, through a series of 
transformations of the public sphere, the clash between the social forces involved in 
mass society and scientism have brought about hyper-real politics of truth – where the 
distinction between truth and untruth is vanishing because of the over-production of 
truth. Expressed in genealogical terms, it is by some historical accident that the hyper-
real politics of truth emerges from the clash between the social forces of scientism and 
mass society. It should be relatively clear why the discourse of post-truth politics is 
unhelpful in this situation: on the one hand, it can be affirmation of the conviction of 
scientism that it alone possesses the truth (the same goes for the opponents of science, 
but that would be nothing new); on the other hand, its instance on politics being a thea-
tre of appearance and nothing but power struggles gives credence to the political game 
as a spectacle.  
 In this present chaos, hyper-real politics has put a full-scale prohibition against 
thought – scientism institutes such prohibition by its denial of meta-physics and the 
invalidation of non-scientific truths while the silent majorities institute such a prohibi-
tion on the basis of non-tolerance and apathy for everything different or alien to its own 
code. It is here that we find the most troubling socio-political limit of thought in a poli-
tics of truth: between the over-production of factual reality and truth of scientism and 
the excessive appetite for the spectacle of the masses. For what are the active forces of 
thought to do in the face of the paradox of hyper-real politics? – an epistemological 
space held up by a belief in that the access to brute facts should naturally collapse, yet 
this is exactly what seems impossible or irrelevant in a mass-society accustomed to 
contradictions.  
 If there is something that most of the critics of hyper-real politics have in com-
mon, it is the pessimism about its demise. For Debord, “a critique seeking to go beyond 
the spectacle must know how to wait” for the end of capitalism.106 For Heidegger and 
Deleuze alike, we are waiting for the forces that can make thought active again – be 
they social or those of God. Let us therefore recall, as Baudrillard points out: “the value 
of thought lies not so much in its inevitable convergences with truth as in the immeas-
urable divergences which separate it from truth.”107 The question is this: “Why might 
there not be as many real worlds as imaginary ones? Why a single real world? Why 
such an exception? Truth to tell, the real world, among all the other possible ones, is 
unthinkable, except as dangerous superstition. We must break with it as critical thought 
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ones broke (in the name of the real) with religious superstition. Thinkers, one more 
effort!”108 Indeed, if this is the epistemological space, the tyrant of truth, in which 
thought is forced to test itself, then the only option left to us seems to be ‘radical 
thought’. For if, by its very success, critical thought culminated in hyper-reality, a kind 
of modern Oedipal patricide, then it will not provide us with the weapon necessary for 
the coming tyrannicide. Radical thought works in the opposite direction of critical 
thought: it is not aiming at objective reality, it does not seek to make the world more 
comprehensible and knowable, it does not possess the conviction of truth. Rather it 
“anagrammatizes, it dispenses concept and ideas and, by its reversible sequencing, takes 
account both of meaning and of the fundamental illusoriness of meaning.” 109 To leave 
the world with more than you received: “Cipher, do not decipher”, that is the motto of 
the radical thought.110  
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Conclusion: The Socio-Political  
 Limits of Thought 
*   *   * 
[1] In this thesis, I started by presenting the diagnosis of the present as I found it in the 
discourse of post-truth politics, in which we are told that contemporary politics is domi-
nated by a complete disregard for truth and truthfulness; in which emotions, alternative 
facts, and conspiracy theories are more important than evidence and rigorous scientific 
facts. Curiously, these themes were nothing new in the Western tradition of thought and 
had long been made, in what I termed the antinomy hypothesis, which holds that truth 
and politics are opposites, they are external to one another, where one exists the other 
disappear; truth is abstract and absolute on the one hand, and politics is a hostile realm 
of men where there is no room for truth on the other. On close inspection however, I 
argued, this antinomy hypothesis is self-contradictory: truth cannot be all-powerful and 
completely power-less at the same time; neither can politics be a realm without truth as 
it also contributes to what is (i.e. that which is true). Thus, it was reasonable to doubt 
some of the main claims of this discourse – in particular that post-truth politics is an 
established historical fact, the underlying rejection of a complex relationship between 
truth and politics, and that post-truth politics marks a decisive historical rupture. Never-
theless, while I did not want to reject that there has been an increase in lying and 
untruthfulness in politics, that conspiracy theories have entered mainstream political 
discourse, or a growing animosity and mistrust towards the political establishment and 
scientific community, I observed that in the present moment, Western societies has 
become insecure about one of its main terms, namely truth – and in particular it’s rela-
tionship to politics. By ascribing an absolute value to truth, I argued, the discourse of 
post-truth politics and the antinomy hypothesis are implicated in what they claims to 
criticise – it is by the realisation of this paradoxical thesis that it becomes impossible for 
it to see the conditions of its own possibility. 
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 Given this state of affairs, I sought to replace the antinomy hypothesis with a 
history of the politics of truth – in short, the struggle at the most general level of socie-
ty, where the true is separated from the false and where what gets to count as truth and 
reality is decided. As I argued in the introduction, the politics of truth establishes the 
socio-political limits of thought: how and by what practices is it possible for thought to 
test its own truth in politics? Here, I argued that the ultimate aim of the politics of truth 
was the transfiguration of these socio-political limits of thought. Thus, rather than en-
gaging in a debate about what truth is and whether it can exist in politics, I attempted to 
circumvent these questions of being by considering the becoming of the complex rela-
tionship between truth and politics in the politics of truth, as it has been constituted as a 
problem for thought in the Western tradition since ancient Greece. In all its simplicity, I 
asked the question, how did get here? By posing the meta-political question of how the 
politics of truth has been turned into a problem in thought more broadly, I hoped to 
discover how it had become possible to think with the utmost conviction that we now 
live in a post-factual society, one in which there is no longer room for truth in politics?  
 Nevertheless, for such a question to be addressed, it was necessary to formulate 
a social theory of how it becomes possible to think differently; that is, how and why the 
epistemological space of the un-thought changes. In the first chapter, I therefore at-
tempted to formulate such a theory based on the French school of Historical 
Epistemology, which would explain the historical development of epistemological 
space that delineates the politics of truth as a series of displacements of problems and 
practices, by how they have been problematized in thought. Taken together these prob-
lematisations establish an epistemological space with an inherent logic that constitutes 
the conditions of possibility for reflecting on these problems. In other words, I was 
interested in how practices were problematized in thought based on the confrontation 
with a practical problem. It is around these practical problems that I have attempted to 
show how the trajectory of the history of the politics of truth has taken shape. Accord-
ingly, I have attempted to write a history of the politics of truth on the basis of practical 
problems. 
 
[2] Throughout the thesis, I have approached the history of the politics of truth by the 
way it has been problematized in thought. In doing so, I followed the strategy of making 
the socio-political limits of thought visible by situating them within an epistemological 
space that is stretched out between three interrelated problems complexes: true-
discourses in politics, political order, and the political game. This was necessary to 
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outline general and distinguishable models for the politics of truth. Accordingly, to the 
general question: how should the difference between the true and the false be estab-
lished in politics? I have taken as the answer the problem of the politics of truth. When 
put in historical motion this answer was first by the wise king, then by parrhēsia, third 
by exhortation, fourth by public critique, and lastly by hyper-real politics. I will now go 
through them in turn.  
 In the second chapter, I started this history by considering how the archaic 
Greeks had come to problematize the politics of truth through the concept of parrhēsia 
– the practice of frank truth-telling. To show how this problematisation constituted a 
historical rupture, the chapter started with an examination of the model of the wise king. 
In this model, the politics of truth was a matter between the king and the gods decided 
by the practice of the oath, and all three problems of the epistemological space con-
verged in the figure of the king: it was only the king who would confront the gods with 
an oath, others he would expose to the ordeal. At the same time, political order was 
problematized as remembering the law (thēmos), and the political game was about 
exercising ones right to decide (dikazein). This model of the wise king was discussed as 
the practical problem of monarchos (the oppressive rule of one) in 7th and 6th century 
BC in Greece because the danger of the king passing crooked judgements was regarded 
too great.  
 The emergence of the juridical concept of dikainon instituted a split between 
truth and power that demanded a manifestation of truth and laws were written down. In 
many ways, this was a genuine epistemological break that set the Greeks definitively 
apart from other traditions of thought in the ancient world. This was accomplished by 
displacing the truth-discourse of the oath: instead of the parties swearing an oath to the 
gods, it would be the judge who swore to uphold the law. The ‘I judge’ of the law be-
came in a democracy the property of the free citizen who could make use of logos 
parrhēsia to persuade the demos of his truth. The politics of truth was thus problema-
tized in thought as the ethical differentiation displayed by those who sought to govern 
the poleis by the practice of parrhēsia. Yet, at the same time, the problem of parrhēsia 
was, in Greek thought, situated between the problem of the constitutional (politeia) 
guarantee of the freedom to speak what one genuinely saw as being true and the con-
stant problem of exercising power through a test of ability (dunasteia) in a political 
game of persuading others that one is actually speaking the truth. The socio-political 
limit of thought was thus governed by a principle of ethical differentiation where the 
limit of novel thought was constituted in the courage and persuasiveness of the individ-
Conclusion 
 223 
ual truth-teller. However, there was a constant danger in the possibility that parrhēsia 
itself opens up for: the bad parrhēsiast, the demagogue who makes use of his freedom 
to speak for his own gains rather than for the good of the poleis. Incidentally, this was 
the very problem that sparked the process of thought around the end of the Peloponne-
sian war when it was no longer possible to tell the difference. 
 The third chapter explored how the politics of truth was displaced from a demo-
cratic setting to an autocratic setting, a politics of truth I termed exhortation. The cause 
of this historical rupture, I argued, was to be found in the actualization of the danger of 
the demagogue. At the time, this was problematized in thought as a result of the para-
doxical demands for isēgoria and eleutheria. From Plato to Renaissance, the politics of 
truth was problematized in thought around the relationship between the philosophical 
counsellor and the king. Here, truth remained neither hidden, nor did it have to manifest 
itself through courage. Rather, truth resided in the good (agathos), and in the active 
relationship with an advisor (sumbouleuo), and through training (paideia), it was possi-
ble for the soul (psūke) to obtain knowledge of the truth. As the king was incapable of 
discovering the truth for himself (a continuation of the split between truth and power in 
the epistemological space delineated by parrhēsia), it was the relationship between the 
advisor and the king that was the attention of thought: together in a homologie, they 
would work towards obtaining the truth by confessing their thoughts. Nevertheless, the 
politics of truth that was elaborated around the concept of exhortation finds its two 
poles in Isocrates and the Socratic philosophers. I attempted to catch this tension be-
tween the two concepts of protrepsis and paraenesis, where the latter would appeal to 
tradition and the former would welcome the activity of thought. 
 This politics of truth was completely formalized in the literary genre of mirrors 
for princes: a genre with the essential thing being that the split between truth and power 
is maintained as the king can per definition not rule without someone to help him dis-
cover the truth about himself and what it means to be a king – a truth that God has 
hidden from him. The physicality of the mirror emphasises the divisional structure of 
the practice; it helps focus the problematisation on the soul of the king. Meanwhile, the 
concept of a naturally existing divine right (a elaboration and consequence of the notion 
of agathos) as the constitutional element came to dominate the thinking about the prob-
lem of political order, while the concept of court society, encapsulated in the image of 
the rota fortuna, focused around the chivalry, etiquette, and eloquence, came to define 
thought about the problem of the political game. These three problems were governed 
by a principle of virtue, where the socio-political limit of novel thought was established 
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as living up to a higher order of things. There was an ever-present danger of flattery 
(which concerned both the king and the advisor) which would plague thought for centu-
ries, yet it did not become terminal before the Reformation. 
 The fourth chapter demonstrates how the politics of truth was problematized in 
thought through the concept of public critique as a response to the growing forces of 
superstition during the 16th and 17th centuries. As the practice of exhortation became 
increasingly fanatical, and kings became tyrannical, the model of the mirror for princes 
started to break down and constitute a practical problem, as was found during the Wars 
of Religion and the spread of Absolutism. Thus, the realization of the danger of flattery 
called the practice of exhortation into question. The problem then taken up by thought 
was that of the public critique, which it problematized as an antagonistic field where the 
true-discourse of critique established the grounds for action rather than providing ad-
vice. The relationship between truth and politics was not to be decided in the 
confrontation amongst the power-wielding citizens of the first rank, nor in an exhorta-
tion to the king, but among men debating the merit of argument on an equal basis 
provided by reason. Accordingly, the problem of political order was addressed through 
the concept of the state, an entity separate from society created by men, providing con-
stitutional rights such as civil liberties and freedom of the press, while at the same time 
holding the right to infringe on these rights to keep order. At the same time, the problem 
toleration took on an increasingly important role in thought about the political game as 
religious movements diversified, and in the absence of immediate judgement, irrecon-
cilability would have to be tolerated. The socio-political limit of novel thought was thus 
constituted around the principle of reason as the sole possession of man, which would 
guide thought on all three sets of problems. However, as reason has a fleeting nature, 
even when it attempts to set it own limits in public, a reoccurring theme in Early Mod-
ern and Modern thought was that it was prone to unreason. Thus, man always lived in 
the danger of tutelage and had to make use of reason to avoid it. The danger was cri-
tique itself because it would always have a tendency to develop into hyper-critique, 
which no longer relied on reason but solely on unruliness of uninformed opinion or 
blatant ideology. 
 In the fifth chapter, I attempted to show how from the end of the 19th century 
and up until the present, a new epistemological space of hyper-real politics of truth has 
emerged. It explores how the logic of factual reality of scientific government, which 
seemed the only way of saving public critique from itself and the dangers of mass-
society, resulted in the overproduction of facts, effectively causing the emergence of 
Conclusion 
 225 
hyper-reality. I called this dynamic ‘the catalyst of scientism’. This epistemological 
space is characterized by the complete transformation into the political milieu of hyper-
reality where politics is enacted as more real than real. There is no real politics, only the 
mirage of it: the process of truth is ordered through the problem of simulation, where 
media and technology come to play a larger role in the production of truth. In a reality 
saturated with appearances, facts no longer matter: opinion-holders, a qualification that 
anyone and everyone may posses, therefore find it relatively easy to discard factual 
truth as just another opinion. Simultaneously, thought about political order becomes 
dominated by the problem of silent majorities (laws of statistical probability), visible 
only through big data. At the same time the problem of the spectacle takes up thought 
about the political game: only what can grab the attention of the masses will prevail in 
the politics of truth. Thus at the present, the politics of truth is problematized in thought 
as the relationship between a saturated reality of appearances, the changing desires of 
silent majorities, and the logicality of the spectacle. In this circular movement ordered 
by a principle of simulacrum, where the real is in the process of being replaced by its 
copy, there is no space for the difference of thought, only the positive mode of thought 
that affirms and produces more truth. 
 Nevertheless, it would be hard to deny that on the surface this seems an alto-
gether implausible history – in no way, whatsoever, does history display this kind of 
inconsistency or disruption. Nevertheless, a history situated at the level of the un-
thought would not consist in an interpretation of factual events, but rather in an episodic 
series of logically coherent epistemological spaces. Which is not to say that flattery 
would not be a practical problem for existing political leaders, or that the relationship 
between the state and critique does not inform political knowledge today, or again that 
the question of which citizens have the right to freedom of speech are not questions that 
are taken up for reflection today. At the surface of things, all these politics of truth 
appear to be part of the present, even if they remain at the margins. Thought is sedimen-
tary, which is why it is difficult to disentangle from the plethora of practices the origins 
or social forces at work in the present. Conversely, in so far as we consider the history 
of the politics of truth schematically, it consists in four historical ruptures between 
different epistemological spaces: first the politics of truth of the wise king would, be-
cause of his crooked judgements, be replaced by a democratic game of truth of the 
parrhēsiast; exhortation of the philosophical counsellor to the king would replace the 
parrhēsiast as he became a demagogue; as exhortation was unable to guard against 
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superstition and fanaticism, public critique would replace it; and as public critique by 
the forces of mass-society and scientism we arrive at hyper-real politics. 
 
Overview: Epistemological Spaces of the Politics of Truth 
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[3] From this genealogical series, it is clear that the problem of the politics of truth is a 
reoccurring challenge that has to be met; as in the past so too today. Thus, for a nostal-
gic interpretation of this history, an age of wise kings or frank democratic truth-tellers 
might seem preferable to our present, but one that would have to omit the social forces 
that resulted in these constellations becoming problematic. Likewise, a triumphalist 
interpretation of historical progress, focused on the ability of thought to overcome its 
obstacles and slowly emancipate the politics of truth from all its harmful tendencies, 
would have a hard time reconciling the parts hyper-real politics that are completely 
antithetical to it. Both refuse to take the paradoxical nature of thought serious and thus 
both seem wholly inadequate to answer this challenge.  
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Throughout this thesis I have attempted to show how the politics of truth is his-
torically constituted in a series of epistemological spaces shaped by the interplay of 
social forces; how a change in the constellation of social forces brings about a change in 
the politics of truth. Thus, if the wise king was displaced by the parrhēsiast, the 
parrhēsiast was displaced by the philosophical counsellor, the philosophical counsellor 
was displaced by the critic, and the critic was displaced by hyper-real politics, what 
social forces will be able to displace the problem of hyper-real politics, and who will 
thus once more be free to pose the question of the politics of truth? Any answer to such 
a question would have to grapple with the forces that have brought these ruptures about. 
In other words, erecting a new epistemological space is the essential task – thought 
needs to set new limits to what counts as true and false, while at the same time making 
room for the difference of thought. If the context of thought has always been prior 
thought, then in confronting the forces that propel it, thought must test its socio-political 
limit. In this thesis I have tried to excavate what we silently think as a first step towards 
freeing thought from the chains of prior thought.  
As I bring this thesis to a close I start to wonder, can this be done within a hy-
per-real epistemological space? What becomes of the socio-political limits of novel 
thought when the only possibility left is factual true-discourse, slowly disappearing 
under the pressure of its own paradoxical nature? What possibility is there then to think-
ing differently? How much truth does life really need? 
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